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ABSTRACT 
A common view of the British Labour Party's troubled relationship with 
Europe since the early nineteen sixties explains the changes in policy purely in terms 
of inter-party and intra-party competition. However, globally induced changes such as 
the disintegration of the Commonwealth along with the foundation and further 
development of the European Community have given rise to fundamental debates 
about identity. Accordingly, by delineating the nationalist arguments voiced by the 
party representatives during five crucial moments of the intra-party debate on Europe 
(1961-2,1967,1970-75,1980-83 and 1997-2000), this thesis points out that the 
European issue has been primarily an issue of national identity for the Labour Party, 
which, since its inception, has been embedded within the British culture. As a result, 
by placing the party's nationalism against the background of its intellectual traditions, 
this study argues that, what the different sides of the argument have exposed has not 
been merely partisan feuds, but, instead, three competing and interrelated narratives of 
British nationalism: the space of the nation (the imperial and the Atlantic links, the 
British isles and the Continent), the culture of the nation (constitution, Parliament, 
Protestantism, and the enduring values), and the time of the nation (war memories and 
memories and practice of a benevolent empire). These three narratives have been 
defined not only by their inter-relationships with each other, but have been also 
produced through a process of negation. They have been primarily defined against the 
`other': race and alien have constituted the conceptual partners of the British nation in 
the Labour Party's discourse. In particular, immigrants, European workers, asylum 
seekers, and their corresponding `different' cultural and temporal backgrounds have 
been some of the `significant others' that have conditioned the existence of Labour 
Britishness during the last forty years. 
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PART 1 
A BASIS FOR EXPLORING THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY'S 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Rationale of the Thesis 
The British Labour party has had a troubled relationship with Europe 
throughout the post-war period. Kevin Featherstone has remarked that, `few political 
parties have been troubled by questions concerned with European integration as much 
as the British Labour party' (Featherstone 1988,41). This troubled relationship can be 
graphically illustrated by a quick look at the six related changes in policy on Europe 
adopted by the Labour party between 1961 and 1997. 
First, during the Conservative Prime Minister Macmillan's first bid for 
British membership of the then Common Market (1961), the revisionist Labour 
leader, Hugh Gaitskell, attacked the move, defending `one thousand years of history', 
during the party conference at the Brighton ice rink in 1962: «A Federal Europe ... does 
mean the end of Britain as an independent European state... it means the end of a 
thousand years of history ... and it does mean the end of the 
Commonwealth» 
(Gaitskell 1962b, 159). Second, Gaitskell's successor, the left-winger Harold Wilson 
made the second application giving a qualified yes in 1966, though, as he said in the 
Commons, owe have our links based on history with the countries, old and new... (so) 
we have still a long way to go before we get a truly European unity)) (Wilson 1967b, 
col. 1094). Third, when in 1971, the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath 
managed to gain the consent of the House on the terms he secured for Britain's 
membership of the EC, it was only because of the support from the sixty-nine Labour 
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pro-European rebels led by Roy Jenkins who dismissed Gaitskell's and Wilson's 
imperial attachments and defied the already altered party policy by saying that «the 
Commonwealth can no longer give us a special role in the world» (Jenkins 1970,5). 
Fourth, during the referendum campaign in 1975, the Wilson government allowed 
disagreements within the cabinet and recommended the British public to vote for 
British membership stressing that «membership of the Common Market does not 
deprive us of our national identity» (HSMO 1975,11). Fifth, five years later, Jenkins 
and his pro-European colleagues abandoned Labour, and the party leader, Michael 
Foot, sought Britain's withdrawal from the EC: «You could perfectly well have an 
international policy without necessarily being a member of the Common Market» 
(Clark 1981,2; Foot 1982b, 83). Sixth, the election of the Labour government in May 
1997, led by Tony Blair, produced a positive rapprochement with Europe. New 
Labour's calls for a re-negotiation of Britain's relationship with Europe supplanted 
the previous intra-party tension, and appeared to be a new departure for the party. 
When confronted with the first challenge of his premiership in the Amsterdam Treaty 
negotiations in June 1997, Blair set out his vision of «a Europe of free, independent 
sovereign nations)) in which «in all the areas - tax, immigration, defence - the British 
national interest, the British veto, is secured» (Blair 1997b). 
Bearing in mind the above intra-party frictions and these `zigzags' 
(conditional no in 1962, qualified yes in 1966, no in 1971, yes in 1975, no in 1980, 
yes in 1997), what first attracted my interest was the existence of an ever-present 
subtext that the accompanying justifications of the opposing policies suggest. In 
particular, I wished to examine not the short-term motives of the party factions, which 
led to such policy inconsistencies, but, rather, the stable core of their beliefs in the 
nation-state as the aforementioned quotes reveal. In my contention, the different sides 
of the argument appeared to share more than they could possibly imagine. Despite 
their apparently partisan and policy differences, the anti-European biased Gaitskell's 
cry God for England and «a thousand years of history>> and Foot's Little Englander 
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«internationalism» on the one hand, and Jenkins' quest for «a special role)) for his 
country in the Continent and Blair's equally Europhile vision of a «Europe of separate 
identities)) (Blair 2000e), on the other hand, they seem to have in common an 
adherence to the nation-state and a mutual dislike of Britain being sucked into a 
European superstate. 
Following on from this central issue, three controversies arose which 
informed my research. First, why has a supposedly internationalist socialist party such 
as Labour sided with nationalist arguments? Are there any ideological, historical or 
cultural reasons that have prompted Labour to defend vigorously the privileges of the 
nation-state? Second, due to the constant changes in Labour policy, have all the 
ideological party factions shared one vision of Britishness during the European 
debates? If not, what have been the competing visions of nationhood that the different 
ideological fractions have espoused, and what does this tell us about the possible 
theoretical implications concerning the character of Labour nationalism? Finally, 
there is the centrality of Europe in the party's perception of the British nation. What 
makes Europe so special that Labour defined and continues to define its Britishness 
against her? 
Below, the literature review aims to address the aforementioned 
controversies by tackling the involved ambiguities. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Starting from the first issue, this introductory note argues that, in contrast 
with the bulk of the literature on the relationship between the British Labour party and 
Europe, the historic-political context in which the concept of national identity can be 
understood, the concept of national identity itself, and the party traditions which 
nurtured these nationalist beliefs, and, as a result, against which these webs of beliefs 
can be comprehended, appear crucial points before we begin to explore the British 
Labour party's view of British identity. 
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Accounts of the Labour party, which involve an interrogation of its national 
identity on the European question, are ignored by a significant section of the 
literature. The European question has received only a descriptive treatment by many 
scholars whose research interests are confined to the party decision-making process 
and balance of power and the conventions of the British political system. There are 
two distinct strands of literature on this subject: the first strand attributes Labour's 
European policies to the issue of inter- and intra-party politics; the second strand 
explains Labour's European policy in terms of the debate over the legitimacy of the 
British state. 
The first strand of literature assumes that the adversarial nature of British 
politics is one of the major factors in Labour's response to the European question 
during the major part of the post-war period. For example, Nigel Ashford argues that 
the convention of adversarial politics is for the opposition parties to oppose the 
policies of the government, even while behaviour in government may reflect a high 
degree of continuity. This was seen in Labour's opposition to Europe in 1962,1971 
and 1980: any movement towards integration was used as a weapon by the opposition 
to attack the incumbent government (Ashford 1992,119). 
Similarly, Michael Newman in his Socialism and European Unity has 
asserted that pragmatic politics played a major role in the reorientation of policy. For 
instance, he said that, in the early seventies, because the EEC issue appeared to 
provide the only major opportunity to bring down the Heath Government before its 
term of office expired, enormous pressure was exerted on the pro-Marketeers to 
subordinate their enthusiasm for the EEC to the domestic political struggle (Newman 
1983,222). Likewise, the Europeanisation of the party in the late eighties is also 
attributed to the character of British politics. Andrew Geddes maintains that for 
Labour the effects of four successive general election defeats and, more recently, the 
adversarial political advantage to be gained from a pro-European stance when the 
Conservatives were suffering bitter divisions over the issue, may have helped prompt 
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a pro-EC stance (Geddes 1994,374). In addition, Daniels underlines the domestic 
political context in shaping Labour's strategy and asserts that the Europeanisation of 
the party may be seen as a response to its long exclusion from national office (Daniels 
1998,79). 
Moreover, the European question has been also seen as an issue of party 
management and internal balance of power. Tudor Jones has said that the party 
controversy over the European policy reflected not only deeply held differences over 
the European issue but also the configuration of power within the party during the 
early seventies (Jones 1996,99). 
Similarly, J. R. Robins in his classic work on the tumultuous period of the 
European debate in the sixties and seventies, links the adversarial nature of British 
politics with the intra-party struggle between the ideological factions. In Robins's 
account, the first consideration in party policy was the internal struggle between the 
fundamentalist and revisionist wings of the party to win support from the centre of the 
party and thereby influence policy. The second consideration had to do with policy- 
making and the accompanying problems of party management (Robins 1979,7) 
Official policy had much more to do than face the specific problems that it was 
directed towards. For example, the party leader was forced into supporting a particular 
position in order to placate a cabal of senior colleagues. At the same time, the party in 
the Parliament and in the country had to be satisfied and maintained as an electoral 
coalition. The leader might frequently be concerned with maximising party unity in 
circumstances where the level of consensus on policy issues might be low. Often the 
demands of party management, Robins alleged, pulled the leadership in different 
directions and to be successful, deft political conjuring or precisely calculated 
ambiguity was required to gratify at one and the same time as many of the rival 
cliques as possible (Robins ibid, 8). 
The shattered morale after the Clause N and defence policy battles reduced 
the European issue to a matter of political manoeuvres at the beginning of the 
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European debates in the early sixties. The EEC provided Gaitskell in 1962 with a 
balm for the party, providing it did not develop into an issue demanding a clear choice 
one way or another. Gaitskell moved from a relatively uncommitted position 
regarding EEC membership, to emotional opposition at conference, and back to a 
more moderate position in the parliamentary party. This erratic behaviour can be 
explained, in Robins' view, in terms of short-term tactical moves by Gaitskell to win 
unity in various Labour fora in anticipation that these inconsistent stands would not 
catch up with him since the issue would never materialise (Robins ibid, 41). 
It is argued that, from Gaitskell's five conditions with their subtle nuances, to 
the disintegration of that approach into its distinctive strands in 1970-1, Labour's 
decision on the issue of principle had been one of no decision. According to Robins, 
this strategy was rational for a party that invariably suffered from conflict over major 
issues such as party constitution, defence and trade union rights. Party leaders saw 
obvious advantages for avoiding conflict until such time as a real choice was available 
on Britain's entry into the EEC. In the seventies, it is argued, Wilson's prime concern 
was that EEC policy should be fashioned so as to cause minimum damage to the 
fabric of the party. His management is claimed to have kept the party intact, with the 
exception of the disillusioned revisionists, and the party quickly ceased feuding and, 
still leaving the principle of Europeanism undecided, headed for a position promising 
unity on the platform of renegotiating the terms of entry. Finally, it was deemed that 
the advantage of holding a referendum, as far as the party managers were concerned, 
was that it made the EEC conflict largely external to the party (Robins ibid, 128). 
In the same vein, Rosamond, citing Gaitskell's 1962 party conference speech 
and Wilson's elusive posture and innovative use of the referendum, argued that 
Labour's attitude to the EC has tended to be influenced more by contemporary 
debates and intra-party trends than by a considered view of the merits of European 
integration (Rosamond 1990,41). 
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Similarly, Bilski's account of the Labour left shows how the latter utilised 
Europe as a launch pad for its attempt to achieve control of the party from the early 
seventies (Bilski 1977). She has stressed that the Common Market issue provided the 
arena for a power struggle not only between the two major parties, but also between 
the rival factions within each party. Her attention focused particularly on the influence 
of the Common Market issue on the formation of groups within the Labour party. The 
nature of these groups, the degree to which they corresponded to the traditional 
Left/Right continuum, shifts of power among them and the overall effects of the 
Common Market issue on the character of the Labour party in the 1970s, are some of 
the issues discussed in Bilski's study (Bilski ibid, 307). She argued that when the 
party was in opposition, the power of the backbenchers, the rank and file, the trade 
unions and the conference became stronger, whereas when the party was in power, the 
tendency was usually towards an ideological compromise around which the party 
could unite. In other words, when in opposition, the ideological differences became 
much more acute, while in power, a compromise was necessary to enable the 
government to function (Bilski ibid, 308). 
Likewise, Geyer and Daniels saw the fluctuations of Labour party policy in 
terms of the rise and fall of pro- and anti-Europeans within the party (Geyer 1992; 
Daniels 1998). Like the previous accounts on Labour's European policy, both have 
claimed that attitudes towards Europe within Labour party became entangled with 
intra-party factional conflicts over the control and ideological direction of the party 
(Daniels 1998,74). For instance, it is argued that Kinnock's acceptance of the 
European Community and its social policy was a way of weakening the hard Left 
within the party and indirectly strengthening his own internal reforms (Geyer 1992, 
23). 
However, as we shall see, these attempts to explain Labour party policy on 
Europe purely in terms of inter-party and intra-party competition, are not wholly 
convincing, since they overlook the enduring belief structure within the party with 
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regard to the British nation. The second strand of literature has linked the party's 
policy with the contested legitimacy of the British state. 
For example, Stephen Tindale suggests that to assume that the changes in the 
party's attitudes in seventies and eighties can be explained simply by the rise and fall 
of the Bennite left is an oversimplification (Tindale 1992,276). Probably the most 
significant factor, he claimed, was the recognition that the belief in the nation state's 
legitimacy was weakening (Tindale ibid, 185). Indeed, Andrew Geddes claims that 
Labour's changed European stance on the issue of sovereignty has had a strong 
domestic impetus centred around a growing discontent about the British constitution, 
which has prompted the promulgation of a reform agenda, by groups such as Charter 
88 calling for constitutional reform. Questioning the constitutional status quo has 
made it easier to accept the ceding of powers to supranational authorities (Geddes 
ibid, 375). Similarly, Russell Holden's study on New Labour tells us that Europe 
became more than an issue of party management and played the role of mainspring 
for promoting the change urgently required for party renewal, in that it provided both 
a context and a primer for change in which the strength and viability of the nation- 
state were being questioned (Holden 1999b, 104). 
However, the previous studies cannot explain the persistent nationalism 
among the main party representatives throughout all these years. The legitimacy crisis 
of British state did not lead to disaffection with the British nation. For New labour, 
the exaltation of the nation and its symbols is the essence of its pro-European case. 
By adopting purely descriptive approaches, therefore, neither of the first two 
strands of literature has been able to establish a dialectical process of interchange 
between the party beliefs and the national culture. The Labour party's views on 
Europe have been seen as a reactive formation either to the interior balance of power 
in the party, or to the issue of constitutional reform. The fault of those explanations is 
that they failed to realise that the policies of the Labour party cannot be studied 
fruitfully in isolation from its own beliefs and traditions in relation to the British 
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nation. This thesis will show that the European policy of the party is largely shaped by 
its national considerations and beliefs. After all, Geoffrey Foote has portrayed the 
party as a «particularly British institutiom (Foote 1997,5 & 13). In fact, Foote has 
claimed that one of the fundamental labourist tenets of the Labour party has been its 
loyalty to the nation state: «The liberal internationalism which was to be so strong in 
the Labour party was always based on adherence and loyal obedience to the nation 
state. Any threat to that loyalty, as posed in their very different ways by revolutionary 
Leninism and by the European integrationism, could find no real home in a labourist 
party )> (Foote 1997,12). 
Tom Naim's perspective on the European policy of the Labour party has 
been put along these lines (Nairn 1971,1972a & b). For him, the European question 
has had to do more with the real nature of the Labour party than with Europe itself. 
Nairn has provided us with the seminal beliefs and traditions of Labour nationalism 
through an exploration of the relationship between concepts of nation and class. In his 
view, the British Labour party appears as more of a national-minded political 
organisation than a class-conscious political movement; an assertion shared by several 
scholars of Labour history (Miliband 1964; Howell 1980,273; Jones and Keating 
1985; Wallace 1989; Elliott 1993,181; Hutton 1995; Marquand 1995b; Kenny and 
Smith 1997). The subordination of the sectional interests of the labour movement to 
the national/imperial interests of the late nineteenth century has been the core of his 
argument (Nairn 1971,22; 1972a, 41; 1972b, 43; 1972c). In The European Problem, 
Nairn demonstrates how the working-class was nationalised, jumping on the 
bandwagon of imperialism: `Labour party's infancy coincided with the definitive 
victory of liberal imperialism', Nairn wrote (Nairn 1972a, 57). `The working class', 
he continued, `was politically integrated into the nation when the latter was most 
confused with Empire, and when the Empire had the most effective ideological 
camouflage at its disposal' (Nairn 1972a, 58). From the outset, consequently, 
Labourist nationalism took on this strong `internationalist' coloration. The latter 
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proved the perfect moral legitimisation of national sentiment: it set the seal of 
conscience upon that pragmatic acceptance of the old nation-state to which Labour 
was borne by its close alliance with the Liberal party and its evolutionist philosophy 
(Nairn 1972a, 59). This is an internationalism, Nairn notes, whose special rootedness 
in Labourism arose from the fact of imperialism (Nairn 1972a, 59). 
Several other scholars of the party's European policy, drawing on Naim's 
analysis, have shifted the focus of the debate from the sterile assumptions about party 
management and the nature of British politics and, instead, linked Labour beliefs 
about Europe with concerns about national sovereignty (Featherstone 1981 a&b; 
1988; Rosamond 1990; Jones and Keating 1985; Grahl and Teague 1988; Pilkington 
1995; George and Heythome 1996). This thesis broadly endorses the scope of this 
approach, even though its arguments are not restricted to the issue of national 
sovereignty. 
However, Michael Newman has partially challenged Nairn's case. In his 
Socialism and European Unity he said that the claim that hostility to Europe 
necessarily stems from nationalism is oversimplified, and that the negative attitudes 
exhibited by some of the left are too complex to be labelled with this single term 
(Newman 1983, xii). Newman asserts that the European attitude and policies of the 
left can be fully explained in terms of their adherence to neither national interests nor 
socialism. Rather they must be seen as the product of a complex and variable 
interaction between the two (Newman ibid, xiv). 
Yet, Newman attributes nationalism only to those who took an anti-European 
stance, whereas we have seen that the pro-Europeans have also adopted the nationalist 
rhetoric, because even for them, the nation-state is more important than any 
transnational association in the international arena. As Nairn has noted, "even fervent 
Europeanists still regularly transmitted surreal notions on how good it would be for 
the Continent to have lessons in democracy from the Mother of Parliaments. The fact 
is that neither side in the debate relaxed its grip on the udders of island 
11 
constitutionalism for a moment" (Nairn 1977,54). Moreover, when Newman puts 
forward the socialist case, what he actually means is the preservation of parliamentary 
sovereignty for the implementation of socialist planning - even though, he notes, there 
has been a very marked tendency within the Labour party for such socialist beliefs to 
be expressed in a chauvinist manner and for a potentially socialist argument against 
West European integration to be subsumed by a traditional nationalistic campaign 
(Newman ibid, 274). 
Although Newman fails to undermine Nairn's argument, Nairn's analysis 
does have three weaknesses. For one thing, Nairn's analysis was published almost 
thirty years ago and requires updating in order to accommodate the elements of 
Labour nationhood that have appeared in the following years. Apart from the three 
applications for British membership of the EC, the debates of the early eighties, which 
coincided with the imperial adventure in the South Atlantic, this thesis also examines 
New Labour's view of Britishness, which appears to re-define the party's view of 
national identity. The focus of this study therefore is not narrowly confined to the 
imperial context of the sixties but also embraces the European context of the nineties. 
Second, imperialism has not been the only vision, which affected the nationalist 
thinking of the party. Little Englanderism and Europeanism were also of prime 
concern for the intellectual forebears and pressure groups of the party such as the 
Fabian Society, the ethical Independent Labour party and, to a lesser extent, the 
Marxist Social Democratic Federation (Webb 1975; Wainwright 1989; Hassan 1995; 
Foote 1997; Gordon 1969; Jones and Keating 1985; Gott 1989; Howe 1989; Ward 
1998; Andrews 1995; Marquand 1995b; 1998; Beer 1998; Minion 1999). This thesis 
takes all these traditions into account in order to explain the nationalist beliefs of the 
various ideological party camps. For instance, since its inception, the Fabian Society, 
perhaps the most important pressure group of the party, became the forum in which 
imperialism, Little Englanderism and Europeanism found expression in varying 
degrees each of them. In the same way, during its first steps the ILP nurtured an 
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insular radicalism whereas in the post-war period, already disaffiliated from the party 
(1932) and in terminal decline, despite its pacifist vision of a United Europe of 
Socialist States, at the end, favoured the `functional', inter-governmental, approach to 
the European problem -a vision adopted by all the subsequent party leaderships. 
Turning now to the second controversy, the previous comments imply that 
one should look at more than one vision of nationhood within a political organisation 
with apparently diverse spatial, historical and cultural attachments. 
In fact, the spatial element of Labour nationhood has been mainly associated 
with arguments over national sovereignty as embodied in three overlapping types: the 
imperialist vision of `Britain rules the waves'; the isolationist `defence of the island' 
vision of `Little Englanderism'; and the pro-European `Britain in Europe as a leading 
partner' have all maintained that each nation better serves its own interests within its 
own territory. The space of the nation emerges as the most important element of 
Labour Britishness. For some scholars, it is perhaps the most salient aspect of the 
conceptions of `nation' (Cohen 1994; Miller 1995,23; Smith 1995,111; Guibernau 
1996,47). That is why it constitutes the main part of thesis and around which the other 
two aspects of nationhood (culture and time) revolve, as will become clear below. 
Nevertheless, despite its centrality in the definition of Labour Britishness, the 
space of the nation is defined by both cultural and temporal elements in the same way 
that the time element integrates space and culture. As it is argued in the next chapter, 
dichotomous classifications of nationalisms such as ethnic/civic appear inadequate to 
encapsulate the wholeness of the party's perception of national identity. In reality, few 
modern national states possess only one form of nationalism; in most states the two 
types overlap (Kershen 1998,2). 
As a consequence, the culture of the nation, consisting of symbols and 
historical shared ways of life such as Protestantism, Houses of Parliament, Ancient 
Constitution, enduring Values, and the time of Labour nationhood as shared 
possession in the form of war memories (Britain's `finest hour') and as a journey to 
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perfection in the form of development either in the imperial or, more recently, the 
European context (as `citizenship capacity' and `modernisation' respectively) overlap 
and define the spatial element. Yet, it is not just the interrelationship of its three 
elements that defines Labour nationhood. 
In this thesis, national identity cannot be defined without the `other'. The 
analysis of nationalist discourse cannot be confined to nation and state institutions. 
Labour nationhood is understood as a relationship. Labour Britishness is a matter of 
boundary negotiation and construction against the `other'. Labour Britishness can be 
understood only as a relationship between nation and the `other' - imperial dominions 
and continental states, `traditional' societies and Western nations. The effects of 
global politics within the imperial or European contexts have defied the limits of the 
British nation-state. The interdependence of `national' and `alien' emerges as the 
crucial precondition in our endeavour to look at the party's view of national identity. 
As it is argued in chapter 2, the definition of nationalism given in this thesis takes us 
beyond the accounts of the modernist paradigm of state-building and national 
development, and consists of those practices, which create and maintain boundaries 
between those who belong to the nation-state and those who lie outside its confines. 
`Alien' and `race' are the conceptual partners of nation. Balibar explains that `the 
discourses of race and nation are never far apart' (Balibar 1991 a, 37). They are 
relational terms, interdependent and inseparable in nationalist practice. 
Here lies the third weakness of Nairn's approach. As will become clear in the 
next chapter, because of Nairn's narrow definition of racism («racism is the symptom 
of an absence of popular nationalism among the English)) (Nairn 1977,294), he failed 
to explore the Labour conception of national identity adequately. That is, he ignored 
the racial implications of the spatial, cultural and temporal components of its 
nationhood. The latter become understood within the inter-relationship between the 
local and the global. 
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Indeed - turning to the third controversy which concerns the centrality of 
Europe in the party's perception of the British nation - one of the major issues that 
most previous scholars failed to address, and subsequently led them to a very 
superficial treatment of the European question, is the context in which one makes 
sense of the idea of national identity. It should be made clear from the beginning that 
the examination of Labour nationhood can be possible only within a wider canvas 
than the narrow one of the British nation-state. As Kate Manzo notes, throughout 
British history, debates about identity have been most evident during periods of 
globally induced change - transformations occasioned by wars against France and 
later Germany; by the administration of the British Empire and its subsequent 
transformation into a Commonwealth; and, highly relevant to this thesis, by the 
formation of the European Economic Community, which evolved into the European 
Community (Manzo 1996,113). 
As a matter of fact, apart from its historical identity, Britain's political 
culture and the specificity of its ancient political regime, Richard Heffernan has 
pointed out that Labour's post-war Euro-scepticism also reflected the country's 
established geopolitical worldview (Heffernan 2000,397). After 1945, the Empire- 
Commonwealth aside, Britain saw itself as far more Atlanticist than it was European; 
and for its part Labour most certainly did as well. In addition, the impact of economic 
and political globalisation and the internationalisation of decision-taking along with 
the pursuit of national interests and preferences through interstate bargaining 
conducted within European institutions appear as some of the most notable reasons 
for the Europeanisation of New Labour in the 1990s (Heffernan 2001,182). In both 
cases, the global context has influenced the way Labour saw Britain in the European 
context. 
In this way, Labour nationalism only becomes understood when situated 
within a larger historical and political context than that of the nation state. 
Nationalism inevitably involves a mixture of the particular and the universal (Billig 
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1995,83). The Commonwealth on the one hand, and Europe on the other, have 
provided this historical and political context. The dissolution of the former and the 
formation of the latter equally posed a challenge to British boundaries. As a result, the 
changing nature of the British nation-state highlighted concerns about `who' belongs 
`where'. Hall has noted that `identity comes to the fore when there are doubts about 
belonging' (Kershen 1998,2). As the debates on the immigration and asylum reveal, 
the construction of racial differences (in character, customs, language, and social 
standards) between the British nation and their Commonwealth and European 
counterparts that set them apart, underlines the fact that geographical, spatial 
separation goes hand in hand with cultural distinctiveness. Those people who cannot 
conform to the above cultural standards (Protestantism, Houses of Parliament, 
enduring values) have been considered un-British, whereas, the absence from memory 
(war memories, memories of Empire) inscribes alienness and inferiority. In this sense, 
space further overlaps with the cultural and temporal components producing thus a 
less `pure' Labour nationhood. 
This last failure of Nairn's was not unique to him; on the contrary, especially 
in relation to the race concept, the Labour literature as a whole has shown little 
interest. The little that has been published has treated race as an immutable biological 
construct and is confined to a particular context, focused usually on black 
immigration from the New Commonwealth. Different interpretations have been given 
to explain the shift from the Labour party's open door policy on New Commonwealth 
to the highly restrictive position adopted in the sixties. Economic needs (Saggar 
1993), a hostile public opinion (Katznelson 1973; Messina 1989; Leyton-Henry and 
Rich 1986), a wavering political leadership (Foot 1965; Gupta 1975; Saggar 1993) 
and lack of commitment to traditional ideological credos (Hiro 1971; Ben-Tovim and 
Gabriel 1982; Reeves 1983; Howe 1989) were some of the interpretations given for 
the changing climate of political debate about race in the sixties and seventies. 
16 
But it is far too simplistic to see Labour as a reactive instrument of either 
economic forces or popular pressures in relation to the control of immigration, as the 
more recent restrictive immigration policies have also revealed. This thesis makes 
clear that nation and race concepts are units of structure, which draw on specific 
patterns of culture and history. As the chapter 2 will make evident, race is primarily a 
political concept constructed in relation to a field of other concepts such as culture, 
class, gender, ethnicity, nation and discursive or extra-discursive practices upon 
which the Labour party draws to sustain the character and identity of British society. 
1.3 The Methodological Approach 
The work, which follows, is based upon an empirical analysis and a 
diachronic interpretation of suitable archival deposits. Whereas the empirical analysis 
is perfectly suitable for the historical aspect of this thesis, why then do we need a 
diachronic treatment of our material? Narratives emerge from traditions of political 
thought. In the same way, as Benedict Anderson has noted «nationalism has to be 
understood with large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which it came into 
being» (Anderson 1991). As seen above, in order to examine the various narratives of 
nation that figured in the Labour party's discourse on Europe we need first to relate 
their nationalist beliefs to the intellectual traditions of Labour in which they were 
developed. 
All our beliefs and actions emerge against the background of a political 
tradition or a set of theories. The latter provide the explanatory framework that enable 
us to describe better these beliefs and concepts (Marquand 1988; Bevir 1996). Samuel 
Beer has also noted that political traditions with their values, beliefs and emotional 
symbols remain one of the variables determining the behaviour of individuals, groups 
and parties (Beer 1971,3). Traditions are contingent, constantly evolving, necessarily 
in a historical context. Traditions emerge out of specific instances and the relations 
between them. The instances that make up a tradition must have passed from 
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generation to generation. They must encompass relationships as they develop over 
time with each case the starting point for later cases; for example, traditions include 
beliefs and practices relayed from teacher to pupil. Moreover, because traditions are 
not fixed and static, we cannot identify or construct instances by comparing them with 
the key features of the tradition. Traditions are the product of the ways in which 
people develop ideas and practices. We can only identify any given tradition by 
tracing the appropriate historical connections back through time (Marquand 1988,2 & 
12; Bevir and Rhodes 1998,98). 
Traditions in turn consist of theories. Theories explain discourses or facts by 
postulating significant relationships - parallels, overlaps, and distinctions - between 
them. In this study, a discourse acquires its particular character from its relationship to 
the other discourses that fix its content. Theories reveal the particular character of a 
discourse by uncovering its relationship to these other discourses that locate it in time 
and space and thereby define the preconditions of its unfolding. Of course, just as 
theories reveal the particular character of discourses, so they often help to define the 
way we regard the discourse. Theories do not reveal pre-given discourses; rather, they 
create the character of facts and even guide our decisions as to what should count as a 
discourse. Thus, we cannot say simply that such and such a theory does or does not fit 
the discourses or facts. All we can do is to compare bundles of theories in terms of 
their ability to relate innumerable facts to one another by highlighting pertinent 
similarities and differences, and continuities and disjunction (Bevir 1999a, 93). 
In this thesis, our theories on nationalism and racism reveal the particular 
senses of nation and race which here appeared in Labour discourse across time and 
space since the early sixties in the European debate. Our concern is that these theories 
should cover a wide range of discourses from different sides of the party. As Bevir 
maintains, a comprehensive web of theories covers a wide range of discourses and 
bring them together from different areas, some of which we previously had not related 
to one another (Bevir 1999a, 102). In this way, my endeavour is to reveal particular 
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relationships, such as overlaps and parallels, between representatives of different 
traditions who share common beliefs in the British nation. I also make clear that 
Labour nationhood is composed of overlapping elements that intersect with each other 
and are derived from different ideological positions. So, our theoretical background - 
see chapter 2- should provide a map, questions, and a language for the analysis of 
Labour nationalist discourse. 
How we understand the Labour view of Britishness depends, therefore, on 
the particular party traditions and the theories of nationalism and racism with which 
they are connected. 
1.4 Source Material 
In this thesis, discourse refers to a collection of statements. Discourses and 
statements are constructed and registered in texts. Empirical analysis of suitable 
archival deposits forms the backbone of this project. Two criteria are used in the 
selection of texts for analysis in this thesis. Firstly, they must deal with issues, which 
have a bearing on national identity, that is, nation and race, and secondly, they must 
have something to do with the Labour party and the European debates. 
Most of the material is drawn from five crucial moments of the intra-party 
debate on Europe. The first three (1961-2,1967,1970-75) refer to the three 
applications for British membership of the EC, the 1975 referendum and the debates 
over the immigration Acts; the fourth (1980-83) refers to one of the most turbulent 
periods of the party history in which, among others, Labour put aside its 
internationalist credentials by seeking Britain's withdrawal from the EC and backing 
the Conservative government's handling of the Falklands war, finally, the fifth 
turning-point of the party's relationship with Europe refers to the Europeanisation 
period in the 1990s, and especially the Europeanism of the Blair-led New Labour 
government. Although Neil Kinnock and John Smith paved the way for Labour's 
contemporary unmistakable Europeanism, as has been suggested, the election in May 
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1997 of the Labour government headed by Tony Blair marked a significant shift in the 
dominant discourses and rhetorics of British politics over the European Union 
(Painter 2000,229). Blair sought to differentiate `New Labour' sharply from his 
predecessor's unco-operative and narrowly nationalistic approach to European affairs 
while, as will become clear, being careful to emphasise the importance of protecting 
what he calls `national interest'. The issue of the asylum shows how the debate over 
Europe continues to be framed by the discourse of sovereignty. 
Labour statements may be official policy statements, or they may occur in 
parliamentary debates, or in conference speeches or newspaper and magazine articles. 
Most of the texts examined were culled from the archives of the Labour party. Clearly 
not all statements carry equal weight, and official declarations of policy and intent are 
distinguished from other statements, and from political action. 
1.5 Chapter Outlines 
The thesis is divided into five parts. Part 1 is consisted of two chapters: 
having taken into consideration the questions and concerns outlined in this 
introductory chapter, in what follows, the second chapter provides an overview of the 
theories on national identity in which race has been a constitutive element of nation, 
and breaks down the main themes of Labour Britishness - space, culture and time. 
Having analysed the relational character of Labour nationalism (national 
identity in `otherness'), Part 2 examines the space of the nation in three separate 
chapters (3-5). Each chapter is devoted to a different vision of spatial nationhood: the 
imperialist vision; the insular Little Englanderism of the 1970s and early 1980s; and 
the Europeanism of the 1990s. In each case, the nationalist argumentation is examined 
against the background of the beliefs expressed within the intellectual traditions and 
pressure groups of the party. In parallel with the nationalist argumentation each 
chapter makes an analysis of its racialist implications as have emerged in the debates 
on the immigration and the asylum. 
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The third part (chapters 6-8), considering the culture of the nation, looks into 
the relationship of three overlapping `border guards' - Protestantism, Houses of 
Parliament, and enduring values - to constructions of racial difference in Labour 
nationalism. The isolation of cultures conditions the preservation of the national 
context of each race across time. 
The fourth part (chapters 9-10) looks at the time of Labour nationhood as 
possession of common memories (memories of war and memories of a benevolent 
Empire). 
Finally, the fifth part (chapter 11) makes a synthesis of the elements of the 
complex and variable nature of Labour Britishness, indicates the future policy 
implications of New Labour's Euronationalism and suggests further research 
directions emerging from this work. 
1.6 Conclusion 
In short, this thesis goes beyond descriptive accounts of the European policy 
of the British Labour party and places particular emphasis on its underlying 
nationalist and racist dispositions. The European question has not been confined either 
to inter and intra-party competition or to the considerations surrounding the 
legitimacy of the British state, as some strands of the literature suggest; instead, I 
argue that the party's discourse on Europe is a matter of national identity which is 
explored in a wider context than that of the nation-state, and whose salient elements - 
space, time and culture - are engaged in a complex relationship. For this reason, 
Labour's discourse on Europe is examined against the party's intellectual traditions 
and related theoretical frameworks on nationalism and racism. As the following 
chapter makes clear, nationalism's conceptual partners are not simply nation and state 
institutions. They are also race and alien that intersect with nation in a particular 
spatio-temporal context. 
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CHAPTER2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss issues arising from the question of national identity, 
nationalism and racism, to enable us to address adequately the multi-dimensional 
character of Labour Britishness on the European question. There are three arguments 
developed in the following three sections. First, I assert that the definition of 
nationalism is not monolithic and pure (2.2). In any society, and even in a political 
party, there is a variety of nationalisms. Second, I argue that nationalism cannot be 
defined without the `other', the alien (2.3). The attainment of nationhood presupposes 
practice, and most often, exclusionary activity against the stranger. And, thirdly, I 
maintain that a look at the competing meanings of race reveals their continued hold on 
the three main themes of nationalism, that is, space, culture and time (2.4). The 
emergence of new racism or `cultural' racism in the post-war years came to affirm the 
social, and not just, biological determination of race (2.5). 
2.2 Competing Nationalisms: In Search of Purism 
Despite gaining relatively little attention from social psychologists, national 
identity is the most powerful social identity an individual might adopt (Tajfel 1978). 
Yet, its nebulous nature has meant that there is no agreement among academics on the 
basic question of how the nation and national identity can be best defined, prompting 
scholars to produce overlapping or competing accounts of the nation. However, we 
can usefully distinguish two broad forms of nationalism: civic and ethnic nationalisms. 
These have found expression under various terms in several works: subjective and 
objective (Keilas 1998), civic and ethnic (Alter 1989; Brubaker 1992; Hobsbawm 
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1990; Greenfeld 1992; Ignatieff 1994; Smith 1991; 1995), political and cultural 
(Hutchinson 1987), voluntarist and organic (Kohn 1967). 
Let us begin with ethnic nationalism, i. e., the idea that the concept of national 
identity should be conflated with that of ethnic identity. In Connor's words, for 
example, the nation can be seen as `a self-aware ethnic group' (Connor 1978,388). On 
this view, nationalism is an irrational, primordial force, `an attachment to one's 
people' and arises in ethnic groups, which claim common origins of blood (Connor 
1993,385). According to this approach, one can best understand the power and 
intensity of national allegiances, as modem manifestations of a phenomenon that has 
existed throughout history and across the world, namely the phenomenon of ethnicity. 
Alter comments on the elements of the pre-political community: 
«The spirit of community that obtains in a cultural nation is 
founded upon seemingly objective criteria such as common 
heritage and language, a distinct area of settlement, religion, 
culture and history, and does not need to be mediated by a 
national state or other political form. Consciousness of unity, 
the sense of belonging together, develops independent of 
the state)) (Alter 1989,15). 
Plamenatz and Kohn contend that the ethnic definition of the nation has been 
predominant in Central and Eastern Europe where it has given rise to exclusivist 
nationalisms (Plamenatz 1976; Kohn 1967). Fichte was one of the first writers to offer 
a coherent ethnic account of the nation, arguing that individuals owe their identity to 
the nation and culture into which they are born (Reiss 1955). His was an organic and 
deterministic nationalism defining the nation as an ethnically and culturally 
homogeneous group, superior to the state and the individual. The nation is a natural 
social unit, linking man with his forefathers and has language as its key external 
feature. The maintenance of ethnic unity and the cultural superiority of the German 
Volk was Fichte's paramount objective. To achieve this he advocated national self- 
sufficiency and a closed nation-state. 
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The ethnic definition of the nation is not though confined to Central Europe: 
one of the major expressions of ethnic nationalism was the integral nationalism of 
Barres and Maurras in the late nineteenth century France (Soucy 1972). Again the 
nation is a pre-political community, defined in ethnic and cultural terms. The 
individual owes his identity to the nation, and the nation is to be purged of alien 
elements: `Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture' 
(Gellner 1983,7). The ethnic nation tends to produce exclusivist, anti-pluralist and 
anti-democratic nationalisms which propagate myths of dead heroes and a golden age 
of authoritarian rule. In short, it is the nationalism of intolerant bigots (Billig 1995, 
47). 
The alternative civic or political model of the nation is frequently cited as the 
predominant one in Western Europe, stressing equal citizenship in a legal-political 
community (Smith 1991; 1995). The emphasis here is on individual and national self- 
determination. The civic model is a state-based, top-down, spatially bound account in 
which membership of the nation depends on citizenship rather than ethnic origins: 
citizenship and nationality are coterminous (Hobsbawm 1990). Here, the idea of the 
national territory is essentially potent as it embodies three of the most important kinds 
of motives that bind human groups together - traditions, interests and ideals: «The 
territory is regarded as a heritage of the national past, and is the basis of the whole 
present existence of the nation-and encourages the idea of the naturalness of national 
consciousness» (Loughlin 1995,4). Patriotism or allegiance to the nation-state is a by- 
product of political citizenship and active participation in a shared civic culture. 
Whereas the ethnic model produces exclusivist nationalisms, the civic model 
advocates a pluralist nationalism in which ethnic diversity is welcomed and 
democratic government is the norm. This style of `civic or citizenship nationalism' 
was evident in the French Revolution when Abbe Sieyes defined the nation as an 
association of free and equal citizens exercising popular sovereignty. The liberal 
nationalisms of NO and Mazzini linked individual autonomy with national 
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determination, while Renan provided the classic account of the political nation as 
based on a shared (democratic) history and on active consent of the people. For Renan, 
the nation is a «daily plebiscite)) resting on democratic values and active participation 
(Renan 1990,19). 
It is my contention, however, that the division between the ethnic and civic 
accounts of the nation is not clear-cut. To some extent the civic-ethnic divide is an 
artificial one. In reality, few modern national states possess only one form of 
nationalism; in most states the two types overlap. So, it is a misleading perception of 
national identity to portray the differences between ethnic and civic accounts of the 
nation as essential dichotomy or unbridgeable divide. As Kershen notes, "identity can 
never, nor will ever, be static; it is multifaceted and variable" (Kershen 1998,2). 
Further, the nation, Nairn maintains, is Janus-faced, in that the `uneven 
development' of capitalism embodies both progression and regression, political 
rationality and irrationality: on the one hand, oriented to an ancient (often imaginary) 
ethnic past; on the other, futuristic in mobilising populations for collective autonomy 
and progress (Nairn 1977,348). Greenfeld too declares that individualistic (political) 
nationalism cannot but be civic, but civic nationalism can also be collectivistic (ethnic) 
(Greenfeld 1992,11). Renan also recognised the importance of shared historical 
experiences and feelings of communal belonging and identity, but noted that these 
tend to be at their strongest in nations based on a dominant ethnic group. According to 
Renan, the nation has both «soul and body: "It is a `spiritual principle' based on 
communal (primarily ethnic) memories as well as political institutions and culture" 
(Renan 1990,18-19). 
Similarly, Kellas claims that Britain is in part an ethnic and social nation 
(Kellas 1998,67). Smith also refers to the dual civic-ethnic nature of many 
nationalisms - their «chameleon-like permutations» - noting that «a national identity is 
fundamentally multi-dimensional; it can never be reduced to a single element» (Smith 
1991,14). Likewise, Schopflin emphasises the multi-dimensionality of national 
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identity: «Ethnicity is the consciousness of sharing, while nationhood implies political 
demands legitimated by the doctrine of nationalism which declares that cultural and 
political boundaries should be congruent)) (Schophflin 1995,42). And Guibemau has 
argued that the force of nationalism springs not from rational thought alone, but also 
from the irrational power of emotions that stem from the feelings of belonging to a 
particular group. The double face of nationalism explains how these emotions are 
either transformed into a peaceful and democratic movement seeking the recognition 
and development of one's nation (civic nationalism), or turned into xenophobia, the 
will to put one's nation above others and eradicate the different (ethnic nationalism) 
(Guibernau 1996,76). 
Moreover, not only is civic nationalism frequently conjoined with ethnic 
nationalism, it embodies ethnic assumptions within itself Civic nationalism cannot be 
neutral in a cultural sense: politics and bureaucracy prefer to speak one language, 
usually a language of eponymous ('titular') group or a language of former metropolis. 
The civic Western model ('good civic nationalism' in the tradition of Kohn and 
Plamenatz) is not devoid of racialist implications of the so-called Eastern model or 
(even more) of the nationalism, which, in Ignatieff's words, "has been a defence of the 
backwardness of economically beleaguered or declining classes and regions" (Ignatieff 
1993,154). 
Smith has pointed out that civic nationalism is neither as tolerant nor as 
unbiased as its self-image suggests. In fact, it can be every bit as severe and 
uncompromising as ethnic nationalisms. For civic nationalisms often demand the 
surrender of ethnic community and individuality, the privatisation of ethnic religion 
and the marginalisation of the ethnic culture and heritage of minorities within the 
borders of the national state. Hence, not only ethnic but also civic nationalisms may 
demand the eradication of minority cultures and communities qua communities, on the 
common assumption not just of equality through uniformity, but that `high cultures' 
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and `great nations' are necessarily of greater value than `low' cultures and small 
nations or ethnies (Smith 1995,101). 
The idea that civic nationalism characterises the first world, and that ethnic 
nationalism characterises the third world is therefore an illusion. Ignatieff's assertion 
that `European racism is a form of white ethnic nationalism' (ibid, 5), casts serious 
doubts on the claim that the ethnic nationalism of the colonised was purely `a revolt 
against modernity' rather than a derivative or imitation of the nationalism of their 
rulers (Manzo 1996,20). Conversely, ethno-nationalism cannot avoid claiming 
authority and state and to be a political project as well (Tishkov 2000,627). So, the 
predominance/superiority of the Western civic ('good') model over the ethnic (`bad') 
model of nationalism cannot be sustained and consequently the exclusive, race-based 
nationalism of the latter can be ascribed to the former as well (Manzo 1996,22). 
In the Labour party we can find evidence of both civic and ethnic 
nationalisms. One cannot expect to find just one account of nationhood within a 
political party such as Labour, which appears more as "a reflection of potentially 
unstable relationships between a number of groups or factions within and without the 
party's internal structure" (Bale 1999,7). The parliamentary debates around the 
European question disclosed that there was not a unanimous view of what it meant to 
be British among the front- and backbenchers of the party. The concept of the nation 
found in the British Labour party is a prime example of an account, which transcends 
the civic-ethnic divide. It is not just a Western civic concept in its attachment to the 
evolving spatial aspect of the party's Britishness (imperialism, re-baptised as the 
Commonwealth, Little Englanderism and Euro-nationalism) and civic culture (Houses 
of Parliament, unwritten constitution), but also one which recognises that adherence to 
the national community is enhanced by enduring values and ethnic sentiments of 
collective belonging (Protestantism, the memories of war). Its focus then is neither 
exclusively political nor cultural, but a fusion of the two. 
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The Labour nation, then, is a hybrid of civic and ethnic accounts of the 
British nation. It is a concept in which political and pre-political components of 
identity are recognised. This amalgamation has been reflected by the internal tensions 
over the European question. Indeed, it gets its particular shape and characteristics from 
the political traditions with which they are associated and from their spatio-temporal 
context. In addition, this civic-ethnic mix in Labour Britishness means that although 
membership of the national community has not been defined along purely ethnic lines, 
groups or populations not sharing the values and traditions of the majority British 
community are not easily integrated. 
One of my central contentions is that Labour Britishness cannot be 
understood as a category, but rather as a relationship. The components of Labour 
Britishness become a matter of boundary negotiation and construction against the 
`other', the `alien', the enemy. Inevitably, to understand what we mean when we talk 
of someone's having a national identity, we must first be clear that the nation's 
conceptual partner is not just the state as Gellner (1983), Giddens (1985) and 
Hobsbawm (1990) contend; nationalism is not just a political ideology either as 
theorists such as Smith (1981) and Kellas (1998) suggest. It is my contention, that a 
racialised understanding of identity is inherent in nationalist practices. 
In fact, nationalism is a practice of boundary creation and maintenance in 
which Race and Nation, Alien and National are interdependent terms and socially 
constructed. The category of alien derives from an implicit contrast with the category 
of national. As Balibar has made clear, "the concept of nationalism never functions 
alone" and "the discourses of race and nation are never very far apart" (Balibar 1991 a, 
37). So, contrary to what Hobsbawm, Giddens and other have argued - that the nation 
"relates to a certain kind of modem territorial state" (Hobsbawm 1990,10; Giddens 
1985,120) - Labour's notion of the British nation is relational and contextual, that is, 
it becomes understood only in opposition to another race coded as the `other', the 
`different', or, recently, `the immigrant' in a particular space, time, and culture. 
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Racialisation marks the boundary of the nation, defining who We are by reference to a 
racialised Other (Miles 1993b, 148). The Other emerges as a representative translator 
of culture, so the impact of racism is mediated through a wider set of social relations 
(Goldberg 1993,155). Because, as will become clear in the third section, the concept 
of race has never been put just in terms of biological and phenotypical distinctiveness 
(blood, skin, color and genetic traits), but has been embedded in the historical and 
cultural constructions of nationhood - either as `difference', or `culture' or `ethnicity', 
in other words as an essential `other'. Because, as Geoffrey Bennington has noted, `the 
idea of the nation is inseparable from its narration; that narration attempts, 
interminably, to constitute identity against difference, inside against outside' 
(Bennington 1990,132). 
2.3 The National Identity in-Otherness 
This study maintains that without an `other' to identify with or differ from, 
self-recognition would be impossible. In particular, national identity is produced 
through a process of negation, the creation of self through explicit rejections and 
denials; it is a dynamic relationship defined through the exclusion of groups deemed 
not to belong (Lunn 2000). The Commonwealth, the immigrants from the former 
British colonies, the continentals and the asylum seekers and refugees have been some 
of the `significant others' that have arisen from the Labour nationalist discourse during 
the last forty years. 
The concept of the Other was developed in the phenomenological tradition, 
particularly by Edmund Husserl, as a constitutive factor in the subject's self-image. 
The Other was conceived as the perceiving, conscious, meaning-conferring other 
person who helps, or forces, the conscious subject to define its own world picture and 
its view of its place in it. Through the work of writers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Claude 
Levi-Strauss, Jacques Lacan and Michael Foucault, the concept of the Other entered 
post-structuralist discourse (Sartre 1957; Levi-Strauss 1966; 1972; Lacan 1977; 
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Derrida 1973; 1976; 1978; Foucault 1967; 1970; 1972a & b). In Michel Foucault's 
seminal work, Folie et Deraison, lepers were the Others of medieval society, a prime 
source of contamination, whose exclusion from everyday life helped provide society 
with a sense of its normality. As leprosy became less common, so it was less able to 
play its previous symbolic role. Instead, argues Foucault, a new Other was born: those 
who were non-productive - the criminal, the homeless, and, especially the mad. `A 
new leper is bor. ', writes Foucault, `who takes the place of the first' (Foucault 1972b, 
17). The Other, then, is that which lies outside a particular culture or society's 
epistemological boundaries. To exist, Bhabba notes, is to be called into being in 
relation to an Otherness, in its look or locus (Bhabba 1990a, 187). 
Likewise, turning to nationalist thought, Smith argues that identity is never 
purely possible, for identity is always dependent on that which is «outside» identity, 
and it always differentiates itself in its shifting relations with its othernesses; but 
identity is never purely impossible, because there always remains something 
irreducibly other against which an «inside» can be constructed; otherness is that which 
makes identity impossible and possible at the same time (Smith 1991). 
For Bhabba, national identities are composed of narratives of `the people', 
and they operate under a `doubled' and `split' signifier - split between the past and 
present, the self and the other. Homi Bhabba directs our attention to the impact of the 
stranger and the outsider in defining the national identity of the host group. What both 
Hall and Bhabba stress in the definition of identity is the psychoanalytic process of 
splitting; splitting between that which one is, and that which is the other, and above all 
between pedagogical (the process of identification constituted by historical 
sedimentation) and performative (the loss of identity in the signifying process of 
cultural identification) narratives (Hall 1990,48; Bhabba 1990b, 304). 
British identity has never been defined as the affirmation of a pregiven 
identity. For Stuart Hall, there is no English/British history without `other' history 
(Hall 1991b, 49). Colley's Britons is a salutary reminder that a nation as a social 
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construct, and a territorialised identity is very often formed in opposition to some 
specific other nation which is seen as posing a threat, and whose qualities are regarded 
as diametrically opposed to those of one's own country (Colley 1992b). Britishness, 
she says, was superimposed in response to contact with the Other, and above all in 
response to conflict with the Other (Colley 1992b, 6). Robin Cohen suggests that who 
constitutes the self (the acceptable, the insider, the familial), and who the other (the 
stranger, the outsider, the alien), is the basic ingredient of a British identity (Cohen 
1994,35). Equally, Dodd tells us that Englishness/Britishness is not so much a 
category as a relationship (Dodd 1986,12). The exotic Empire, the militant Catholic 
France and the hostile continentals were some of the `significant others' in British 
history. To be English/British was to know yourself in relation to the French, the 
colonised Other and the hot-blooded Mediterranean (Hall 1991a, 22). The `significant 
other' is perceived as threatening to wipe out the nation (Triandafyllidou 1998,603). 
`Others' usually become salient in periods of social, political or economic crisis during 
which the identity of the nation is put in question. The significant other in these cases 
serves in overcoming the crisis because it unites the people in the face of a common 
enemy, it reminds them `who we are' and emphasises that `we are different and 
unique'. 
Gilroy has said that the modem history of race and racism is the product of 
the complex historical processes involving contact with, and theorising about, the 
`other' (Gilroy 1993). Race is a way of naming the difference between members of a 
particular collectivity and the `other', the `alien' (Guibernau 1996,85). Although the 
`other' is an integral element in most accounts of nationalist theory, the main theorists 
do not consider the racialisation of the `alien' as a prerequisite of national identity. For 
example, one strand of theory asserts that race is an ideological construct within a 
restrictive historical context, whereas a second thread treats race as an objective 
condition, that is, a biological given construct. 
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In respect of the first view of race as an ideological construct, Guibernau 
considers as one of the defining criteria of identity the differentiation from 'others': 
`differentiation stems from the consciousness of forming a community with a shared 
culture, attached to a concrete territory, both elements leading to the distinction 
between members and `strangers', `the rest' and `the different' (Guibernau ibid, 73). 
Yet, Guibernau considers the relationship between racism and nationalism as 
antithetical: `Racism and nationalism offer radically different messages'. Nationalism, 
as 4a common project', he claims, is about building, dreaming and working for a better 
future for the new generations whereas, racism does not attempt to construct anything 
(Guibernau ibid, 90). 
Although Guibernau sees a way in which racism is incorporated in the 
nationalist discourse, when `nationalism sees in the `other' a potential or factual 
enemy... someone inferior', at the same time, he restricts their relationship to the 
colonial setting: `Racism accompanied a certain type of nationalism inspired by the 
idea of Empire beyond the frontiers of the metropolis'. Guibernau associates race 
strictly with skin color and defines racism as an ideological effect in the sense of a 
`false consciousness' that explains how other `material' relationships can only account 
for the origins of race thinking and then only in one social context (colonial): 
`Racism emerged as a doctrine of exclusion to legitimise 
domination of phenotypically diverse groups, and it has 
proved crucial in the creation and reproduction of class- 
structures grounded on the subordination of those defined as 
inferior by nature. Racism does not cut across national 
boundaries, it determines the relation between groups that 
live together in a compartmentalised society' (Guibernau 
ibid, 89). 
Whereas Guibernau restricts the significance of race in the colonial setting, 
most of Nairn's comments on the relationship between racism and nationalism equally 
focus on a single historical example - the role of racism in the expression of English 
nationalism since 1945. Nairn (1977) claims that British nationalism has been 
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patrician in its character because there was never a need to mobilise the English 
working class in order to carry out a bourgeois revolution. As a result, he maintains, 
racism has only limited potential for political mobilisation under the banner of a right- 
wing nationalism in England and the resort to racism in England results from the 
absence of the main mobilising myth of nationalism, an idea of `the people' as an 
active political subject. In other words, the expression of racism is a secondary 
substitute for the absence of a coherent, modem and bourgeois English nationalism: 
`There is no coherent, sufficiently democratic myth of Englishness... this missing factor 
explains the precipitous descent into racism' (Nairn 1977,294). 
By insisting, as Guibernau does, that the raison d'etre of the racist ideological 
structure is to rationalise some underlying form of economic, social or political 
oppression, Nairn fails to acknowledge the materiality of racially defined effects in 
their own right. As Goldberg notes, such a view fails to acknowledge that racist 
expressions may at times define and promote rather than merely rationalise social 
arrangements and institutions (Goldberg 1993,97). 
Further, both Guibernau and Nairn do not recognise the salience of race as a 
social construct that has developed over half a millennium or more into a fundamental 
principle of social organisation and identity formation. The longevity of the race 
concept and the enormous number of effects race thinking has produced, guarantee 
that race will remain a feature of social reality across the globe. They also fail to 
recognise that at the level of experience, of everyday life, race is a relatively 
impermeable part of our identities (Omi & Winant 1994,16; Winant 2000,184). 
Let us see how the second strand of nationalist theory, in its configuration of 
the `other', treats race as an immutable objective condition. Even though theorists, 
such as Smith, who concentrate on the ethnic origins of nations, refer to the 
importance of symbolic or real `others' for the shaping of national identity, they view 
the race concept as an ideological construct (Smith 1981; 1986; 1991). 
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In respect of the importance of the symbolic `others', Smith has pointed out 
that in the context of the philosophical and historical discourses developed in the 17th 
and 18th centuries in Europe, identity is conceptualised as sameness (Smith 1991,75). 
In other words, the members of one community have a number of features in common, 
for example, language or dress code that constitute the markers of their identity. 
`Others' differ from the members of the community precisely in these features, they 
speak a different language for instance or they have a different dress style. Even 
though Smith agrees that `this pattern of similarity-cum-dissimilarity is one meaning 
of national identity' (Smith 1991), he does not consider that there might be an 
interaction between the two. Do the members of the community come together 
because of their common language, tradition or cultural codes? Or do they, like the 
Ruritanians, become aware of their common features only as a means of differentiating 
themselves from a privileged Megalomanian? 
The relationship between national identity and the `other' underlies the 
typology of nationalist movements proposed by Smith (1991,82). This typology is 
based on the distinction between ethnic and territorial nationalisms and their pre- or 
post- independence context. The pre- or post- independence condition mainly indicates 
whether the `other' is within or outside the territory of the state. Yet, it is not clear in 
the typology whether the goals of the movement are derived from the ethnic or 
territorial character of the nation or whether the nation is conceptualised as an ethnic 
or a civic community because of the specific context and situation in which the 
nationalist movement develops (Triandafyllidou 1998,610). Although these 
arguments do not put in question the validity of the typology, they demonstrate, that 
the notion of the `other' is inextricably linked with the concept of national identity. 
However, Smith has concluded that there is no overlap or relationship between 
nationalism and racism and that they should always be carefully distinguished. Smith 
incorrectly suggests that racism, as an ideological construct, is a purely biological 
doctrine and has no cultural referent (Smith 1979). 
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Likewise, Karl Deutsch argues that the conception of the `other' is a 
functional element intrinsic to the notion of nationality. Membership of a national 
community consists in the ability to communicate more effectively with fellow 
nationals than with outsiders (Deutsch 1966,97). This is the fundamental quality of a 
nation: `peoples are held together `from within' by this communicative efficiency' 
(ibid, 98). Nationality from this functional perspective is not an absolute concept; all it 
means is that members share with one another more than they share with foreigners. 
Accordingly, like most scholars of nationalism, Deutsch claim that `nationality is not 
biological and has little if anything to do with race' (Deutsch 1966,13). 
In addition, Anderson's `imagined communities' can only be imagined by 
imagining the foreigness. Nevertheless, Anderson argues that nationalism and racism 
are antithetical ideologies. For him, nations are made possible in and through print 
languages rather than notions of biological difference and kinship. While he takes the 
language of nation to be historical, that of race is deemed ahistorical and as a 
biological given, though it has never been understood solely in this way. He thus 
insists that the language of race erases nationhood by substituting biology for it: 
`Nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies while racism dreams of eternal 
contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of 
loathsome copulations: outside history' (Anderson 1991,149). 
Finally, James Kellas has noted that `boundary maintenance' is the aim of 
groups, which feel threatened by other groups, and this applies both to ethnic groups 
and nations (Kellas 1998,18). But he immediately adds that nationalism is an ideology 
for the justification of the pursuit of self-interest not ethnic purity (ibid, 31). Although 
boundary maintenance or, alternatively, boundary creation is a form of both nationalist 
and racist practice, Kellas, like Anderson, thinks of race in biological terms. `Race' is 
distinguished from `nation' mainly because races are discussed in predominantly 
biological terms, with particular emphasis on `phenotypical distinctions such as skin 
colour, stature, etc. and presumed genetic discussions' (Kellar 1998,5). Kellas 
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subsequently maintains that the relationship between nationalism and racism is one- 
way: "Nationalism does not entail racism or genocide, but racism and genocide entail 
some form of nationalist ideology" (ibid, 41). His analysis of the link between 
nationalism and racism is restricted to black nationalisms in the US, Britain and 
Africa, ignoring the fact that whiteness like blackness is socially constructed and not a 
mere biological category. 
However, as will become clear later, race is not a fixed biological category, 
but a socially constructed way of differentiating between human beings (Omi & 
Winant 1994,56) in particular time and space and not `outside history'. The scholars, 
who regard race as a biological given, seek to remove the concept of race from the 
historical context in which it arose and developed. They employ an essentialist 
approach which suggests that race is a matter of innate characteristics, of which skin 
colour and other physical attributes provide only the most obvious, and in some 
respects more superficial, indicators. But racism is increasingly not an ideology, which 
can be easily reduced to biological arguments as such. Contemporary racial thought 
invokes a range of markers of `difference' in order to construct the stereotypes and 
images on which racism relies (Solomos and Black 1996,58). The essentialist 
discourse, by viewing race as an objective condition or `natural' attribute, cannot grasp 
the processual and relational character of racial identity and racial meaning, denies the 
historicity and social comprehensiveness of the race concept, and cannot account for 
the way actors, both individual and collective, have to manage incoherent and 
conflictual racial meanings and identities in everyday life (Winant 2000,185). 
Other scholars have remained silent on the race concept. In Gellner's account, 
the awareness of a shared nationality on the part of the population of a backward 
region is initially based on a negative trait: their exclusion from the nation of the 
privileged. `Even though', he states, `nationalism does need some pre-existing 
differentiating marks to work on', these may be purely negative (Gellner 1964,168). 
But if the aim of the Ruritanians is to differentiate themselves from the inhabitants of 
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Megalomania, this must bear some effect on the development of their identity. Indeed, 
according to Gellner, common habits or traditions of the Ruritanians become 
significant because they provide a basis for identification in contrast to the privileged 
Megalomanians. Cultural difference coded as race is common currency in racial 
thought and, more recently, in the new racist discourse. Yet, Gellner remains silent on 
race itself. 
On the other hand, in 1882 the French philologist Ernest Renan (1990) 
delivered a lecture at the Sorbonne in Paris that was to prove immensely influential. 
Entitled `What is a Nation? ', the lecture sought to establish the difference between the 
Enlightenment and the Romantic traditions of nationhood. The first conceives of a 
nation as a voluntary association or contact, the second as a predetermined community 
bound by blood and heredity. In this understanding of the distinction between the 
Enlightenment and the Romantic traditions, the former is seen as positing human 
differences in terms of culture, and the latter in terms of race (Malik 1996,131). 
However, Renan's argument is more blurred and confusing. `What is a nation? ' can be 
read not so much as a triumphant vindication of the Enlightenment tradition as a text 
that subverts the essence of Enlightenment discourse. `A community of interest', he 
declared, did not 'suffice to make a nation'. He alleged that `it is no more soil than it is 
race which makes a nation. The soil furnishes the substratum, the field of struggle and 
of labour; man furnishes the soul'. Renan used race as synonymous with family due to 
the emergent discipline of anthropology: "A Nation is a spiritual principle... it is a 
spiritual family not a group determined by the shape of the earth". Two aspects 
(`which in truth are but one') constitute this spiritual principle: "One is the possession 
in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to 
live together ... the nation, 
like the individual, is the culmination of the long past of 
endeavours, sacrifice and devotion". His concept of culture was homologous to race. 
The important distinctions in contemporary human society were those of culture and 
language. `These are linguistic races', Renan believed, `but they have nothing to do 
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with anthropological races' (Reran 1947-61 a). He also made the blood relationship 
more clear by saying that, `the instinctive consciousness which presided over the 
construction of the map of Europe took no account of race, and the leading nations of 
Europe are nations of essentially mixed blood' (Reran 1990,15). Race as lineage 
(races united by common descent), found in Renan's work was in contention with race 
as type (different stocks of races subdivided on geographic and climate grounds) 
('language, religion, laws, mores brought the race into being much more than blood 
did' (Renan 1947-61 a; b) in the mid-nineteenth century and both gave way to the 
notion of race as subspecies (evolution of human races by means of natural selection). 
In Kohn's work, nationalism and racism overlapped because the former was 
grounded in the very nature of scientific racism, which asserted a deterministic link 
between biology and cultural variation and expression, following the publication in 
1859 of Charles Darwin's book On the Origin of Species by Natural Selection: Or the 
Preservation of Favored Races in Struggle for Life. Because `nations' were identified 
as naturally occurring groups identifiable by cultural differentiae, it was logically 
possible to assert that these symbols of `nation' were themselves grounded in `race', 
that `blood race is the basis of the nationality, and that it exists externally and carries 
with it an unchangeable inheritance' (Kohn 1967,13). 
Kohn is right in the sense that racial thought has played a significant role in 
the perception of the main elements of nationhood. Race brings together in self- 
conception individuals who have literally nothing to do with each other. In this, race 
pushes to its extreme the logic of national identification; hence the gratuitous ease 
with which racism and patriotism seem to intersect (Goldberg 1993,79). 
From this perspective, the important point is the rejection of a unified identity 
that can be justified in terms of a biological essence. As said earlier, essentialism is 
understood as belief in real, true human essences, existing outside or impervious to 
social and historical contexts (Omi and Winant 1994,78). In contrast, the debates on 
post-modern and post-colonial cultural theory underline what Stuart Hall calls the 
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`dynamic process of identification', rather than a static notion of identity (Hall 1990). 
Racism - like nationalism - operates by constructing impassable symbolic boundaries 
between racially constituted categories, and its typically binary system of 
representation constantly marks and attempts to fix and naturalise the difference 
between belongingness and otherness. National and racial boundaries may naturally be 
seen to map onto each other. Here, each nation must be taken to have a unique set of 
characteristics that constitute its nationhood, and these are considered just the 
characteristics that mark them off as distinct races (Goldberg 1993,97). Along this 
frontier there arises what Gayatri Spivak calls the `epistemic violence' of the 
discourses of the Other (Hall 1992,256; 1996,445). Race, coded as identity and 
difference, becomes a constitutive element in the definition of nation as the following 
historical account of how race has been used at different times will make clear. 
2.4 Nation and Race in Racial Thought 
A short account of the three rival meanings of race as lineage, race as type 
and race as subspecies reveals that they have considerable affinities with the 
nationalist conceptions of time, culture and space. 
2.4.1 Race as Lineage: Time and Culture of National Community 
As Goldberg has said, nation has both a conceptual and social history 
intersecting with that of race. The term nation was originally used to refer to those 
claimed to be of common birth or extended family - dating to approximately 1584 
(Goldberg 1992,557). Theoretical works on nationalism have substantiated this claim. 
Liah Greenfeld has said that it is possible to locate the emergence of national 
sentiment in England in the first third of the 16t' century having an anti-alien feeling 
(Greenfeld 1992,42). The so-called founding fathers of sociology', Marx and Weber 
did not treat the national idea as peculiarly modem either (Greenfeld ibid, 17). What is 
more, the `simple family' has been a core element in nationalist readings of identity 
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and other themes central to Marx's discussions of state and civil society (Manzo 1996, 
10). Indeed, in early sixteenth century England, the word «nation» in its conciliar 
meaning of an «elite» was applied to the population of the country and made 
synonymous with the word «people» (Greenfeld ibid, 6). In that sense, Goldberg 
asserts, nation stimulated the early significance of race as lineage (Goldberg 1993,78). 
From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries the principal use of race was 
lineage, to refer to a group of persons, animals, or, plants connected by common 
descent origin - the notion of a Great Chain of Being. Two broad schools of thought 
developed. The older of these was that of monogenism, the belief that all humankind 
was directly descended from Adam. Racial distinctions were ascribed to group - 
correlated geographic, climatic, and social differences (Hay 1957). The other school, 
polygenism held that different `racial' communities had different origins. Writers in 
this school believed that ethnic features were innate and permanent, undergoing no 
significant modifications through environmental change. Though polygenism 
continued to read `race' in terms of origins, it differed from monogenism in 
emphasising biological inheritance and hierarchy over pedigree (Goldberg 1992,545). 
Thus, race as a lineage harboured mythologies of collective kinship. It designated a 
family line sustaining the integrity of noble lineages and provided a natural foundation 
for the hierarchy of virtues and prerogatives (Malik ibid, 80). 
Myths by origin enable people to locate themselves in time and space. They 
offer an explanation of the unknown and hallowed traditions by linking them to heroic 
events and personages of the distant past. In addition, they form the ground for belief 
systems providing a moral validation for attitudes and activities (MacDougall 1982, 
1). In fact, they hold up before us the virtues of our ancestors and encourage us to live 
up to them (Miller 1995,36). 
In English history two national myths predominate. The first, best represented 
in a twelfth-century work by Geoffrey de Monmouth, a Welsh bishop, located the 
origins of the early inhabitants of Britain in Troy. The second great national myth, 
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asserting the Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon origins of Englishmen, claimed a higher degree 
of historicity than Geoffrey's account (MacDougall 1982). It was suggested here that 
`Englishmen are descended from German race and were therefore called Saxons'. The 
German nation was `the Tree from which English men, as a most stately and 
flourishing branch, are issued and sprung forth', as Richard Verstegen, the staunch 
advocate of Germanic superiority and Saxon virtue, alleged (MacDougall 1982,47). 
Verstegen's work ran to five editions by 1673 and represents the first comprehensive 
presentation in English of a theory of national origin based on a belief in the racial 
superiority of the Germanic people, a theme which appeared a thousand times in 
succeeding centuries (MacDougall 1982,49). 
The German race had settled in England from AD 449 and as a result the 
claims of the Stuart monarchs who wanted to weaken the power of parliament by 
divine right seemed unfounded, because it ran contrary to the nature of the people. 
`Back to the Golden Age', `back to the free Anglo-Saxons', `back to the Old 
Testament', `back to the Noble Savage' were so many different expressions 
demanding the return to a shared glorious past in order to make a future (Hill 1954; 
1958,55). The Anglo-Saxon centuries were alleged to be a golden age, before the 
arrival of Norman rulers. In this way, according to Banton, an ancestral myth was 
created which derived the chief English virtues from their Anglo-Saxon forebears 
(Banton 1987,13). Hence in mid-seventeenth century England, the ideas of the 
existence of an Anglo-Saxon Church and Parliament and of an original Anglo-Saxon 
`race' suppressed and oppressed by a foreign `race' since the Norman invasion in 1066 
legitimated political revolution. The result was a conception of Englishness, which 
was associated with a supposedly natural capacity for freedom. Thereafter, a 
proportion of the English population regarded themselves as a discrete biological 
`race' whose superiority allegedly originated in their German origins, in the inherent 
courage and freedom on the part of the Saxons, in the innate superiority of their 
language and institutions (especially Parliament) and in a natural ability for reason and 
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science representing the traditional genius of their ancestors and thereby carrying a 
special burden of leadership in the world community (MacDougall 1982,2). 
Apart from the affinity with the temporal element of nationalism, race as 
lineage sustained the division of races on cultural grounds. During the late eighteenth 
century the obsession with measurement and statistics generated a conception of race 
founded upon the idea of difference and inequality. People could be conveniently 
divided and classified not merely in terms of geographical origin or colour but equally 
by virtue of cranial capacity or shape (Solomos and Black 1996,34). Blumenbach, the 
father of anthropology who first advanced the fivefold classification: Caucausian, 
Mongolian, Ethiopian, American, Malayan, wrote of degeneration as an explanation of 
variation within a species. The climate was supposed to exert great influence (Banton 
1987,6). The German physician Gustav Klemm distinguished stages of cultural 
evolution dividing the mankind into active and passive races, emphasising the 
environmental and cultural influence upon human development (ibid, 20). James 
Cowles Prichard, the most respected writer on race after Blumenbach, found no 
evidence to indicate that acquired characters could be transmitted by heredity to the 
next generation, and used race to refer to physically distinctive nations (ibid, 23). The 
three types of cranium found amongst Negroes seemed to be associated with degrees 
of civilisation rather than geographical populations (ibid, 24). It can be argued that 
race as lineage may be identified with the discovery, physical and conceptual, of the 
racial `other' of the initial empirical observation of significant difference in the drive 
to Empire and domination (Goldberg 1993,91). For instance, contemplating reports 
about the life of peoples in the newly discovered regions of America, Europeans were 
bound to ask, 6 Why are they not like us? ' (Banton 1987,7). The answer was that 
`they' belonged to a genealogical group, which had acquired special characteristics 
either because of divine intervention or because of its distinctive environmental 
experience. The cultural inferiority of West Africa was ascribed to `the African 
environment' and not to biology. As Banton notes, the contending parties were united 
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in their belief that because of their bad environment and their cultural backwardness, it 
could be to the Africans' advantage to be removed from their existing society if that 
could not be reorganised along European lines (ibid, 9). Of course, this answer could 
not explain how the environment affected the transmission of inherited characters. But 
what mattered was that the Africans, either because of divine intervention or climatic 
reasons, could not be members of nations defined in cultural terms. 
2.4.2 Race as Type: Culture and Space of the National Community 
Only in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century does race come to 
refer to supposedly discrete categories of people defined according to their physical 
characteristics which implied particular cultural identities. During the late eighteenth 
century the obsession with measurement and statistics generated a conception of race 
founded upon the idea of difference and inequality. People could be conveniently 
divided and classified not merely in terms of geographical origin or colour but equally 
by virtue of cranial capacity or shape (Solomos and Black 1996,36). 
A new phase in the history of racial thought was inaugurated in 1800 by 
Georges Cuvier who treated races as separate species and maintained that their cultural 
development corresponded to variations in their cranial capacity (Banton 1987,60). 
The identification of three types of human varieties (Caucasian, Mongolian and 
Ethiopian) was accompanied, first, by their representation as a hierarchy with whites at 
the top and blacks at the bottom, and, second, by Cuvier's contention that differences 
in culture and mental quality were produced by differences in physique (Banton 1987, 
30). 
Furthermore, in typological thinking each race was adapted to a particulate 
climate and a particular zone of the earth, and inherited characters had to be 
understood in relation to different environments, not of genetic material. According to 
Banton, each race was superior in its own zone or province (ibid, 37). Josiah Clark 
Nott, a physician in Alabama was the first to argue that the various races, being 
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permanent and lacking in adaptability, had been created in their several environments 
(ibid, 39). Likewise, a more pugnacious propagandist for typology, Robert Knox (The 
Races of men), claimed that each `race' struggled to form its own laws, literature and 
language more in accordance with its intelligence than its physique (ibid, 57). And 
because these cultural phenomena were biologically determined, they could not be 
socially transmitted. By implication, «races thrive best in the land on which they were 
originally found.... (because) each race can produce its own kind of civilisation 
(Banton 1987,58). Knox wanted to awaken his contemporaries to the fundamentally 
racial nature of the chief political conflicts within Europe. As Banton puts it, four main 
races were the parties to these conflicts: 
"The first was that of the Scandinavians, who were naturally 
democratic but refused to extend to subordinated peoples their 
own principles of freedom and justice. Second came the Celts, 
who were notable warriors but had less understanding of liberty, 
being incapable of implementing ideas of freedom in government. 
Third were the Slovanians who had great intellectual and political 
potential... and fourth came the Sarmantians or Russ who were 
incapable of real achievement in literature or science. Their blind 
obedience to despots made them a threat to liberty" (Banton 1987,57). 
For Knox, `race' and `nation' were interrelated, even synonymous. This is 
evident in Knox's concern about the multiracial character of Britain: "The really 
momentous question for England, as a nation, is the presence of three sections of the 
Celtic race still on her soil ... the race must be forced from the soil... England's safety 
requires it... nations must ever act as Machiavelli advised: look to yourself' (ibid, 57). 
In Knox's racist theory of history, the all-determining character of `race' shaped all 
aspects of cultural expression and capacity with the result that the category of `nation' 
dissolved into that of `race' (Miles 1993b, 63). A professor of anatomy at Giessen in 
Germany, Karl Vogt made the relationship between nation and race even more 
explicit, arguing that new nations are synonymous with new races when he predicted 
the formation of an American race out of racial mixing of immigrant groups (Banton 
1987,61). 
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In sum, race as type attempted to explain its conflation with cultural-physical 
difference and spatial configuration. It is a relationship, which makes the relationship 
between the race and nation concepts explicit. 
2.4.3 Race as Subspecies: Space and Time of the National Community 
Finally, the race as subspecies - Darwin's notion that human races evolve and 
multiply by means of natural selection - made it easier to appreciate the significance of 
the conception of a geographical race or subspecies as a distinct local form which 
maintains its special characteristics and can evolve to a point such that it is no longer 
able to inter-breed with other forms that have split off from the same stock (ibid, 70). 
This suggestion is appealing to nationalists who argue that autonomy is required for 
progress against any kind of interbreeding. Also in Darwin's work, the number of 
races was not fixed permitting multiple races, which assumed provinces that were 
smaller than entire continents. This enabled the idea of a `British race', a `French race' 
and so on, whereby race coincided with political sovereignty rather than continental 
divide (Banton 1987,37; Manzo 1996,63). 
In addition to its spatial conception, race as subspecies was temporal as well. 
The evolutionary explanation of human diversity depicted a process whereby higher 
forms had developed from lower in the great chain of being (Banton 1987,16). Those 
who favoured an evolutionary explanation were inclined to see races as inter-grading 
rather than as distinct (ibid, 18). According to this view the higher forms had to pass 
through the earlier phases of evolution before reaching their own stage. If those lower 
races had not reached the higher, they could be in the same national community, in 
other words, have a shared time. After all, the word `primitive' was first used in the 
late fifteenth century thought to accompany the image of an early, ancient, or first 
stage, age or period: old-fashioned, or rough, or rude (Goldberg 1993,155). As a 
temporal signifier, it put race in non-biological terms and presupposed the national 
exclusion of those who represent the past in the present. The separate development of 
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the New Commonwealth populations appeared to the British political establishment as 
an obstacle for their final accommodation to the supposedly `superior' British social 
standards throughout the post-war era. 
In this respect, as Goldberg maintains, race brings together in self-conception 
individuals who otherwise have literally nothing to do with each other and pushes to 
its extreme the logic of national identification; hence the gratuitous ease with which 
racism and nationalism seem to intersect in Anderson's shared time (Anderson 1991). 
As the race theory has demonstrated race has been historically equated with 
culture, space and time in such a way as to conflate race with nation. Before the rise of 
modem scientific racism in the 19`h century `race' intersected with `culture'. Race 
inscribed and circumscribed the experiences of space and time, of geography and 
history. No surprise then that in its post-war retreat from racism the term has once 
again acquired an explicitly cultural rather than a biological inflection. In fact, the 
revival of the cultural racism or new racism in the decolonisation period made more 
evident these links between race and nation. 
2.5 The New Racism 
Throughout the sixties and seventies, British writing on racism evolved 
largely in isolation from other European work. As Miles (1993a) has suggested, much 
of the recent British literature assumed and sometimes argued that the only or the 
most important racism was that which had `black' people as its sole object. The 
outcome was often an exclusive conception of racism, which was blind to, or could 
not permit the existence of other modalities of racism. The `race relations' paradigm 
was challenged during the eighties when a number of British writers concluded that a 
sufficient expression of racism in Britain could not be adequately explained without 
taking account of nationalism (Barker 1981; Gordon and Klug 1985). It was mostly 
found in the discourse of right-wing politicians during the seventies, but as this thesis 
will show, elements of this discourse were evident in the Labour party's as well. It is 
46 
no wonder then, that, as Hunt suggests, talking the language of its opponents is a 
problem that has preoccupied New Labour since its inception (Hunt 2001). 
The form that racism took in the specific historical circumstances of the 
decolonisation era has been labelled alternatively as `new racism' (Barker 1981), 
`cultural racism' (Seidel 1986), `differentialist racism' (Taguieff 1990), `neo-racism' 
or `post-racism' (Balibar 1991a & b). 
This is a theory linking race and nation. According to Paul Gilroy this is a 
racism which is able to link «race» with nationhood, patriotism and nationalism, a 
racism which has taken a necessary distance from crude ideas of biological inferiority 
and superiority and now seeks to present an imaginary definition of the nation as 
unified cultural community (Gilroy 1990,266). Three features of new racism justify 
considering it a departure from previous biological perceptions of race: a sanitised, 
coded language about race that adheres to, more than it departs from, generally 
accepted liberal principles and values, mobilised for illiberal ends; avid disavowals of 
racist intent and circumvention of classical anti-racist discourse; and a shift from a 
focus on race and biological relations of inequality to a concern for cultural 
differentiation and national identity (Ansell 1997,59). Thus, drawing on the school 
of instinctivism (Barker 1981,22), the new racism may be summarised as a cluster of 
beliefs which holds that it is natural for people who share a way of life, a culture, to 
bond together in a group and to be antagonistic towards outsiders who are different 
and who are seen to threaten their identity as a group. 
In this, the proponents of the new racism claim that they are not being racist 
or prejudiced, nor are they making any value judgements about the `others', but 
simply recognising that they are different. The significance of what is called `racial 
difference' is something, which is socially defined. As Gilroy (1990) has asserted, 
culturalism of the new racism has gone hand in hand with a definition of race as a 
matter of difference rather than a question of hierarchy. In another context Fanon 
(1961) refers to a similar shift as a progression from vulgar to cultural racism. 
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In other words, groups, which are classed as `outsiders' in one period or in 
one country, may be defined as `insiders' in another. For instance, people from 
southern Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Italy were frequently described 
as `dark aliens' in 19`' century English literature. Today, as citizens of EEC countries 
with full rights to live and work here, they are more likely to be accepted as part of 
British society (Gordon and Klug 1985,22). 
So, it is important that the Labour party's discourse on the European question 
should be located at all times in the specific historico-political context, because what 
the previous scholarship on racism has made clear is that racism is intersecting with 
elements of the social formation, cannot be treated as an external factor, and in this 
way essentialist analyses which emphasise its unalterable nature and are biologically 
driven will certainly lead us to mistaken conclusions. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The analysis of national identity as a multifaceted concept cannot confine 
itself to accounts of the nationalist phenomenon, which give priority over nation and 
state institutions, and advocate a reductive perspective of the race concept. Race has 
always been the conceptual partner of nation and explanations of racialised 
phenomena cannot be simply reduced to merely biological terms. The failure of 
scholars of the nationalist phenomenon, such as Anderson, Gellner, Deutsch, Smith 
and other to see how race is coded in practices of boundary creation has led them to 
assume that race appears, often, as an objective biologically given or ideological 
construct. But `race' is only partially determined by biology and is otherwise in 
complex interplay with environmental, cultural and social factors, which entail certain 
boundary conditions (Outlaw 1990,68). The new racist paradigm of the post-war 
period reaffirms the conclusions drawn from the historical analysis of race. 
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The following three parts look into the intersections of the nationalist and 
racist practices across the space, culture and time of the British Labour party's 
nationhood, as it emerged during the European debates in the early sixties. 
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PART2 
THE SPACE OF THE NATION 
For most scholars of nationalist thought one of the most affect-laden symbols 
associated with national identity is a clearly demarcated territory, not least because 
the spatial component is perhaps the most salient aspect of the conceptions of `nation' 
by providing the discovery of self-definition and location at the heart of any shared 
sense of national identity (Cohen 1994; Miller 1995,23; Smith 1995,111; Guibernau 
1996,47). Indeed, the logic of identity is «limited» by being spatially organised 
(Anderson 1991,6; Walzer 1981,15; Hall 1991b, 43). As Nairn notes, location 
explain most things for students of nationalism (Nairn 1997,211). In other words, 
nationalism is never beyond geography (Billig 1995,74). In this thesis, as the first 
component of the Labour party's nationhood over the European question, the space 
component has taken three forms: the widest boundaries of the Empire, the narrow 
confines of the British Isles and the frontiers of the European Community. 
A .s becomes clear, geographical boundaries are not only tangible (Armstrong 
1982,9). The geography is not mere geography, or physical setting: the national 
place has also to be imagined, just as much as the national community does. The 
imagining of a country involves the imagining of a bounded totality beyond 
immediate experience of the place (Anderson 1991; Billig 1995,74). Anderson 
rightly points out that the community has to be imagined because it is conceived to 
stretch beyond immediate experience: it embraces far more people than those with 
which citizens are personally acquainted. In fact, since the early 1960s, the European 
debates have been dominated by the arguments concerning the relationship of Britain 
with the English-speaking world. Even nowadays, as the following analysis will 
demonstrate, the New Labour government has not repudiated the world links that 
have bound Britain with the dominions and, especially, the Atlantic ally. Inevitably, a 
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national community is not just «limited» but «imagined» as well, because even the 
largest of them has finite, if elastic, boundaries beyond which lie other nations 
(Anderson 1991,7). 
However, the act of «imagining» between national communities implies that 
the spatial element of Britishness is also defined and conditioned by the configuration 
of the `Other', the `other patriae' (Grainger 1986). In fact, the boundary, Cohen 
(1994) argues, symbolises the community to its members in two different ways: it is 
the sense they have of its perception by people on the other side and it is their sense of 
the community as refracted through all the complexities of their lives and experiences. 
The point is well expressed by Julia Kristeva who points out that with the 
establishment of nation-states `we come to the only modem, acceptable and clear 
definition of foreignness' (Billig 1995,79). 
As chapter 2 made clear, the racial `Other' contributes to the constitution of 
the national identity. The articulation of national identity as narration is inseparable 
from and premised upon the identification of the difference:, in respect of the bounded 
aspect of nationhood, the `inside' is supplemented by the `outside', the assumed 
superiority of inside over outside (Smith 1994; Bennington 1990,132). Racism as a 
boundary creation practice involves a negative evaluation of the other that requires an 
active censorship of any tendency to regard him or her as an equal (Goldberg 1993, 
205). Race inscribes and circumscribes the experiences of space, just as race itself 
acquires its specificity in terms of space (Guibernau 1996,87). The Labour spatial 
nationhood was dependent upon the movements of people from the former colonies 
and non-European world to the British Isles. 
Even though this thesis sides with the assertion expressed by the modernist 
paradigm of the nationalist theory and some scholars of the Labour party politics that 
place is a crucial factor in the bonding process of individuals, it does not accept that 
nation is solely defined by the nature of the sovereign authority of the state 
(Anderson 1991; Breuilly 1993; Nairn 1977; 1997,212; 2000,128; Ward 1998). The 
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debates over the locational effect of British sovereignty during the European debates 
were not just about the nature of the political power - whether it resided in the British 
Parliament (parliamentary or legal sovereignty), in the British people (popular 
sovereignty or democracy) or in the supra-national institutions of the EC (democratic 
deficit). 
The following three competing and overlapping particular forms of Labour 
nationalism - the imperial vision of the Commonwealth and the Atlantic ally, the 
insular Little Englanderism and the Euro-nationalism - all rely on racial thinking in 
order to construct racial collectivities as inherently different in terms of social and, 
generally, culturally characteristics. As the following analysis will exhibit, according 
to the Labour representatives, the character of the British has been also constructed 
against, and conditioned by the suppression of the differences of the `lesser breeds', 
`illegal immigrants', `welfare scroungers', `asylum seekers' who, as the essential 
`others' or different `races', have been defining elements of the party Britishness 
during the last forty years. 
This duality of the boundary means that either the imperial Britain or Britain 
of the Little Englanders or the European Britain is `positioned' in a particular context 
and is constituted from within, but perhaps more importantly, from without. 
Accordingly, the following three chapters on Commonwealth (chapter 3), Little 
Englanderism (chapter 4) and Euro-nationalism (chapter 5) examine respectively 
three competing and complementary visions of Labour's spatial nationhood. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE COMMONWEALTH 
3.1 Introduction 
For some scholars, the transoceanic identity of Labour Britishness, that is, 
the identification with the English-speaking world, remains, in a diachronic sense, 
stronger than Little Englanderism and Europeanism (Ash 2001). As a matter of fact, 
since the early 1960s, the Commonwealth and the `special' Anglo-American 
relationship were given primacy over a potentially `limited' Anglo-Continental 
association. For a long time after the official demise of the Empire - in 1968 with the 
end of the `east of Suez' role - Labour pro- and anti-Europeans did not cease to reflect 
on the imperial heritage. Hence, the importance of a conceptual analysis of the 
imperialist vision that has emerged in the party discourse. 
In this chapter, the Commonwealth is initially analysed as element of the 
British identity. It is approached primarily as a relationship, as a duality ('inside' 
against `outside') (3.2). That is, its historical formation makes clear that its character 
was formed in opposition to specific cultures and populations. It has not been a self- 
defined concept but has been constructed within relationships of power, which 
implied the suppression, exploitation, and exclusion of specific populations, or alien 
`races' on biological and cultural grounds. Most of these views were passed on to the 
Labour party's forebears (3.3). The post-war imperial attitudes of the party 
representatives should be examined against the background of the prior webs of 
beliefs in the Empire. Hence, the analysis of the late Victorian views of the first 
socialists (Fabians, ethical socialists and Marxists) on the imperial nation and race 
will help us to make sense of the historical and intellectual background out of which 
the Labour party emerged, and more importantly, establish a continuity or mark a 
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difference from the way the imperial nationalism of the contemporary Labour party 
has been constructed throughout the European debates (3.4). As a matter of fact, in 
each of the five examined periods the imperial identity was re-invented, not 
immensely altered, by Labour in order to address the changing global politico- 
economic environment. 
In the early 1960s, the Commonwealth was one of the main reasons that 
deterred the party leaderships from espousing the European commitment. Politico- 
economic arhipelagic fantasies made the Common Market look in the party's eyes a 
narrow association with no significant world influence. The Wilson government's 
second application for British entry (1967) was dictated more by the declining 
economic framework of the imperial centre and was less a result of a prior 
abandonment of the `kith and kin' arguments. After the end of the east of Suez role in 
the early 1970s and in the face of Heath's final bid for British entry, although much 
narrower than earlier, the `imagined' community of the English-speaking world did 
not loose its grip on Labour's conscience. Besides, the `great power syndrome' of 
these times also delineated the continental destiny of the pro-European faction of the 
party in more `outward-looking' terms. The Falklands episode and its implications for 
the European debate (1982-83) came to affirm that issues of national identity such as 
a war or the European question cannot be merely reduced to the narrow intra- or inter- 
party antagonisms as a section of the scholarship suggests. Finally, as said above, 
geography is not mere geographic setting. The Atlanticism of the New Labour 
government, as the issues of the single market and defence have made clear, 
demonstrates that the identification with the transoceanic world remains no less strong 
than in the past. 
On the other hand, Labour's imperial Britishness cannot be defined just in 
affirmative terms. As said in the previous chapter, national and racial boundaries map 
onto each other. During the debates concerning the European question, the imperial 
grandeur was at the same time defined by, supplanted with and depended on the 
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negative signification of the `Other' whose `different' norms challenged the extra- 
territorial vision (3.5). The suppression of the `differences' has been constitutive 
element of Britishness (Hall 1991a, 22). The Commonwealth Acts of 1962 and 1968, 
the Immigration Act 1971 and the British Nationality Act 1981 gives us an 
illuminating account of the way the British negotiated with the `difference' and the 
eventual exclusion of those who represented national decline, preserved and 
complemented the exceptionalism of the Labour party's kith and kin arguments on 
Europe. 
3.2 The Commonwealth as Element of the British Identity 
As already said, national identity is defined by the social or territorial 
boundaries drawn to distinguish the collective self and its implicit negation, the other 
(Colley 1992a, 325). In other words, men and women decide who they are by 
reference to who and what they are not. Once confronted with an obviously alien 
«Them», an otherwise diverse community can become a reassuring - or merely 
desperate - «Us». This was how it was with the British after 1707; as Linda Colley 
has said, they came to define themselves as a single people not because of any 
consensus at home, but rather in reaction to the Other (Colley 1992b, 6). The Empire, 
which was dated from the third decade of the seventeenth century (Barker 1951,32), 
was one of the main points of reference, the Other. 
Linda Colley implies that a negative content to the `Other' - i. e. foreign 
enemies or rivals, `backward people', `lesser breeds' - carried also a positive 
meaning, as the unifying bond of the British. Norman Davies has argued that the 
United Kingdom was established to serve the interests of Empire (Davies 1999, 
1053). Marquand (1995b) has also pointed out that the Empire was not an optional 
extra for the British, in the way that republicanism was an optional extra for the 
French. It was their vocation, their reason for being British as opposed to English or 
Scots or Welsh. In fact, either as an expression of the multi-national British Isles 
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(Kearney 1991,3; Colley 1992b; Wright 2000,8), or as an index of England's 
ascendancy - as the supposedly representative of the perceived imperial cosmopolitan 
ethos of London and the centre of economic, political and ideological power - over 
the other three nations (Lunn 1996,87; Barnett 1997,293; Jacobson 1997; Noakes 
1998,10; Nairn 2000), Britishness was cemented in symbolic and historic sense by 
the Empire in the 18`h and 19th centuries among the Welsh, Scottish and English as 
`four nations in one' (Kearney 1991,3) in opposition to `alien' populations and 
cultures. It has been the essence of Britishness to suppress and absorb the differences. 
As Hall has put it (1991 a), it was only by dint of excluding or absorbing all the 
differences that constituted Englishness/Britishness, the multitude of different regions, 
peoples, classes and genders that composed the people gathered together in the Act of 
Union, that Englishness could stand for everybody in the British Isles. It was always 
negotiated against difference. It always had to absorb all the differences in order to 
present itself as a homogeneous entity (Hall 1991 a, 22). In this way, they could 
contrast their law, their standard of living, and their political stability against societies 
that they only imperfectly understood but usually perceived as far less developed. 
Whatever their own individual ethnic backgrounds, Britons could join together vis-a- 
vis the Empire and act out the flattering parts of heroic conqueror, humane judge, and 
civilising agent (Colley 1992a, 326). As Thornton puts it, `the essence of Empire was 
control' (Thornton 1966,378). Likewise, Ernest Barker has noted that the word 
`Empire' signifies primarily a particular form of authority, and secondarily, by a 
natural expansion, the area over which that particular form of authority is exercised 
(Barker 1951,1). 
During the early period of imperial expansion, this `control' was associated 
with the endeavours to transmit to other parts of the world the principles that made up 
British identity itself, such as Protestantism, constitutional government, free commerce 
(Miller 1995,167). Apart from materialist considerations, Empire was partly an 
exportation of English stock and ideas (Barker 1951,7). Britons tried to cement in 
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these distant lands those structures of power through which their interests would be 
served. Passion for power, passion for wealth, and passion for justice were the motives 
(Barker 1951,51). As Tom Nairn maintains, the early misdeeds of Empire were 
compensated by the export of Westminster and the Law to backward areas and peoples 
(Nairn 1988,189); in the second phase of imperial expansion, when the structures of 
power were firmly established, a different idea emerged: Empire as the rule of the 
civilised peoples over the uncivilised who were not yet fit to govern themselves. As 
Miller notes, the mission was not to transmit British principles but to supply a partial 
version - good administration, imperial justice - in the expectation that sooner or later 
the `barbarians' would be fit for self-government (Miller 1995,167). 
The moral strands of thought was summarised in the concept of trusteeship 
(Hinden 1949,14; Fryer 1984). Moral considerations involved a paternal attitude 
towards `backward' or weaker people within the Empire (the moral crusade of 
imperialism was captured in Rudyard Kipling's idea of `the White Man's Burden'). 
Paternalism had many gradations of thought, ranging from a protective kindness to a 
recognition of the economic and political rights of subject races, as long as they 
remained to some degree subject. It came from a conviction that a special `mission' 
had to be fulfilled in spreading the virtues of a superior civilization throughout the 
world or from a high sense of trusteeship (Hinden, 1949,12). As Kathreen Tidrick has 
said, moral display served a dual purpose; being intended not only to improve native 
character but also to stimulate native loyalty (Tidrick 1990,213). In fact, the Great 
British state was compatible with an overwhelming sense of superiority over other 
peoples (Nairn 1977,298). 
In the late Victorian period, the whole bias of the British imperialist state 
embodied a particular governing ethos which was based on the practice of the 
synchronic exclusion and inclusion of the indigenous working class or `dangerous 
classes' (Samuel 1989b, xiii; Malik 1996,114) which led the British people, when 
faced with the colonised, to feel themselves as something naturally bigger, more open 
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and more important than just another nation-state. At the time of social Darwinism, 
the superiority was not established just on biological grounds but echoed the domestic 
stratification of the British national community - something that will become clearer 
in the views of the first socialists. But in these times there emerged another idea. 
Above all, the term Commonwealth referred originally to a white 
Commonwealth Tidrick has noted that we first find it employed by the Liberal 
Imperialist Lord Rosebery in 1884. `Does this fact of your being a nation', he inquired 
of an Australian audience, `imply separation from the Empire? God forbid! There is 
no need for any nation, however great, leaving the Empire, because the Empire is a 
commonwealth of nations' (Tidrick ibid, 227). Around the turn of the century, the 
term Commonwealth began to gain currency among people who wished to 
acknowledge the increasing political and economic maturity of the colonies of white 
settlement. Behind all this was discernible the dim outlines of an even grander vision - 
the social Darwinist inspired vision of an Anglo-Saxon world state, in which Britain, 
the white dominions and America would in concert undertake to ensure the peace and 
prosperity of the world (Tidrick ibid, 231). Victorian paternalistic humanism 
contributed to hierarchical racial stereotype (Gupta 1975,57). 
In short, structured by the discourses of race and power, ideas of the 
allegedly superior British national character were refracted by the inferiority of 
`backward' populations. The Empire was absolutely central to the organisation of 
British nationalism since the late 19`h and early 20th centuries when the discourse of 
imperial nationalism included elements of racial superiority on cultural and biological 
grounds. The imperial nationalist discourse constituted a «world view, which united 
the various fragments of the British nation in terms of a shared superiority over and 
against the non-European world. The `outside' had in fact contributed to the 
constitution of the `inside' in the sense that Empire or Commonwealth played a key 
role in the construction of an imaginary national space, which transcended class 
differences. 
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The conditions of emergence of the Labour party articulated this value- 
loaded duality of the frontier of the imperial Britishness under the influence of the 
liberal imperialism, as the discourse of the first socialists will make clear. The 
analysis of the relational character of the imperial space in the discourse of the 
Fabians, ethical socialists and Marxists provides us with the background and a guide 
for the analysis of the post-war discourse of the Labour party on the European 
question. 
3.3 The British Labour Party: `A Relic of the Empire' 
The early socialists did not object to British imperialism per se, but to the 
particular aggressive form, which it was perceived to take after the Jameson raid of 
1895. More significantly the left was disoriented by the widespread support that the 
new imperialism appeared to attract (Jones 1983; Taylor 1990,974). 
Perry Anderson, Tom Nairn and Raymond Williams all observed that 
Britain's long record of imperialism had «corrupted» the working-class, not by 
bringing economic benefits, but by inculcating habits and attitudes of insularity and 
superiority (Lin 1989,119,186). The German journalist, Egon Wertheimer noted that 
among the workers there prevailed a naive and rapturous pride in the fact that by men 
of their class and in their name, their name, the mightiest Empire of the world was 
ruled (Wertheimer 1929, x). Robert Tressell (1940), in the opening chapter `An 
Imperial Banquet' of his novel The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists, captured and 
portrayed the dominant covert imperialism and racism of the English working class 
with insight and accuracy. Writing in 1883 Jules Valles, a French writer, depicted the 
patriotism of English working men and women: «They are proud of being English; 
that's enough. Without a shirt on their backs they find consolation in seeing a scrap of 
bunting on the wind -a Union Jack; shoeless, they are happy to see the British lion 
with the globe beneath its paw)) (Bedarida 1979,147). This was the era of the 
imperialist idea. As Francois Bedarida put it: ((The basic idea was quite simple: the 
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English were a chosen race entrusted with a mission that was both human and divine, 
and which it was their duty to discharge» (Bedarida ibid, 145). 
In opposition to Anderson and Nairn, E. P. Thompson played down the 
economic reductionist thesis and emphasised the importance ofan unbroken tradition 
of English popular radical and anti-imperialist currents in the labour movement. 
However, he admitted that «imperialism penetrated deeply into the labour movement 
and even into socialist groups» (Thompson 1978,67). Yet, while shocked by the 
irrationality of jingoism, the founding groups of the Labour party refused to give up 
imperialism. Young (1989) maintains that this imperialist culture impinged on the 
consciousness of the founding groups of the Labour party such as the Fabian Society, 
the Marxist Social Democratic Federation (SDF) and the ethical Independent Labour 
party (ILP). In particular, Labour's infancy coincided with the definitive victory of 
`liberal imperialism' over the more right-wing variety, which had asserted itself in the 
1890s (Derry 1967; Nairn 1971; Cunningham 1989). 
Liberal imperialism represented the central free trade traditions and clung to 
the moral internationalism of Cobden and Bright, to their abstract liberal belief in 
`freedom' at home and abroad and the simpler and less doctrinaire view of Empire 
which fitted such old beliefs (Derry ibid, 231; Nairn 1972a, 57). For Haldane, Asquith, 
Grey, Acland and Munro-Ferguson, `the Empire' meant white settlement. The Empire 
was `composed of free self-governing communities, bound together, not by force, but 
by sentiment and affection. It was in essence a Liberal Empire'. For them, `race' was 
defined culturally, not biologically. Rosebery thought the `sympathy of the race' was 
based on linguistic, `moral, intellectual and political influences'. Immigration from 
`foreign races' was acceptable as long as it was assimilated. In this respect, Americans 
were part of the `British or Anglo-Saxon' race (Matthew 1973,163). Although their 
opposing views of social reform made the fusion of Fabian socialism and Liberal 
Imperialism not feasible (Joyce 1999,30), their imperialist tendencies made great 
impact on the Fabians. Actually, Rosebery and Haldane were both delighted with the 
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Fabian manifesto Fabianism and Imperialism; `one of the most brilliant and incisive 
analyses' which Haldane had seen (Matthew 1973,183). 
3.3.1 The Fabian Society and the Empire 
The Fabian Society has been portrayed as the embodiment of gradual 
constitutional reformism, to be brought about by middle-class `administrators, 
professionals and technicians' (Wright 1996). Founding as a socialist discussion group 
in 1884 the Society went on to co-found the Labour Representation Committee in 
1900, which in turn became the Labour party after the 1906 general election. 
The Fabian Society was probably the socialist grouping that was most 
outspoken in its support for imperialism (Kaarsholm 1989,115; Porter 1984,54). Yet, 
the imperialist issue did not appeal equally within the ranks of the Society, but 
threatened to split it. As chapter 5 will explain further, in relation to its European 
ideas, the Society should be categorised as a `hybrid' organisation. Throughout its life, 
it has acted as a debating chamber providing valuable space for imperialist and 
European ideas. With regard to imperialism, the differing sympathies of individual 
Fabians were already, before the outbreak of the South African war, becoming 
apparent. William Clarke contributed to the Progressive Review in February 1897 a 
brilliant, anti-imperialist article under the title `The Genesis of Jingoism'. On the other 
hand, Sidney Webb had come closely into contact with the Liberal Imperialists, 
Haldane and Rosebery, in his work and was thought to be drifting into the camp of the 
Liberal Imperialists, and Shaw and Band with him (McBriar 1962,120; Pierson 1979, 
96; MacKenzie 1984,170,184; Clarke 1978; Porter 1984,55; Joyce 1999). 
Nevertheless, the Fabians' first major sortie into foreign affairs came when 
George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950) was charged by the Executive Committee of the 
Society with writing a study of the Boer War. His resultant piece Fabianism and the 
Empire caused great consternation within the Society: thirteen Fabians resigned 
including the future Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald (1866-1937). In 
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essence, Shaw argued that imperialism was an established fact and therefore Britain 
should maintain and develop her Empire but along the lines of a `great socialist 
Commonwealth'. 
Yet, the curious nature of the Society's Tract Fabianism and the Empire and 
the reason why it was issued at all is explained by the Webb's and Shaw's 
expectations of the Liberal Imperialists. The fact that Fabianism and the Empire was 
concerned for half its length with domestic rather than imperial affairs was neither an 
accident, nor merely a sign that the Fabians were preoccupied with domestic reform 
(McBriar 1962,243). In the manifesto Fabianism and the Empire edited by Shaw in 
1900, the Society dedicated itself to the spread of 'efficiency' and `civilisation' at 
both national and international levels (Shaw 1900,3-4,23,41). In particular, Beatrice 
Webb wrote in her diaries that the manifesto was «a restatement of municipal 
socialism)) and that the Fabians pressed for «a national minimum of Health, Education 
and Efficiency» while Rosebery placed the interests of the Empire first (Mackenzie 
1984,187-8). The question at issue was whether the British Empire could be made 
into an agency for good. The main tenet of the Fabian view was that the `interests of 
civilization as a whole' should govern imperial policy (Shaw 1900,3; Porter 1968, 
231). Empire-building by its very nature meant growing units of diverse peoples 
under one government which in turn was deemed one step nearer the Society's 
definition of internationalism. Discussing Shaw's work, Pease noted that, `we must 
accept the most responsible imperial federations available as a `substitute for 
[internationalism]' (Pease 1963,31). 
They seem to have been of the opinion that the states of Western Europe 
could and would benefit `less developed' communities by taking them over or ruling 
them. Like the Liberals, they saw Empire as a `partnership' between the races and 
considered that they had a moral obligation and not just a dedication to trade and 
power interests (Shaw 1900,4; Porter 1968,115). However, this partnership of `races' 
was not based on equality in terms of political capacity. Ion Davis (1963) has said that 
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for many years the Fabians continued to treat, in particular, Africans as sub-human. 
The Webbs saw in Asia and Africa, with the one notable exception of Japan, a world 
of politically immature people, not yet sufficiently advanced to be able to master the 
arts of administration. ((The whole Chinese nation remind us, in fact, of a race of ants 
or bees of gregarious habits, but incapable of the organisation of the anthill or hive, 
Sidney Webb argued, pressing his social Darwinism (Winter 1974,184). They held 
that only parts of the Anglo-Saxon race possessed those qualities most conductive to 
the development of socialism. 
Yet, as said earlier, their prime concern was domestic. Their benign 
imperialist plans were threatened by a perceived quantitative and qualitative decline in 
the English or British `race' (Davin 1989). In the Webbs' writings in the years before 
the First World War we can see the extent to which they accepted and helped to 
propagate a number of crude assumptions about racial character, which were shared in 
late-Victorian society. In essence, according to Winter (1974) and Berger and Smith 
(1999), the Webbs argued that municipal socialism could be achieved only when the 
white race became the dominant one in world affairs. As seen in the liberal case, the 
racial Anglo-Saxonism became in some respects a natural accompaniment of British 
overseas imperialism since it embodied a view of historical past as well as stressing 
the common racial make up of the British colonisers (Malik ibid, 13). For the Fabians, 
Sidney Webb and for many others, whose views were woven out of diverse strands in 
late Victorian thought, reproducing the `race' was a domestic necessity. 
For the Victorians, race was a description of social distinctions. The view of 
non-Europeans as an inferior race was but an extension of the already existing view of 
the working class at home and took considerable time to become established as the 
normative view (Malik ibid, 91). The working class people and the poor were nature's 
failures, the `residuum', by no means, an `imperial race'. Samuel (1989a) writes that 
the outcast poor, or at any rate the `undeserving', `mendicant' poor, were, for some 
three centuries, the untouchables of British society. From the Tudor statutes against 
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`sturdy vagabonds' down to the abolition of the Poor Law they were the objects of 
administrative deterrence and repression. For the Malthusians they were an `extra' 
population, increasing geometrically by reason of their improvidence and threatening 
to overwhelm society by their number. For the social investigators of the 1830s, they 
were the carriers of cholera and crime. For the social Darwinists they were nature's 
failures, the `Residuum'. Class divisions denoted of `perpetual superior to perpetual 
inferior' (Malik ibid, 94). They were `examples of the race reverting to some inferior 
type from which ages of civilisation and culture have raised it. The characteristics of 
this class are entirely those of the inferior races of mankind - wandering habits, utter 
laziness, absence of forethought and provision; want of moral sense, cunning, dirt, and 
instances may be found in which their physical characteristics approach those of the 
lower animals or what Professor Darwin calls `our arboreal ancestors' (Malik ibid, 
95). 
By espousing these views, Webb asserted that «(London) the largest city in 
the world, the capital of the Empire, cannot, in these democratic days, safely be 
abandoned to the insidious influence of its festering centres of social ulceration. We 
dare not neglect the sullen discontent now spreading among its toiling millions. 
Metropolitan reform has become a national if not yet an imperial question)) (Webb 
1891,6). In fact, by 1901 metropolitan reform had become an imperial question when 
Webb noted that eight million destitute persons constituted `not merely a disgrace but 
a positive danger to our civilisation' and asked `what is the use of an Empire if it does 
not breed and maintain in the truest and fullest sense of the word an Imperial race? ' 
(Clough 1992,30). It was not accidental that the eugenics, an influential current of 
opinion in the birth control movement of the 1920s, were naturally linked with the 
Fabians (Rich 1986; Samuel 1989b; S. Cohen 1994). The Fabian vision of a welfare 
state was eugenic, combining racism, nationalism and a hatred of the native `unfit' (S. 
Cohen 1994,80). In the New Statesman in 1913, the Webbs commenting on the failing 
white birth rate, they wrote: `Into the scarcity thus created in particular districts, in 
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particular sections of the labour market, or in particular social strata, there rush the 
offspring of the less thrifty, the less intellectual, the less foreseeing of races and 
classes - the unskilled casual labourers of our great cities, the races of Eastern or 
Southern Europe, the negroes, the Chinese - possibly resulting as already parts in parts 
of the USA, in such a heterogeneous and mongrel population that democratic self- 
government, or even the effective application of the policy of a national minimum of 
civilised life will become increasingly unattainable. If anything like this happens, it is 
difficult to avoid the melancholy conclusion that, in some cataclysm that is impossible 
for us to foresee, that civilisation characteristic of the Western European races may go 
the way of half a dozen other civilisations that have within historic times preceded it; 
to be succeeded by a new social order developed by one or other of the coloured races, 
the negro, the kaffir or the Chinese» (Clough ibid, 31). Their fellow Fabian, H. G. 
Wells went as far as advocating `the sterilisation of the failures' (Clough ibid). Indeed, 
under the optic of `race hygiene', a Parliamentary Commission in 1933 was pondering 
the compulsory sterilisation of the `sub-normal types' (Samuel 1989a, xii). In this 
sense, the British working class was `white' in colonial settings but something less 
than, or other to, white in the context of Britain's internal social hierarchy. In the latter 
context, the excessive nature of the bourgeois construction of whiteness, its 
exclusionary zeal, brought about its own impossibility: most whites, at least within 
Britain, were unworthy of whiteness (Bonnett 2000,32). As a result, the Fabian elitist 
view of the inferiority of non-white races was to a large extent driven by domestic 
considerations. The perceived inferiority of the indigenous was projected over the 
assumed cultural and biological inferiority of the alien. Consequently, the party 
document in 1918, Labour and the New Social Order, referred to the `moral claims 
upon us of the non-adult races', and to the `great Commonwealth', which was `not an 
Empire in the old sense, but a Britannic Alliance' (Labour Party 1918,22). 
Finally, after the Second World War the Fabian Society retained the attitude 
of superiority held by many socialists in the western half of Europe. For the British 
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Let, rejection of Europe was based on the premise of being more `internationally' 
focused, especially on the Commonwealth which was increasingly seen as the 
democratic ideal, above the creeping `undemocratic' nature of non-Western Europe 
(Minion 1999,306). In this sense, for some within the Fabian International Bureau, 
any development of intra-continental co-operation was to be secondary to Britain's 
primary economic relationship with the Commonwealth (Minion ibid, 191). 
However, it was not just the Fabian Society that provided us with an insight 
of the duality of the imperial space: ethical socialists and Marxists contributed too. 
3.3.2 Ethical Socialists, Marxists and the Empire 
Despite their moralistic, radical anti-imperialism, both ethical socialists and 
Marxists could not disassociate themselves from this paternalistic view of the Empire. 
Although the more progressive Liberals and Marxists in the labour movement were 
sympathetic to the blacks, they were almost always motivated by a sort of paternalism 
influenced and shaped by the stereotypes of `scientific racism' (Young 1989,43). 
3.3.2.1 The ILP, the Ethical Socialists and the Commonwealth 
The Independent Labour party (ILP) was launched in 1893 at a time of 
growing resonance for socialism; at the same juncture the Fabian Society and the 
Marxist SDF were also exerting greater influence upon British politics (Minion ibid, 
256). The ILP stressed the ethical dimension to its own brand of socialism. Foote 
(1997) stresses the religious underpinning to the ILP, which was `committed to a 
socialist objective - the collective ownership of the means of production, distribution 
and exchange - interpreted in the light of Christian nonconformity rather than 
Marxism (of the SDF) or Fabian elitism'. One of the party's early theorists, J. Bruce 
Glasier (1859-1920) expressed this outlook as an `ideology [which] was in no sense 
materialistic or just political; rather it was an ethical doctrine, a region even. It was 
intended not simply to abolish poverty but rather to save the soul as well' (Greenleaf 
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1983,414). In relation to the ILP's wider international outlook, historians are in some 
disagreement. P. J. Twaites (1976), in his study of the party's later years (1938-50), 
suggests that the ILP was an international party from its inception. Robert Dowse 
(1966) in contrast argues that up until the First World War the ILP was 
overwhelmingly focused on domestic matters. The publications though of the ILP 
would tend to favour Twaites' position. 
Among the representatives of the ethical tradition, Robert Blatchford (1851- 
1943), an internationalist and follower of the Tory radical tradition of William 
Cobbett, came to believe that the Empire was necessary for the achievement of 
socialism in England (Barrow 1975,392,394). As will become clear later on, 
Blatchford was the most representative Little Englander of the labour movement at 
the time. Yet, as Gott (1989) has argued, Little Englanders of the 19thcentury never 
had any particular desire to make England `little'. Most of them had a more positive 
attitude to what would happen in a post-colonial age. 
In fact, during the Boer War Blatchford's chauvinism did not deter him from 
coming out to defend the Empire. His nationalism was a precondition of his 
international beliefs: «I am not a jingo, I am opposed to war but I cannot go with 
those socialists whose sympathies are with the enemy ... I am for peace and 
for 
international brotherhood. But when England is at war I'm English. I have no politics 
and no party. I am English)) (Ward 1998,60). His support for imperialism was on the 
grounds that England was the best colonising power the world had ever known and 
the `gentlest' and `wisest' ruler over `subject' races (Ward ibid, 60-2). «We never 
ought to have conquered India», he wrote; yet, owe did conquer and we must govern 
and defend it», he added (Thompson 1951,9). 
Likewise, Ramsay MacDonald (1866-1937), a leading member of the ILP, 
strongly defended the idea of Empire on the grounds that it was England's mission to 
spread freedom to the rest of the world (Porter 1968,189; Ward ibid; Berger 1999). 
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He argued for a democratised and humanised Empire, which had to fulfill its 
civilising mission in the world (Berger 1999,61). 
Like the Fabians, he thought that the European states had a `civilising 
mission' in the world due to the superiority of the white races' (Berger and Smith 
1999,17). During a debate on `socialist colonialism' at the 1907 Stuttgart Congress of 
the Second International, he supported the resolution that `congress does not, in 
principle and for all times, reject the colonial policy, which, under a socialist regime 
may have a civilising effect'. In this he merely echoed the position of the German 
Social Democrat Bernstein, who had argued that `a certain guardianship of cultured 
peoples over non-cultured peoples is a necessity which should also be recognised by 
socialists' (Fox 1933,110; Clough ibid, 141). Hence, imperial racism constituted a 
`world view' by erecting Eurocentric cultural standards in such a way that the 
colonised were equated with a total lack of culture. 
As a consequence, it is no wonder that in the post-war period, as will become 
clear in chapter 5, Britain had a special position in the ILP'. s vision of the United 
Socialist States of Europe due to her imperial past and manufacturing capabilities. 
3.3.2.2 The Marxists and the Commonwealth 
Henry Myers Hyndman, the founder of the Marxist Social Democratic 
Federation (SDF), wanted to maintain Britain's proud history of leading the world in 
political reform. Of no leading socialist other than Hyndman could Max Beer have 
written that he was `a patriot burning with zeal to see all his countrymen, the scions of 
a great race, well-housed and warlike, having a stake in their world-wide Empire, the 
boundaries of which they should be prepared to defend and to extend' (Beer 1929, 
230). Hyndman's path to socialism was paved with conservative influences. He 
belongs to the tradition of radical conservatism (Bevir 1991,126), which began with 
Burke and links Coleridge and Southey with Carlyle and Disraeli - see chapter 4 on 
`Little Englanderism and Labour'. His early writings concentrated on the conservative 
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theme of Empire. He argued that the Empire was in danger of falling apart and that the 
solution lay in a self-governing Commonwealth and parliamentary representation for 
the colonies (Hyndman 1877; 1881,443-62). He was a strong believer in the 
beneficent mission of Empire and an advocate of heavy expenditure on the Royal 
Navy (Tsuzuki 1961,2). `A true imperial policy', said Hyndman, `means a constant 
endeavour on the part of the whole nation to secure liberality, welfare, and 
contentment in every part of the British dominions, to knit together the various 
communities under our flag and to exercise far and wide that continuous influence in 
favour of the principles that have made the greatness of this country - justice, freedom, 
and respect for each one's rights' (Tsuzuki ibid, 25). 
Like Liberal Imperialists and Fabians, Hyndman's Empire was white: «In 
America, in Australia, all the world over, the Anglo-Saxon blood is still second to 
none)) (Hyndman 1884,31). He actually wondered, «why should not Britain strive to 
achieve a closer union with Australia, Canada and other `democratic Colonies'? » 
(Hyndman 1884,34). Although his views on race, nation and imperialism were 
challenged from within the SDF, Hyndman took a route based on race rather than 
class: «Surely those who are in favour of a unity of all peoples... cannot fail ere long to 
understand that the first step towards this great unity end must be a closer and yet 
closer unity of peoples of the same race, language and political traditions working 
together for the good of all portions of that noble federation» (Hobsbawm 1968,233- 
4). Hyndman identified the natural leaders with the upper `classes' (Bevir 1991,133). 
Like the elitism of the Fabians, Hyndman thought that the working classes were blind 
unless given suitable leadership (Bevir 1991,139). 
In fact, his attachment to the old Liberal tradition of the `rights of the little 
peoples' was accompanied by a strong element of paternalism in Hyndman's attitude 
to the working class: he felt almost towards them as he did towards the Fijians, the 
Africans and the Indians. He, like Fabians, was a different `species', a member of the 
`educated classes' (Tsuzuki ibid, 271). Furthermore, Hyndman was perhaps the most 
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infamous anti-Semite among early socialists (Tsuzuki ibid, 128). His first comments 
on the Boer War described it as «The Jew's war on the Transvaal» and blamed the 
«Jew jingo press» and the British ruling class run by «their masters, the capitalist 
Jews» (Baker 1974,5-6). Once more, paternalism over other races drew on the 
domestic front. Hyndman and his like-minded in the SDF such as Balfort Bax believed 
in the ultimate emancipation of the black peoples in the `backward' underdeveloped 
countries but they did not transcend racist stereotypes of the `backward', `child-like' 
black Africans. They actually thought that black Africans were incapable of playing 
any role in political struggles (Porter 1968,116; Young 1989,57). J. R. Widdup, 
another prominent member of the SDF, defended the `progressive' and `civilising' role 
of English imperialism in Africa by arguing that when socialism came the English 
would be the first to `drop the thought of any superior racial characteristics' (Young 
1989,45). 
It can hardly be accepted that the views of Shaw, Hyndman, Blatchford and 
McDonald were identical with those of the majority of the members of the founding 
groups of the Labour party. Nonetheless, as Ward (1998) has noted, the real problem 
about Labour anti-imperialists was the uncritical backing given to imperialist political 
programmes in which both liberal and socialist anti-imperialism incorporated and 
mirrored basic imperial nationalist assumptions, which intersected with particular 
racial constructions of the colonised on social and biological grounds. 
The `social imperialism' of the Labour party in the 1960s reflected many of 
the above assumptions already made in the late Victorian period by the first socialist 
groups. Some of them were destined to last for many years. For example, as seen, the 
racial superiority of the Anglo-Saxons was not based on merely biological grounds. 
Cultural traits were equally important for the best `governing race' of the world. 
Similarly, second, the `backwardness' of the non-English speaking world, which 
sustained the Anglo-Saxon superiority, reflected domestic considerations and was not 
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made in terms of biology either. Third, it was apparent that in the vision of the 
multicultural Commonwealth or the `partnership of races' lurked the seeds of 
exclusion for those populations, which were incapable in terms of political capacity. 
The post-war Labour official discourse on Commonwealth reproduced, re-worked and 
adapted many of the elements of the late Victorian imperialist discourse to the 
changing politico-economic environment of the post-colonial period. 
What follows then is the analysis of the imperial identity in others: that is, 
first the analysis of the imperial nationalism as emerged in diverse forms in the party 
discourse in each of the five examined periods; and, second, an analysis of its 
complementary racial implications. 
3.4 The Labour Commonwealth: Symbol of Greatness 
What makes the imperial vision of Labour Britishness the most significant 
element of the party's identity has been its continuity throughout the European 
debates. In particular, since the first application for British-membership of the 
Common Market in 1961 (in July 1961 Macmillan announced British application to 
join EEC), either in the form of the Commonwealth, or in the form of the Atlantic 
`special relationship' or in both, the extra-territorial space of the English-speaking 
world has remained a source of British superiority for all the post-war Labour leaders 
and the bulk of the party members. As Marquand has argued, in the post-war period, 
Britishness was firmly situated in relation to a history of global expansion and 
imperialism (Marquand 1995b, 189). When explaining Britain's policy concerning 
the Schuman Plan in 1950, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stafford Cripps, stated: 
«In our view, participation in a political federation, limited to Western Europe, is not 
compatible either with our Commonwealth ties, our obligations as a member of the 
wider Atlantic community, or as a world power (Cripps 1950, col. 1948). These 
views, which allegedly represented «a rehash of Beaverbrook's Empire policy>> 
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(Edwards 1950,5), were destined to influence heavily the attitudes of the following 
party leaderships and members. 
3.4.1 The Defence of `One Thousand Years of History' 
Between 1961, at the time of the Macmillan Government's first bid for 
British membership of the Common Market, and, 1967, when Wilson made the 
second try, for the Labour party the European issue was a matter of global «political 
considerations, that is, Britain's role as a world power (Labour Party 1961; 1962; 
1964; 1966). Tom Nairn has alleged that Labour's determined idealism about the 
Commonwealth suggested an ignorance of what at the time the Commonwealth really 
stood for; and hence an ignorance of the true terms of the problem of British 
capitalism in its fight for revival (Nairn 1965a, 8). In fact, at times of crisis for 
Britain, when the maintenance of the imperial grandeur proved financially unbearable, 
the Commonwealth started to disintegrate under the impact of the decolonisation 
process and the Common Market had emerged in 1957 as a promising politico- 
economic association of medium sized countries, Labour resorted to prior forms of 
belonging. 
For generations, the growth of British industrial capitalism was relatively 
neglected for the sake of investment in this parasitic imperial system. This was 
because imperial preferences and the sterling area had offered a financial buffer 
against Britain's true plight of accumulated wartime debts, major infrastructural 
damage and neglect. When the rest of Europe, particularly Germany, was 
reconstructing its industries and infrastructure with a judicious mix of capital and 
labour, it was easier and cheaper for Britain to retreat into an as yet unexploited part of 
one of those favoured zones in the Commonwealth rather than meet competition face- 
to-face. Thus, Britain was becoming a parasitic rather than a competitive economy 
living off the vestiges of her world monopoly, the underdeveloped world, and her past 
accumulations of wealth (Nairn 1965a, 5). In the early 1960s, doubts about the 
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Commonwealth's worth had begun to be widespread. Britain no longer possessed the 
military and economic capability to sustain its imperial role in the third world. By 
then, it was also recognised that a fairly rapid withdrawal would be less painful for all 
concerned than a lengthy campaign to retain control of possessions that would 
eventually be lost anyway (Sanders 1990,104). 
Especially, after the enlargement that followed Suez - between 1957 and 
1966 Britain granted formal autonomy to some 22 major colonial territories (Sanders 
ibid, 104; Curtis 1995,56) - the Commonwealth could not become a unified 
prosperous economic unit because the newly free developing nations did not want to 
be led by anybody but themselves, certainly not by an ex-colonial Power. For all the 
Commonwealth sentiment and emotion, the Commonwealth countries did not try to 
trade with Britain to the exclusion of all others just because they happened to belong 
to the Commonwealth (Hynd 1961, col. 1562). The last thing they were prepared to do 
was to give United Kingdom manufacturers a free rein in their markets. Before the 
1960s, Canada was becoming more dependent on the United States, and Australia was 
starting to recognise her Asian destiny. They were not good markets as the basis of 
British trade any more. Others would soon be looking to the Common Market, with or 
without Britain, because of the quantity and quality of what it offered (Young 1998, 
139). 
Indeed, Labour's imperial fervour defied trading patterns that were already 
visible. On the one hand, Commonwealth exports to Europe were rising while those to 
Britain were declining: as a result of the aggregate effect of innumerable individual 
business decisions in Europe and the United States, trade with the Empire circle was 
becoming progressively less important to the British economy (Sanders ibid, 119); on 
the other hand, the economic needs of those countries could not afford any more the 
paternalistic strangulation of the mother country and some, as already mentioned, had 
already chosen other economic partners. Sanders talks about a black political 
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conscience emerging that was all too aware of the nature and extent of the oppression 
and exploitation that colonialism engendered. (Sanders ibid, 115; Young 1998). 
However, the bonds of history and culture were stronger than the economic 
facts. Whatever the uncertainties surrounding it, the idea of nationality remained 
deeply embedded in the Labour party's political unconscious, and the sleeping images 
sprang to life in the time of crisis. As Samuel suggests, fantasies of national rebirth 
remain a stock-in-trade of political rhetoric (Samuel 1989a, xxxii). The white bonds, 
connected to the old rather than the new Commonwealth, gripped hard on Labour's 
mind (Young 1998,139). Even though Richard Crossman recognised that «despite all 
pretensions for fifteen years we have been going downhill, while France and Germany 
have been overtaking us and forging ahead» (Morgan 1981,951), the majority of his 
party colleagues maintained that Britain was «still a great nation» (Blyton 1962, col. 
570); «a world power (Wilson 1986,188) with a role to play on issues that went 
beyond Europe (Wilson 1962a, col. 1282). George and Heythome (1996) have noted 
that from the beginning the British Labour party approached the European 
Community from a very distinctive national political tradition in which imperialism 
featured strongly. This was sensible since, according to Jones and Keating, one of the 
historic forms of Labour nationalism has been patriotic - the idea of Britain as a world 
power (Jones and Keating 1985,186). 
More specifically, politically down to the 1960s, for Labour, Britain was still 
the `Mother country' of the Empire, a Commonwealth of nations covering a fifth of 
the earth's surface and accounting for a quarter of its population (Samuel 1989a, 27). 
In 1961, the Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee of the National Executive 
Committee of the party argued that «Britain's leading part in world affairs as the 
centre and founder of member of the Commonwealth would be sharply and quickly 
reduced in Europe» (Labour Party 1961,6). In the 1962 National Executive 
Committee statement `Labour and the Common Market', it was argued that Britain 
could still `go it alone'. It asked for «strong and binding safeguards for the trading and 
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other interests of our friends and partners in the Commonwealth» and «freedom as at 
present to pursue our own foreign policy>> (Labour Party 1962,219). Reminiscent of 
the Fabian inspired `partnership of races' as an agency for good, the Labour 
Commonwealth then represented the possibility of international harmony, peace and 
co-operation (Labour Party 1958,2). It offered the prospect of a multi-racial 
community in which Britain would have a central part, which was justifiable for a 
country of `higher civilisation' as Bernard Shaw might have said. As Stephen Howe 
has argued, much of this aspiration fell into the category acidly described by Ronald 
Robinson of radicals who `ceased to decry the wickedness of Empire past and exalted 
a better Empire to come' (Howe 1989,133). Labour, the party of the Commonwealth 
of partnership, offered the way in which Britain could continue to give a political, 
economic, and perhaps above all moral, lead to world-wide association of nations. 
The party leader of the time, Hugh Gaitskell gave his full support to this vision. 
Like other Fabian efficiency experts (he was vice-chairman of the New 
Fabian Research Bureau in 1934), Gaitskell's vision of the multiracial 
Commonwealth was determined by a particular set of political concerns and standards 
of citizenship (Williams 1979,61; Milward 1997,149). «Belief in freedom, 
democracy, and self-government» were the ideals that held the Commonwealth 
countries together, according to the party leader (Gaitskell 1970,209). The 
fundamental basis of British nationalism from the time of its emergence as a secular 
body of ideas in the seventeenth century had always been closely associated with 
Puritan ideas of liberty, though always expressed in a quiet and covert manner. These 
liberal ideas became incorporated into imperialism and ultimately acted on it to shape 
the emergence of the Commonwealth ideal, as seen above. In the 1960s, Labour 
imperialism, re-baptised as British Commonwealth, was a monument to British 
exuberance, British abilities, and British institutions (Thornton 1966). This gave 
British a sense of national pride in the civilising mission of British imperialism and a 
sense of moral superiority over the rest of the world - Europe included. 
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In particular, according to the Labour leader, the Commonwealth countries, 
especially the old white ones such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand were 
thought to be «very British indeed» because they embodied «our traditions, our 
political institutions and our monarchy)) (Gaitskell 1962a). The. Anglo-Saxon 
countries shared national traits of the political culture that put them in a superior 
position over the other nations - on Labour's view of political culture, see also chapter 
7. As Rich has argued, the British success in Empire building had to be ascribed to the 
respective merits not of breed but of institutions (Rich 1986,66). Gaitskell, echoing 
the teachings of the liberal imperialists, assumed that those `democratic' countries had 
the «obligation» to `spread' those institutions and help the «backward countries of 
Asia and Africa)) to go through <<the process of swift transition from static economy 
under democratic conditions» (Gaitskell 1970,211) - on Labour's `benevolent 
Empire', see also chapter 10. Labour's concept of imperialism was still reminiscent of 
the moral crusade which Rudyard Kipling had captured in the idea of the White 
Man's Burden -a notion which embodied the sense both of Western superiority and 
of a moral obligation placed upon the West to act for the good of humankind (Cohen 
1994,22; Malik 1996,115). After all, as seen earlier, the essence of Empire was 
control and authority; the confidence to wield it; and the capacity to enforce it, if 
necessary (Thornton 1966,383). By both birth and formation, Gaitskell had some of 
these instincts within him. He was infused with the imperial connection that found its 
way into the lives of so many of the British professional classes (Postan 1964; 
Williams 1979; Young 1998,156). His father joined the Indian Civil Service and 
spent all his professional life in Burma, though Hugh was born in Kensington. His 
elder brother, Arthur Jr, the founder of a peasant co-operative in the Sudan, spoke for 
the same dutiful attachment to public service on the global scale, and Hugh absorbed 
this family tradition (Williams 1979; Pimlott 1993). 
As Robins (1979) has pointed out, in the early 1960s, for most of the members 
and the MPs of the party, their leader's vision was common ground on which they 
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could build up their own political and economic toothless fantasies for the old 
Commonwealth and their country as the head of it. First, even though the confident 
certainties of the Churchillian vision had already dissolved, they persuaded 
themselves that this heterogeneous entity would play a vital role «in improving East- 
West relations by helping to develop international co-operation» (Blyton 1962, 
col. 576). A strong, free and independent Britain sustained and supported by her 
Commonwealth friends, white, black and yellow, it was argued that, would become «a 
beacon of hope for the world, a mitigating influence between the two muscle-bound 
giants» (Carr 1961,215). Further, Gaitskell's prime concern, as he often said, was 
with the economic reckoning. The Commonwealth, Labour persuaded themselves, 
could be made into a viable economic partner, a growing force, if only London set its 
mind to the task. The charge started developing then by Labour was that Britain had 
shamefully neglected Commonwealth trade, which should now be boosted by all 
manners and devices. George and Haythorne have remarked that protecting the 
national interests required steering Britain away from a European alliance and 
concentrating on the traditional trading relationship with the Commonwealth partners 
(George and Haythome 1996,113 ). 
In particular, Clive Jenkins proposed a Commonwealth Bank to help those 
colonies that desperately needed capital: «We could have a Commonwealth Bank and 
we could say to the emerging African nations and to the non committed nations: `Join 
us. We will give you help with goods, factories and universities')) (Jenkins 1961,21). 
Likewise, Barbara Castle had envisaged a mutually beneficial «co-operative 
Commonwealth» (Castle 1957,724) on the development of which the Labour party 
pledged to spend I% of the national income. By reinforcing financial aid by deliberate 
planning, trading agreements and preferential rates of interest for some of the colonial 
loans, Labour's aspiration was to revive the rusting skein of ties and make them into a 
more robust association of states and business networks (Young 1998,157). It was 
said that the colonial territories would no longer accept a system based on the 
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exploitation of their extractive industries and export profits on the current scale. «We 
must give them a share in the physical as well as financial priorities, because, as 
Healey claimed, owe in the Labour Movement have got to make the Commonwealth 
the nervous system, the spinal column of a new world orden> (Healey 1962,175). The 
debates of 1961 and 1962 contained much wild thrashing about in search of 
Commonwealth oriented economic nostrums, to avert the unthinkable political 
outcome of membership of the Common Market. But as seen above, the extra-national 
('outward-looking') polity of the party was dependent upon the retention and 
reinforcement of the Commonwealth's economic parasitism. 
Preserving the sterling area, where Commonwealth countries kept their funds, 
continued to eclipse any thought of European solidarity. The sterling area gave some 
lingering substance to the notion that Britain was still a World Power. It was to uphold 
that notion that Britain was at Suez (Young 1998,111). As Gupta has claimed, this 
was one of the weakest points in Hugh Gaitskell's ideal of «Commonwealth 
standards» (Gaitskell 1970,209-211), that is, the notion that it embodied the principle 
of the richer members helping the poorer ones, when it was well known that the 
Commonwealth's own interests, country by country, diverged sharply and none of the 
member states could really pursue this moral goal without harming their internal 
political goals (Gupta 1975,384). In these cases, as Nairn has remarked, 
`emergencies' define national identity (Nairn 1972b, 22). The changing global context 
prompted Labour to recover the imperial grandeur. 
Thus, by appealing to the imperial identity, the party leader could compensate 
for the failures of the British state and give it a continuity it might otherwise lack. In 
fact, British membership of the Common Market was presented as a suicidal action 
that would have broken the `great chain of being' : ((It does mean the end of Britain as 
an independent nation state... it means the end of a thousand years of history ... 
it does 
mean the end of the Commonwealth» (Gaitskell 1962b, 159), as Gaitskell said in an 
epoch-making speech at the Brighton ice rink on 3 October 1962, driven by a concern 
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for global internationalism. The widest boundaries of the British national collectivity 
came to signify a national symbol of a global superiority. According to David 
Marquand, more than anything else, this `imperialist vision' solidified Labour's 
attitude towards the European Community at the time (Marquand 1995b, 186). 
But imperialism itself was not something that distinguished the British from 
other European powers. As Colley has said, what was distinctive about Britain's 
Empire (for a century or so) was its sheer size (Colley 1999a, 28). Possession of such 
a vast and obvious alien Empire encouraged the British to see themselves as a distinct, 
special and - often - superior people (Young 1998). The extra-territorial, extra- 
European vision of the British Commonwealth provided Britain with a world role and 
influence that the narrow confines of the Common Market could not guarantee. As 
Tom Nairn has argued, extra-territoriality has been the true genetic code of 
Britishness (Nairn 1988,246). In his study over Labour's Commonwealth at the time, 
Davis maintained that Labour plans for the Commonwealth read strikingly like 
Chamberlain's Greater Britain or Leopold Amery's Commonwealth Empire (Davis 
1963,94). 
Gaitskell and, his successor, Harold Wilson thought that Britain could not 
become just another state of a supranational association. For Labour, the genuine 
opposite of `Great' in the inherited - history sense would naturally be small, or 
smallish: diplomatically resourceless, without a special relationship to call one's own, 
an absence unnoticed at Top Tables, an ordinary country comfortably distanced from 
today's global crossroads and with parochial problems like those of such un-Great 
nations as Italy, Spain and Holland (Nairn 1988,255), or what Gaitskell called, «no 
more than a state in the US of Europe, such as Texas and California)) (Gaitskell 
1962b, 159). George and Heythorne have claimed that Labour enjoyed a sense of 
national superiority over its Continental counterparts and an assumption of a 
privileged position and a duty to spread enlightenment to others (George and 
Heythorne 1996,113). Indeed, for Labour, the British state was a uniquely imperial 
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state, and the British a uniquely imperial people, with a role to play on issues that 
went beyond Europe (Blyton 1962, col. 570; Jay and Jenkins 1962,2; Wilson 1962a, 
col. 1282; 1986,188). On the contrary, it was argued that, as «a seventh state of 
Europe, instead of bridging the great gulfs that divided humanity - the gulf between 
the committed and the uncommitted, and the gulf between white and coloured, rich 
and poor - Britain would be hopelessly reduced to a ((powerless Little England on the 
margin of the Continent)) (Edelman 1962, col. 590). 
Contrary to Robins' (1979) assertions that the Commonwealth's significance 
declined by the time of Wilson's second application, this thesis maintains that 
Commonwealth retained its grip on Labour's minds for much longer than this scholar 
has assumed. 
3.4.2 The British Frontiers... at the `Himalayas' 
In the 1964 election manifesto «The New Britain, Labour thinking was still 
riveted to traditional British doctrines which stressed Atlantic and Commonwealth ties: 
«The first responsibility of a British Government is still to the Commonwealth)), it said 
(Labour Party 1964,56). In «Time for Decision, the party's manifesto for the 1966 
General election, it was maintained that «Britain... should be ready to enter the EEC 
provided essential British and Commonwealth interests are safeguarded» (Labour Party 
1966). George and Haythorne (1996) have argued that protecting the Commonwealth 
was one of the fundamental conditions on which the Labour government entered into 
the unsuccessful membership negotiations of 1966. On 2 May 1967, when Wilson 
announced in the Commons the decision of the government to make a second 
application for British membership of the EEC, he said owe do not see European unity 
as something narrow or inward looking. Britain has her own vital links through the 
Commonwealth with other continents. And he continued, assuring the House that, 
«together we can assure that Europe plays in world affairs the part which Europe of 
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today is not at present playing (... ) contributing to the solution of the world's North- 
South problem, to the needs of the developing world» (Wilson 1967a, 314). 
Nairn (1972b) has observed that Labour's Britain felt that its proper place 
remained the whole world, nothing else would do: only the globe could measure up to 
the demands of this particular national ego. The sheer breadth of this largesse would 
naturally enfold the world's poor shielding them from Brussels (Nairn 1972b, 14). Even 
though the party Conference in 1967 supported the government's decision to apply for 
entry into the Common Market by a great majority, if we read carefully the speeches of 
the Labour members, we will realise that the Labour party as a whole did not address 
the issue. In their arguments we can easily notice their reluctance to restrict Britain's 
role within the Common Market. Their perspective remained worldwide, or as a Labour 
MP put it, «across the Continent and across the seas» (De Freitas 1967, col. 1550), 
whereas their feelings were lukewarm towards the Continental countries. James 
Griffiths, the former Secretary for the Colonies in 1950-1, who had a long memory of 
the first years of decolonisation, was undoubtedly the most, prominent proponent for the 
dutiful role of Britain towards the Commonwealth. «We all have an obligation, 
Griffiths said, «to the countries which in the past were conquered, acquired 
and... exploited by us)) (Griffiths 1967, col. 1130). The left-wing MP Michael Foot saw 
the Commonwealth as the key factor for any substantial role for Britain within the 
Common Market: «This country will still able to exercise its power in the affairs of the 
world... if we could keep the Commonwealth together... then we could greatly enhance 
our influence in Europe too... » (Foot 1967, col. 1121). 
Indeed, from the most prominent anti-European of the Cabinet, such as 
Douglas Jay to the most voluble pro-Europeans such as George Brown, Michael Stewart 
and George Thomson, the Commonwealth still remained a vital vehicle of Britain's 
influence in the world (Jay 1968b, 125; Brown 1966a, 268; Thomson 1968, col. 545). 
The pro-Europeans especially put their arguments in imperial perspective and did not 
see Britain's influence as that of a medium sized country within the Common Market. 
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They claimed that membership was the only route left to the `top table' and they thus 
presented themselves as the true protectors of Britain's greatness. None of them, 
though, could get rid of the imperial legacy. Actually Stewart and Thomson conceded 
that «adaptation to our position in the second rank is not easy, for Britain still has post- 
imperial commitments all over the world» (Stewart 1980,144). George Thomson 
believed that, although Britain had to consolidate her position on Europe, «the 
Commonwealth still has a great potential usefulness in the world ... the 
Commonwealth 
will remain a vital vehicle of Britain's influence in the world» (Thomson 1968, 
col. 545). 
In this way, as Barnett (1997,294) Fishman (1998,102) and Nairn (2000,15) 
have all argued, the pro-European faction of the party supported the Common Market 
negatively from a neo-imperialist position. This was not a pro-European argument; it 
was a pro-British one. George Brown, the pro-European Foreign Secretary in the 
Wilson Cabinet (from August 1966 till March 1968) was one of the most eloquent 
advocates of this claim: 
((We have a role: our role is to lead Europe.. . It 
is our 
business to provide political leadership that for so long 
has eluded the democracies of the mainland of Europe. I 
have as much arrogant patriotism in me as anybody else, 
and I do not want to see Britain's becoming just one of a 
number of small European states. That is why I feel that 
we must support the idea of a United Europe, play our 
full part in bringing it about, and offer leadership 
wherever we can. I do not see where else leadership can 
come from other than from this country» (Brown 
1971,202). 
This contradicts Robins' claim that many within the Labour party were in the 
habit of posing Europeanism and the Commonwealth role in an `either/or' relation 
(Robins 1979,21). The pro-Europeans of the time could not abandon the imperial 
heritage in order to assume a European identity. The issue was not so clear-cut as a 
section of the scholarship suggests (Ashford 1991; Newman 1983). 
Although, in 1966, Wilson and his colleagues had no strong admiration for 
European integration, the severe economic crisis of that year, which was to culminate in 
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the devaluation of the pound by 14.3 in November 1967, brought about a change of 
tune, and in May 1967 the second application was made. Britain's entry into the EEC 
had every appearance of being a policy of last resort. For the party leader, Britain's 
entry was based on mere pragmatism (owe mean business» (Wilson 1967a, cols. 310- 
332), whereas the party's loyalties and attachments lay beyond the Atlantic. Newman 
(1983,218) has commented that the adopted Europeanism did not entail any real shift in 
political outlook while the nebulous world-wide consciousness associated with 
Commonwealth continued to underlie Labour party attitudes. 
As Northedge has also claimed, so long as Britain was able to maintain an 
influential position within the Commonwealth and the Atlantic Community, British 
governments were bound to work hard to preserve it (Northedge 1983,27). In fact, the 
left-wing Minister Barbara Castle noted in her memoirs that despite the fact that he did 
not succeed in developing the economic links with the Commonwealth «Harold 
(Wilson) has tried very hard to develop them... » (Castle 1984,249). 
Wilson's attitude to the Commonwealth came from the Attlee heritage, as he 
shared the Attlee Government's pride in the notion of transforming the Empire into the 
Commonwealth (Pimlott 1993,434). Wilson, like Gaitskell, was by temperament a 
Commonwealth man. Although the evidence of a long-term downward trend away from 
the Commonwealth trade could be refuted, this special relationship with a multi-racial 
Third World was something with great appeal to the Labour soul of which Wilson 
considered himself the prime custodian (Young 1998,187). So it was possible to see the 
Commonwealth as a multi-racial community and potential force in the world, and one in 
which there was a post-colonial role for Britain, guiding the development of the poorer 
regions (Pimlott 1993,434). Ziegler (1993) has pointed out that, Wilson's love for the 
Commonwealth was romantic and traditional as he relished the idea of Britain at the 
heart of this great international network. Wilson believed that Commonwealth 
represented the surest way by which his country could remain among the foremost 
powers, and he was also convinced that the British role in Africa and Asia was essential 
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for world peace. «On the Commonwealth), he wrote, «lies not only our economic 
strength but our potential for world leadership)) (Wilson 1964a, 21). His illusions of 
imperial grandeur made him believe «in a world which is genuinely looking to Britain 
for a lead which no others can give)) (Wilson 1964a, 11). In his. eyes, Britain rose to a 
first rank world Power because of «our traditions, the skill of our diplomatic service at 
home and abroad, our pattern of alliances and our unique relationship with a great 
Commonwealth» (Wilson 1965b, col. 1144). 
In fact, Wilson reiterated a theme, which was destined to be recurrent in his 
speeches till 1968. Britain's duty was not to strut the world stage like a down-at- heel 
monarch, but to contribute to peacekeeping on a worldwide scale. Wilson, as Gaitskell 
before, took it for granted that this would be acceptable both to the new developing 
countries, in whose territories for the most part this role would be played out, and to the 
British taxpayer, especially the not too well-off taxpayer, who would be called upon to 
foot the bill (Pimlott 1993,435). Wilson expressed these views in a statement made in 
the Commons, in his first speech on Foreign Affairs as Prime Minister: 
«I want to make it clear that whatever we may do in the 
field of cost effectiveness, value for money and a 
stringent review of expenditure, we cannot afford to 
relinquish our world role - our role which, for shorthand 
purposes, is sometimes called our `east of Suez' role, 
though this particular phrase, however convenient, lacks 
geographical accuracy» (Wilson 1964c, col. 424). 
The purest expression of Wilson's nationalism, of his belief in the Greater 
Britain and the modem version of the white man's burden - the peace-keeping role in 
Asia - and of the delusions of grandeur which inspired his whole foreign policy, till 
then, was to be found in the famous East of Suez speech made to a restless 
Parliamentary Labour party meeting in June 1966, in which he set Britain's frontier 
not on the Rhine but at the Himalayas (Allen 1988; Crossman 1975; Nairn 1965a). 
Significantly, while Wilson's books contain many lengthy extracts from his own 
speeches, this one was not included. Richard Crossman tells us that, «his theme was 
that, though, he was prepared to withdraw and reduce the number of troops East of 
84 
Suez (which he did later) he would never deny Britain the role of a world power 
(Crossman 1975,540). As Nairn has also pointed out, there was the same crypto- 
imperialist streak in the Labour internationalist ideology as there was in the liberal 
and free-trade dogmas that lent themselves so well to Anglo-Saxon Empire (Nairn 
1997,43). As a matter of fact, the internationalism of Labour was in terms of spheres 
of influence, constitutional dogma and the Atlantic alliance (Davis 1963,88). 
The EEC should have killed all illusions about the British Commonwealth and 
destroyed the last vestiges of social imperialism. Yet, it revealed the lack of any specific 
policy that was outside the limits of the Commonwealth and NATO. 
This was a nationalism that hoped to conserve and transmute the national 
essence by embracing the power, which supplanted it (Nairn 1972b, 19). The Atlantic 
ally traditionally served as a buffer to cushion the shock of British declining power. 
This relationship goes back to the tacit alliance concluded between the British and 
American Empires before 1914 (Nairn 1971,39). At that time, the differing interests of 
the two systems - one increasingly devoted to the export of capital, the other to rapid 
industrial growth and the export of commodities - allowed an implicit accommodation 
between them. This material conjuncture provided the basis for a conflation of 
ideologies. Like the British 'liberal imperialism', which triumphed, as already 
mentioned, in 1906, the American Empire easily assumed the guise of an anti- 
imperialist and internationalist movement (Jones 1972,229). Many elements in the 
common culture of the two nations fostered this development, and rendered it palatable 
to the Labour party (Nairn 1971,18). 
This was made more evident during and after the Suez fiasco. Labour's 
apparently anti-imperialist opposition to the Conservative government's Suez 
adventure was in fact wholly consonant with its Atlantic nationalism. In tones of 
genuine outrage, it was pointed out by many a Labour spokesman at the time that the 
Tory government had not even informed the American ally of what they were up to 
(Young 1998,135). In 1957, the Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell had expressed his 
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strong attachment to a wider world perspective, which incorporated the 
Commonwealth and the Atlantic Alliance (Williams 1979,702). After the Suez 
expedition, Gaitskell frankly admitted that the Commonwealth was not enough for 
Britain to hold world role pretences: «In these circumstances we had to be realistic 
and recognise that all ideas of `going it alone' were nonsense and that we must cut our 
losses and swallow our pride. And he continued: «in spite of our bargaining powers 
(Commonwealth) we cannot use them on our own... they are essentially weapons, 
which can only be used in collaboration with US» (Gaitskell 1957,419). 
Likewise, in the 1960s, as Nairn noted, the proudest, most arrogantly 
independent-looking of Wilson's postures, the claim to a `world role' east of Suez, in 
reality involved American backing (Nairn 1965a, 11). As long as America was so 
busy in Vietnam, she was quite happy to hear Wilson saying that Britain's frontiers 
were along the Himalayas, defending the most important Asian country from the 
Chinese menace. As Pimlott has remarked, in 1964 Wilson had readily agreed to 
White House requests that Britain should keep a foothold in Hong Kong, Malaysia 
and the Persian Gulf while the following year, American demands became more 
specific, as the commitments to US troops in the Far East grew (Pimlott 1993,385). 
Wilson maintained that «our Commonwealth history and connections mean that 
Britain can provide for the Alliances and for the world peace-keeping role a 
contribution which no other country, not excluding America, can provide» (Wilson 
1964c, col. 424). His Commonwealth peace initiative on Vietnam in 1965 was 
indicative of this determination, despite his critics' claims that he had too high an 
opinion of Britain's moral weight in world affairs, especially with regard to the 
Commonwealth as being a moral third force in world affairs, taking into account the 
strained relations over the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia in 
1965 and the several economic crises of his government (Castle 1984; Crossman 
1975; P. Jenkins 1971; Ponting 1989; Wilson 1965a; 1971e; Wrigley 1993,126). 
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Despite Wilson's refusal to Lyndon Johnson's request for British troops, the 
Vietnam war was a very good opportunity for the Labour Prime Minister to harbour 
illusions that Britain, as head of the Commonwealth, was sitting on the same table 
with the Americans and that her world status was tantamount to a go-between role. 
Even if Britain, having abandoned all of its major colonies, no longer needed to 
protect exclusively British interests in the third world, it could still provide a useful 
supplement to American efforts to defend the general interests of the West which in 
an era of decolonisation the Soviet Union was doing its best to subvert. 
Furthermore, for some British ministers, adherence to `East of Suez' was 
simply an obligation of the British-American partnership. Patrick Gordon Walker, 
Michael Stewart and George Brown, who were, at the time, responsible for Labour's 
conduct of foreign policy, all prized the American connection, despite their different 
evaluations of the relative merits of European and Commonwealth entanglements. In 
several cases George Brown had underlined that owe remain firmly committed to the 
alliance as the basis of the security of this country» (Brown 1967b, col. 345), and as «a 
corner-stone of our foreign policy» (Brown 1966a, 268). The collusion, so evident in 
Britain's role as chief executant of American designs and the re-structuring of the 
Atlantic Alliance, was in fact worldwide. As one of his biographer tells us, Wilson 
was determined to `recreate the Anglo-American axis' (Ziegler 1993,221) at the 
expense, if necessary, of Britain's links with Europe in order to maintain Britain's 
world position as an imperial, though toothless, Power. «He (Wilson) just saw that, 
as the then Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons, 
Richard Crossman said, «one must either go into Europe or become a subsidiary of 
the Americans, and he chose the latter (Crossman 1975,156). In addition, as recent 
documentation revealed, Wilson went on to discuss with the American President 
Lyndon Johnson the possibility of Britain becoming America's 51 " state which though 
was ruled out of the question «because the US was keen for Britain to join Europe to 
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restrain De Gaulle's erratic behaviour (Little 1999,15). In the late sixties, Britain's 
world role had become a mercenary one, as the United States' hired help. 
However, the Commonwealth idea had lost much of its gloss, largely because 
of, as already seen, the second decolonisation wave; second, Wilson's half-hearted 
response (economic sanctions) to Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Rhodesia in the period after 1965, which was not well-received by black 
Commonwealth leaders who naturally felt that Britain should have acted far more 
decisively in order to effect a speedy transition to majority rule (Frankel 1975; 
Berridge 1981,151; Ponting 1989,243; Sanders 1990,149; Ziegler 1993,235); third, 
Britain's persistent refusal either to withdraw its investments from South Africa or to 
boycott South African products continually aroused the resentment of the black 
Commonwealth states - see the arms sale affair which cost George Brown his post 
(Berridge 1981,151; Brown 1971,171; Castle 1984,339; Crossman 1975,477); 
fourth, the burden of successive economic crises, and the final abandonment of the 
Overseas Sterling Area in 1968 cost Britain a potential economic lever (Sanders ibid, 
149). The decision of the British government to abandon the East of Suez role, 
announced by Wilson in the Commons on 16`h January 1968, turned off the military 
engines of neo-imperialism and resulted in a reassessment of Britain's role (Wilson 
1968, col. 1580). 
Yet, as Saunders (ibid, 291) has put it, the continued pursuit of the residual 
pretensions of the old Empire circle in the seventies and early eighties led to the `post- 
imperial Great Power syndrome'. 
3.4.3 The `Great Power Syndrome' 
In an overall examination of the European debates, Labour commented in 
1973 that «throughout the whole period of applications and negotiations for the British 
entry from 1961 to 1971 the party's policy has consistently supported the view that 
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there are many essential British and Commonwealth interests which must be 
safeguarded in any negotiations for UK accession to the Community; failing the 
achievement of the necessary safeguards, it would be far better for Britain to remain 
outside the EEC than to go in on onerous and unacceptable terms)) (Labour Party 
1973b, 13). 
In fact, the vestiges of imperial nationalism were visible in Labour discourse, 
even after Britain had officially abandoned her East of Suez role. Under the impact of 
the loss of the imperial space, all the factions of the party, the pro and anti-Europeans, 
and the agnosticists such as Wilson, Callaghan and Healey, put their policies into a 
culturally homogenised context saturated with moral content and global reach. But the 
mental framework of this context was nationalist throughout. 
George and Heythorne (1996) have argued that the Commonwealth was one 
of the central objections of Labour in opposition to the terms of entry negotiated by 
the Conservative government of Edward Heath in 1972. Even as late as 1975, during 
the renegotiation of the terms of entry, Harold Wilson made protection for agricultural 
exports to Britain from Australia and New Zealand one of the key issues at the summit 
meeting in Dublin to finalise the new terms. His statement that he had more relatives 
in New Zealand than he had in Huddersfield (his home town) struck exactly the right 
note with the British working classes: protecting the interests of `our own people' 
(George and Heythorne 1996,113) -a very familiar theme at a time when the party 
became more insular, as chapter 4 on Little Englanderism makes clear. Indeed, in a 
speech to a Welsh Rally at Newtown, Montgommery, Wilson outlined his first duty to 
the nation in terms of judging the arrangements for entry against traditional concerns 
such as Commonwealth sugar and New Zealand. Wilson had seen Heath's 
arrangements as «a betrayal of the Commonwealth>, and in general, sensed «a 
conspiracy aimed at discounting>> the developing countries (Wilson 1971d, col. 2085). 
For Wilson, British and Commonwealth interests were still inseparable in the early 
1970s. He and Callaghan spent a lot of time elucidating the special difficulties of New 
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Zealand whose traditional market in Britain had been affected by British membership. 
«He viewed it as a moral obligation, Callaghan later wrote (Callaghan 1987,313). 
Callaghan, because of his wartime service, attachment to Indian 
independence, and his relationships with Commonwealth leaders, made the world 
wide network of links that resulted central to his view of the world. «Our interests are 
closer to world interests than they are to the present policies of the European 
Community, Callaghan said at St. George's Hall Bradford on 8 September 1971 
(Callaghan 1971 c, 5). His biographer has remarked that, like Churchill, Callaghan saw 
Britain's world role as consisting of three concentric rings, the North Atlantic 
Alliance, the Commonwealth, and a relationship with western Europe, but the last of 
these was also last in importance (Morgan 1997,393). Callaghan insisted that a world, 
not a regional answer was needed to the problems of global economy, because Britain 
was «a sea-going nation with great traditions... » (Callaghan 1973, col. 1741). This 
was also his message at the party conference in 1971: 
Q know it is our history and our tradition to throw our 
weight into the world scales on these issues, not to talk 
as one submerged voice inside a grouping, inside 
Europe. I want us to speak up, to speak up for 
internationalism, to speak up for true world trade. We 
are large enough to do so» (Callaghan 1971b, 143). 
Several Labour MPs, also, capitalising on the nationalism of the party 
leadership, maintained that «the membership of the EEC will inhibit us in many ways 
from playing the sort of role we should play in the world» (Prentice 1971, col. 1335), 
and that instead of sinking in «our own prosperous provincialism in Europe, we had a 
duty to the outside world» (De Freitas 1970, col. 497). The leftish Labour members 
wanted to see Britain assuming a peacekeeping role (Barnes 1971, col. 1590), bridging 
the gap between the rich and the poor nations, in other words, a benevolent world role 
which had, though, in the past, proved illusory in political and economic terms for the 
declining British state. 
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As seen above, for the pro-European MPs, the European Economic 
Community was mostly presented as a surrogate for the lost Empire. It supplied the 
same sensation as in the past, of belonging to a great and glorious show (Price 1975, 
611). As Tom Nairn (2000,15) has put it, the English were the main builders of the 
old archipelago; they could hardly avoid being the architects of the new. Most of their 
arguments were drawing on the imperial extra-territoriality. They were not 
accustomed to seeing Britain as a medium sized country. Even a committed European, 
like Roy Jenkins wrote in his book that if Britain could make European unity 
((an accepted force not only for European but for world 
progress, then we shall indeed be fulfilling a new 
leadership role)) (Jenkins 1972a, 79). 
According to his biographer, Roy Jenkins was one of the first British 
politicians of either party to shake off the wartime delusion of great power status 
(Campbell 1983,49). However, Jenkins saw in a united Europe under British 
leadership a power for good in the world as a counterweight to America: «The best 
basis for a close continuing North Atlantic relationship is the nearest approach to 
equality... and this is far more likely to be achieved by a Europe of which Britain is a 
part than one from which Britain is excluded» (Jenkins 1971, col. 1308). 
Barnett (1997,295) has pointed out that this was a pro-British argument that 
took a European form. It contained an enormous degree of suppressed resentment 
against Europe - for having developed such a dynamic project in which, to preserve 
its standing, Britain had to participate. In the pro-European arguments there were 
obvious presumptions of superiority and nostalgia for Empire, which underlined 
Britain's potential contribution to European affairs as bearer of an outward-looking 
attitude towards the world affairs. «I believe a distinctive British impact can and 
should be made on the Community as a whole because we have a vast experience as a 
world power: we have had a vast experience in terms of aid to developing countries 
and I believe that we should bring that experience to bear upon the decisions which 
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will be made when we are a member of the Community)), it was argued (Oram 1972, 
col. 83). In similar terms, David Owen asserted that the influence of the EC could not 
be confined to the European contours: 
«our foreign policy in Europe had to be not solely concerned 
with the aspirations of Europeans, or with the short-term 
objectives of European economic policy, but had at all times 
to take a wider view of our role as Europeans and to look 
beyond regionally oriented European politics. There has never 
been a time when the need for internationalism was not just a 
Utopian dream. It is the very essence of our survival» 
(Owen 1973, co1.222). 
Even though they all recognised the limitations of the Commonwealth 
relationship, the withdrawal from the East of Suez role did not mean for them «the 
abandonment of our links» (Richard et al. 1971,17). Featherstone has argued that, 
although the pro-imperial arguments were more applicable to the anti-European 
faction, they applied no less to the majoritarian view within the party as a whole and 
were conclusions drawn from the broad sweep of party history. For this reason we 
must give them importance in our analysis (Featherstone 1981a, 10). As a result, in 
mid-seventies Labour still insisted that 
«Our membership of the Commonwealth continued 
to be a key factor in British foreign policy)) 
(Labour Party 1975,84), 
and that 
«in an increasingly interdependent world, the existence 
of the Commonwealth with its diversity of membership, 
cutting across divisions of race and culture and 
embracing nations at almost every level of economic 
development in every part of the world is an important 
contribution to world understanding» 
{Labour Party 1976b, 93). 
As the previous analysis has showed, there was still the problem of the 
`imperial overhang' within the ranks of the Labour party, the tendency to continue to 
view the world from the old imperial perspective, to persist with the old habits of 
thinking, long after the Empire itself had disappeared. This challenges Robins' (1979) 
`government/opposition' variable; the endeavours of the Wilson government to 
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maintain world role pretences were not abandoned when the party was in opposition. 
Even the pro-European MPs did not see Britain in Europe without her world links. In 
this sense, Britain could not become a fully-engaged European country, as Barnett 
rightly put it above. And, certainly it was not the case that Europe was seen just as a 
pretext to overthrow the Heath government, as Newman (1983) has assumed. For the 
bulk of the Labour party in the 1970s, the Commonwealth argument did not lose its 
attraction and, as Sanders suggests, `the `post-imperial Great Power syndrome' did 
continue to affect British foreign policy considerations long after the formal retreat 
from the world role in the late 1960s' (Sanders 1990,290). 
Another illustration of this syndrome was the position of the party during the 
Falklands war and the ensuing wrangling over the Common Agricultural Policy, as 
the following two sections reveal. 
3.4.3.1 The Falklands Factor and the Commonwealth: The `Last 
Episode of the Imperial Past'? 
While the arguments surrounding the importance of the Commonwealth in 
European affairs appeared to settle down at the beginning of the eighties (it was really 
more apparent than real), a challenge to British sovereignty and imperial grandeur 
were adequate to bring to the surface the party's loyalty to the archipelagic family as 
an extension of the British nation. As Kershen (1998) has noted, nationalism in the 
broader and artificially constructed British context, ebbs and flows with external 
pressures and tensions; war, or its threat, is a major stimulus. The Falllands war was 
another proof that issues of national identity have not been for Labour just a matter of 
intra-party struggle or arenas for short-term electoral benefits. This incident makes 
untenable several of the claims of those scholars who have treated the European issue 
either as an issue of adversarial politics (Newman 1983; Ashford 1992,119; Geddes 
1994,374; Daniels 1998,79) or a matter of the intra-party balance of power (Geyer 
1992; Robins 1979; Jones 1996,99; Rosamond 1990,41; Bilski 1977). The Labour 
attitudes towards the Atlantic adventure and its implications for the European debate 
93 
reveal the consistency and continuity of the party beliefs and loyalties with regard to 
the English-speaking world. 
According to Tom Nairn, the Falklands war gave the Labour party the 
chance to re-frame a sense of national identity distanced from the chauvinism of its 
imperial tradition, the psychology of `undefeated superiority' (Nairn 1982,14) that 
accompanied it, and the Conservative institutional status quo as embodied in the very 
aura of sovereignty itself, the `sacred cow of the world order', according to Anthony 
Barnett (1982,11). But this did not happen because it would have meant that the party 
had to renounce its nationalist roots and the traditional background out of which it 
emerged. 
Briefly, in the spring of 1982 a war was fought between Britain and 
Argentina over the sovereignty of the Falklands Islands or the Malvinas as they are 
known in Argentina. General Leopoldo Galtieri, the leader of the military junta in 
Argentina, ordered an invasion on 2 April 1982 and rallied a national cause to his 
faltering military regime. In Britain, immersed in perennial domestic and political 
crisis, the occupation of the islands was widely perceived as a demeaning slight by a 
Third World nation towards a world power with a special relationship with the USA. 
In retaliation, the British government with the full parliamentary support of the 
Labour opposition (HMSO 1982a), put a large Task Force of ships and military units 
to sea in record time. The fleet sailed over 8000 miles to where the islands are situated 
off the coast of Argentina in the South Atlantic. The British forces advanced across 
windswept terrain to liberate the capital, Port Stanley, on 14 June 1982 where most 
2000 inhabitants lived. On the way there were over 1000 British and over 2000 
Argentineans casualties in just 33 days of fighting (Aulich 1992; Barnett 1982; 
Charlton 1989; Dillon 1989; Freedman 1988; 1990; HMSO 1982b). 
As an examination of the parliamentary debates of the time has exposed 
(HMSO 1982a), Labour chose the traditional way: an atavistic rhetoric and a re- 
enactment of a mythologised version of the national past as if it was the only source 
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of hope and identity to exorcise the facts of a declining present, all in combination 
with the Labourist discourse of moral internationalism - `the rights of the people' -, 
which implied sheer imperialism, national superiority, paternalism, and fostering 
racism against the `barbarian Argies' and those who `look to us' to give them the 
lights of `our' superior British civilisation respectively. Neil Kinnock, the subsequent 
successor to the party leader at the time (Michael Foot), lamented the fact that it was 
difficult for some to get rid «of the imperial grandeur (Kinnock 1980,422). During 
the Atlantic adventure, Labour responses were consistent with those of the previous 
decades, that is, were significantly characterised by a reluctance to challenge the 
model of national greatness inherited by its traditional imperial attitudes, the 
formation of the Commonwealth and the metaphysical order of belonging on which it 
rested. Lucy Noakes (1998) has argued that the war was an opportunity for Britain to 
prove that it was 'Great' again; a chance to recompense for the numerous `end of 
Empire' wars of the past fifty years: wars in Malaya, Korea, Kenya, Aden, Suez, and 
Cyprus that symbolised Britain's declining role as an imperial world power. The 
Falklands War became a crusade to recapture lost British honour and values, an 
opportunity to prove that British military might still existed, at least enough to mount 
a relatively small and short campaign to recapture some small, sparsely populated 
islands thousands of miles away (Noakes ibid, 106). 
As a matter of fact, the case for Labour in 1983 was very simple, or so it was 
claimed to be, as George Robertson said later: <dt was on people with the right to 
choose» (Robertson 1982,15). This theme of liberal imperialism became Labour 
motto since the first debate in the Commons: 
«The rights and the circumstances of the people in the 
Falldand Islands must be uppermost in our minds.... It is a 
question of people who wish to be associated with this 
country and who have built their whole life on the basis 
of association with this country. We have a moral duty, a 
political duty and every other kind of duty to ensure that 
that is sustained» (Foot 1982a, col. 638). 
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The leader of the party, Michael Foot made it clear that it was people not 
territory that mattered, «the people who wish to be associated with this country (read: 
ruled by it)». Later, though, the left-wing MP Judith Hart left no doubt about what 
was at stake in this crisis: 
«We know that there are implications for other 
territories that are part of the British Commonwealth to 
whose people and to whose territory we owe very grave 
responsibilities» (Hart 1982, col. 1161) 
As Miles (1993b) has noted, the Falklands episode celebrated the cultural 
and spiritual continuity, which could transcend 8000 miles and call the nation to arms 
in defence of its own distant people. As said above, nationhood involves the 
distinctive imagining of a bounded totality beyond immediate experience of place. 
The Labour party legitimated this stretching of the boundary of the imagined 
community of the British nation to include the people of the Falklands. For Labour, 
the war was about territory, national sovereignty - the everlasting element of British 
and Labour nationalism - and credibility. The role of Britain in the world was put in 
danger. In reality, the Labour MPs were not defending 1,800 islanders and their 
600,000 sheep in 1982. At a time when the economy and social life were visibly 
falling apart in Britain (Thompson 1985,103), Labour was defending Britain's 
standing in the world. The lives of the islanders were inextricably conflated with 
British rule over them and territorial conquest, under a cloud of moral purity (Barnett 
1982,19). As Foot put the case: 
The people of the Falkland Islands have the absolute 
right to look to us at this moment of their desperate 
plight, just as they have looked to us over the past 150 
years» (Foot 1982a, col. 639). 
Labour was fighting for the Anglo-Saxon right to arbitrate across all frontiers 
under the pretext that a British voice must speak out against the Argentineans' 
violations of humanity. Foot was expressing the liberal conscience of an 
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internationalism whose core was a presumption of national superiority. His real 
interest was to 
((uphold the rights of our country throughout the world 
and the claim of our country to be a defender of people's 
freedom throughout the world, particularly those who 
look to us for specialprotection)) (Foot 1982a, 
col. 639). 
His motivation could hardly have been a desire to ensure more peaceful 
relations internationally. But nor was it the case that he had radically changed his 
attitudes from the man who campaigned for British unilateral nuclear disarmament 
during the 1950s. There was an underlying continuity of attitude between the strand of 
opinion he belonged to then and his position on the Falklands crisis: the tradition of 
British liberalism. 
It has long been remarked that the first CND campaign (1957-63) saw a 
renewal of the British liberal tradition of protest that goes back to opposition to the 
slave trade. Humanitarian antagonism to the unnecessary and inhuman excesses of the 
world was the characteristic feature of this stance (Wainwright 1987). As Barnett has 
noted, it never challenged the system, which produced such horrors and rather 
avoided any overall, systematic theory, for fear of dogmatism and ideological excess 
on its part (Barnett 1982,21). Michael Foot was a contemporary embodiment of this 
tradition and exemplified one of its most paternalistic aspects: its moral imperialism. 
Foot's sentiments over the Falklands were an archetypal expression of this liberal 
imperialism. As Ken Coates has said, the left-wing Labour leader Michael Foot 
drifted along in an orgy of jingoism, going back to the famous jingoes of Hyndman 
and Blatchford, but not going forward to anything (Coates 1982,13). 
Actually, it did not take long for Foot's peaceful intentions to show their true 
colours. In 1933 he had stated firmly: `Force is not the proper instrument to establish 
the rights and wrongs of any case; reasonable and just ends can only be achieved by 
reasonable and just methods' (Jones 1994,27). Yet, fifty years later, winding up his 
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speech in the Commons, Foot made himself the voice of the House that day. He 
became the spokesperson for its fervid assent to the expedition. Advertising himself 
as the potential saviour of the nation (John Silkin, who was closely associated with 
the CND in the late fifties gave his verdict later: ((The leader of. the Opposition spoke 
for the nation)) (Silkin 1982, col. 661), Foot blamed the government for betrayal and 
neglect of the rights of the islanders in the Falklands and demanded that something 
had to be done for their protection: 
«The government must now prove by deeds that they are 
not responsible for the betrayal and cannot be faced with 
that charge» (Foot 1982a, col. 641). 
As one of his biographers said, Foot required that Britain should somehow 
get the Argentineans out of the islands, whether by actual force, threat, pressure or 
whatever method proved effectual (Jones 1994,487). Foster (1999) also noted that 
despite the remoteness of the fighting and the limited numbers of those directly 
involved in it, this was a struggle in which every member of the community could 
play an active role through the actual structures, historical associations and symbolic 
significance of the family. In fact, the corrosive relationship between national decline 
and nostalgia for a greater national past, the explosion of national feeling and the 
essentially backward-looking nostalgic nature of that national feeling, were embodied 
in the words of the leader of the Opposition. The party was giving the impression that 
they were living on the capital of past consciousness and successes (see also 
memories of Empire in chapter 10), but increasingly out of touch with what was going 
on in everyday life around it (Hall 1983,11). According to Foot, Britain had to 
reinvent herself as a military power: 
«More important than the question of what happened to British 
diplomacy or to British intelligence is what happened to 
our power to act... Of course this country has the power 
to act - often, taking military measures» (Foot 1982a, 
col. 640). 
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The leader of the Opposition was wondering where the Dunkirk spirit had 
gone. E. P. Thompson commented that between the Britain of the `Falklands Factor' - 
the strutting bully which made the world aghast by sinking the General Belgrano, an 
old battleship with a complement of more than one thousand souls, without warning 
and outside the exclusion zone which we ourselves had imposed and while it was 
stemming away from our fleet - and the alternative Britain of citizens and not subjects 
which, summoned up all the strengths of its long democratic past and cut through the 
world's nuclear knot, the leader of the opposition chose the former (Thompson 1985, 
104). 
In similar terms, all the Labour MPs gave their allegiance to the British 
nation and its superior mission (Goodwin 1982,4-7; Hallas 1982,5-7). The left wing 
MPs, apart from some exceptions such as Tony Benn and Tam Dalyell, either 
continued to rely on the UN chimera and a Utopian pacifist tradition (Christie 1984, 
301), or, like their fellow like-minded MP Judith Hart, insisted that the 
`responsibility' to the Commonwealth territories had to be reassumed. Michael 
English put this duty in its right dimensions: 
((We are defending civilisation against barbarians as our 
ancestors did centuries ago elsewhere. That is what we 
are doing. That is what I hope we shall continue to do for 
the sake of the world» (English 1982, col. 1025) 
It was the duty of the `White Man's Burden' that the British knew very well 
how to fulfill. The lesson of the Falklands was that this nation still had those sterling 
qualities, which shined through the island's history. Labour wanted to prove that their 
generation could match their fathers and grandfathers in ability, in courage and in 
resolution. The Brits stood for the civilisation that their ancestors bequeathed them, 
and the rest of the world was conspicuously classified as the innocent `lesser breeds' 
(the islanders who `look to us' and obviously all the other who depended upon the 
British race), and the `barbarians' (the Argentineans who `raped' British sovereignty, 
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and implicitly all these countries which did not respect it (sovereignty)- we suppose, 
Europeans including). 
Therefore, it was not an irony that in 1972 Labour argued for six days against 
British entry to the Common Market and ten years later, it did not take more than 
three hours for the party to give its assent to the war. Throughout all these years, 
Labour's heart had been still in the Open Sea deeply rooted in a great machinery of 
tradition and interests. The imagery of a `sceptred isle set in a silver sea', powerfully 
supported by the English-speaking peoples from across the seas, set the context for 
Labour's British foreign policy in the decades after the war (Gordon 1969,146). The 
`Falklands Factor' made clear that the sores of a lost Empire (and a lost world role for 
Britain) were still open; and they continued to irritate those sections of the Labour 
party that still had much emotional capital invested in British `grandeur'. The litany of 
excess and national self-centredness was long throughout the European debates, but 
pride of place went to the mythic notion of Britain as `the centre of the 
Commonwealth of nations'. The former Labour Prime Minister, James Callaghan said 
in the Commons soon after the war: 
«I wish that British foreign policy and British diplomacy 
had been more vigorous and more active. We are a 
leading member of the Commonwealth» (Callaghan 
1983, col. 1031). 
Thus, the involvement of the Commonwealth in the Falklands war proved 
once more that the British nation was not limited to a cramped and constricted nation- 
state. This explains the caution and hostility with which Labour was handling the 
European issue. We can see a similar practice in the party's hostility to the CAP. 
3.4.3.2 The `Patriotic Spirit of the Commonwealth' and the CAP 
Although Britain's partners in the EEC agreed to support her in the Falkland 
Islands crisis in the early summer of 1982 by voting in favour of economic measures 
in restraint of trade with Argentina, they did so in a limited and restricted way: and 
two of them, Ireland and Italy dissociated themselves from those measures. When 
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Britain objected to the raising of Community farm prices during her conflict with 
Argentina, there was some suspicion in Britain that the prices were being raised as the 
quid pro quo exacted by the EEC for the support afforded to Britain against 
Argentina. Britain insisted that there was no connection between the Falkland crisis 
and farm prices. When, however, the other EEC states went to the point of raising 
farm prices despite British objections, thus, in the British view, violating the rule 
embodied in the Luxembourg compromise of 1966, which stated that `where very 
important issues are at stake, discussion must continue until unanimous agreement is 
reached', they argued that the Luxembourg rule was not applicable. Britain on the 
other hand, contended that there was a link between the rule established in 1966 and 
the farm prices issue (Northedge 1983,34). Thus, though the Falklands crisis seemed 
at first to strengthen Britain's ties with the EEC by creating a consensus on economic 
measures against Argentina, in the end, the Europeans were again the `villains' and 
the Commonwealth `our brothers'. Peter Kellner of the New Statesman has noted that 
it was a pity that none of Labour critics of the naval expedition spoke in favour of the 
Common Market's prompt action in mounting a trade embargo (Kellner 1982,5). In 
this way, Labour was deluding itself if it supposed that the rest of the world, and in 
particular, the UK's Common Market partners, would regard a dispute over an 
insignificant outpost of a lost Empire as an event on the same footing as the Nazi 
invasion of Poland. 
Nobody suggested that it was possible for Britain to go back to the cosy 
relationship with the Commonwealth. Yet, the higher farm prices in the Community 
led some to suggest that owe should once again open our ports to effectively produced 
food from the Commonwealth» (Leighton 1985b, col. 205). The CAP was considered 
to bean «anti-British» policy. For Labour the British national essence ignored the 
confines of a miserable north European state: 
«We are told by Europeans that that is our fault. In other 
words, we should change and adapt ourselves, stop being 
internationalists... We should seek to break off our relations 
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with the rest of the world and deal only with the Continent... 
They are asking us to change our nature and history, and 
basically stop being British - to become, perhaps, an imitation 
of France» (Leighton 1982b, col. 674). 
Being British was equated with big, strategic questions, on a far grander 
canvas than the pettifogging debate of European economies. On the grounds of 
history and trade, Labour was attached to the old white Commonwealth. The CAP 
was not only «anti the interests of British taxpayers, agriculture and consumers, but 
also «of our friends in the world» (Leighton 1985a, col. 826). There was no distinction 
between the two. The latter were part of the British `family'. The degree of solidarity 
shown in the words of Dennis Sabin at the party Conference - «these people really are 
our kith and kin.. . they must not 
be abandoned by the UK» (Sabin 1979,330) - was 
expressed vividly in the Commons before and after the Falklands war. Indeed, «of all 
the people, Labour MPs used to claim, 
«hon. Members should have consideration for their kith 
and kin in New Zealand. They are our people. Let us make 
no mistake about that. They are our descendants... the New 
Zealander is another Briton who lives in a different part of 
the world» (Stoddart 1980b, col. 619; Torney 1980, col. 950). 
Anderson's (1991) thesis that the nation is essentially an imagined concept, 
one that exists primarily in the minds of those who consider themselves its members, 
illustrates the importance of national identity, particularly in times of national crisis 
(here, Falklands War). The 1983 election manifesto stated that the Labour party 
«recognises the true political and geographical spread of international problems and 
interests» (Craig 1990,383), whereas the Tories, as Leighton said, «are obsessed by 
this little part of the world (Europe)», which was the opposite of the «true 
internationalism (Commonwealth)» (Leighton 1986, col. 612). Echoing the French 
socialist Jean Jaures, Eric Heller also asserted that true internationalism «must begin 
from the position of loving and respecting one's own country» (Heller 1982, col. 203). 
In the same way as during the Falklands war, throughout the European debates, 
Labour constantly blamed the Tory government for betraying the nation (Britain 
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together with Commonwealth), leaving at the mercy of the EC the New Zealanders' 
butter. All the quotes taken from the debates over the CAP placed emphasis on the 
«blackmailing tactic of the French>> and the «actions of small minded people, on the 
one hand, and the «patriotic spirit of the Commonwealth>>, on the other. In particular, 
it was argued that 
((we saw during the Fallland crisis exactly those who would 
stand by us in a period of great trial. We saw how the EEC, at 
a crucial point in the negotiations at the UN, stabbed us in the 
back by refusing to continue sanctions for a reasonable period. 
We saw two members of the Community, one just across the water, 
withdraw sanctions completely and give comfort to an enemy 
that had invaded British territory and taken British people under 
its Fascist wing. We saw exactly who our friends were. They were 
not in Europe. The first to come to our aid and comfort were the 
people we sold out in 1973 - New Zealand and Australia>> 
(Stoddart 1982a, col. 466). 
The European role amounted to <<the actions of small-minded people who are 
out for their own personal gain, irrespective of the harm it can do to other people» 
(Stoddart 1982b, col. 805). As Mitchell wrote later, 
((when we needed the EC, it did better as a comedy routine 
than a voice respected in the world.. . 
by stopping new 
contracts, not existing supplies and excluding the two nations 
who needed the trade most)) (Mitchell 1983,128). 
On the contrary, on the part of the Commonwealth countries, it was argued, 
«there was no backsliding... there was no stabbing in the back>> (Stoddart 1982b, 
col. 806). It seems that in the early 1980s the party still basked in the glow of 
`ostensibly a-national-grandeur- in the anti-narrowness of those born ... to give 
examples to others' (Haseler 1989,84). The Falklands episode and the debates on the 
CAP appeared to affirm the party's continuing attachment to liberal imperialism, and 
the English-speaking world. For E. P. Thompson, the Falklands War was the last 
episode of Britain's imperial past (Thompson 1985,103). Perhaps it was then too early 
to claim so. 
103 
Incidents like a small scale crisis in one of the post-imperial leftovers or a 
temporary rupture in the relationship with its Continental neighbours might revitalise 
the imperial identity and bring to the surface the sentiments and ever lasting loyalties 
of a party that has been imperial born and bred. When the national essence is put into 
doubt a process of national self-realisation will surely draw on the narcissist wounds 
of the imperial identity. 
In fact, as Schlesinger (1992) has noted, the ongoing difficult search for a 
transcendent unity by the EU - especially after the introduction of single market in 
1999 - has contributed to the redefinition (or better, reassertion) of the national. In 
particular, the resurgent `leading' rhetoric of the pro-European New Labour 
government has revealed an uneasy attitude towards the supranational institutions (see 
more in chapter 6) and an insistence on the traditional emphasis on Britain's 
independent global role. As Timothy Garton Ash (2001) has recently argued, Britain's 
current European identity is partial since the other identities are simply too strong--not 
so much the insular identity, but the western and transoceanic identity, the 
identification not just with the US but with all the English-speaking peoples. 
3.4.4 The Independent Role of Britain in Europe: `Greatness in 
Retreat' 
In the practice of the New Labour government, the intimacy of co-operation 
with partners in the EU has no parallel in the party history, or even, in the history of 
Britain's relationship with Europe. It is true that Britain under New Labour has 
become much less insular, less separate. Moreover, if one looks at the nationalist 
discourse of the party and, in particular, the content of its European policy, especially 
its emphasis on the single market and defence, what one cannot possibly deny is that 
there emerges the spectre of the old links, especially the omnipresent `special 
relationship' with the US. 
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Britain's leadership in Europe is now largely based on the American 
connection. David Marquand (1999b) has noted that, although New Labour seeks to 
run with European integration, like the Thatcher and Major governments, it looks 
across the Atlantic not across the Channel for ideological inspiration. ((There is no 
more important task in international statesmanship today than to bind America and 
Europe close together, said the Prime Minister to the American Bar Association 
(Blair 2000d). Norman Davies (1999) has argued that the principal inhibitor to 
Britain's membership of the EEC lay not just in the memories of Empire, but also in 
the habit of clinging to America's apron strings. 
Further, Tom Nairn maintains that New Labour's project has retained an 
unavoidable archaism in its genetic code. It depends upon symbiosis with the older 
core of the Anglo-British identity and also remains based upon instinctive attunement 
to the most backward-looking core of Britishism - imperial sovereignty (Nairn 2000, 
10). In fact, the legacy of the Empire is praised and honoured by New Labour, not 
because it existed just as a famous war machine, but because it enabled Britain to 
acquire «a global view>> of the world problems and remain «independent in outlook>) 
(Quin 1999b). Reminiscent of Gaitskell's 1962 speech at the 1996 party conference, 
34 years later, the leader of New Labour urged the delegates to «consider one 
thousand years of history)) and «an Empire, the largest the world has ever known 
(Blair 1996b, 87). 
The twilight of Greatness has remained unextinguished in the British Labour 
party's psyche; even though, as Tom Nairn explains, a kind of `Greatness in retreat' 
which can only be preserved by clinging to a `crossroads' location and status, that is, 
a balancing influence between the American continent and Europe, for as long as 
possible (Nairn 1988,253). Britons no longer possess the strength to think of either 
`dominating' or `helping' the world in a major way on their own. Yet, as Davies 
(1999) has noted, they could obtain a frisson of the old superiority complex by 
cultivating the supposed `special' relationship with the USA. In particular, in two 
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major issues, the single market and defence, New Labour appears reluctant to shed the 
remnants of the imperial grandeur. 
The issue at the top of Labour's European agenda -jobs - reflected a fairly 
traditional British approach with its emphasis on the single market and on 
responsibility lying with individual member states. As Hughes and Smith (1998) have 
argued, Labour's main ideas for tackling EU unemployment are, on the one hand, to 
work to complete the single market - thus improving competitiveness and, so the 
argument goes, prospects for employment - and, on the other hand, to increase 
flexibility and employability in labour markets. Labour's signature to the EU social 
chapter at Amsterdam - applying EU social legislation to Britain in areas such as the 
working week and maternity rights - has lowered some of the ideological barriers 
between Britain and its partners erected by the previous government, though Labour 
in power has been careful to qualify calls for greater flexibility, aware of continental 
suspicions of the concept. The new buzz word - `employability' - essentially refers to 
improving skills, knowledge and adaptability ofjob-seekers (Hughes and Smith ibid, 
103). In pursuit of that goal, Britain was placed at the forefront of this campaign 
during the special meeting of the European Council in Lisbon on 23 and 24 March 
2000. In Blair's words, this Council marked «a sea change in European economic 
thinking - away from heavy-handed intervention and regulation, towards a new 
approach based on enterprise, innovation and competition (Blair 2000f, col. 21). 
Aims and values that New Labour assumes that Britain has a responsibility to 
transplant into the Continent because they supposedly have enabled her and America 
to respond more effectively to the challenges of the new global economy: 
«As the new government in Britain has begun to create a 
new Britain, we are also working with our European 
partners to create a new Europe - one that combines 
enterprise with social cohesion, more dynamic, more 
competitive, more open and thus learning from the 
entrepreneurial and flexible labour markets of the 
American economy)) 
(Brown 1998) 
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In his book Capitalism Against Capitalism, Michel Albert (1993) identifies 
Britain as part of an Anglo-American model, as opposed to a Rhine-Alpine model. 
Driver and Martell (1998,50), Marquand (1999b, 239), Ash (2001) and Fishman 
(1998,61) have all pointed out that Britain's leading role in Europe is focused on 
developing an Anglo-American model, extolling the virtues of flexible labour markets 
and building welfare around the needs of a flexible workforce, with training and 
education to deal with job insecurity. Setting the British agenda for European reform 
along the lines of employability, flexibility and enterpreneurship in the age of the 
knowledge-driven or e-commerce economy, the Chancellor maintained that this has 
been «the right way to express the British identity in the modem world» (Brown 
1997c), not by remaining aloof. Using words, which were reminiscent of George 
Orwell, Gordon Brown said that `the British Genius' would `shape' the European 
course and benefit British interests into a more prosperous 21st century. As he put it at 
the Confederation of British Industry in 1997, «we should have the confidence to 
engage with Europe and make it better and - dare I say it -more British)) (Brown 
1997a). 
Like the Greeks who controlled the Roman Empire, New Labour wants to 
shape the destiny and the course of the European social and economic model. For 
instance, statements such as «Europe needs us. For we have a vision of Europe)) (Blair 
1997b); «we want a Europe that proclaims our shared values... » (Blair 1998e, 19); 
«Europe needs us more than we need them» (Vaz 1999), give ammunition to those 
critics who accuse the European approach of the New Labour government of sheer 
«neo-imperialism» (Fishman 1998; Fairclough 2000; Hug 1998; Gamble 1996). It is 
argued that the allegedly `neo-imperialist' posture of New Labour is no better 
displayed them when Blair trumpets himself as the most recent embodiment of the 
mythical connection between English speaking peoples on both sides of the Atlantic 
seeing the world wholly through American-centred eyes, by emulating the corpus of 
American domestic political culture and by trying to impose the aura of the USA's 
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success and glory and the American way of capitalism and flexible labour markets on 
European countries (Fishman 1998,61). This means fewer barriers, regulations, and 
unfair state aids, and more active governments to enhance the potential of the working 
force through life long education. For the Minister of State for Europe in the first New 
Labour government, Keith Vaz, the Lisbon European Council was crucial in 
«marking the need to modernise Europe's various social models, while making sure 
that we maintain Europe's social values. This modernisation requires an active welfare 
state (where people are encouraged to work and are provided with the means to do 
so), a focus on social inclusion, and reform of our systems of social protection so that 
they are sustainable and viable into the future. According to Vaz, Lisbon indicated 
that, at last, «British perspective became Europe's perspective» with regard to the 
economic reform (Vaz 2000b) 
However, for Hutton and Marquand, it seems that, whereas the British now 
define the political task as adapting to market forces whatever the social costs, the 
Europeans see the task as shaping market forces to sustain dearly held social and 
cultural values (Hutton 1999,148). In turn, Marquand (1999b) assumes that part of 
the purpose of the European Union is to create a space where Europeans may remain 
true to a solidaristic model of society and economy, drawn from the continental 
social-democratic tradition and from the tradition of catholic social thought, which 
differs profoundly from the American model. In contrast, for Streeck (1996), the 
history of the European integration is one of continuous conflict between the two 
alternative political-economic projects. However, Marquand insists that behind this 
difference (continentals versus Anglo-Saxons) there lies a much more fundamental 
difference of approach, which in turn reflects an even deeper difference of culture and 
tradition - on the `entrepreneurial Britishness', see also chapter 6. The British 
government, supported by British advocates of the enterprise culture a1 'anglaise or a 
1 'americaine, holds, in effect, that economic change and adjustment to economic 
change come, and can only come, through the market (Marquand 1997a, 156). 
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New Labour hoped to resolve the paradox by converting the rest of the EU to 
Americanisation by force of example - «What we can be is a shining example to all of 
what a modern state should aspire to», the Labour Prime Minister has incessantly 
reiterated (Blair 1998b). That is what the Lisbon European Council allegedly brought 
about. Ironically, though, from a European perspective and standards, the aim that 
New Labour set for the European Union, that is, «to match the entrepreneurial 
innovation and economic dynamism of the United States while at the same time 
maintaining the social cohesion of European societies» (Blair 1998a; 2000f; Cook 
2000) appears self-deceptive. This is a circle that cannot be squared in reality 
(Fairclough 2000,16). Hughes and Smith (1998) have noted that it would be a major 
shift if EU member states reorganised their social market systems to take on the main 
elements of the British system. 
Marquand (1997b) leaves no doubt that in the struggle between globalisation 
and the European model - the central theme of European politics today - their instincts 
are with the globalisers - the United States. So, when American and European 
interests diverge, New Labour can be relied on to show more tenderness to the former. 
Overall, the emphasis on the single market reflects a strong element of continuity in 
British European policy. New Labour appears quite happy with its Thatcherite 
inheritance in the shape of deregulated markets, flexible labour practices, low rates of 
taxation, and a stress on entrepreneurial values. Nevertheless, in this way, as 
Marquand notes, New Labour cannot play more than a marginal role in European 
politics so long as it gives priority to its American ties and the American model of the 
political and moral economy (Marquand 1999b, 239). 
The issue of defence policy has further weakened New Labour's commitment 
to European integration. After an interval of nearly four centuries since the loss of 
Calais in 1558, British have again made what the historian Michael Howard (1989) 
has called "the continental commitment. " British troops are stationed permanently on 
the continent of Europe. But in what context? In the context of NATO: only as part of 
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the transatlantic organisation (Hix 2000,50). The initiative that Tony Blair launched 
on European Defence in autumn 1998, which led to the statement at the St Malo 
Franco-British Summit in December 1998, and the European Defence Initiative two 
years later, signified Britain's desire to play a constructive role at the centre of 
European politics. Yet, during the European Summit in Nice in December 2000, the 
Prime Minister made clear that «we are going to end up with something that NATO 
supports, Britain supports and America supports - and the French can live with>> 
(Jones and Evans-Pritchard 2000). From the 1950s to the early 1990s the EEC and 
NATO possessed a long list of common members interacting in a mutually 
complementary fashion. The one took care of economic development: the other of 
strategic security (Ash 2001). Nothing appears to put this relationship into doubt. 
Although there is close co-operation between Britain and her European 
partners in defence and foreign policy issues, a look at the Balkans - the biggest 
European foreign policy challenge of the last ten years - shows, as Ash has noted, that 
the key policies have been made not in the EU, but in the Contact Group of four 
leading EU powers plus Russia and the US, and then in the so-called Quint, the same 
group without Russia. Who is the key partner, to whom the first telephone call would 
usually be made? The US (Ash 2001). 
The Americans, after all, had inherited a considerable dose of English 
`moralism' and they were the only people left to put it into practice. In 1999 an 
American President and British Prime Minister felt entirely justified in joining forces 
to break international law and to bomb a sovereign state in the name of their own 
interpretation of morality or liberal imperialism. The war in Kosovo -a war fought 
«not for territory but for values» (Blair 1999c), a war made «for the sake of 
humanity)> (Blair 1999b) - was a demonstration of the shared morality between the 
two countries. One could praise or condemn their action. But one could not deny that 
NATO's campaign against Serbia was a good example of the old way of doing things. 
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In fact, the insistence of New Labour that Britishness must be projected 
abroad in terms of values (see also chapter 8) and of the much touted example that 
British should give to the other nations - «a belief in the capacity of the British people 
to improve themselves and be a force for good, by deed and example in the wider 
world» (Blair 1996a, 9); «the British Way is to lead by example>> (Brown 1999b); owe 
can set an example for others to follow» (Blair 1997e); «what we can be is a shining 
example to all» (Blair 1998c) - gives indeed substance to the claims about a `new 
imperialism' and, at least in their moralism, its close relationship with their Victorian 
and Edwardian forebears as the literature suggests (Tidrick 1990). 
At the dawn of the new millennium, New Labour's Britain possesses strong 
connections with both America and Europe. For New Labour, the old dilemma, which 
amounted to a choice between the EU and the US, does not exist: «Britain does not 
have to choose between America and Europe, insisted the Chancellor (Brown 
1999b). As Blair also says, owe are listened to more closely in Washington if we are 
leading in Europe. And we have more weight in Europe if we are listened to in 
Washington» (Blair 1999m). However, as the above analysis revealed, Britain has 
still to deal with its imperial legacy if it is to project a new image because Britain was 
an imperial construct (Barnett 1997,300). Blair seems to want Britain in Europe 
rather than completely out of it. But, as said earlier, Europe is simply one choice 
amongst others for Labour to project Britain's identity against the significant `others'. 
All symbolic constructions of the nation and national identity depend upon 
some kind of boundary between insiders and outsiders (Ansell 1997,173). As Anne 
Marie Smith (1994) has argued, fantasies - like the transoceanic ones of Gaitskell, 
Wilson, Callaghan, Foot and Blair - are always accompanied by symptom-figures: 
since fantasies construct a perfect order, imperfections must be displaced onto the 
supplementary symptom; not only is the symptom external to the fantasy order, it 
demarcates its very frontiers; because it symbolizes that which cannot be integrated 
into the fantasy order, it marks out that order's limits of tolerance. People coming 
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from the non-English-speaking community were at variance with the social norms of 
the British national community. As the immigration debates make clear below, their 
exclusion was a precondition for the maintenance of those cultural characteristics that 
once made Britain great. 
3.5 Labour's Multiracial Commonwealth: The `Decline' of the 
Nation 
This section will argue that the largesse of the British Empire that shaped 
Labour imperial, oceanic and extra-European Britishness was conditioned by and 
linked with the normalisation of the differences between the indigenous population 
and the `immigrants' from the New Commonwealth who represented the `decline' and 
the diminution of the national ego. Britain's profound dependency on the imperial 
system itself for its identity meant that decolonisation provoked an identity crisis, and 
internal antagonisms seemed to threaten the total disintegration of the nation from 
within (Smith 1994,26). Whereas, as seen in the European debates, the 
Commonwealth stood for British greatness, the postcolonial black immigration in the 
1960s and 1970s questioned the standing of the British political community. 
In the late 1890s, the immigrants were not excluded just on biological 
grounds, but also in terms of employment, cultural standards and citizenship capacity. 
In the same way, in the post-war period, although skin colour was still considered by 
some party representatives as an immutable feature of biology (((you cannot change 
the colour of your skin (Driberg 1970,208), Labour's new racist discourse gave 
black skin a range of social significances in the debates of the time. Citizenship, 
disorder, and in general, cultural and social attributes accompanied skin. Labour had 
acknowledged that being a subject, rather than a beneficiary, of Empire created forms 
of poverty and a pressure to migrate to Britain in the first place (Labour Party 1958, 
3). In this respect, Martin Barker's (1981) assertion that new racism begun in the 
discourse of the Conservatives in the mid-seventies offers a misreading of the 
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significance of the Labour party's discourse. Blackness and Britishness were 
constructed in Labour discourse, not just in biological, but also in culturally 
incompatible terms, as mutually exclusive identities. 
Thus, by constructing in culturally negative terms the black populations and 
supporting exclusionary practices, the Labour party of that period attempted to defend 
and symbolically restore national greatness. As Knowles (1992) noted, the multiracial 
Commonwealth established a political distinctiveness but not a Britishness which 
could serve as the basis for a claim to access to Britain. The Commonwealth ideal had 
never been intended as a defence of black immigration to Britain (Solomos 1995, 
161). The examination of the 1962-81 parliamentary debates on immigration will 
make clear that for Labour the multiracial Commonwealth for which the party took 
credit during the European debates, consisted of a bifurcated or racially divided 
political community. In this racially divided community the rights and entitlements of 
white Englishness were jeopardised by the social attributes and the demands made on 
behalf of the black section of the political community. 
3.5.1 The Immigrant-Workers 
In particular, the 1962 Commonwealth Act established the first de jure 
distinction between British passport-holders: every British passport-holder who had 
not been born in the UK or Ireland was subjected to new immigration controls. The 
Labour party under Gaitskell leadership opposed it, but soon afterwards, pledged to 
renew it in its 1964 manifesto (Labour Party 1964). Roy Hattersley, then 
Parliamentary Private Secretary, later said: 
«Looking back on the original Act, which limited the entry 
of the Commonwealth citizens into this country, I feel that 
the Labour party of that time should have supported it» 
(Hattersley 1965,380) 
In 1965 the Labour government published a White Paper on immigration 
which strengthened the 1962 black immigration controls and reaffirmed its basic 
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argument that race relations management depended primarily upon the controls of 
black immigration (Smith 1994). The White Paper on Immigration from the 
Commonwealth called for controls to be maintained in a stricter form than the 
Conservative's, along with measures to promote the integration of immigrants. If 
immigrants were workers whose entry to Britain was permitted by labour shortages, 
then, in the absence of any other right to entry, their access could be disallowed when 
there were no longer shortages (Knowles 1992,99). The White Paper represented a 
shift in the direction of what some called a `Little England' policy (Solomos 1995). 
It is true that Labour opposed the Immigration Bill that Conservatives 
introduced in 1962 on economic grounds. They argued that the contribution of the 
immigrants to the economy was considerable, especially in the public sector, as long 
as this did not affect the welfare of the indigenous population. But this conditional 
opposition did not make Labour MPs less racist, as the right of the Commonwealth 
citizens to stay in Britain would depend on the shape of the economy. Hugh Gaitskell 
said that «the rate of immigrants into the country is closely related and will always be 
closely related to the rate of economic absorption (Gaitskell 1961b, col. 794). As 
Reeves (1983) has remarked, in the case of a period of economic crisis Labour 
remained silent, but it was obvious that the immigrant would be the first to suffer. 
«We oppose restriction of the immigration as long as there is a job to be done» 
(Pannell 1961, col. 1713), it was argued. Foot (1965), Saggar (1993) and Gupta (1975) 
have stressed the leadership factor as an essential factor for the change of Labour 
policy in the sixties. In their accounts of the immigration policy Gaitskell appeared 
less racist than his successor Harold Wilson. However, the above evidence shows that 
this was not the case. 
As Caroline Knowles (1992) has pointed out, Commonwealth citizens were 
no longer British subjects with a right to live in Britain. They were workers who with 
their dependent families were limited by employment vouchers issued by the Ministry 
of Labour. So, in future, access to Britain was to be conditional on skill shortages and 
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labour needs. This was a major shift redefining the relationship between Britain and 
the Commonwealth. The political community of the Commonwealth was ruptured by a 
notion of labour market, and the union of British brethren became a pool of mobile 
labour (Knowles 1992,99). In the 1960s and 1970s, parliamentary debates on 
immigration referred to the «needs in the transport system of London» (Glyn 1961, 
col. 1330), «vacancies in the building industry and civil engineering>> (Howell 1961, 
col. 764), and to the shortages in «industry, hospitals, railway yards, social services and 
factories» (Sorensen 1961, col. 1990; Chapman 1965, col. 352; Moyle 1968, col. 1307), 
showing that the jobs which coloured immigrants found themselves in were the largely 
unskilled and low status ones for which white labour was unavailable or which white 
workers were unwilling to fill: «If in this country we are to encourage everyone to 
become a white-collared worker we have to get someone to do the other work» 
(Pargiter 1961, col. 789). In these sentiments, Labour reinforced the image of the 
coloured minorities as suitable for the jobs that were menial and un-British: «we are 
exporting craftsmen, technicians and doctors and in their place we are importing a glut 
of unskilled and illiterate labour» (Binns 1965, col. 1007). 
Shamit Saggar (1993), examining the 1964-70 Labour government's race 
relations' strategy, has noted that, among other concerns, Labour had also to take 
account of industrial relations more generally (Saggar 1993,269). It is argued that it 
had been the immediate post-war labour requirements of the economy, notably in 
semi-skilled and unskilled industrial sectors as well as in the public services such as 
health and transport that had originally fuelled the immigration boom of the fifties and 
early sixties (Saggar 1993,268). However, the impact of the new immigration upon 
labour relations during the early and mid-sixties must be treated with caution. 
Ben-Tovim and Gabriel (1982) noted that there was no single, over- 
determining economic rationale for the shift towards restrictive controls on the black 
presence in Britain. Attempts to interpret changes in Britain's immigration legislation 
in terms of the shifting economic needs and political interests of capital do not, by 
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themselves, provide an adequate and unambiguous explanation of the eventual 
political outcomes (Ben-Tovim and Gabriel 1982,147). Likewise, Paul Foot's (1965, 
141) remark that `no one had the slightest idea what sort of effect the 1962 
Immigration Act would have on the rate of immigration into Britain' is some 
indication of the area of economic indeterminacy involved in the whole issue. 
Messina (1989) has argued that central to Labour's approach was the belief that 
irrespective of the economic benefits to be derived from New Commonwealth 
immigration, non-whites could not easily be absorbed into English society. 
The reconceptualisation of immigrants, as workers from the Commonwealth 
and not simply a union of British brethren, sustained the concerns that immigrants 
imposed on scarce resources. Knowles (1992) noted that, for Labour, immigrants as 
workers were a distinctive population whose impact on the indigenous population was 
of questionable value, and who had a lesser claim than others to society's scarce 
resources. Immigrant workers were distinguished from indigenous workers through 
arguments about social pressure and prior claims on resources. 
In fact, some MPs expressed popular concern about perceived or experienced 
shortage of houses, schools, and jobs. It was argued that «on employment grounds, 
for reasons of our housing problems and for reasons of an excessive population; each 
of these is a reason for restricting immigration into the country» (Ennals 1965, 
col. 393). Moreover, explanation of migration was given in terms of attraction to the 
good life with the presentation of an image of the immigrant as a welfare scrounger 
whose excesses in consuming hard-earned social benefits would exhaust the supply 
for the indigenous population. Miles (1993b) has alleged that the outcome of racist 
discourses is to deny to a racialised collectivity certain rights and resources or 
sometimes all rights and resources. By virtue of this alleged difference, this exclusion 
does not admit to the possibility of an equality of being at another level. The moment 
of discourse is the moment of marginalisation, which precedes exclusion in material 
practice. Thus, racism is not only the discourse, which creates the Other; it is also a 
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discourse of marginalisation which is integral to a process of domination: and those 
who articulate racism always necessarily situate themselves within relations of 
domination (Miles 1993b, 101). The following comments illustrated this view: 
«We do not want people in the West Indies to regard 
this country as an El Dorado, as they do when they talk 
about it as the `Great Trek to the North'. Why is that? It 
is because they think that there will be better 
opportunities and that the carpenter and mason will 
have a higher standard of living here than if he stays in 
his own country)) (Henderson 1961, col. 1962). 
«people in far distant countries look towards this 
country as it were as a land flowing with milk and 
honey» (Bowden 1965, col. 347) 
«A picture is painted of these people rushing to this 
country. They seem to have an idea that Britain is an El 
dorado» (Hughes 1968, col. 1536) 
This theme of the social difficulties posed by immigrants, and organised 
around Britain's capacity to absorb, was popular among Labour MPs, who 
vociferously asserted the prior claims of their constituents in the context of 
immigration debates. Actually, statements such as «Britishers come first» (MacLeavy 
1968, col. 1021) appeared as a response to the «instincts» and «fears» of those who 
felt that the deteriorating social conditions were due to the presence of the immigrants 
(Henderson 1961, col. 1960; MacLeavy 1968, col. 1022; Fraser 1971, col. 121). 
Slavoj Zizek (2000) argues that what really bothers us about the `other' is the 
peculiar way he organises his enjoyment, precisely the surplus, the `excess' that 
pertains to this way: the smell of `their' food, `their' noisy songs and dances, `their' 
strange manners, `their' attitude to work. To the racist, the `other' is either a 
workaholic stealing our jobs or an idler living on our labour, and it is quite amusing to 
notice the haste with which one passes from reproaching the other with a refusal to 
work to reproaching him for the theft of work. The basic paradox is that our Nation is 
conceived as something inaccessible to the other and at the same time threatened by 
him (Zizek ibid, 596). Labour MPs were aware of the «distress immigration must 
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cause to an English family» (Fletcher 1961, col. 2007), the «genuine feelings on this 
matten» (Gordon-Walker 1961 a, col. 714) and the «public anxiety about the rate of 
entry from the New Commonwealth» (Bidwell 1973, col. 1504). 
Ansell (1997) claims that once natural instincts are conceived as being the 
basis of genuine fears, it follows that such natural instincts when unheeded or 
frustrated lead to `natural' hostility towards the 'other'. When though Labour MPs 
were challenged they claimed that their views were not expressing racism but 
«common sense)) (MacLeavy 1968, col. 1022). Martin Barker (1981), Gordon and 
Klug (1985) and Ansell (1997) maintain that new racists disavow racist intent and 
assume that nations are built out of human nature and instincts, which in a «common 
sensical» way defend `our' way of life, traditions, and customs against outsiders. 
Actually, people of colour were offered as scapegoats in a long-effective 
political tactic to explain away social problems by identifying a certain group of 
individuals as personifying their cause (Ansell 1997,14). The scapegoat model takes 
the outsider status of the black immigrant for granted, and assumes that the «British 
people)) functioned like an already fully formed subject with completely organised 
desires (Solomos 1995,166). The demand that immigration should take account of the 
effect on the «social and economic difficulties of this country» (Parkin 1961,1948-9) 
was a fairly typical response of this time. 
After a period of relative economic stability, the British political agenda in 
the 1960s was dominated by concerns about balance of payments deficits, 
unemployment and a decline in manufacturing investment. At the same time, the 
decentralisation and internationalisation of British manufacturing decreased the 
effectiveness of government interventions. Industrial disputes also escalated in 
number and intensity throughout the 1960s. Industrial management had secured 
agreements from union shop stewards for sustained productivity rates in exchange for 
greater union control over work practices. In response to lay-offs and downward 
pressures on wages, the rank and file ignored the management-union leadership 
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consensus and staged numerous short-term work stoppages (Leys 1983,66-67). 
Wilson's anti-elitist reforms were juxtaposed with disciplinary corporatist policies. In 
1968 having failed to defend profits through voluntary wage agreements and 
legislated wage ceilings, the government proposed a bill, which would have outlawed 
unofficial industrial action. Wage-control councils, commissions and boards only 
provoked a greater sense of resentment among workers (Leys ibid, 70-1,74,75). 
Furthermore, Leyton-Henry and Rich (1986) and Hall (1978) have argued 
that a high political salience for race and immigration was clearly a threat to Labour's 
electoral hopes in the 1960s and also to its priorities. This threat was highlighted for 
Labour by the Smethwick result in the 1964 general election and the subsequent defeat 
the following year of Patrick Gordon Walker. The Labour Cabinet acted hoping that 
reduced immigration would allow those already settled to be integrated more easily 
into the community. Labour wished for a consensus on race for electoral reasons 
(Leyton-Henry and Rich 1986,10). Saggar has argued that Labour by mid-1963 
recognised that it had moved dangerously out of line with grassroots public sentiment 
on the immigration issue. Labour became more aware of the grassroots hostility 
towards black immigrants among its own working class supporters (Saggar 1993, 
255). 
Yet, Labour was not just the political barometer responding to racist pressure 
that many scholars have suggested (Anwar 1986,84; Foot 1965,123). Rather than 
seeing public opinion as simply forcing the reluctant hand of the liberal politician, it 
can be argued that popular racism, undoubtedly a significant political force, has to be 
seen as itself encouraged by and reflecting official state policies and practices. 
Perhaps it would be more accurate to see the popular articulation of racist exclusivism 
and the enactment of racist policies as a dialectical process between politicians and 
people (Ben-Tovlin and Gabriel 1982,152; Solomos 1989,66). 
Classical racial theory has shown that racism is not a static package of 
irrational attitudes rooted in human nature, nor is it an inevitable part of civilisation. 
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Rather, it is a socio-historical construct that emerged and is still evolving in the 
context of unfolding social relations and has assumed successive forms throughout 
history. Anne Marie Smith (1994) asserts that imperial nationalist discourse had a 
tremendous impact upon British society: it contributed to the complacent habit of 
superiority which created what might be called: «protected markets of the mind» in 
Britain. As seen in the late nineteenth century, the Empire played a key role in the 
construction of an imaginary national space, which transcended class differences. Yet, 
the racism of the sixties and seventies is different from the racism of the «high» 
colonial period; it is a racism oat home», not abroad; it is the racism, not of a 
dominant but, as seen above, of a declining social formation (Hall 1978,26). As a 
result, in Etienne Balibar's words, the class struggle necessarily takes the form of 
racism, at times in competition with other forms (Balibar 1991 c, 214). 
This `working class racism thesis' was a product of academic work on race in 
the 1970s. It was cogently explored in Miles and Phizacklea in their essay on 
`Working Class Racist Beliefs in the Inner City'. Contrary to Westergaard and Resler, 
who regard immigrant workers as part of the working class, sharing common 
disadvantages with other workers (Westergaard and Resler 1976), Miles and 
Phizacklea's class fraction thesis states that classes are not homogeneous entities but 
are divided by economic and ideological factors. Racism within classes to some extent 
sets immigrant workers apart from fellow workers and professional colleagues. Black 
migrant workers are ascribed negative characteristics because of the widespread racist 
beliefs that pervade all areas and sections of British society (Miles and Phizacklea 
1979,65). 
The best proponents of the divided working class thesis are Castles and 
Kosack who argue in Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe that 
racism is such an important component of working class consciousness that it 
becomes entrenched, dividing white workers from non-white immigrant workers who 
are seen as both cheap competitors for work and as culturally inferior because of their 
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Third World origins. In addition, they are regarded as foreigners even though they 
may be British citizens, and because of this they are seen as not having equal rights to 
economic and state benefits. Racism is high in the working class, according to Castles 
and Kosack: fearful of competition for jobs, workers are economically insecure; they 
experience a repressive socialisation which has inculcated in them middle class 
aspirations for a good life and standard of living but has denied them the chance of 
achieving these aspirations (Castle and Kosack 1973). 
The rather more Weberian accounts by John Rex and Rex and Tomlinson, 
argue that black people form a separate class formation in British society: namely an 
`underclass'. Black people are seen as constituting a class beneath the working class 
by virtue of their inferior economic and social circumstances and because they and 
their children face poorer life chances compared with other people in similar 
circumstances. Because of racism, black people are forced into a situation of 
defensive confrontation with white society, and are obliged to defend themselves 
through their own organisations, in conflict with white workers as well as with the 
white middle class (Rex and Tomlinson 1979,62). 
However, there is a problem with the Marxist approach in its attempt to 
establish a permanent relationship between race and class. It is assumed that class is 
always a more real or privileged social division around which other divisions are 
organised. Yet, class is simply a priority constructed in discourses concerned with 
socialism. Caroline Knowles in her Race, Discourse and Labourism maintains that 
when sections of the Labour party decided to support Indian nationalist activities, they 
damaged the interests of British trade unionists in the 1930s, whereas in the case of 
anti-Semitism, Labour decided that Jews could only be defended from anti-Semitic 
attacks as members of the working class, and not as Jews (Knowles 1992,15). This 
suggests that the relationship between race and class in the Labour party is dynamic 
and contextual, taking different forms in different contexts. 
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In the post-war settlement, class took a low priority in Labour discourse. 
Alistair Bonnett, writing on working class whiteness, noted that the so-called post-war 
settlement, the formation of the welfare state, was routinely articulated in the 1950s 
and 1960s in racialised terms, as `our' welfare system that should be used to benefit 
`us' and should not be exploited by `them'. As long as British welfare capitalism and 
more generally the British national project, is construed as `ours', as a white project 
only extended on sufferance to `them', then the discourse of `unfairness' continued to 
be central to white British identities (Bonnett 2000,132). As seen above, race and not 
class was prevalent in British working class party towards the foreign workers. In this 
sense, Bonnett has pointed out that welfare was wrapped in the Union Jack (Bonnett 
2000,40). 
Yet, by presenting the problem of equality between the two communities 
(multiracialism) as one of integration, Labour helped to transform the issue of race 
from a question of biology to one of culture and it provided a new language of race 
untainted by association with biological racism (Malik ibid, 25). The problem 
stemmed from the `difference' of immigrants. The `underclass' of the immigrants was 
seen as culturally distinct from the rest of society. The habits and morals that made it 
different were seen as being passed on from generation to generation through cultural 
not genetic, transmission (Malik ibid, 201). The new racism is thus less concerned 
with notions of racial superiority in the narrow sense than with the alleged `threat' 
people of colour posed to the national order by the incoming subversive element. 
3.5.2 Patriality: A Matter of Belongingness 
Immigrant workers were differentiated from the indigenous population on the 
grounds of being bearers of lesser standards of development. Frank Reeves (1983) 
argues that while (old) racism has not disappeared in Britain, references to biologically 
oriented racial themes have given way to more covert racist legitimation that more 
often work through social reformist, humanitarian and seemingly liberal discourse. 
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The significance of what was called racial difference was socially defined. As Gilroy 
(1987) points out, the politics of race was primarily fired by conceptions of national 
belonging and homogeneity, which blurred the distinction between race and nation. 
Labour new racist language sought to present an imaginary definition of the nation as 
a unified cultural community. It constructed and defended an image of national culture 
- homogeneous in its whiteness yet precarious and perpetually vulnerable to attack 
from enemies within and without. As Malik notes, racialising immigration by 
rewriting the history of past immigration helped recast national identity through 
establishing the myth of a national homogeneity then being destroyed by the new 
immigrants (Malik ibid, 36). 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1968 was based on the racially 
divisive 1965 White Paper and arbitrarily invalidated the right of a particular 
population of British passport holders (i. e. Kenyan Asians) to enter the UK. The Act 
was racially discriminatory in that automatic entry to the UK was only retained for 
British passport holders who had one parent or grandparent born in the UK (patriality 
clause). This neatly protected the position of most white Commonwealth citizens but 
excluded the Kenyan Asians, who would be subject to a strict quota on entries 
(Ponting 1989,256). As a result, the legislation aimed to adjust the definition of 
Britishness to the realities of decolonisation through the creation of a new British 
frontier. It set the white-British colonial administrators and the descendants of the 
white Britons who had migrated to Commonwealth countries, apart from the non- 
white colonised, even though both groups were British subjects (Smith 1994,145). 
Since the concept of British nationality was connected to British sovereignty and the 
boundaries of the national collectivity expanded as the British Empire expanded, the 
exclusionary positions started to emerge in relation to the gradual process for the 
British to «cut their losses», to «come home» from the Empire (Anthias and Yuval- 
Davis 1992,48). James Callaghan, then Home Secretary, admitted that the distinctions 
made by his Act were «geographical» (Callaghan 1968b, col. 1251). Indeed, the 
123 
patriality clause in the British immigration law in 1968 demonstrated the way in which 
British immigration law reflected Britain's coming to terms with its loss of Empire. 
Marquand (1995b) has asserted that this statutory redefinition of British nationality 
made mockery of the imperialist vision. 
True the expansive ideology of the Commonwealth and the Imperial family of 
nations bonded in common citizenship gave way to a more parochial and embittered 
perspective that saw culture in neat and tidy national formations. The family remained 
a key motif, but the multiracial family of nations was displaced by the racially 
homogeneous nation of families (Gilroy 1990,268). Labour MPs provided us with 
plenty of arguments, trying to emphasise the irreconcilability of the British way of life 
with that of the coloured citizens of the Commonwealth. «We must consider that the 
ethnic groups which come within these islands have an entirely different way of life 
from ours, it was argued (Pannell 1968, col. 1281). People from New Commonwealth 
were racialised as essentially different as a race «apart» (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 
1992,45). The immigrants from the New Commonwealth were differentiated as the 
bearers of lesser standards of health, education, and general living standards. Ben- 
Tovim and Gabriel (1984) argued that development operated as a discursive device for 
distinguishing indigenous from immigrant workers. It corresponds with a readiness by 
Labour to operate exclusion through controls and contains some damaging 
implications in construing the concept of the immigrant. The central feature of these 
processes was that the qualities of those populations, which were assumed to be fixed, 
became natural. Fears of bodily contact and contagion were explicit in statements like 
the following: 
«The question of public health is seriously endangered by the 
way in which these people crowd together in the limited housing 
accommodation available. In Bradford this has caused one 
serious epidemic... » (MacLeavy 1968, col. 1020) 
«In the areas into which the immigrants come there are all the 
social evils - bad schools as well as bad housing - and the children 
are also required to be taught under some of the worst educational 
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conditions in the country» (Hattersley 1965, col. 384) 
((Where the number of immigrant children is rapidly approaching 
a very high proportion there is no doubt that the character of 
education begins to change. No longer is one trying to produce 
British children for the British way of life. The whole system of 
education is becoming distorted in the direction of trying to 
accommodate children, many of whom cannot speak the 
language, to the British way of life» (Moyle 1968, 
col. 1307). 
In this respect, immigrants were diseased and likely to infect an indigenous 
population, who were accustomed to higher standards of health and hygiene. As a 
consequence of the imminent threat, it was deemed necessary that some measures had 
to be taken. Labour MPs supported several measures which seemed to violate human 
integrity of the human being, such as medical tests in British airports and ports, and, 
also, tests on the immigrants' ability to be assimilated into the British way of life - 
language, work skills and so on. 
«immigrants can be asked to undergo medical examination at the 
ports of entry, and subsequently to report to the medical officer of 
health for treatment» (Callaghan 1968a, col. 660) 
((we must impose a test which tries to analyse which immigrants, 
as well as having jobs or special skills are most likely to be 
assimilated into our national life)) (Hattersley 1965, col. 381) 
Notions of development also focused on the state of social, economic and 
political conditions in countries sourcing immigration. Labour parliamentary 
references to immigrants as «tribesmen (who) cannot speak a word of English>> came 
«straight from the tribal villages of Pakistan and their ideas of personal hygiene are 
different from ours» (Binns 1965,1005) invoked terms of anthropological discourse, 
to emphasise differences in living conditions and expectations between the immigrant 
and the indigenous population. The black populations were representative of a 
different `Culture'. 
Literacy, education and competence in English were concerns linked to a 
notion of development, and constituted indicatives of difference. «Most of the 
immigrants who have come here in the last 20 years, Alexander Lyon said, «have 
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come from relatively poor rural areas, and many of them are illiterate, even in their 
language)) (Lyon 1975, col. 1471). This created problems for the Ugandan Asians in 
the early seventies when they arrived in Britain, because they were coming from what 
was called «an alien culture>> (Lestor 1973, col. 1537). So they were considered as a 
problem of «different cultural standard and different cultural background which may 
come into conflict>> (Lyon 1976, col. 56), and subsequently they were deemed unfit for 
the British way of life. National belonging was given not by citizenship but by an 
indefinable quality of possessing the essence of Englishness (Malik ibid, 144). 
Inevitably, assertions of difference could not easily be distinguished from assertions 
of inferiority, and the more virulent strains of justification for controls in terms of 
difference merge imperceptibly with those of threat. In 1970s, Labour concerned itself 
with the problems of illegal immigration, violence and drug trade, which were 
assumed to accompany people from «alien cultures». Sydney Bidwell demanded 
provisions for police powers in the new Bill to tackle the new generation of black 
people who invaded and threatened British society: 
((The dangers arise not with aliens or the white immigrants 
but with coloured people - they are the people who are fearful. 
These are the people we are talking 
about and it is to them that we must relate the provisions 
of the Bill about police powers)) (Bidwell 1971, col. 99) 
Anne Marie Smith argues that the black communities were defined in racist 
discourse as the most potent signifier of the post-colonial national decline; the black 
immigration to post-colonial Britain represented a dangerous inversion of frontiers; the 
«outsiders» were represented as vicarious invaders (Smith 1994,126). Black 
settlement was continually described in military metaphors, which offered war and 
conquest as the central analogies for immigration. «Our social and economic well- 
being», Henderson said, «is being threatened by the influx of these 250,000 
immigrants» (Henderson 1961, col. 1960). «Influx », «wave», «upsurge», «flood» 
encapsulated the very essence of the parliamentary language of immigration control. 
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Emphasis on the size and the quantity of the immigration played a part in convincing 
people that some sort of action must be taken. 
The use of analogy, such as reference to `population flows' in demography, 
adds suggestibility to the need for orderly control. «The recent upsurge in arrivals)) 
(Callaghan 1968b, col. 1251), «the flow of immigrants» (Callaghan 1968b, col. 1248), 
«the great influx the last few months» (Callaghan 1968b, col. 1255), «the floodgates 
were wide open)) (Binns 1965, col. 1005), «to secure agreement on ways in which they 
could limit the flood (of immigration)» (Ennals 1965, col. 395), all these expressions 
depersonalised immigrants into things - hydraulic forces. The numbers game reduced 
them to statistics: 
«the number of coloured immigrants at the moment in 
this country is round about the 800,000 mark; it may be 
more and is sometimes said to be nearer 1 million» 
(Soskice 1965, col. 445) 
«it would be irresponsible not to legislate on this vast issue 
of whether this country could afford in any circumstances 
to envisage the prospect of an invasion of 1 million or more 
Asians 
... » 
(Callaghan 1968b, col. 1247) 
«hordes of Asians coming into this country at an alarming rate... » 
(Pannell 1968, col. 1280) 
Paul Gilroy has argued that the language of war and invasion was the clearest 
illustration of the way in which the discourses, which together constituted `race', 
directed attention to national boundaries (Gilroy 1987,45). The popular solution lay in 
the social process of absorption, a slow and limited business. 
Indeed, James Callaghan's «commitment to the development of a multi-racial 
society» (Callaghan 1968b, col. 1241) and Roy Jenkins' abdication of the melting pot 
(Banton 1984,71) rested on the premise of keeping immigrants and domestic society 
apart. 
In the Labour government's 1965 White Paper `Immigration from the 
Commonwealth', on which the Immigration Act was based, the need for controls was 
explained with reference to the country's «capacity to absorb [immigrants]». There 
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was a limit to that capacity since o the presence in this country of nearly one million 
immigrants from the Commonwealth with different social and cultural backgrounds 
raises a number of problems and creates various social tensions in those areas where 
they have concentrated» (HMSO 1965,2,10). One of those problems was specified as 
`the evil of racial strife'. Clearly the White Paper divided the national community into 
different racial groups and presented these groups as culturally distinct. It rationalised 
popular racism by suggesting `racial strife' was the inevitable result when people 
belonging to different racial groups share a social space. 
So, the new racism preserved the xenophobic intolerance of the imperial 
racism, but re-cast it in suitable «tolerant» post-colonial terms (Smith 1994). Roy 
Jenkins in 1968 announced that Britain had abandoned a policy of assimilation for 
immigrants and instead had embarked on a policy of pluralism, which he described as 
the promotion of `cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity, in the atmosphere 
of mutual tolerance' (Knowles ibid). This is a new form of exclusionary politics that 
operates indirectly and through the rhetorical inclusion of people of colour and the 
sanitised nature of its racist appeal. The dispersal of immigrants, for instance, was not 
a way of promoting good relations but a means of pushing them to the margin of 
society. After all, British nationhood had always comprised various ethnicities with no 
intention of swallowing them (Joppke 1999,224). 
Most of the arguments embraced practices of inequality for the sake of 
multiracialism: 
«I would like to see a dispersal of the immigrants throughout 
the country, and if this were done we would be well on the 
way towards producing a multi-racial society» (Moyle 1968, col. 1310) 
«The government are satisfied that these measures are necessary 
in fairness to the people of this country and in the interests of 
equitable treatment for the citizens of the Commonwealth as 
a whole)) (Callaghan 1968a, col. 660) 
«I should like to see priority for vouchers given to people who 
are willing to settle in areas where there are few immigrants... to 
settle in areas where there are not undue concentrations of immigrants. 
This could be a dispersal system built in to the voucher scheme» 
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(Chapman 1965, col. 366) 
Q should like to see planned dispersal of the immigrants throughout 
the country to lessen the social tensions» (Moyle 1968, col. 1310) 
As immigrants remained ghettoised, excluded from mainstream society, 
subject to discrimination and clinging to their old habits and lifestyles as a familiar 
anchor in a hostile world, so such differences became rationalised not as the negative 
product of racism or discrimination but as the positive result of multiculturalism 
(Malik ibid, 177). 
It seems that Labour's multicultural anti-prejudice discourse represented 
racism as an external accident, which could be added or taken away from post-colonial 
British society without any fundamental transformation of its most basic structures 
(Smith 1994,145). The tendency within its multiculturalist discourse to portray ethnic 
groups or minorities as external to the national body arose from the language through 
which social differences could be understood without having to refer to the discredited 
discourse of race (Malik ibid, 177). Labour thus de-politicized racism: it became 
purely a matter of individual behaviour; the pro-tolerance, anti-prejudice discourse 
could be summed up in terms of a simple maxim: Be kind to «our friends from 
overseas, then racism will disappear (Hall 1978,219). 
Yet, multiculturalism represented not a means to an equal society but an 
alternative to one, where equality gave way to the toleration of difference, and indeed 
of inequality (Malik ibid, 170). The treatment of immigrants provided an important 
commentary on the character of the political community in Britain under the impact of 
black migration; because, above all, race is a political symbol (Ansell 1997,14). It was 
the presence of black people, in conjunction with seeing them as problems, which 
brought to the surface the question of «who we are? »: the setting apart implied not 
only a definition of «them», but also of «us». This was what was necessary for those 
drawing such boundaries (Miles and Phizacklea 1979). 
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In fact, the 1971 Immigration Act which extended the notion of patriality - 
the «substantial connectiom> as Wilson called it - already set out in 1968 by Labour 
showed that the sense of self and identity was mediated through the concept of race. 
Although during the late 1960s the Labour party effectively accommodated itself to a 
`White Britain policy', in 1971 it felt moved to question the treatment of 
Commonwealth immigrants along the same lines as aliens (Solomon 1995,169). This 
removed the claims of black (and old) Commonwealth citizens to be immigrants to 
Britain and completed a process set in train by Labour which, in construing 
immigrants and indigenousness as separate and antagonistic political communities, 
legislatively and most effectively defended the intolerant from the undesirable 
(Knowles ibid, 103). In overturning the constitution of identity in the 1948 Nationality 
Act (it had stressed that regardless of national citizenships, the common nationality 
throughout the Empire would remain British (Paul 1995,249), the 1971 Act retied the 
nation more tightly to the geographical space of the British isles (Manzo 1996,132). 
Although Labour regretted patriality, it favoured the kind of immigration restriction 
which it offered - «it was a regrettable necessity», as it was said (Callaghan 1971a, 
col. 76). It was argued that Labour had already made «a considerable contribution to 
the effective control of the numbers of people coming in» (Short 1971, col. 131). The 
1970 Labour Election Manifesto affirmed that «the rate of immigration was under firm 
control and much lower than in past years)) (Craig 1975,362). Subsequently, 
Callaghan and Jenkins did not consider the 1971 Act as racist in conception, as long as 
patriality secured a quest for «limited and low figures» (Jenkins 1973, col. 1487). 
As the Labour statements made clear, the prime object of the 1968 and 1971 
Acts was the diminution of the number of immigrants coming to Britain. Smith (1994) 
points out that the entire imperial project had contributed significantly to the 
unification of the British nation. By re-naming the colonized as immigrants, these 
supplemental populations were suddenly identified as the late additions to an already 
complete body. Roy Hattersley's famous formula, «integration without control is 
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impossible, but control without integration is indefensible» (Hattersley 1965, cols. 
378-85) was based on the idea that fewer immigrants the easier it would be to 
integrate them into the English way of life and its sociocultural lines. The mother 
country had reached her limits and more immigrants were undesirable. As Ansell 
(1997) maintains, the new racism erects «thresholds of tolerance: the racial «others» 
could not be digested by the host race nation if they arrived in large numbers and 
retained their dangerous alien identities. The authors of Labour's Opposition Green 
Paper: Citizenship, Immigration and Integration, published in 1972 `wholeheartedly' 
rejected the 1971 Immigration Act. Labour's own proposals for future immigration 
policy should be `both in theory and in practice, free from race or colour bias (... ) 
None of us objects in principle to immigration control, but the criteria must be 
rational and non-racial and must be seen to be so'. However the authors of the 
document failed to specify what those criteria should be other than stating that they 
should be `clear and publicly known' (Labour Party 1972,31,35). When Labour was 
in government between 1974 and 1979, no action was taken to amend the existing 
legislation. By 1976 Labour party literature and publicity emphasised Labour's 
commitment to firm immigration control. A Labour party pamphlet entitled `Labour 
against Racism' put it clearly: 
«All immigrants face problems when they come to a new country. 
Differences in language and background are very obvious. But 
with previous groups of newcomers, the children have very quickly 
blended in. With black or brown immigrants it's not so easy)) 
(Labour Party 1976a, 5& 6). 
In a diary entry of 16 December 1970 in the published version of Tony 
Benn's diaries the man who succeeded Harold Wilson (James Callaghan) six years 
later would state his objection to more black immigrants: 
((Executive this morning, where there was a frightful row about the 
Kenyan Asians resolution, which I had carried through the Home 
Policy and International Committees in support of Joan Lestor and 
against Tim Callaghan. Tim was livid so I made a few amendments 
to meet some of Tim's points and this was carried. When Tun realised 
that he was up against it he simply said, `We don't want any more blacks 
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in Britain' : it really did reveal at bottom what is all about)) 
(Benn 1989,320). 
Even Arthur Bottomley's internationalist and multiculturalist sentiments 
were outweighed by the `overcrowding' argument. 
<Q believe that over the generations the British way of life 
has benefited because of immigrants who have come 
here and blended their cultures with ours, bringing new 
skills and all kinds of opportunities and benefits. They have 
made Britain a stronger nation than it would otherwise have 
been. We cannot though escape the fact that Britain is an 
overcrowded island. For this reason we have to consider 
what population our island will bear, consistent with our 
economic and social development. I believe that we have reached 
saturation point)) (Bottomley 1972, cot. 1376). 
For his part, Jenkins, the liberal conscience of Labour in the late sixties, was 
convinced that the price for the low numbers could be high but, in the final analysis, 
it was worth it. His calculations about the exact number of immigrants, though, were 
not identical to Lyon's. In both cases, the quantification and the emphasis on size 
contributed to the demand for more and tighter controls: 
We must have limited and low figures but in some cases 
the price to be paid can be too high... We have a coloured 
population of about 11/2 million and successive governments 
are responsible in varying degree for their being here» 
(Jenkins 1973, col. 1489) 
<(It does not matter whether Members of this House like 
coloured immigration or dislike it, whether they like 
coloured people in this country or dislike them. The fact is that 
there are now 1 3/4 million coloured people in this country.. .1 do not complain of any hon. Member pointing to the problems 
that may arise as a result of that situation, but that is the fact 
that now exists. I accept that the demographic nature of this 
country is changing and that means that we are getting an 
increasing number of coloured people living here and that 
that may have certain consequences» (Lyon 1976, col. 55) 
Official labour statements throughout the seventies anxiously repeated the 
immigration figures, although there was some opposition from people who considered 
it wrong to play the `numbers game' (Lestor 1976,74). But, as Knowles (1992) has 
argued, in order to apply this argument, it would have been necessary to challenge the 
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field of concepts constructed around immigrant, blackness and race. This did not 
happen, even when the number of the immigrants fell significantly in the eighties. 
3.5.3 The 1981 Nationality Act and After 
From the early eighties Labour was very critical of post-war immigration 
policy, and it repeatedly assured the public in official statements that the repeal of the 
1971 Immigration Act and the 1981 Nationality Act would be among the highest 
priorities of the next Labour government. With a few exceptions, though, it refused to 
admit its own responsibility in developing that policy. Furthermore, Labour never 
dismissed the need for firm immigration controls (Winder 1982,3). 
In fact, one of Labour's arguments against the 1981 Tory Nationality Act - 
which brought citizenship into line with the right of abode (Knowles ibid, 104; 
Joppke 1999,122) - concerned the nature of immigration controls. It was alleged that 
«primary immigration is no longer a feature of our society)) (Hattersley 1982, 
col. 635), and the existence of controls was by definition racist (Temple 1981,50). 
However, it was also argued that a future Labour government «will operate a more 
humane, non-racial, but... firm immigration controls)) (Kaufiran 1985, col. 1181) and 
«entry clearance procedures» (Madden 1985, col. 1190). The NEC promised non- 
discriminatory controls on grounds of gender and race, which respect human rights, 
obligations to refugees (Labour Party 1982,45). What all these statements meant in 
practice was that the immigrant from the New Commonwealth was still the unwanted, 
the undesirable whose impact in the political community had to be monitored, 
challenged and controlled (Knowles ibid, 105). Although Labour was not directly 
responsible for the 1981 Act, the fact was that, as this chapter has demonstrated so far, 
Labour played a significant part in sustaining and giving political direction to 
immigration controls in post-war politics. In the late seventies and early eighties, there 
was evidence that some attitudes remained intact towards the former British subjects, 
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despite the assurances given by some MPs for a less racist policy (Short 1985, 
col. 1202). 
For instance, the concept of the immigrant-worker and its accompanying 
negative connotations remained unchallenged. Once more, it was alleged that 
immigration controls were necessary for economic reasons. Labour MPs claimed that 
their policy had nothing to with colour, but the controls were «based on jobs available 
and a host of other criteria)) (Lestor 1979, col. 346). The decision on the controls, it 
was said, had to be taken «according to the priorities that this country can have in 
relation to its labour force and in relation to its services». Those criteria would 
determine «who should come and who should not» (Lyon 1978,318), because as 
Merlyn Rees admitted «the problem of overstaying is real and should be dealt with)) 
(Rees 1979, col. 266). The role of the New Commonwealth immigrants was again 
measured by their ((substantial contribution to the British economy)). These were the 
people, it was said, «who often do unpleasant work, work unsocial hours, work in the 
public sector and who maintain services that would not otherwise be maintained» 
(Deakins 1984, col. 689). 
Furthermore, the multicultural anti-prejudice language, which disavowed 
racist intent, continued to stress the incompatibility of the immigrants with the norms 
of the national community. The Labour party sought fairness in the implementation of 
controls but, they also stated, owe are not asking for more people to become eligible 
for settlement)) (Randall 1987, col. 845). Bidwell addressed the issue confessing that, 
«I take second place to no one in acknowledging the anguish and the difficulties 
caused by the coming of immigration labour (Bidwell 1983, col. 205). It was alleged 
that these controls were regarded as beneficial for all sections of society, and the 
country in the longer term. Indeed, several arguments were based on non-racial 
grounds: 
«it does not help race relations to bring great numbers 
of people into a country that already has a million and a 
half unemployed. It does not help black people or race 
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relations to bring additional black people or any immigrants 
in when you have not got enough homes to go round 
already... you have got to face the facts)) 
(Torrey 1978,317) 
(d want that to be understood outside the House because 
Asian constituents and others have written to me because they 
are confused about the proposals before the House. 
They believe that the Opposition are not welcoming the 
government's measures. We welcome them, but we want 
much more in the interests of justice, race relations and 
the future of Britain>> (Bidwell 1982, col. 727). 
Labour gave no indication of any intention to reconstruct immigration on 
principles different from it had applied the previous decades, despite the willingness of 
the party leadership of Neil Kinnock and Roy Hattersley «to have a multiracial 
Parliament to reflect our multiracial society» (Kinnock 1987,45). Labour was happy 
with the situation as it was. The inflow of significant numbers of black people with 
immediate access to the national community had effectively been stopped. No new 
measures needed to be taken. 
By 1992, the first key point in a policy statement on immigration and 
nationality was that «Labour is committed to fair but firm immigration control» 
(Labour Party 1992). Readers of Labour's Policy Handbook of 1996 were told that 
«we want a fair, firm and efficient immigration and asylum policy)> (Labour Party 
1996a). Statements by Barbara Roche at the 1995 Labour party Conference revealed 
that `firm' meant that under Labour only European Union citizens, close relatives and 
relations of British citizens and refugees would be allowed to migrate to Britain; `fair' 
meant that nobody else would be allowed to migrate to Britain; and 'efficient' meant 
that the system would be run effectively (Lentze 1996,135). The focus on the 
immigration laws started to change, as New Labour's immigration and asylum policies 
will make clear in a following section. The black immigrants started to give way to the 
refugees and asylum seekers; the latter were to portray the main threat to the European 
identity of the nation in the late nineteen nineties. Their `whiteness' and not the 
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`blackness' will be racialised with elements drawn from the social structure and 
character of the British national community on the eve of the new millennium. 
3.6 Conclusion 
All the party leaderships since Gaitskell have subscribed to the `outward- 
looking' oceanic vision of Britishness to less or greater extent. The vision provided an 
independent role and sustained the world role pretences that the developing European 
Community of medium sized countries could not allegedly provide. Under the impact 
of global changes, such as decolonisation, end of east of Suez role, crisis in a imperial 
leftover, and European integration, the defence of the `imagined community' of the 
English speaking world was a consistent theme of the Labour party's nationalism 
throughout the European debates. The trans-oceanic identity was not claimed by the 
party because of its intra-balance of power or its electoral fortunes; both in opposition 
and in power the party has been in favour of the multi-national community. The 
supposedly anti-European Gaitskell and the pragmatic Europeans Wilson and Blair 
have in varying degrees been attached to the English-speaking world, and the 
disjuncture between the real declining imperial framework and the imagined 
exceptionalism was closed by attitudes of extreme hostility and xenophobia to those 
who were deemed undesirable aliens and unassimilable. Despite the emergence of the 
European Community and Britain's subsequent entry in 1973, the imperial grandeur 
exhibited consistently in the party's discourse during the European debates was 
sustained by the racialisation of those populations who threatened to reverse the 
superior status of the national community. 
Labour chose to defend the national `imagined' community, building barriers 
around it before the alien forces of the black immigrants eroded it. Labour's imperial 
spatial Britishness has been a racial concept since the issue of Britain's standing in the 
world as a head of the multiracial community was dependent upon «race relations, 
that is, a particular set of political concerns focusing on public order and standards of 
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citizenship, and not just on biological grounds. In this way, national sovereignty can 
be seen not just as a civic locational effect but also an ethno-cultural one. As the 
second chapter made clear, the quest for purism in the nationalist practices appears as 
a lost battle. 
Especially after the loss of the Empire in the late sixties, the quest for 
definite and `pure' boundaries for the nation coincided with fears about `threats' to 
national identity from the movement of the populations to Britain from the former 
colonies. They provided the occasion for the re-closure of the broken body and the 
specifically anti-black immigration laws offered a solution to the post-colonial crisis 
of national identity. `It is the `greater' nations', as Nairn has noted, `that remain 
grandly unaware of their narrowness, because their size, their culture, or their 
imagined centrality makes them identify with Humanity or Progress tout court. Great 
- British chauvinism belongs to this camp. But it does so with diminishing reason and 
increasing delusion, dragging British from Empire to something less than a modem 
nation-state' (Nairn 1977,78). The insularisation of the party's nationhood embodied 
in Little Englanderism in the 1970s and early 1980s was no less important in its 
attitudes towards Europe. As the following chapter will demonstrate, for Labour, 
Britain belonged to the British and the rest of the world, but not to Europe. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE BRITISH ISLES 
4.1 Introduction 
Although imperialism appears to be in an historical perspective the dominant 
form of the Labour party's nationalism in respect of the European question, in this 
chapter I would like to analyse another form of nationalism, which, for some scholars, 
did not imply exclusively the dissolution of the imperial vision. After all, in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, at a time when Little Englanderism showed its true colours within 
the party ranks, Commonwealth was not discredited as, at least, an imagined national 
community. 
The first part of this chapter (4.2) will argue that traditionally Little 
Englanders were not just the anti-imperialists. In their ranks there were several who 
argued for a different, more `sane' form of imperialism; for them, anti-imperialism 
was associated with a populist criticism of the injustices of capitalism and 
industrialism. Like previously, the insular vision of the `free born Englishman' was 
also defined by the exclusion of the aliens. The Little Englanderism of the Labour 
forebears (4.3) will make more explicit the connection of national populism and 
racism. Ethical socialists, Marxists and Fabians argued for a very English form of 
socialism, for an autarkic economy, independent from foreign influences. In this 
sense, the foreign workers were considered to be a threat to the national welfarism. In 
the 1970s and early 1980s, under the impact of the global economic crisis and the loss 
of the Atlantic financial support (4.4.1), the Labour representatives put their populism 
(4.4.2.2) in nationalist (economic) terms (4.4.2.1) in order to protect the indigenous 
workers from the injustices of the European capitalism. The amalgamation of 
nationalism and populism resulted in the negative representation of the European 
workforce (4.4.2.3). 
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4.2 The Origins of Little Englanderism 
This section delineates the three main elements that have accompanied Little 
Englanderism as a competing vision of nationhood: an insular view of national 
identity; a radical agenda, which went back to the Civil War; and, perhaps, the most 
ambiguous one, racialism. The latter, as the subsequent analysis of the Labour party's 
intellectual traditions will further show, has been the complementary element of the 
insular nationalism. Like imperialism, Little Englanderism has been defined against 
the `other'. 
In particular, Little Englanderism grew from the 1880s primarily as a series 
of critical responses to the larger patriotism of British imperialism (Grainger 1986; 
Gott 1989; Green and Taylor 1989). The original notion of Little England referred to 
the small piece of the English-speaking world that happened to be located in the 
British Isles, as opposed to that Greater England beyond the seas - the remains of 
Britain's mercantile Empire (Gott 1989,92). Old liberals and new liberals (John 
Morley, Leonard Courtney, Francis Hirst, J. M. Robertson, J. L. Hammond, L. T. 
Hobhouse, and J. A. Hobson) maintained continuity of ideology in censuring the 
vanity, irresponsible adventuring, improvidence and «lust for domination» of their 
fellow-countrymen (Grainger ibid, 141). They `did not wish to liquidate dependent 
Empire but to prevent further expansion. Some - J. M. Robertson not among them - 
might even defend a `true' against a `false' imperialism. As a critique, Little 
Englanderism ranged from Harcourt's practical objections to `extensionism' or 
`inflationism' to Hammond's rejection of the new moral syllogism of Empire as he set 
it out: `The British Empire is the greatest blessing known to mankind. Whatever helps 
to extend Empire is good. Although a particular course of action may be immoral, in 
the sense that it is a breach of faith, it becomes not merely innocent, but positively 
virtuous, if it helps to extend the Empire' (Hammond 1900,160,162). Critics of 
Empire were specifically ranged against what they regarded as something new: the 
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late nineteenth century conspiracy of Empire, financial and military. From Morley to 
John Hobson they reckoned the cost of this late imperialism in blood, money and 
energy and insisted that it was a subversion of the better part of English history, of the 
life and ideals of the people, of the British Constitution itself. As J. M. Robertson 
noted, England would be doing well enough in the world if she cultivated her own 
garden and solved her own domestic problems. Against the Roman ideal of the 
perpetual rule of others, Robertson proposed self-development and the rational 
construction of alternate bases for sounder civilization (Robertson 1899,181,182, 
202-3). 
Above all, the criticism of imperialism was a direct objection to a particular 
governing ethos, which deprived the majority of the people their rights. For J. A. 
Hobson and the mid-19th century radical critics of Empire and aggression, the 
problem with imperialism and war was not simply that they oppressed people in 
foreign lands but that they also led to the suppression of the rights of the `free-born 
Englishman' whose heritage of liberty the Empire was supposed to export and 
Britain's wars were supposedly fought to preserve. The basic root of Little England 
thinking is concern for the ramifications of this kind of policy within the domestic 
sphere. It has always been the domestic aspect of radical Little Englanderism, which 
has given it its truly radical cutting edge (Green and Taylor 1989,108). 
Medievalism, the persistence of the continuity of the Common Law and the 
predisposition to refer back to an earlier golden age of Anglo-Saxon liberties 
destroyed by the Norman Yoke were part of the Little Englanderism tradition (Hill 
1954; 1958). These qualities were mostly reflected by radical elements during the 
English civil war, notably, the Levellers and the Diggers (Hill 1958,75). Their 
critique of English political, legal and spiritual institutions did not lead Levellers to 
seek a new constitutional settlement. Parliament retained its central role unquestioned, 
save for a demand that the franchise be extended, because sovereignty resided with 
the `people'. For the Levellers this meant the whole adult male population and 
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threatened the `old constitution' based on law and property, the Englishman's 
birthright. Likewise, the Diggers advocated the abolition of private property and 
provided much of the inspiration for the utopian socialist movements in the nineteenth 
century. But the strong religious emphasis of the Diggers and their commitment to 
communal rights, based on the Englishman's birthright of shared free land, were 
derived from the medieval ideas of a Christian commonwealth and firmly 
incorporated the Diggers into the English radical tradition. Thus both Levellers and 
Diggers sharing the common presumption of an assertion of an Englishman's rights, 
established a tradition of English radicalism, which was not only constitutional but 
also national and popular (Jones and Keating 1985,17). 
Yet, restricted nationhood and radicalism were not the sole attributes of Little 
Englanderism. Racialism was inextricably linked with an inward-looking radicalism. 
As Mercer (2000) has noted Little Englanderism is the peculiarly English 
combination of nationalism, radicalism and racism. The defence of the rights of the 
people involved the negation of rights to those aliens who do not belong to the 
national essence. 
Cohen (1988) gives us an illuminating account of the Puritan tradition, which 
makes uncomfortable reading for those contemporary representatives of the labour 
movement who have been looking for radical inspiration back to that era. In the 1640s, 
at the height of the Puritan revolution, a great debate took place on whether the Jews 
should be readmitted into England. Monarchists and other radical sects supported 
readmittance because the historical legacy of Judaism lent biblical legitimacy to their 
own sense of political destiny. As the original `chosen people', the Jewish presence 
was to confirm the Puritans' own divine calling to lead the nation out of bondage and 
into a promised land. Jewish culture was to be exploited to provide the freeborn 
Englishman with an additional set of ethnic credentials whilst Jewish people 
themselves were to be assimilated and lose their separate identity. 
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The anti-admittance faction took a different line. They emphasised that the 
Civil War was a war of bloods, and tried to link popular feeling against the aristocracy 
with anti-Semitism by suggesting that the Jewish community had only flourished 
because of Norman protection and no `true-born Anglo-Saxon king' would have let 
them in. Judaism is presented as an ally of Rome, the secret agent of a Papist 
conspiracy to overthrow the Commonwealth. The English in contrast are portrayed as 
a chosen people by virtue not only of their true adherence to the Christian faith, but 
also in terms of their racial ancestry. As Cohen has noted, `race is used as a 
genealogical principle linking nation and people in such a way as to exclude anyone 
who is not Anglo-Saxon born and bred from its privileged patrimony of freedom' 
(Cohen 1988,30). 
Only by excluding those who do not belong to the national body, one can 
make sense of one's identity. The labour movement provided adequate platforms from 
which to promote the elements of `Little Englanderism'. The duality of Little 
Englanderism threw a long shadow over the radical arguments voiced from the 
forebears of the Labour party. The following section will elucidate this relationship. 
4.3 Little Englanderism and the Early Socialists 
Along with Liberal anti-imperialism, the forerunners of the Labour party, 
based on John Ruskin's Romantic critique of industrialisation and the research of the 
radical historian Thorold Rogers, came to see capitalism as bringing an absolute 
decline in the standard of living of the English people (Ward 1998,22), and stressed 
the re-assertion of the rights of the `free born Englishman' (Jones and Keating 1985, 
17) and the exclusion of those who do not belong to the narrowly defined national 
space through the state power. The reassertion of radicalism against the injustices of 
the international capital within the narrow confines of the nation-state implied the 
exclusion of those who had no stake in the national essence. In addition, for Paul Ward 
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(1998), the attitudes to the state were crucial in the relationships between the left and 
ideas of national identity in the formative years of the labour movement. 
First, in respect of the Marxist SDF, in his work on Labour Imperialism, 
Gupta asserts that despite his chauvinism, the Marxist Hyndman had brought some 
Liberal-Radical intellectual baggage with them, including the Cobdenite `Little 
England' belief that industrial Britain need not and should not pursue annexationist 
and militarist policies to protect her economic interests (Gupta 1975,10). Hyndman's 
Marxism incorporated the medievalist historiography and fear of impending anarchy 
that informed the politics of radical conservatism whose discourse echoed the country 
party (Bevir 1991; 1992; Robbins 1959; Pocock 1975; Peters 1971). His Historical 
Basis of Socialism (1883) owed as much to Cobbett as to Marx. Radical conservatism 
idealised the Middle Ages as a time of harmony and order when people were `merrie' 
and devout: the stout yeomen of medieval England were attached to the land or an 
established trade and so economically independent; they were a free and vigorous 
people who, guided by an enlightened aristocracy, provided. the backbone of an 
upright nation (Bevir 1991,127). Radical conservatives were anxious about the 
commercialism which had created disinherited workers who were cut adrift from a 
stable order and lacked spiritual satisfaction; and they feared that these workers in 
desperation might overthrow society (Bevir 1991,128). 
Hyndman's England for All looked back to the 15`h century as an age of 
English glory, the golden age of agricultural England, the `golden age of the people' as 
he called it in his Historical Basis of Socialism (Hyndman 1883,1-22). Medievalism 
was by no means the sole preserve of radical conservatism. The same historiography 
can be found in political Liberals such as Ruskin and the young William Morris 
(Morris 1910-5; Ruskin 1892). Indeed the popularity of medievalism during the 
nineteenth century was mainly due to its place within the romantic tradition, which, in 
turn, influenced many of Hyndman's fellow socialists. With William Morris, 
Hyndman described fourteenth-century England as `inhabited by perhaps the most 
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vigorous, freedom-loving set of men the world ever saw' (Hyndman and Morris 1884, 
13). In the late Victorian era, socialists wanted to find the cause of England's social 
problems in the advent of capitalism. The onset of capitalism in the countryside had 
diverted the course of English history and had reduced the standard of living of the 
English people (Hyndman 1973,16,17; Morris and Bax 1893,122). Thus Hyndman's 
Tory radicalism spoke of `restitution', reclaiming for the people what was theirs, 
rather than of `confiscation' (Hyndman and Morris 1883,60). Contrary to the 
respective arguments of his `right' and `left' critics Hyndman was neither a 
straightforward revolutionary nor a straightforward parliamentary pacifist. His 
Marxism allowed him to take a positive view of the state as an instrument of social 
reconciliation, «a state as the organised power of the people» (Bevir 1991,141). 
Political reform along Chartist lines in which workers had the power to introduce 
change without bloodshed was an immediate necessity (Hyndman 1904). 
Although Marxists often accepted the need for a more interventionist state, 
their economic theory did not compel them to do so. Socialist poet and designer 
William Morris, for example, defended a form of anarcho-communism (Morris 1910- 
15). Other Marxists, notably Tom Mann, favored a form of syndicalism (White 1991). 
Turning to the ethical tradition, the more influential in his Little 
Englanderism was Robert Blatchford (Thompson 1996; Foote 1997,36; Ward 1998, 
27; Barrow 1975; Thompson 1951; Blatchford 1895; 1902). Like Hyndman, 
Blatchford argued that Britain's independence could not be secure while greed was the 
motivating power in society, and that greed was the outcome of industrialism 
(Blartchford 1895,18,35). Blatchford was worried about the social effects of 
industrialism, particularly the decay of the traditional ties that bound the national 
community together: «Don't you see that if we destroy our agriculture we destroy our 
independence at a blow, and become a defenseless nation? » (Blatchford 1895,34). A 
rural economy, he believed, would achieve this security by taking advantage of 
English insularity and restoring the rights of the free Briton: «The British Islands do 
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not belong to the British people; they belong to a few thousands - certainly not half of 
a million - of rich men... If England could feed herself she would not be at the mercy of 
any foreign power. Suppose our agriculture is dead and we depend entirely upon 
foreigners for our daily bread! What will be our position then? ... We are therefore 
entirely dependent upon foreigners for our existence... » (Blatchford 1895,34). 
Because Blatchford's socialism was above all other things national: «If you as a Briton 
are proud of your country and your race, if you as a man have any pride in your 
manhood, or as a worker have any pride in your class men, come over to us and help 
in the just and wise policy in winning Britain for the British, manhood for all men, 
womanhood for all women, and love to-day and hope to-morrow for the children, 
whom Christ loved, but who by many Christians have unhappily been forgotten 
(Blatchford 1895,172-3). 
In both Merrie England and Britain for the British, Blatchford argued for an 
autarkic economy which expected to restore the rights of the Englishmen. Hence, «the 
people should make the best of their own country before attempting to trade with other 
people's» (Blatchford 1902,133). Earlier in Merrie England, he defined «practical 
socialism» as «a kind of national scheme of co-operation, managed by the state. Its 
programme consists essentially of one demand that the land and other instruments of 
production shall be the common property of the people)) (Blatchford 1895,100). 
Apart from Blatchford, ethical socialists, following the co-operative notions 
of Robert Owen and the medievalist values of John Ruskin, rarely evoked 
sophisticated economic theories to reveal the unjust or inefficient nature of 
industrialism or capitalism (Foote 1997,34; Bevir 1999b, 340). The ethical socialists' 
ideal centred on a personal democracy in which relationships were based on equality 
and love. The particular role of the state was of little importance compared to personal 
transformations. Thus Edward Carpenter advocated a nongovernmental society based 
on co-operative units of production (Carpenter 1897,174-92). 
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Turning to the Fabians, it cannot be easily sustained that the Society, as a 
hybrid organisation in terms of ideas, favoured Little Englanderism since its writings 
were mostly devoid of radicalism. Yet, we find that Fabian economic theories, unlike 
those of the Marxists and, even, of the ethical socialists, compelled their adherents to 
call for a more interventionist state, for a more English state socialism. Indeed, here 
the talk was less about radicalism and more about administration, hierarchy and 
efficiency. 
George Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb drew on marginalism to construct 
theories of rent as exploitation (Bevir 1989,313-27). Shaw argued that capitalists 
exploited workers in part by the exercise of their monopoly of the means of production 
and in part because as landlords they appropriated the rents arising from natural 
advantages of fertility. Webb argued that interest was strictly analogous to land rent 
since it derived from an advantageous industrial situation. Both Shaw and Webb 
believed, therefore, that any economy necessarily produced rent understood as a social 
surplus (Bevir 1989,320). The solution, therefore, was for the state to appropriate the 
rent (Webb 1888,53-60,79-89). But socialism was not just about rectifying 
distributive injustices; not just about securing the economic surplus for social use. 
Socialism was also about the elimination of waste and inefficiency through the social 
organisation and control of the nation's productive capacity (Thompson 1996,19). 
Only in this way could socialism provide an effective antidote to the competitive 
anarchy of the market economy. So Fabians advocated the "taking over of the great 
centralised industries" by the state or municipalities in order to lay the basis for a 
"consciously regulated co-ordination of economic activity" (Webb 1896,5). The 
extension of public ownership was therefore to be the means of organising and 
controlling economic activity in the interests of society as a whole. 
In short, unlike the ethical and Marxist traditions, this was a socialism of 
administration and organisation, contemptuous of democracy and the working classes, 
and it found fertile ground in the limited concept of citizenship in Britain and the 
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autonomy of the state (Hassan 1995; Bevir 1999b). Although leading figures in the 
Independent Labour party and the Labour party - Keir Hardie, Philip Snowden, and 
Ramsay MacDonald - condemned capitalism in much the same terms as the ethical 
socialists, they turned to the Fabians to provide them with an economic analysis of the 
market economy. They turned to the state to correct the failings they believed were 
inherent in the market economy. They rejected traditional fears about a too powerful 
state by stressing the ethical nature of a truly democratic state. As MacDonald 
explained, «the democratic State is an organisation of the people, democratic 
government is self-government, democratic law is an expression of the will of the 
people who have to obey the law» (MacDonald 1905,70). 
As Hassan (1995) has noted, this was a very English type of socialism. The 
inward-looking vision of Britain for the British, which the above traditions favoured, 
meant that the nation and the working class of other nations were always potential 
enemies (Foote 1997,36; Ward 1998,53). 
Indeed, underlying the whole subject of Little Englanderism was the 
dominance of ideas about race at the end of the nineteenth century. Blatchford's 
Clarion sided firmly with the British state and was prepared to use both xenophobia 
and anti-immigrant sentiments (Ward 1998,41). Blatchford became contemptuous of 
internationalism: «We were out for socialism and nothing but socialism and were 
Britons first and socialists next» (Blatchford 1895,199). Blatchford's Clarion saw the 
problem in terms of immigration combined with emigration. An editorial spoke of the 
mismanagement of the nation which meant that «the best of our bone and brain must 
seek a living in other lands, leaving their places to be filled with the mental and 
physical dregs of foreign peoples who did not mind serving as slaves and living as 
beasts» (Ward 1998,55). As early as 1895 Clarion claimed that immigration control 
against Jews was a matter of «legitimate self-preservation and that «there is scarcely 
any town of any dimensions in the country in which the foreign element has not 
injured and menaced the position of the local workmen (Cohen 1994,76). The health 
147 
of the nation was seen as the concern of the left and that health was seen to be 
determined by the origin and social status of its inhabitants. Immigration was linked 
to the problems of urban decay and the worst parts of the cities, which attracted 
immigrants, assumed the appearance of foreign enclaves. In 1896 Clarion spoke of 
being `in a foreign country' in Whitechapel (A. Lee 1980,111). The English were not 
known as great lovers of foreigners, especially in this heyday of imperialism, and, as 
said earlier, the working class were themselves rather parochial (A. Lee 1980,113). 
The attitude of the labour movement towards immigrants oscillated wildly. 
Labour attempted to defend them against discrimination, and, officially, the party 
always took a stance against restricting immigration. Britain in its view had to remain 
the `home of freedom'. Yet, many Labour leaders also believed that foreigners made 
effective unionisation of the work force more difficult, that the importation of foreign 
labour would lead to blacklegging undercutting and deskilling. Expressions of racial 
hostility were closely tied to competition for employment and housing as well as to 
complaints about `strange habits', i. e. an alien culture. It was after all, the 
internationalist Keir Hardie who before a Select Committee of the House of Commons 
argued in 1889: «Every foreigner throws one British workman out of employment>> 
(Berger 1999,55). At the 1903 ILP conference which reiterated a resolution proposing 
immigration restrictions, the ethical socialist and leading member of the ILP, Bruce 
Glasier spoke of the decline of the nation: «our internal freedom and external defence 
are less secure... our national character are in less repute... our young and virile 
population is quitting the country... and we are getting in pauper aliens and rich 
predatory aliens instead» (Ward 1998,56). Moreover, Glasier, expressing irritation 
that immigrants might capitalise on welfare provisions, declared in 1905 that "neither 
the principle of the brotherhood of man nor the principle of social equality implies that 
brother nations or brother men may crowd upon us in such numbers as to abuse our 
hospitality, overturn our institutions or violate our customs" (Bourke 1994,196; 
Berger 1999,55). 
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As Ward (1998) has pointed out, for most of the early British socialists, 
internationalism was something desirable but it was also something distant. This led to 
socialists seeing no further than the English Channel. By employing a very English 
version of state socialism, as embodied in the slogan Britain for the British, saw 
`splendid isolation' in terms of domestic policy (Ward 1998,44). 
As the following section will explain, their teachings apparently provided the 
framework on which a section of the contemporary British Labour party built their 
own insular vision of Britishness in relation to the European question in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
4.4 Little Englanderism in Labour discourse in the European 
debate, 1972-83 
After the loss of the imperial space, the party, while still suffering from the 
`great power syndrome' (see chapter 3), at the same time, started exhibiting a more 
insular outlook of Britain in relation to the European debate. During the particular 
period, although initially it did not enjoy the approval of the party representatives as a 
whole, in the early 1980s, especially after the departure of the `Gang of Four' and the 
formation of the SDP, Little Englanderism managed to attract the majority of the 
opinion within the labour movement. Despite their various attachments and tactical 
considerations, all the Labour leaders of that period, Harold Wilson, Jim Callaghan 
and Michael Foot, expressed, to a less or greater extent, a genuine desire to recover 
national prestige, not by necessarily resorting to a kind of submissive relationship 
with the European Community; but, rather by developing a nationalist strategy within 
the limits of the British Isles and keeping contact with the remnants of the British 
imperialism, as seen in the previous chapter. As Tindale has argued, this hostility to 
the British membership of the EEC was not restricted to a specific ideological faction 
within the party. The issue cut across ideological boundaries and defied intra-party 
factional barriers (Tindale 1992,276). 
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Richard Crossman, a member of the Wilson Cabinets in the sixties, set the 
tone of Little Englanderism. He publicly admitted that the only way to respond 
effectively to «British degeneracy>> was not to go back to the old or new 
Commonwealth, which constituted then just a «legend», but, «to make ourselves an 
offshore island... and become a nation of Little Englanders)> (Crossman 1972,16). The 
future that Crossman envisaged for Britain was that of «an offshore island, cutting 
down all her overseas commitments, getting herself an economic position as 
favourable as that of Japan in the Far East and living on her own as an independent 
socialist community>> (Kedourie 1984,14). 
At the time of the Heath government's successful bid for Britain's entry -a 
very well documented period in terms of Labour party's European party policy (Nairn 
1971; 1972a; 1972b; Newman 1983; Robins 1979; Featherstone 1988; Byrd 1975; 
Butler and Kitzinger 1976; Bilski 1977; Broad and Geiger 1996; Grahl and Teague 
1988; Geyer 1997) no motion was passed at the party conferences (1971-73) in 
principle against membership of the EEC (Donoughue 1993,91) - the party leadership 
confined themselves to an opposition to the terms of entry. The leader of the party till 
the mid-seventies, Harold Wilson, despite his ambiguous position, was not opposed to 
Britain's staying out if the negotiations with Europe were not satisfactory for the 
British interests. «If we were to be excluded by bureaucratic pedantry, he claimed, 
«a Britain confident to build up her economic strength outside the Community will 
seek its own destiny)> (Wilson 1971a, 3). At that moment, the terms that Labour set 
for negotiation were extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be met by the European 
countries. So, these terms were actually a rejection of the very principle of British 
entry and a clear adoption of the isolationist argument. Wilson, at the Socialist 
International Conference in Helsinki on May 25th 1971, bluntly stated that «Britain is 
and will be strong enough to stand on her own feet outside» (Robins 1979,96). 
During the 1971 summer, Wilson's eventual successor, James Callaghan was looking 
for an alternative strategy. He announced that he had uncovered an alternative policy 
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to entering the Common Market. All that the next Labour government needed to do 
was to `run the economy flat out for five years' (Clark 1971b, 2). The proper national 
programme was to sacrifice everything else to industrial growth. Callaghan, like 
Wilson, a natural Commonwealth man (Morgan 1997,393), insinuated that if British 
could pull their collective selves together in this fashion the open seas might still be 
theirs. 
The referendum period unveiled the hostility of a significant part of the party 
to the prospect of British membership (for example, the NEC of the party - the 
supreme body which is custodian of the conference decisions (Minkin 1980; Hatfield 
1978) - recommended to Labour's Special Conference in April support for British 
withdrawal, which was accepted by 3.72 million to 1.97 million (Featherstone 1988, 
60). Newman underlines the pre-eminence of national economic sovereignty in the 
case against EC (Newman 1983,246), while all the resolutions passed since 1977 
talked about `repeal of the European Communities 1972 Act' (Labour Party 1977, 
249), `extensive changes in Britain's relationship to the EC' (Labour Party 1978,320) 
and finally the demand from the party `to include the withdrawal of the UK from the 
EEC as a priority in the next general election manifesto (1983)' (Labour Party 1980, 
125), following the NEC statement `Withdrawal from the EEC' (Labour Party 1981, 
2-3). Before the 1983 General Election, the then party leader, Michael Foot 
considered that «you could perfectly well have an international policy without 
necessarily being a member of the Common Market» (Clark 1981,2). In fact, the 
Manifesto of 1983, The New Hope for Britain, presented a non-nuclear `Fortress 
Britain': `British withdrawal from the Community is the right policy for Britain', it 
declared and it would be `completed well within the lifetime of the Parliament' 
(Labour Party 1983). After the general election, the left-wing New Statesman 
commented that «the residual Little Englanderism of the current Labour anti- 
European policy does not fit a party that proclaims its internationalism)) (New 
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Statesman 1983,3). Commentators have characterised, Labour's mentality over the 
European question as that of «a narrow restricted island party)) (Hatfield 1978,1). 
What the historical account reveals is that the transition of the party's 
attitudes, or a significant section of it, from `ruling the waves' to the `defence of the 
island' was indeed noteworthy, at a time when Commonwealth was not discredited 
altogether, as seen in the previous chapter. In this sense, Little Englanderism did not 
imply an opposition to the grandeur of the imperial vision per se. Like the early 
socialists, the party representatives of the time were associated with a criticism of the 
contemporary form of capitalism and a more insular policy agenda in order to address 
the prize of a parasitic economy heavily dependent on the transatlantic links. 
As Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) have noted, the boundaries often change 
over time and in response to concrete political, economic, and ideological conditions. 
Hence, Labour's Little Englanderism over the European issue of the 1970s and early 
1980s was not just a result of adversarial, intra-party antagonisms such as the rise of 
the New Left (Ashford 1991; Newman 1983; Jones 1996), and solely domestic 
considerations (Bilski 1977; Robins 1979; Geddes 1994; Daniels 1998), as sections of 
the literature over Labour's European policy of that period suggest. Instead, the 
distinctive isolationist strategy that the New Left expressed and formulated in its 
populist strategy was also the outcome of a combination of the effects of global 
politico-economic and geopolitical changes that affected a former imperial power. As 
seen previously, nationalist discourse invents nations in moments of anxiety attendant 
upon shifting global power relations (Manzo 1996,27). The dilemmas set by the 
international context, and especially the questioning of the `special relationship' and, 
more importantly, its connection with the declining domestic economic front, touched 
the roots of the party's intellectual traditions and inevitably stimulated its national- 
populist defences. George and Heythorne (1996,119) have stressed that the world 
economic crisis, which affected living conditions in Britain in the early 1970s, 
reinforced a rather negative view within the party about Europe. Thus, the 
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development of little Englander attitudes, which found expression in the amalgam of 
nationalism, populism and racism in the party politics, cannot be examined in 
separation from the changing pattern of Britain's international links. 
4.4.1 The Global Politico-Economic Context 
As seen earlier, the Wilson government's 1967 decision to withdraw from 
east of Suez reduced Britain's world role. However, the timing of the British 
withdrawal - between 1968 and 1972 - could not have been worse, coming as it did 
when the Americans' morale-draining involvement in Vietnam was at its peak. For 
twenty years the British presence east of Suez had lightened Washington's burden in 
its efforts to make the world safe for capitalism and liberal democracy: with the British 
gone, the burden was inevitably increased and the Americans became commensurately 
more resentful. By reducing the potential for Anglo-American collaboration in-out-of 
NATO area operations, the British withdrawal from east of Suez had further weakened 
the `special relationship'. In essence, the withdrawal from east of Suez weakened 
Britain's ties with both the residue of the Empire and with the United States. And in so 
doing, of course, withdrawal paved the way for Britain's greater subsequent 
participation in the European circle (Sanders 1990,176). In its desire to establish 
Britain's credentials as a `good European', the Heath government then chose to ignore 
Henry Kissinger's somewhat extravagant plans to make 1973 the `Year of Europe'. 
Worse still, in October 1973, Heath proceeded to make common cause with Britain's 
European partners in refusing base facilities to the American aircraft which were 
supplying Israel in its `Yom Kippur' war with the Arab states (Watt 1986,1-14). By 
1973, Anglo-American relations were indeed becoming distinctly ordinary (Sanders 
1990,177). 
At the same time, in the US there was a sense of vulnerability in that 
previously all-powerful nation on other fronts (Morgan 1997,440). For example, 
Vietnam proved a military catastrophe, and caused a huge rift in domestic opinion. 
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The American economy was also experiencing unpleasant and unfamiliar difficulties, 
as the inflation of the dollar priced US goods out of world markets. This was a bad 
omen for Britain, which was itself already facing intractable economic conundrums. 
As a result, Keynesianism found itself increasingly embattled in the Britain of 
the mid-seventies (Sassoon 1996; Thompson 1996,235). On the one hand, it seemed 
to have lost its explanatory power. While most Keynesians had come to believe in the 
existence of a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, the late nineteenth 
sixties and early seventies saw inflation and unemployment increase in tandem. By 
1975, Britain could boast a 25 per cent of inflation and a post-war high in the rate of 
unemployment of 5 per cent (Thompson 1996,236). Such a state of affairs called into 
question both the efficacy of traditional macro-economic policy instruments and the 
theoretical justification for their use. A tight monetarist policy, fiscal self-discipline 
and a growing reliance on private initiative in a context of competitive market forces - 
this was the way forward that monetarists exhorted governments to take over the 
corpse of Keynesianism (Laidler 1976). The subsequent 1974-79 Labour 
government's obeisance to monetarism (Smith 1987; Bleaney 1985; Backhouse 1987; 
Britton 1991; Holmes 1985; Artis & Cobham 1991; Coates 1980) was summarised by 
the leading protagonists of that period as `eclectic pragmatism' (Healey 1989) and 
`frustrated Keynesianism' (Britton ibid, 20). The sterling crisis of 1976 (Burk & 
Cairncross 1991; Dell 1991), the intervention of the IMF and the government 
expenditure cuts signalled the end of Keynesian social democracy (Thompson 1996, 
239). 
Most of these difficulties were due to the old `special relationship' which 
started to decline. Green and Metcalfe (1993,146) have argued that due to the 
extremely close trading and financial relations between the US and Britain, the latter 
was strongly hit by US shocks. This influence took a number of forms. US 
deflationary policies after the oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80, ((added to the 
recessionary forces (in the UK) arising directly from the oil price rise» (Allsopp and 
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Mayes 1985,401). With political tensions and racial troubles at home, the United 
States needed support and reassurance in the world, at a time when the European 
powers were grouping together inwardly in their Common Market. This period was 
thus marked by a growing distancing on the part of US from Britain and indeed 
Europe generally (Allen 1988,174). The Conservative Prime Minister Ted Heath 
presented the whole EC entry procedure as a venture into a period of new national 
glory: «We have the chance of new greatness», he said, owe must go in if we want to 
remain Great Britain, and take the chance of becoming Greater Britain>> (Young 1998, 
230). The Labour leadership did not share Heath's triumphalism. Wilson and 
Callaghan were concerned that the Anglo-American relationship had badly 
deteriorated during the Heath years and the US had little interest in providing Britain 
with any special economic privileges. This was clearly demonstrated by the rigid 
terms that the US set for making a loan to the British Labour government in order to 
stabilise the pound in 1976 (Holmes 1985). 
Taking into account the wider context in which Britain positioned itself in the 
seventies and eighties, Geyer (1997) suggests that Labour's European policy reflected 
the changes in relation to the declining political and economic importance of the US. 
The pressing question for Labour was to present an alternative strategy to overcome 
the economic decline given the fact that the Sterling Area and the US could not 
intervene to do so. The previous attempts made by the Wilson's governments 
instigating the Fabian-inspired National Plan had failed (Brittan 1971; Davis 1968; 
Graham 1972; Nairn 1972a, 63; Posner 1972; Thompson 1996,183-92; Young 1974). 
As Nairn (1972a) said, the six years of historic Labour government did not alter the 
course of world history; more important, they did not stand the nation back on its feet. 
Worse, the Wilson government showed once more the asymmetry between the role as 
a party of the wider labour movement and the role as a party of government 
(Thompson 1996). 
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As a result, in the early 1970s, Labour was in danger of ideological paralysis, 
or what David Marquand then called «in a state of suspended doctrinal animation 
(M, arquand 1975,398). Leading theorists of the movement questioned the relationship 
between class and nation, at a time of overt class conflict and Heath's confrontational 
approach towards the trade unions. It was argued that Labour's predominant 
orientation was consistently one of presenting itself as a national party in the 
conventional idealist sense of defining a `national interest' above classes (Miliband 
1964,15; Panitch 1971,193; Panitch 1977; Panitch 1985,14; 1988). This implied a 
disregard of the interests of the working class, which appeared defenceless in the face 
of the growing economic crisis and was threatened by those governing elites and 
business circles who favoured British entry (Moravcsik 1998,281). At a time when 
institutions are in disarray, as Marquand (2000a) and Miller (1995) have assumed, 
when an old order has fallen apart and there is no coherent alternative in sight, the 
easiest way to cut through the resulting contradictions is to appeal directly to the 
people, over the heads of such intermediaries as remain. 
Under the impact of the global changed politico-economic context, the 
questioning of Britain's ability to solve her problems and the failures of the previous 
administrations to respond effectively to the new dilemmas paved the way for the rise 
of populism within the party ranks (the New Left); at the same time, they harboured 
chauvinist assumptions in relation to the European question, as the following sections 
reveal. As Newman put it, the reassertion of the control over the economy could 
succeed only if the increasing incorporation of Britain into the world economy was 
reversed (Newman 1983,245). 
For the bulk of the party, the issue of the EEC in the 1970s was again a 
national question with a national solution; but, as Coates (1980) has noted, it was also 
one of `democracy' and the `rights of the people'. G. S. Jones has suggested that 
although economic grievances are always important to populist movements, these are 
translated into political questions of democratic power (Jones 1983,96 & 100). The 
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Labour party's nationalist discourse in the 1970s overlapped with the common agency 
of the `people', which allegedly stood for the prime source of political authority. The 
radical and populist agenda provided by the New Left of the party were in accordance 
with the Little Englander attitudes of the party at the time. Above all, populism 
becomes dominant ('hegemonic') only as a national construction (Laclau 1982). The 
New Left's populism appealed to the nation, while it depended on concepts such as 
national independence and popular sovereignty. The latter was a prerequisite for the 
former and vice versa. According to Margaret Cannovan, one of the main facets of the 
populist discourse is an appeal to the united people, the nation. Merging with this 
stress on unity is the appeal to our people (Cannovan 1999,5). This appeal appears 
divisive, distinguishing our people from those who do not belong - alien immigrants, 
for example. Hence, alongside the macro-economic questions, it was the prospective 
realignment of Britain internationally that moved the European debate in the 1970s: 
after the long detour of Empire, the British were home again. The defence of the 
island and the restoration of the rights of the people became a moral purpose for the 
antis. 
4.4.2 The Defence of the Island: The New Left's National Populism 
Populism is best seen as an appeal to the `people' against both the established 
structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society (Canovan 1999, 
3). More than anybody else, the so-called Labour New Left - led by Benn, in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, who, along with Heffer, Maynard and Skinner split from 
Tribune and formed the so-called `hard left' Campaign Group in 1982 - came to 
express the need for a different relationship between traditional structures of power 
and the `people' (Seyd 1987; Panitch and Leys 1997). 
In particular, a different type of state related in a different way to a different 
type of party as well as to the public at large, called for a leadership with a 
commitment to a socialist project, and one that did not see a modus vivendi with 
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international capital - with its corollary of a narrow, elitist conception of parliamentary 
democracy - as the first principle of government when in office. The aims of the 
Bennite New Left since the early 1970s for an inclusive kind of party democracy, the 
creation of a new popular base for democratic socialism, the radical reorganisation of 
the relationship between state and party and the accountability of the PLP and party 
leadership to the party Conference and hence to rank and file (Panitch and Leys 1997) 
bore fruits at the 1979 party Conference, when the policy of mandatory reselection on 
sitting VIPs in each Parliament and the principle of establishing an electoral college to 
elect party leadership rather than leaving the decision in the hands of the PLP -a 
reform which eventually was implemented in 1981 - were accepted. The latter reform 
was the main reason for the departure of the pro-European `Gang of Four' (Jenkins, 
Owen, Rodgers and Williams) from the party (Crew and King 1995,10). 
Bennism was an expression of the emergence of a new generation of 
community activists that understood that class identity and socialist consciousness had 
to be reconstructed (Panitch 1988,339). Appealing to the grassroots looked like a 
democratic thing to do. The speeches made by Tony Benn in the early 1970s and later, 
echoing the radical traditions of the Levellers and the Diggers (Benn 1979), reflected 
the attitudes and activities then current among a new generation of political and 
industrial activists. The content of New Left's `redemptive democracy' (Canovan 
1999,11) was power to the people: we the people take charge of our lives and decide 
our own future. Entwined with the redemptive strand of democracy is a deep revulsion 
against institutions that come between people and their actions, and a desire for direct, 
unmediated expression of the people's will (Canovan 1999,13). As Paul Taggart puts 
it, populism is `of the people but not of the system' (Taggart 1996,32). 
For example, the municipal socialist emphasis of the 1980s in many of the 
practices of the `socialist republic of South Yorkshire' under David Blunkett, and the 
Greater London Council under Ken Livingstone came close to the `new politics' 
articulated by Benn in the early 1970s. It was Blunkett who claimed that `Sheffield 
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made me a socialist' and that the community has a sense of identity, a sense of 
purpose and solidarity' (Blunkett 1982,56). If there was a theme that constantly 
resurfaced among the new activists it was their strong opposition to what Blunkett 
called `legislative paternalism' (Body and Fudge 1984,244; Blunkett 1982,56). The 
real levers of economic and financial power were considered to be outside Parliament: 
«The parliamentary democracy we have developed and established in Britain, Tony 
Benn said, «is based, not upon the sovereignty of Parliament, but upon the sovereignty 
of the people)) (Benn 1979,95). 
Although they did not dispute the role of the state, the New Left figured out 
that the failures of a strictly defined state management of British economy demanded 
interventionist policies, which would have made the party responsive and accountable 
to its traditional activists, strengthening thus the link between Labour, class and the 
British people. «The choice is between a growing concentration of private power held 
in a very few hands, or greater accountability to workers, consumers and to the people 
- from within the public sector, Tony Benn asserted (Benn 1979,54). In this way, the 
workers, the consumers, the unprivileged, in general, became part of the British people 
in Benn's national populism. The nationalised industries were expected to find new 
ways of relating to the working-class communities in which their operations were 
conducted. 
Public ownership of a good part of the financial sector was deemed 
necessary. This could not take the form of the mere legal transfer of banks from 
private to public hands as in the 1945 nationalisation; both the public and the banking 
workforce would need to have a different kind of relationship to publicly-owned 
banks. This in turn required that the party leadership must not only work out new 
models of public enterprise capable of providing this, but also work actively to win 
public support for them (Panitch and Leys 1997,13). As it was alleged, owe must 
control economic events and not allow ourselves to be controlled by them» (H. Benn 
1978,307). In general, where economic policy is concerned, populists in one country 
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may embrace an agenda of economic liberalism, while other populists elsewhere are 
reacting against a free market hegemony by demanding protectionism and more state 
provision (Canovan 1999,4). In the New Left's case, the British people were expected 
to take care of their own future and defend their own rights within the national context. 
Economic nationalism would bear fruits only when people was sovereign; the latter 
would become feasible only if Britain remained out of the capitalist-ridden EC. 
As a result, by couching the argument in the language of popular 
sovereignty, Labour representatives strengthened the underlying thesis of the ruling 
class against which they struggled: that British workers and their rulers have interests 
in common against foreign capitalists and workers alike (Coates 1980,255). In other 
words, against aliens. This sort of answer to the ambiguity of democratic power has 
recurred again and again in hard times: if the government is the people's government, 
why it is not looking after the people? Because it is in the hands of corrupt politicians, 
tools of the M, politically correct patrons of immigrant workers, the answer is to 
elect a people's government that will send the immigrants home, or whatever the local 
remedy happens to be at a particular time (Canovan 1999,12). As Young (1998) has 
put it, the last thing the Labour anti-Europeans and their Conservative like-minded 
wanted now was to have a lot of foreigners trampling over their soil. So, nationalism 
does not involve just arguments around sovereignty but also imagining `foreigners'. 
In sum, the New Left's national populism can be defined as call for an unmediated 
relationship between the people and the governing (political and economic) classes in 
defence of the national community, and primarily in opposition to the `other' national 
communities and people which allegedly threatened it. 
In this sense, as the following sections argue, the search for Britain's 
independence was couched in terms of economic nationalism (4.4.2.1), which in turn 
overlapped with populism (4.4.2.2), and racialism of the European `other' (4.4.2.3). 
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4.4.2.1 The New Left's response to Europe: `Britain for the British' 
Stuart Holland, who had been in Wilson's political office in 1967-68 and the 
main instigator of the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) - the economic version of 
political isolation - assumed that what characterised not just the British but all 
Western capitalist economies was the large multinational corporation. It was these 
firms that represented the commanding heights of the economy and destroyed national 
sovereignty as regards the conduct of economic policy: «they had the power to 
arrange intra-company payments between subsidiaries and in such a way to minimise 
declared profits and maximise undeclared global profits» (Holland 1975,368). Frank 
Judd also argued that «one of the weaknesses of Western democracy at present is that 
we see, on the one hand, the increasing accumulation of economic power on an 
international basis, and, on the other hand, the gravest difficulties of the so-called 
democratic political structures in trying to control and make accountable this 
economic power (Judd 1971,1138). 
The New Left saw Europe embodying a capitalist and undemocratic ethos. 
Canovan (1999) maintains that although economic grievances are always important to 
populism, these are translated into political questions of democratic power. For 
Labour, the Treaty of Rome served to strengthen the capitalist ethos and throw up 
barriers against the encroachment of socialist policies and state interventionism: ((The 
whole ethos of the EEC prevents any control, as was asserted (Clemitson 1974, 
col. 918). It was argued that «the internationalism of capitalism means that these 
workers are used as whipping boys. All the ills of capitalism are blamed on upon 
them. This is no sort of internationalism which we as socialists should look towards» 
(Mooney 1973,285). Those who would be responsible for Britain's economic policy 
were alleged to be «the industrialists and the bankers)) (Baldwin 1972,200). Indeed, 
the Labour left were not convinced that the banding together of the nation-states in an 
organisation like the EEC would be a significant step towards the assertion of political 
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control over the multinational corporations. «You cannot improve living standards of 
working people», it was claimed, «by reaching a pact with your exploiters» (Apps 
1971,318). In Labour's Programme for Britain, launched in 1972, the left opposed 
British membership of the EEC because the treaties demanded a degree of economic 
integration that would take control of the economy out of the hands of the British 
government and put it in the hands of European industrial and economic interests 
(Hatfield 1978,127). Most of the motions at the 1973 conference declared that re- 
negotiations could not change the capitalist nature of the EEC (Bilski 1977,327). 
Instead, the main condition for a non-capitalist socialist Britain, which was 
expected to take care of the needs of the people, was the insulation of the British 
economy from the international pressures of competitive capitalism and that meant 
protection from an unregulated flow of foreign imports and closer control over inward 
and outward investment flows (Meacher 1982). In particular, the Alternative 
Economic Strategy (AES), which was embodied in Programme for Britain (1972), the 
Programme 1973,1976, Labour's Programme, 1982 and its 1983 election manifesto 
The New Hope for Britain (Jones 1996,110), proposed the insulation of the country 
from the constraints of the international economy. While Britain was already plunged 
into a desperate economic crisis, this appeared to present «a greater possibility of 
socialist change than at any time in Britain's history>> (Hodgson 1981,7,3). The 
proponents of the AES were in a strong position in the period until 1983, especially 
after the departure of the social-democratic wing, and their strength is reflected in the 
literature produced by the party, party members and those who sought to influence 
party opinion (Aaronovitch 1981; Meacher 1982; Hodgson 1981; Heller 1986; Benn 
1979; 1981). 
The main arguments of the AES focused on the accountability of the 
multinationals and the protection of the indigenous industry. For Holland, one way for 
a Labour government «to ensure direct control of the strategic decision-making in a 
range of leading companies» was to purchase shares through the medium of a State 
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Holding Company (the National Enterprise Board) and pursue a planned programme 
of expansion that would reverse the decline of British economy (Holland 1975,159). 
Holland saw the State Holding Company as providing the means of countering those 
actions of multinationals deemed to be harmful to the national economy. In addition, 
the «planning agreements)) between a National Enterprise Board and major private 
companies would provide the means of making those companies wielding 
mesoeconomic power accountable for its use (Holland 1975,224). 
Further, the wall of capital controls around Britain, which involved the 
adoption of protectionism and the abandonment of the EEC, was expected to provide 
a kind of shield for «heavy industries such as steel, and the manufacturing industries)) 
(G. Barnett 1982, col. 777). Ron Leighton was complaining that «this country is being 
swamped by imports from the Common Market, and that is damaging our economy 
and pushing up unemployment. We are becoming an economic colony of West 
Germany» (Leighton 1979, col. 682). Only, the «national context>> was considered to 
be suitable for tackling this sort of problems. As a result, the only obvious solution for 
the proponents of the New Left agenda was to `rebuild our economy on the basis of an 
independent nation belonging to the rest of the world' (Mitchell 1982, col. 792), but, 
apparently, not to Europe. This was considered to be the only way «to put our people 
back to work and to put Britain back on its feet» (Heifer 1981,243). 
An unaccountable domestic executive was supposed to be more prone to 
establish a relationship with equally undemocratic foreign bureaucrats and 
monopolies that put the economic and political future of the country in danger. As 
seen above, populism is not just a reaction against power structures but an appeal to a 
recognised authority. Populists claim legitimacy on the grounds that they speak for 
the people (Canovan 1999,4). 
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4.4.2.2 The New Left's response to Britain's Elitism: `Trust the 
People' 
Populism challenges not only established power-holders but also elite values. 
The demand for protectionism and state provision was naturally associated with an 
assault on the elitist structure of power, which obviously ignored the `consent of the 
British people' (Mendelson 1971, col. 1795). Benn has noted that, ((the establishment 
and the media have cooperated to cover up the systematic transfer of power from the 
British Parliament to the Common Market)) (Benn 1981,16). Populists love 
transparency and distrust of mystification: they denounce backroom deals, shady 
compromises, complicated procedures, secret treaties, and technicalities that only 
experts can understand (Westlind 1996,203; Shils 1956). As a consequence, the 
continuing membership of the EC allegedly reflected the «Vichy spirit in the top 
echelons of the establishment (City of London, Fleet Street and Whitehall))) and 
essentially meant the «end of Britain as a completely self-governing nation and of our 
democracy)) (Benn 1979,163 & 95). For Benn, Britain was «in law and in practice a 
colony of West European federal state)) (Benn 1981,15). The latter entailed the 
review of Britain's relationship with the EC for the restoration of the rights of the 
people. 
During the negotiations conducted by the Conservative government, the NEC 
noted that «in the last twelve months the Conservative government has shown ruthless 
disregard for the welfare and living standards of millions of British people)) (Labour 
Party 1971). British membership was considered to be «the elitist approach of those 
parties of privilege, the Tories and the Liberals)) in contrast with «Labour, the party of 
the people that trusts the people» (Urwin 1974,249). In this fashion, by achieving 
Britain's entry to the EC, the Heath government and the 69 Labour `moderates', who 
voted for Britain's adhesion to EC, were accused of elitism, of «treachery», and of 
having lost «faith in their country's ability to solve her problems outside the wider 
free market of the Community)) (Castle 1980,11; Benn 1989,109). 
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As a result, the 1975 Referendum was considered to be, after all, «the 
honourable and democratic way in taking people's verdict on questions of 
sovereignty)> (Urwin 1974,250). The referendums and popular initiatives favoured by 
populists are universally referred to within the literature of political science as `direct 
democracy' (Budge 1996; Cronin 1989). As Tony Benn put it to his constituents, the 
EEC threatened five basic democratic rights: 
«The power of the electors of Britain, through their direct representatives in 
Parliament, to make laws, levy taxes, change laws which the courts must uphold, and 
control the conduct of public affairs, has been substantially ceded to the European 
Community whose Council of Ministers and Commission are neither collectively 
elected, nor collectively dismissed by the British people, nor even by the people of all 
the Community countries put together (Benn 1989,108). The demand for `sharing, 
altruism and co-operation' in contrast to `elitism, materialism and excess 
competitiveness' (Meacher ibid, 234) also echoed medievalism, the moral critique of 
industrialism and the ethical vision of the writings of William Morris. 
But the arguments against elitism primarily concerned the traditional 
structures of power. The 1974 Labour Manifesto committed the party to a substantial 
programme of nationalisation that contrasted with both the stance on public 
ownership in 1964 and 1966 and Gaitskell's earlier attempt to scrap Clause IV from 
the party constitution in 1959. In fact, the new left model of state socialism did not 
aim to assume the elitist, paternalistic character of Fabianism of the old left. One of 
the proponents of the AES, Geoff Hodgson made clear that democracy and the 
extension of democracy were the central agents of social transformation in the AES 
because that transformation was about empowerment, about a genuine 
decentralisation of decision-making power into the hands of the working class 
(Hodgson 1981). The extension of the public ownership had a role to play but only in 
so far as it brought a changed relationship between workers and management 
(Hodgson ibid, 201). As Miller (1995) has noted, the activist element in nationality 
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should be anathema to a certain kind of conservative structure of power as embodied 
in the paternalism of parliamentary sovereignty. 
As a matter of fact, the underlying concern of the new left was the issue of 
popular as opposed to parliamentary sovereignty. Popular sovereignty was widely 
associated in new left's discourse, but not always rightly in the legal sense, with 
`national independence', the `autonomy of the state', `the self-determination of the 
working class' (Heller 1975,648) and `self-government of Britain' (Benn 1983, 
col. 684). The popular dimension of sovereignty concerned the relationship between 
society and the authority of Parliament. Tony Benn, the republican of the Labour 
party, a devoted anti-Burkean - «Burke is dead and so is his view of democracy» 
(Benn 1971 a, 17) -, assumed that parliamentary democracy was not based on the 
sovereignty of Parliament but upon the sovereignty of the people (Benn 1979,95). In 
a letter sent to his constituents he defined sovereignty as «the power belonging to the 
people and being lent to Members of Parliament to use» (Benn 1989,288). Parliament 
was either an instrument of the people or it was nothing, according to the chairman of 
the party in 1971-72 (Benn 1971b, 1760; 1994,419). 
This came in contrast with the definition of parliamentary sovereignty in 
maximalist terms, which was adopted by the left-wing Tribunite faction of the party 
the heirs to the post-war Bevanite `Keep Left' in which Richard Crossman and . 
Michael Foot were among its most prominent members (Schneer 1988,60-2). In 
contrast with the populist `redemptive' vision of democracy, the `pragmatic' point of 
view espoused by the Tribunites meant institutions not just to limit power, but also to 
constitute it and make it effective. On the issue of Europe, the nationalist Tribunites of 
the party, coming from all the ideological factions, left and right, such as Peter Shore, 
John Silkin and Michael Foot, were enthusiasts of the Westminster Parliament 
prerogatives. The Tribunite perception of sovereignty was equated either with the 
independent policy-making capacity of the executive or the primacy of Parliament 
and any attempt to draw a line between these two elements of sovereignty looked 
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rather futile. Westminster absolutism and executive autonomy were inextricable and 
essential to their project. The Tribunites adhered to the idea of Westminster as the 
only sun which provides light and around which other institutions move and have 
their being (Bogdanor 1994,20). 
Michael Foot, heir to Aneurin Bevan's famous epithet `Parliament is a 
weapon and the most formidable one we have in the struggle' (Bevan 1961), was 
expressing in his speeches on the European issue the authority of parliament on the 
economic issues which was reminiscent of the principle around which its struggles 
against the Monarch in 1254 revolved (ono taxation without representation): «We 
are discussing the whole question of the rights of Parliament and its taxing rights, the 
leading left-winger of the party commented (Foot 1972, col. 1215) - see more on the 
sovereignty of Parliament as a cultural concept in the next chapter. The old left 
Bevanites' socialism was epitomised by `parliamentary paternalism', i. e. it wanted to 
extend the scope of nationalisation and the welfare state via legislative enactment and 
benign bureaucratic administration (Panitch 1988,339). According to Labour 
theorists, that `democratic collectivist'(Marquand 1998,25) or `centralised 
collectivist' (Hain 1995,19) tradition was essentially top-down and dirigiste. The 
liberal socialist, Peter Hain (1999) considers that the blind attachment to Whiggish 
doctrines, such as absolutist parliamentary sovereignty, had alienated the British state 
from the basic needs of the public, behaving like an ostrich towards the calls for an 
immediate adaptation to the changing post-imperial political and economic order. 
Such centralism left little or no scope for individual empowerment and local control; 
on the contrary, the state socialists saw these as obstacles to the grand design of a 
better society and its noble ideal of equality (Hain 1999,25). 
In Neil Kinnock's article in Tribune entitled `Socialism and Sovereignty' on 
the eve of the 1975 Referendum, the independence of executive was dominant. He 
argued that socialist policies involving state intervention in the field of regional 
development and job creation would be impeded by Community rules (Jones and 
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Keating 1985,189). The state, once the predatory war-making machine in the race for 
Empire, was to deliver the gradual amelioration of domestic economic conditions 
(Andrews 1996,126). The object of all the post-war Labour leaders was to capture the 
state, and use it for planning economic and social change. This was mostly 
hierarchical; it depended on leadership, on authority, on structure (Marquand 1995a, 
26). This kind of socialism was influenced by the Fabian collectivism, which imparted 
an indelible political coloration on Labourism (Hall 1982,20). It was increasingly 
statist in that the reforms were expected to be brought down from above by the state 
through experts for the working class - see Wilson's managerial National Plan. As 
Marquand (2000a & b) has recently noted, the cadres of the Labour movement came 
largely from the professional service class and the trade union movement. Both were 
schools for leadership; the products of both displayed what AP Thornton (1966) once 
called the "habit of authority" as fully as any aristocratic Whig or Tory. Albeit with its 
own great strengths and achievements, it marginalised or ignored concerns about 
constitutional reform. In short, the Labourism of the old left had traditionally been a 
pillar of the old-state order rather than a radical-provincial protest movement (Nairn 
1979,249). At the time, Labour Britishness suffered from, what has been called, 
«institutional sclerosis)> (Banton 1991,18). A survey of Labour MPs and MEPs over 
the European issue has disclosed that the 1950-83 cohort were highly sceptical about 
the notion of the parliamentary sovereignty being pooled (Baker, et at. 1996,369). 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Tribunite, top-down definition of 
sovereignty was termed Anglo-Gaullism, that is, the maintenance of the national veto 
over those issues deemed vital national interests. The outcome of the French policy in 
1965-6 (the `empty chair' crisis) was the famous `Luxembourg Compromise' which 
was a recognition of the right of a member to exercise a veto where a Community 
proposal affected an issue it regarded as being of fundamental national importance 
(Williams 1990,300; Moravcsik 1998,177). It had no constitutional validity. It was 
simply an acknowledgement of the fact that the major Community countries could not 
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be compelled to accept and implement decisions they regarded as contrary to vital 
national interests. The General's nationalist opposition to Monnet's vision of Europe 
had made great impact on the Labour nationalist ranks. Austin Mitchell asserted in 
1983 that «Anglo-Gaullism should govern our approach to the EEC, national 
assertiveness, mobilising popular dislike for national purposes)) (Mitchell 1983,174). 
Early in 1978, Douglas Jay made the same claim in the Commons over the British 
agricultural policy in Europe: «Unless we follow the example of De Gaulle and make 
clear that we are not prepared to co-operate unless some of our demands are met)) (Jay 
1978, col. 470). Throughout that period the NEC and the Conference demanded in the 
strongest terms, safeguards for Britain's «balance of payments, cost of living, control 
over sterling and guarantees that the EC would not interfere with the British state 
control of the economy needed to pursue effective regional, industrial and fiscal 
policies)) (Geyer 1997,24; Bellini 1972,22; Newman 1983,225). 
In fact, one of the major controversies of the European debate in the 1970s 
and early 1980s was the emergence of European monetary integration (Moravcsik 
1998,238). The creation of the European Exchange Rate Agreement or `Snake' in 
1973 and the making of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 provoked 
much turbulence within the ranks of the party. It was on the agenda when Heath 
signed the Treaty. When Wilson displaced him, joining the EMS was still nominally 
in place, though the oil shock meant that most bets were off (Young 1998,286). 
Nevertheless, it appeared on the agenda of a summit Wilson attended in Paris in 
December 1974, and he signed up to the declaration which said that, on EMU, the will 
of heads of government `has not weakened, and that their objective has not changed'. 
`The time has come', it went on, `for the Nine to agree as soon as possible on an 
overall concept of European Union' (Geyer 1997,25). Wilson, in his agnosticism, 
said that the objective of the EMS was tacitly abandoned. But the fury at the prospect 
of joining the EMS was felt within the Labour anti-European camp and was a bad 
omen for what came two decades later. «To accept a common currency, Jay said, 
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«means the loss of effective control over all the main elements of economic 
policy... the essentials of economic independence are gone)) (Jay 1970, col. 383). For 
James Callaghan a monetary and economic union meant actually «the end of national 
sovereignty» (Callaghan 1972b, col. 657). Already, at the 1971 party Conference, 
Callaghan insisted that if Britain were to accept it, «central decisions would be taken 
by Brussels bureaucracy)) and the national identity would submerge in Europe 
«becoming a small part of a great enterprise)) (Callaghan 1971b, 143). As Moravcsik 
has noted, Callaghan never seriously considered rejoining the Snake. One of the 
reasons was the political opposition from within the party to it. Even when he became 
Prime Minister, substantial elements of the Parliamentary Labour party and the 
National Executive Committee were openly critical on grounds connected with belief 
in the virtues of economic autarky (Moravcsik ibid, 280). 
All the same, as Jones and Keating (1985) have suggested, the issue of the 
distinction between parliamentary and popular sovereignty appears confusing for 
constitutional and political thought. Even A. V. Dicey (1939,18) came close to 
identifying the democratic ideal with the identity or sovereignty of the nation itself, 
whose `secret source of strength is the absolute omnipotence, the sovereignty of 
parliament' since there is no written constitution, which means that there are no legal 
limits to the legislative authority of Parliament (Bradley 1994,81). Moreover, the 
`sovereignty of the people', as defined by Benn, is considered a wholly meaningless 
phrase because `the people' even if 100 per cent unanimous, for example, in a 
referendum, would not have had the authority to make enforceable law. The people 
had no sovereignty in the parliamentary sense. Popular sovereignty is delegated rather 
than direct (Griffith 1975,164; Budge 1996; Cronin 1989; Mather 2000,37). This is 
minimal democracy since electors cannot initiate, sanction or repeal parliamentary 
legislation (Mather 2000,37). Riker assumes that even supposing that `we, the 
people' can combine our diverse interests and opinions into a coherent will', the hard 
facts of political and economic interdependence often make that an empty promise 
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(Riker 1982). After all, just five years after he received the «very big message from 
the British people», Benn himself was successfully proposing at the 1980 Labour 
conference that Britain should leave the European Community without a referendum. 
In fact, Broad and Geiger (1996) have pointed out that the decision of `the people' 
was not respected for very long by those who had pressed for a referendum in the first 
place. 
However, the mixture of populism and nationalism fostered by the Labour 
party against EEC membership in the 1970s may have sought its rationale in an anti- 
capitalist, anti-elitist and radical discourse, but there can be little doubt that it was fed 
on popular chauvinism (Coates 1982; Lunn 1996). Populism is not just inclusive, but 
suffocating as well (Marquand 2000a & b); genial and manipulative. It marginalises 
dissent, blankets debate and fosters the banalisation of politics. It might also pave the 
way for an uglier populism, a populism of xenophobia and intolerance (Marquand 
2000a & b). Even Tony Benn's nationalism, which looked back for inspiration to the 
English radical tradition, was not devoid of racialist implications. On the eve of the 
1975 referendum, Benn claimed that those who were opposed to the idea of 
referendum were the minorities, «the rich, the immigrants... the people who are in 
favour of entering Europe and suspect the public that do not agree with them)) (Benn 
1988,426). These particular parts of the population were considered not to belong to 
the national body, because, as seen above, the stress on unity is the appeal to our 
people, often in the sense of our ethnic kith and kin (Canovan 1999,5; 2000). Dahl 
and Riker have noted that populism's entwinement with nationalism appears 
uninhibited by liberal constraints, given to a crude majoritarianism that neglects or 
overrides the rights of minorities (Dahl 1956,4,6 & 34; Riker 1982). 
Indeed, as the following section will demonstrate, the Labour party's radical 
definition of Britishness was permeated with and conditioned by the racialisation of 
the European `alien'. 
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4.4.2.3 The Island Under Threat of Invasion 
As seen above, formative influences in labour movement culture in 
particular, were often drawn from situations involving white immigrants. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were particular concerns for 
immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, mainly Russian Jews (Lane 1980; Lee 
1980; Miles and Kay 1994). The `alien' became synonymous with the `Jew' and the 
`alien question' synonymous with the `Jewish question' (Joyce 1980; Lee 1980,114, 
116; Miles and Kay 1994,19). Clashes over jobs, conditions of work, pay and union 
membership were the basis for much broader questions of identity. The immigrants 
lived with the workers, were of the workers. But the responses bore a close 
resemblance to responses to other groups. As Lee (1980) has argued, the English were 
not known as great lovers of foreigners, perhaps especially in the heyday of 
imperialism, and the working class itself was rather parochial. But it was not just that. 
Working-class whiteness was bound up with the reformation of capitalism and its 
oppositional discourse was wrapped up with the `gains' of the British state (Bonnett 
2000,132). Immigration coincided with the end of peak Victorian prosperity 
(Buckman 1980,223), at the very time when Britain was under pressure both as an 
imperial and an economic power. The attitude towards the `foreigner' was thus 
hardening precisely when there was a need to show more tolerance (Lee 1980,114). 
Excluding the `undesirable' meant not only the poor but also the `racially inferior'. It 
was frequently the case that the definition of `alien' was based on being `non-British' 
(Lee 1980,107; Lunn 2000,116). The same appeared in post-war Labour Little 
Englanderism as well. 
In the post-war Britain differentiations were made between categories of 
European workers, in which racialised hierarchies were constructed (Miles and Kay 
1994,17-32). Social and political repercussions of an increased East European 
presence were not neglected (Miles and Kay 1994,23). Although economic interests 
dominated policy-making, the then Labour government had imported European labour 
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for reasons including racial prejudice and worries about integration and assimilation. 
At that time, they feared large-scale migration from the colonies and they preferred 
the European stock instead, though, even then, there were racialist conditions 
attached, as the 1949 Royal Commission declared 
«it could only be welcomed into a fully established society like 
ours without reserve if the immigrants were of good human 
stock and were not prevented by religion or race from 
intermarrying with the host population and becoming merged 
with it» (Cambridge and Feuchtwang 1992,17). 
Similar concerns about Italians were voiced in the early sixties during the 
debates on the first application for British entry to the Common Market: <<Do you 
remember what happened when we put Italians into the pits of this country? We have 
a terrible cry to clear out people from our colonies. Are we to replace these people 
and bring in Italians? » (Blyton 1961b, 217). If Italians were considered to present 
obstacles in the mines, this augured poorly for their adjustment to a wholly different 
way of life. Moreover, it was revealed that a large number of Italians came from the 
Southern part of Italy where the problems of poverty, overpopulation and 
unemployment were more acute than in Britain (Holmes 1988,215). As the left- 
winger Jennie Lee had said, «the civilised people in the North of Italy were shocked at 
the desperately low standard of living in Southern Italy» (Lee 1961, col. 1551). Shanks 
and Lambert noted that the picture of rapacious Latins, socially backward and 
politically unreliable, seeking to `horn in' on Britain's privileged position vis-a-vis 
Washington and the Commonwealth, flattered British pride and British insularity 
(Shanks and Lambert 1962,16). According to Bonnett (2000) the so-called post-war 
settlement, the formation of the welfare state, was routinely articulated in the 1950s 
and 1960s in racialised terms, as `our' welfare system that should be used to benefit 
`us' and should not exploited by `them'. Indeed, the spirit of the times was articulated 
by the National Executive Committee of the party, which argued that «we represent 
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Britain, we represent the working class of Britain and they are Britain (Labour Party 
1962,182). 
It appears then that Commonwealth immigrants and `blackness' were not the 
sole object of the party racial considerations throughout the pre- and post-war period. 
Instead, the European experience of migration revealed that there was a gradation of 
whiteness in the party discourse. Although, the Western representation of whites as 
non-raced has placed them in the context of normality, and ordinariness, as Bonnett 
(1996; 2000) has argued, white identity needs to be understood as historically and 
geographically variable. So, in order to avoid the danger of reifying whiteness and 
reinforcing a unitary idea of `race' we should constantly locate any discussion of 
whiteness in a particular empirical and historical context, because whiteness, like 
blackness, is a political definition (Solomos and Black 1996,24). 
In the early 1970s, domestic economic decline, loss of the traditional 
imperial or Anglo-Saxon financial backing and the instinctive movement towards the 
closure of the nation, made race the framework through which the crisis was 
experienced and the means by which the crisis was to be resolved (Hall 1978,33). In 
this period, Labour racism needs to be situated within the specific state of economic 
policies and political relations. National identities involve the postulate of a necessary 
territorial separation and are thus tied to a specific political project (Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis 1992,10). Indeed, the protectionism advocated by the AES contributed 
to a further racialisation of national welfarism. As seen above, the issues of state 
intervention, the restriction of imports in labour and capital and the protection of 
indigenous industry, were placed high on the political agenda of the Labour party IS 
European policy. As a result, the reorganisation and redistribution of resources were 
expected to take place along particular racial lines and inevitably, British welfarism as 
a national project was construed in antithetical terms: `Us' against `them'. 
First and foremost, the little Englanders of the party saw a future of <amen 
living in their own nations)) (Shore 1971 a, 1127). Martin Barker (1990) has pointed 
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out that the creation of `super families' or nations necessarily involved kin altruism 
within the community whose counterpart was hostility and aggression toward 
competitive outsiders. In particular, it was assumed that the British race had a special 
character that enabled it to stand alone. The rhetorical motif «if we do not go in we 
would survive)) (Shinwell 1970,190) was not just a nationalist shibboleth. It was 
closely associated with racial constructions of «a special character, «the genius of 
the British people)) (Pannell 1971, col. 1292), that made the British a unique and 
different nation in Europe; a nation whose members could survive alone due to their 
own personal, genetic, social and, in general, cultural characteristics. Miller (1995) 
suggests that personal characteristics presently seen as constitutive of national identity 
are projected back on to distant forebears. It was actually said that the British people 
had proved in the past that «their good sense and their mature democratic instincts had 
provided them with better judgement of the needs, aspirations and ideals» of the 
nation (Peart 1971, col. 1097). Michael Foot considered that this «greatness of the 
British)) instincts, which fixed British within the narrow geographical contours of the 
isles, could be summed up by 
«their ingenuity, their compassion, intelligence, spirit 
of adventure, sense of community, understanding of 
how democracy must be effective» (Foot 1973,293). 
Phenomena of race depend on the constructs of collectivity and 
belongingness postulated through notions of common origin or destiny and in terms of 
the specific positing of boundaries (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992,2). As a result, the 
association with the European Community insulted «the instinct of the British people 
which is so strongly against it)) (Thomas 1971, col. 1602). «We delude ourselves if we 
believe that we are one people with them now)), Peter Shore said after British entry 
into the Common Market in 1973 (Shore 1973a, col. 585). Devoid of any value 
judgements, biological attributes and prejudices these statements aimed to underline 
the incompatibility between two different cultural formations: «A great deal of 
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emotion... concerns the way of life of our people, it was argued (Thomas 1971, 
col. 1591). The new racist discourse of the party considered it natural to isolate oneself 
behind cultural or genetic boundaries. As Barker said, these (neo-racist) attitudes are 
just the extension of loving one's family, as a unified cultural community (Barker 
1990,35). 
In this sense, the labour Prime Minister in the mid-nineteen seventies, James 
Callaghan, constructed cultural boundaries in his famous `Chaucer's speech' at 
Southampton on 25 May 1971 (Callaghan 1971c, 5). He complained that President 
Pompidou wanted the language and global stance of the EEC determined by what he 
called a `French continental-European approach' (Callaghan 1971c, 5). This would 
mean `a complete rupture of our identity', Callaghan said. But what caused most 
comment was the passage in defence of the English language. Pompidou had 
commented about the desirability of having French as the language of Europe and had 
dismissed English as the language of the United States (Morgan 1997,395). 
Callaghan responded in robust populist style: 
«Million of British people in Britain have been surprised 
to hear that the language of Chaucer, Shakespeare and Milton 
must in future be regarded as an American import from which 
we must protect ourselves if we are to build a new Europe. 
We can agree that the French own the supreme prose literature 
in Europe [a debatable proposition in itself]. But if we are to 
prove our Europeanism by accepting that French is the dominant 
language in the Community, then the answer is quite clear and I 
will say it in French to prevent any misunderstanding: 
`Non, merci beaucoup. '» (Morgan 1997,395; Callaghan 1971c, 5). 
As Samuel has argued, ideas of national character have typically been 
formed by processes of exclusion, where what it is to be British is defined in relations 
of opposition to enemies both without and within (Samuel 1989b, xvii). The invention 
of nations means organising against other competing groups. The constructions of 
collectivity involve mechanisms of both inclusion and exclusion of individuals on the 
basis of the categorisation of human subjects into those that can belong and those that 
cannot. Because race is one way by which the boundary is to be constructed between 
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those who can and those who cannot belong to a particular construction of collectivity 
or population (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992,4), the definition of British race as an 
essence, as a matter of innate, genetic characteristics becomes hard to sustain. Racism 
cannot be separated from the wider political culture and the given historical 
conjuncture (Solomos and Black 1996,26; Omi and Winant 1994; Winant 2000). 
Omi and Winant (1994) have argued that we should think of race as a matter of both 
structure and representation. The structural condition of racism embodied in the 
questioning made by the Labour's AES of the merits of continuing a free movement 
of labour and capital (it was alleged that entry into Europe «will not and is not 
designed to benefit the ordinary people of Britain, but rather was «inimical to their 
interests» (Lestor 1971,2; Short 1972,742), led to negative representations of the 
European populations/races. 
The ideas about the European race articulated and interacted with economic 
nationalism, which went beyond conflicts between races. In the nineteen seventies, 
Labour appeared to share most of the fears of the right-wing political circles that to 
join the EEC would encourage «a flood of foreign labour» which would further 
«dilute the national character (Taylor 1971,6). In particular, European immigrant 
workers became the target-group as people who were perceived as the `alien trait' or 
`alien wedge', and received the most abusive racial treatment from within the ranks of 
the Powellite faction of Labour and the corresponding Powellite faction of the Right. 
Goldberg (1990) has pointed out that racism exists as the effect of established 
relations between subjects and institutions, economic and social practices. Thus, the 
symbolic image of the undeserving and often criminal `Euro-scrounger' of the new 
right discourse of the eighties, which was constructed to justify new definitions of the 
boundary, had its origins in Labour discourse already in the early seventies. Harold 
Wilson feared that, 
«workers coming here from southern Italy, or other 
depressed parts of the Common Market, will be free to 
take jobs in British industry, to break long-established 
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industrial arrangements by securing employment regardless 
of the skill and craft which has always been required of 
British workers)) (Wilson 1971b, 6). 
In fact, there were particular fears about a possible influx of `cheap foreign 
labour' into Britain from Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey (Rowley 1970,27). 
Richard Dyer (2000) admits that, given the variety of whiteness, «I have sometimes 
thought that what I am really writing about is the whiteness of the English, Anglo- 
Saxons or North Europeans, that this whiteness would be unrecognisable to Southern 
or Eastern Europeans and their descendants. In this sense, Labour racism has to be 
located within specific economic relations rather than reified stereotypes of normality 
about the European populations. Within a declining economic framework, the danger 
of importing `unfair competition' in the form of impoverished immigrants whose 
assumed willingness to work for lower wages could undercut and displace British 
workers apparently loomed large in Labour left's state of mind. It was assumed that, 
«there is too much stress on the worker moving to 
where the work is... and the principal cause is the 
attraction of millions of people from lands that border 
the Mediterranean, including the two associated 
member states - Turkey and Greece ... >) 
(Shore 1973a, 586). 
The workers who were citizens of the European Community countries were 
entitled to move anywhere in the community. An EEC national did not need a work 
permit that the Immigration Act 1971 required for aliens and Commonwealth citizens. 
Limitations on the right of mobility were specified in the Treaty as ((reasons of public 
order, public safety and public health)) (Taylor 1971,6). For this reason, James 
Callaghan, despite giving his consent to exemptions in the Immigration Bill for 
limited groups of people such as crews of ships or aircraft coming from the EEC, had 
no objection to stricter controls for immigrants if Britain decided to enter into 
arrangements with the other countries (The Times 1971,7). 
In fact, the well calculated employment of a discourse of renewed warfare - 
`surrender', `invasion', `wreck', `unscrupulous', `monstrous', `destroy' etc. - by the 
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party towards the European Community, for fear of attacks on the `British way of 
life', denoted that its economic nationalism was conditioned by racial constructions 
which in turn contributed to an authoritative national identity. As Faist (1994,61) has 
noted, these metaphors which help to dramatize the socio-economic problematic of 
the welfare state by framing it in experiences of economic and social uncertainty are 
translated into opposition to and fear of the `aliens' and their culturally disruptive way 
of life. Mitchell of the late seventies was sounding like Thatcher of the late nineties: 
«Many of the ills are of the making of the Common Market» (Mitchell 1979, col. 631), 
he said. The European Community was closely linked with images and practices of «a 
certain atmosphere of corruption» (Jay 1979, col. 533), «swindles and frauds» 
(Leighton 1980, col. 742), which propped up, in particular, «the inefficient farmers in 
France and Germany>> (Hoyle 1983, col. 728). The social conditions in the European 
states seemed rather repelling to the `common sense Britishers' (Leadbitter 1978, 
col. 506) of the party and the fear of the potential `contamination' ditched any thought 
of association with them: «I would not swap the conditions that I have seen in those 
countries for the conditions that we have in this country)) (Leadbitter 1978, col. 505). 
Or, it was asserted that a potential harmonisation of the social standards on the 
European level would transform Britain into «Northern Europe's Calabria>> (Judd 
1971, col. 1619). 
More specifically, Harold Wilson deplored the fact that the Conservative 
Minister of Transport was accepting «those monstrous Continental lorries wrecking 
our roads and bridges and destroying our villages» (Wilson 1972,214). In the same 
vein, Harry Urwin, representing the Transport and General Workers Union, accused 
the Continental drivers of the «40-ton lorries, which roll through our towns and 
villages», of dangerous behaviour defying «the standards that were legislated away in 
this country 40 years ago» (Urwin 1973,283). Besides, Herbert Bowden, Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Affairs in 1966-67, denounced «skilled, determined and 
wholly unscrupulous>> EEC civil servants who were trying «to wreck the English 
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education system>> (Jessel 1973,2). British entry into the European Community was 
seen as a subversive assault on the education system. Bowden stressed that 
«they were trying effectively to take over the system 
and to destroy the autonomy of the chartered professions 
and the learned institutions ... on accepting the 
European 
qualifications, we shall find people coming here wholly 
unqualified to do the work» (Jesse! 1973,2). 
Moreover, the alleged efforts of the Europeans to remould British culture 
were also applied to the fishing industry. The latter was a complex and disastrous 
story for the British. Like CAP, the fisheries policy had been designed by the Six and 
carefully insulated from British influence (Moravcsik ibid, 282). It was one question 
on which the Labour was not hopelessly compromised by its own activities in 
government from 1967 to 1970, and Wilson and his colleagues leaped with special 
relish to attack the government, driving home the scandalous nature of the deprivation 
facing in-shore British fishermen at the hands of predatory Frenchmen who, at one 
stage, seemed likely to be able to fish `right up to the beach'. The Common Fisheries 
Policy, which looked like an amazing piece of chicanery, opened the way for 
foreigners to enter what had always been regarded as British waters. The leftish MP 
Raphael Tuck had no doubt about this. He claimed that the Europeans «cast envious 
eyes and want to abolish the 12-limit because our waters are full of fish and the EEC 
water are depleted» (Tuck 1971,1578). In the late seventies, as John Prescott put it, 
the starting point of Labour policy was Nye Bevan's vision of Britain: «We are an 
island of coal, surrounded by a sea of fish>>. Prescott strongly assented - and behind 
him lay the majority of the Labour members - saying, we are determined to preserve 
those natural resources. Let us make no mistake about what will happen if we 
surrender them» (Prescott 1978,310). 
Finally, personal accounts about the destructive effects of European capital 
on small industries, whose future was tied with the welfare of local populations, 
provoked further denigration against the ruthless Europeans: 
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<ü have been involved in an argument about the special steel 
industry in Sheffield, which is being destroyed by German dumping 
against which we have no defences. Our lack of defences has... 
aggravated our problems» (Hooley 1978, col. 603) 
The Joint Honorary Secretary of the Labour Committee for Europe - an 
organisation of the social democratic wing of the Labour party - stated that, 
throughout that period «there always had been quite a strong anti-feeling, a populist 
anti-European feeling `we do not like the foreigners, especially French' etc. » 
(Stephenson 1993,402). In this respect, the anti-alien feeling and the racialisation of 
the European movement of labour dispels simplistic notions that race politics in 
Britain is one based on black/white relations and on movements and identifications of 
`others' from the immediate imperial experience. This misconception of migration has 
generated a specific political discourse and set of meanings, which have equated 
immigrants with `black' people (Miles and Kay 1994,17). This view does not give 
due recognition to other ways in which labour became racialised and shows a lack of 
understanding of the functioning of many aspects of British social, economic, political 
and cultural history (Lunn 2000,111). In this way, we fail to dislodge whiteness from 
its centrality and authority (Dyer 2000,542). 
4.5 Conclusion 
In short, the above analysis of the Labour party's restricted view of 
Britishness revealed that national identity cannot be defined irrespective of forces 
which transcend and defy boundaries. Global economic crises, movements of labour 
and capital provoke and lead to the redefinition of national borders. The state policies 
adopted to control and manage these forces involved the reassertion of the national 
essence and the exclusion of those elements, which threatened it. The national 
populist vision of Little Englanderism of the Labour party's New Left was not defined 
only by the `rights of the people' and the state socialism in one country; but also by 
the exclusion and racialisation of the European `alien'. This section contextualises 
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reified meanings of `whiteness' in the power relations and economic structures of the 
time. The object of the party's racist responses and negative construction was not just 
black immigrants who threatened to overturn the social norms of the British society, 
but also the `white' Europeans who were perceived as illegitimate claimants of the 
national welfarism. 
In this sense, if race was for Labour one of the elements in this wider 
crusade to `clean up' Britain in the late sixties, in the following years it became the 
means of rolling up the map of progressive liberalism and turning the clock of history 
back to the times when the world was safe for ordinary Englishmen, free from 
foreign, at least European, entanglements. As the analysis of the party's discourse 
exhibited, in both cases, the `other' held together Britain in a changed global context. 
Likewise, the following chapter will demonstrate that the European destiny of the 
country has been equally dependent on the foreigners. 
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CHAPTER 5 
BRITAIN IN EUROPE 
5.1 Introduction 
The key question being asked of the party's positive approach to Europe 
under the New Labour government in the late nineties - the first Labour government 
for a generation - has been whether this is New Labour, New Europe or New Labour, 
Old Britain. This chapter will argue that the old certainties of national sovereignty and 
the `other' remain stabbornly unchallenged in the party's Europhile discourse. 
In his foreign policy mission statement, just two weeks after the 1997 general 
election, the new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook stated that the aim of the New 
Labour government was to make the UK «a leading player in a Europe of independent 
nation states» (Cook 1997a). At the launch of the UK Presidency of the European 
Union, Blair called for the creation of a `people's Europe' and announced that the 
British government `shares the goal of a constructive partnership of nations in 
Europe' (Blair 1997g). Yet, in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997, 
the `leading' rhetoric and the radicalism of the previous two statements gave way to 
mere nationalism: «Not a single thing we have yielded up... in all the areas - tax, 
immigration, defence - where the British national interest, the British veto, is secured» 
(Blair 1997b). It appears that in the party's European approach there is a combination 
for a medium-sized country like Britain of working with and through the EU, with a 
more traditional emphasis on retaining sovereignty and independent policies such as 
border controls and taxation (Hughes and Smith 1998,95). As Richard Heffernan has 
also noted, Labour continues to look toward Europe in terms of `pooling' rather than 
`surrendering' sovereignty; it is only European in a `national' sense, an attitude 
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reflecting its well-established fidelity to the ways and means of the British state 
(Heffernan 2000,397). 
The self-proclaimed determination of the New Labour government to be in a 
`constructive' way a leading player in Europe has been conditioned by a rather typical 
British unease with supranational structures. This approach to the nation state comes 
to defy all those scholars who recently have expressed fears concerning the viability 
of the nation state and its eventual suppression by supranational and global structures 
of power. 
Hutchinson and Smith (1994) have pointed out that both the concepts of 
`nation' and `Europe' are contested categories. A particular section of the scholarship 
on nationalism makes more explicit these claims. Theories of postmodernity have 
argued for the obsolescence of the nation-state and heralded this as opening up 
potential new spaces for the `stranger' (Bauman 1990,239-60). According to this 
view, the demise of the nation state is imminent through an overwhelming 
combination of political dependence, economic globalisation, mass communications 
and cultural hybridisation (Castles et al. 1988,140-4). Although the modernist 
paradigm of nationalism remains reticent about the fate of the national state, Eric 
Hobsbawm (1990) has argued about the dislocation and absorption of the nation states 
as a result of the anew supranational structuring of the globe. From an interactionist 
point of view, Albert Melucci (1989) has also suggested that with the crisis and 
decline of the nation-state, the revival of ethnicity in modern societies is to be 
expected. 
Yet, despite the recurrent power of ethnic nationalism, the international 
society has remained reluctant to challenge the sovereignty of individual states. 
Despite being squeezed by the globalisation the nation state still remains a crucial 
point of reference. As the previous sections made very explicit, the global changes 
surrounding the position of Britain in the international order provoked the 
nationalist/racist response from within Labour ranks. There has been a dialectic 
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between the global and the national in the party discourse. Hall considers that the 
global is always composed of varieties of articulated particularities (Hall 1991b, 67). 
As the following analysis will make clear, the issue of immigration more than any 
other shows that the state has not withered away in the age of late capitalism (Billig 
1995,142). States retain control over immigration and the definition of citizenship. 
These most important functions of state show little sign of erosion. In particular, 
within the European Union, national boundaries may be eroded but as internal 
boundaries have been eroded, so the outer perimeter has been strengthened. 
Immigration has been a central concern in EU policy. In the face of the New Labour's 
Immigration and Asylum 1999 Act, `Fortress Europe' is being constructed in order to 
keep at bay what in Delors' image becomes the non-Christian, non-European and 
non-civilised world (Billig ibid., 142). 
The rest of this section contains, first, a review of the pro-European attitudes 
of the main Labour party's pressure groups such as the Fabians and the ILP during the 
1940s. In both cases, their European visions were conditioned by the existence of the 
non- Western `other' (5.2). Second, an account of the positions held within the pro- 
European camp during the initial stages of the European debate exhibits that, despite 
some dissident voices, most of the European-minded MPs appeared to be reluctant to 
abandon national sovereignty altogether (5.3). Likewise, third, we will see how New 
Labour, whose leadership is considered to be, for a significant section of the literature, 
the most `constructive' pro-European the party ever had (Hughes and Smith 1998; 
Daniels 1998; Holden 1999a; 2000; Heffernan 2000; 2001), puts the nation at the 
centre of its European vision which naturally remains of a qualified inter- 
governmental character (5.4). As a consequence, the 1999 Immigration and Asylum 
Act will make clear that Britain as a `civilised', European nation is primarily defined 
by and dependent on the `non-civilised', non-European world (5.5). 
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5.2 Europe and the Labour Party's Pressure Groups 
When Europe was spoken of within the main pressures groups of the Labour 
party a variety of constructs were meant in the 1940s. Especially in the late 1940s, 
when the first steps towards European organisation were made (see Churchill's Zurich 
speech calling for a `United States of Europe' (1946), the Statute of Council of 
Europe (1949) and the Schuman Plan (1950), to speak of Europe could mean many 
different mutually conflicting notions. 
The reformist Fabian Society and the ethical ILP (though disaffiliated from 
Labour since 1932) played a formative role - especially the former - in the 
configuration of three distinct approaches to Europe within the confines of the 
parliamentary `Europe Group': firstly, a functional approach which focused upon 
economic relations with other Western European nations. The Attlee government 
rejected the Schuman Plan on these grounds because any alliance with Europe would 
involve compromises with non-socialist or undemocratic elements and endanger 
Labour's socialist programme. The second route taken within pro-European ranks was 
the federal approach. Labour's federalists, including Mackay and C. Sawcross, were 
small in number, and accordingly, their influence was diminished. The third European 
group was the fundamentalists. Support for trans-Continental European political and 
economic union across Europe was the dominant cause of the supporters of the 
fundamental position, such as William Warbey and Sydney Silverman. This vision 
was often called a United Socialist States of Europe (USSE) (Minion 1999,6-7 & 
170-303). Among the three, the functional one that defended national sovereignty and 
the nation-state's privileges became dominant. 
In particular, the Fabian Society acted as a debating chamber for Labour 
throughout the whole of the 1940s, providing valuable space for European ideas to be 
formulated and defended, both by opponents and supporters of the Attlee government. 
Support for functional, federal and fundamental positions were all evident in the post- 
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war years. Already, in 1916 Leonard Woolf had developed the concept of a `world 
government' for establishing a supranational machinery which could prevent future 
conflicts (Porter 1984,59-61). Inescapably, during the Second World War, and even 
later, federalism was the only possible guarantee against war. For instance, during the 
summer months of 1940 Barbara Wootton, a leading member of Federal Union and D. 
N. Pritt MP debated `Socialism and Federation'. Wootton stressed in Fabian 
Quarterly that a federation based on Anglo-Franco-German co-operation was the only 
force capable of eliminating war between national communities (Minion ibid, 177). 
Likewise, Austen Albu, William Warbey, Patrick Gordon Walker and Beatrice Kelly 
wrote Labour's Next Step: A Wartime Strategy, which was published by the Fabian 
Society and argued for Europe as a single unity where the powers of the nation state 
were to be limited (Albu et al. 1940,3,9,12). Yet, within the Fabian Society primacy 
role was given for economic matters over political developments. 
At the same time, Europe was perceived as an entity consisted of two 
different in cultural and political terms communities. As part of the Fabians' Research 
Series of publications Doreen Warriner examined the question of Eastern Europe 
post-war. Eastern Europe After Hitler sought to investigate the different economic 
and social developments of the eastern and western parts of the European continent, 
between which `there [was] a real division, the outcome of centuries of differences in 
evolution'. Within Eastern Europe Warriner suggested there existed: low standards of 
living; overpopulation; low levels of labour productivity; and a lack of technical 
progress (Warriner 1940,4-5). It is tempting to see this categorisation of East as 
economically `backward', as part of the post-war ideological justification for the 
defence of `Western civilisation' within a divided Europe. Interestingly, Warriner 
listed Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
as the former. Whereas, Britain, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Germany, France 
and Belgium comprised the latter. Warriner's categorisation of Eastern Europe's 
economic structures as primitive implied that the latter had in turn made political 
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instability endemic. As Minion (1999) notes, Warriner's investigation of East Europe, 
and the `tight' definition of what comprised Western Europe, pre-dated the post-war 
developments which eventually led to the acceptance of the division of Europe by the 
Attlee government and the Labour Left. 
The notion of the existence of a politically and economically `advanced' 
Western group of nations affected the subsequent European visions, and especially the 
federalist one. The incompatibility of the different ways of life was a significant 
reason for their diminished influence. 
During 1944, the Fabian International Bureau (FIB) formed a study group to 
examine and publish a pamphlet on International Political Authority (IPA). As part of 
the Society's Research Series the group produced Labour and Europe: The Need for a 
Socialist Strategy. The authors - Albu, Parker, Warriner, Paul Yates and Lillian Chase 
- sought to develop a socialist foreign policy with particular reference to Europe. A 
Political Authority was envisaged by the pamphlet's authors with power passing from 
individual nation-states to a supranational body - it was not though indicated which 
parts of a government's control were to be surrendered. Nevertheless, background 
papers written by Woolf and Noel-Baker for the IPA Study Group suggest that 
members favoured a functional authority as the only viable alternative federal union 
was deemed impractical, as democracy was not yet sufficiently widespread in Europe. 
The issues raised in Labour and Europe, particularly Labour's leading role for the 
Continent, the preference for functional developments, and generally what should 
constitute a socialist foreign policy, were to set the tone for the Fabian Society, and of 
course mirrored the wider debate within the Labour party in the post-war years 
(Minion ibid, 187). Furthermore, charged by the FIB with preparing a statement on 
`British foreign policy in relation to available resources and manpower', G. D. H. 
Cole argued for Britain being the leader of a `Western Group' of nations along 
supranational lines- but only within the economic sphere (Cole 1946,3-6). His criteria 
for inclusion in such a group were, among others, democratic participation and 
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consent of a country's electorate (capacity for citizenship); the sound development of 
limited economic resources (capacity for economic development). It becomes 
apparent that the Western Group of nations was primarily defined against those 
politically and economically backward non-Western nations. A similar point was 
made by Allan Flanders (1948) with regard to Western Union. Flanders hoped that 
WU, based upon the economic co-operation, could be a major factor for peace 
defending democracy. 
In addition, Mackay, a long time keen federalist, argued within the Fabian 
News during September 1948 for a thoroughgoing merger of national sovereignty and 
the establishment of a new state with power to plan economic resources of Western 
Europe. He also went further and suggested that `political union' of the European 
nations receiving aid as a result of the Marshall Plan was urgently required. A 
constituent assembly should be convened by the end of 1948, continued Mackay, as `a 
European Federation' was the only guarantee against the `economic and political ruin 
with which the states of Western Europe are today confronted' (Mackay 1948,38). 
Yet, Mackay's article provoked a number of critical replies. On the grounds of the 
existence of differential political and economic variables within the Continent, 
Thomas Balogh and E. T. Lewis argued that only `economic collaboration' was 
viable, as the nations of Western Europe did not share the necessary `similar social 
structures' required for successfid political union. For Balogh the `real third solution 
of combining economic democracy with political liberty' was the only answer to 
Western Europe's problems. Lewis stressed the pertinent, and oft-raised point by 
many on the Labour Left, that Britain's political stability would be jeopardised by the 
fragile situation in the communist deputies (Minion ibid, 202). 
From the outset the Society exhibited a propensity to concentrate on matters 
of economics, and subsequently, calls for European unity stressed the primacy of 
economic and political stability and inter-governmental co-operation. Dissident voices 
were apparent. Warbey (1947; 1948) and Woolf (1947), following Monck/Whyte 
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socialist foreign policy thesis (1946), for example, envisaged a `mediating' third force 
based on the fundamentalist position (a wider economic Europe of the Continent 
allied with the colonies which could act as a peace-keeping body in international 
relations) whereas Mackay held firm to a federal vision for Western Europe. Yet, 
these federal visions could not supersede the perceived division between the 
politically and economically advanced Western and the relatively backward Eastern 
Europe. 
Likewise, the ILP initially saw Europe as an economic unity, which followed 
from the ILP's view of the negative attributes of the nation-state that had caused the 
First World War. Integral strand of the party's international philosophy was its 
commitment to pacifism (Laybourn 1997; Pelling 1954; James, et al. 1992). The party 
had no attachment to any nation-state, including Britain. `All such entities', argued 
Brockway, `were based on the capitalist mode of production, hence the proclamation 
of concepts such as a central federal European authority, international authorities for 
the utilities, transport, banking and heavy industries' (Brockway 1942,25). The ILP's 
vision of a united Europe would appear to encompass all of the nations of the 
Continent, including Britain and Germany in a fully trans-Continental United 
Socialist States of Europe (USSE) (Brockway 1942,10-11). 
However, an important part of the ILP's version of a united Europe also 
recognised the differences between nations, for example language and culture. Hence, 
the ILP saw Britain as head of a Western European bloc reinforced by their colonial 
Empires. In this way, the ILP's adherence to the USSE in the guise of a peace- 
keeping neutralist `third force' (`World Socialist Commonwealth', as Brockway 
(1940) called it) rested on the assumption that Britain would be part with a somewhat 
special position; a view that reflected both the country's imperial past and 
manufacturing capabilities. As Minion (1999) tells us, Britain would be a leading 
economic component in a USSE because of its industrial heritage, current capacity 
and the obvious wartime devastation of Continental industries. The implied division 
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of industrial and agrarian sectors of the Continent echoed the West-East partition 
found within Fabian circles, such as that propounded by Warriner. 
As a consequence, this suggestion of a West European construct was 
revealing and a clear move away from a trans-continental approach previously voiced 
within party publications. The suggestion that the majority of the British Left was 
favouring a `European federation' in the form of that trans-Continental USSE was 
extremely doubtful (Minion ibid, 275). The Open Letter to Attlee (October 1946), the 
King's Speech amendment (November 1946) and Keep Left (May 1947) were part of 
the trend of the third force, which comprised an independent group of nations in 
Europe and the Colonies (Schneer ibid). It was not though clear whether the desired 
peace-keeping neutralist `Third Force' in the form of the USSE was to be based upon 
Western Europe, or all of the Continent (Minion ibid, 275). By 1950, the ILP argued 
that there was no great support for federalism within the Labour movement, and that 
moreover it favoured the functional approach to solve Europe's current problems. As 
Minion points out, national considerations, which arose from the party's ideological 
milieu, would appear to have eventually been given primacy within the ILP's 
internationalist perspective (Minion ibid, 279). Previous adherence to an immediate 
and full-scale USSE did not show any approval of the gradual approach favoured by 
the Attlee government and by 1950 the majority of the Labour left. Europe was 
therefore to be democratic which centred USSE upon Western Europe, rather than the 
trans-continental ideal, which the ILP had previously supported. 
As the previous concise account of the European ideas espoused by the main 
Labour party's pressure groups reveals, the majority of the left increasingly gave 
vocal support to functionalism within Western Europe. The latter in turn is defined 
against a politically and economically backward Eastern Europe. Any residue of 
European-ness on the Left became a subterranean presence in the case of the USSE. 
However, this increasing marginalisation of Labour's Europeans does not in any way 
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downplay the significance of Labour's European ideas and its impact on the attitudes 
and policies endorsed during the European debates from the early 1960s onwards. 
5.3 Britain in Europe: The Rescue of the Post-War Nation 
Raymond Aron reflected in the nineteen sixties, that `the old nations will live 
in the hearts of men, and love of the European nation is not yet born' (Smith 1998, 
217). Indeed, more economic pragmatism than diligent construction of Europeanness 
was the main consideration of the pro-European faction of the party since the first 
application for Britain's entry. Although there were dissident voices, the majority of 
the Labour MPs favoured the functional approach. 
The resilience of the traditional national reflexes should be viewed once 
more in the wider canvas of world politics. The supranationalist quest of the Common 
Market compelled the party to rethink the nature of the nation-state in post-imperial 
times. In fact, the basic consideration of the anti- and pro-Europeans was the wider 
geopolitical and economic landscape of the post-war period, which had created 
conditions that defied national boundaries, inflicted Britain with economic crises, and 
deprived her of her traditional world links. As seen earlier, both camps shared 
common goals; the rescue of the nation and the maintenance of Britain's world role 
pretences. Unlike the anti-Europeans, the pro-Europeans considered that the rescue of 
the nation should be done not out but in Europe. Labour pro-European MPs such as 
Ivor Richard and Austen Albu maintained that «our influence inside the Communities 
and within an eventual political unity will be greater, particularly over those events 
which, if they do go wrong, are no longer under our direct control and will obviously 
affect our standard of living)) (Richard 1971, col. 2151; Albu 1971, col. 1157). 
Alain Bihr (1992) has identified a crisis in the post-war west European 
nation-state's capacity to manage its political-economic space that is due to the impact 
of economic internationalisation. The nation state was not regarded as the monopolist 
of effective decision-making on social, economic and military issues. The pro- 
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European camp arrived at the conclusion that «the present frontiers are entirely out of 
date and far too restrictive having regard to modem communications» (Hynd 1961, 
col. 1563). John Hynd also noted that, although nobody wanted to give up any 
sovereignty, Britain had already «given up a lot of sovereignty to the United Nations, 
to EFTA, to GATT, to WEU, to NATO, to OEEC and so forth)) (Hynd 1961, 
cot. 1563). So, the question of sovereignty «should not stick in our gullet» Hynd 
added. National sovereignty was not lost as a result of the membership of any of the 
above international organisations. In this way, Europe was perceived by European- 
minded Labour MPs in mere economic pragmatic terms. It was maintained that in a 
Europe of interdependence and not independence common problems ought to be 
tackled jointly. It was Europhile's conviction that Europe had questions to answer 
which could not be dealt with in any one country, and that there should be a European 
government and Parliament to handle these problems (Woodburn 1961, col. 1521). 
The national instrumentalisation of the European idea, as Timothy Garton Ash (2001) 
has called it, was the essence of the Europhile MPs' arguments. 
As a matter of fact, at the time of the first application for British membership 
in the early sixties, whereas the Labour leadership thought that Britain's world role 
would be secured by not merging her sovereignty with the Common Market and by 
retaining her ties with the Commonwealth (see the section on the imperial space), Roy 
Jenkins, who had resigned from Labour's front bench economic team on the European 
issue, stressed the need for Britain to redirect her exports away from the sterling area: 
«lt is not the question of how much we gain in preference in Europe as against what 
we may lose in the Commonwealth... it is a question of giving our whole export effort 
a new strength which it has been so badly lacking)) (Jay and Jenkins 1962,10). Roy 
Jenkins claimed that the rapid rise in national incomes, the highly successful 
nationalised industries and the excellent family allowances in France, and the very 
developed system of retirement benefits in Germany «make anything that we have in 
this country look a disgrace)) (R. Jenkins 1961, col. 1587). If harmonisation of social 
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systems and the equalisation of wages and conditions were to mean that Britain could 
introduce a pension scheme as good as that of the Germans, and family allowances as 
high as those of the French, then, the social democrats of the party noted, that would 
indeed be a giant step forward in welfare state benefits and costs. David Owen 
maintained during the six-days long debate on the Conservative government's 
negotiated terms for Britain's entry in the early seventies that «a Labour government 
which is returned to power will find it easier to exercise the socialist priorities in 
social spending, in spending on health, education and welfare, which all of us in this 
party want, if we are within the EEC» (Owen 1971,1638). 
However, the production of a collective identity within the Euro-space is 
difficult to materialise in these instrumental terms. As Smith puts it, to pool 
sovereignties is not the same thing as fusing cultures or amalgamating identities: and 
the creation of a European super state is not the same as forming a `supra-nation' of 
Europe (Smith 1995,125). True, unlike the federalism of Mackay and Shawcross in 
the post-war period, for the Labour Europhiles of the 1960s. and 1970s, `federation' 
meant a looser idea of international organisation and not necessarily an imposed 
centralisation (Mulley 1960, col. 1150). Furthermore, the emergence of fundamentalist 
and ethical positions similar to those that JLP put forward for a USSE in the 1940s 
and those voiced from the Fabian circles failed to supersede the predominant 
functional line. For instance, Europe was seen as «a new force for world peace» 
(Davies 1971, col. 1569) and «reconciliation» (Maclennan 1971, col. 1967); «a third 
force» based upon the «brotherhood of man» towards a «world government» 
(Edwards 1962,184; Hynd 1967, col. 321; Heller 1967,28 1); a «united Europe 
[allied] with the Commonwealth» (Woodburn 1961, col. 1523; Dell 1971, col. 2180). 
Yet, as it was also pointed out, «the supra-national authority can make the decisions, 
but still they have to be carried out by the individual nations» (Woodburn 1962, 
col. 1040). In this respect, Kellas (1998) is right to point out that supranationalism 
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appears a weak competitor to nationalism and usually takes the limited form of 
economic common markets, intergovernmental institutions and military alliances. 
In this sense, Roy Jenkins assured his party colleagues that there was nothing 
in the Treaty of Rome to prevent a Labour government from nationalising any 
industry they liked (Jenkins 1962a, 216). Besides, assuming the post of the Home 
Secretary in 1976, he did not consider abandoning the right of the nation state «to 
maintain a strict control over immigration>> (Jenkins 1976, col. 1548). Jenkins, along 
with his more European-minded colleagues adopted a trade-off between two 
competing objectives which became the guideline for the first New Labour 
government in the late 1990s: first pooling or surrendering sovereignty through 
political and economic integration in order to secure national prosperity, and second, 
retaining sovereignty in order to maintain the nation's autonomy (Heffernan 2001, 
185). Smith (1995a, ch. 4) and Billig (1995,141) have argued that in the post-1945 
era, the political and economic dependence of most states has been accompanied by a 
huge expansion of internal state power and penetration in the social and cultural 
spheres, notably in such fields as mass education, health, social welfare and border 
controls. These were not intended to lie outside nation-state's authority. 
For the majority of the pro-European members of the party the right of the 
national government to implement its own policies would not be essentially 
challenged by a supranational authority. Prominent figures of the pro-European 
faction such as Shirley Williams, George Brown, John P. Mackintosh were reluctant 
to admit that national sovereignty was completely outdated as being part of the 
European Community. Their allegedly European `internationalism' was put in purely 
national terms. For instance, Shirley Williams made clear that owe want to keep 
British sovereignty, and to set up a genuine Socialist Movement in Europe» (Williams 
1961,219). The leading voice of the pro-Europeans in the nineteen sixties, George 
Brown also stressed othe paramount need to protect our own internal planning and 
social capacity here» (Brown 1961,227), and that there was not very much evidence 
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that «members of the six find it difficult to have an independent foreign policy 
because they belong to EEC» (Brown 1967a, 284). One of the prominent social 
democratic voices in the early seventies whose life was cut short tragically a few 
years later, John Mackintosh, defied the cries of the Labour antis who saw in Britain's 
entry the imminent end of the nation state and `a thousand years of history'. Instead, 
he stated that «it cannot be said that Britain would lose its independence and 
sovereignty by becoming part of a more powerful independent Europe». On the 
contrary, he added, «in joining the Common Market we extend it and develop its 
potentiality so that we can find for our country a direction and purpose» (Mackintosh 
1971, cols. 1192-94). As leading commentators have argued, the motif of the leading 
pro-Europeans throughout all these decades has been very familiar: our membership 
is vital, our assistance is imperative - but nothing you really care about will change 
(Young 1998,293). Moravscik has also noted that on supranational institutions the 
pro-Europeans at the time remained sceptical of the increased powers for the 
European Parliament and Commission (Moravscik ibid, 282). 
It is right to point out then that the Luxembourg Compromise, which 
preserved the right of national veto over essential national interests, did not serve only 
the Tribunite Anglo-Gaullists of the party but also strengthened the Europhile 
argumentation (Young 1998,184). David Marquand, a voluble pro-European at the 
time, has argued that Labour social democrats were as zealous in their commitment to 
the British tradition of autonomous executive power and to the doctrine of absolute 
parliamentary sovereignty which accompanied and sustained it as the socialists of the 
party (Marquand 2000a). 
Although the current record of the New Labour government's European 
engagement policy has surpassed those of the previous post-war British 
administrations, its attachment to the nation state has remained equally undiminished. 
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5.4 The Paradox of New Labour 
As the previous comments have suggested, Europeanisation is an 
acknowledgment by party representatives that national actors and individual states 
alone can no longer be conceived of as the appropriate political units for either 
resolving key policy problems or managing effectively a broad range of public 
functions. In the face of a globalised, inter-dependent world New Labour's 
Europeanisation, as revealed in its policy initiatives, has bowed to national 
considerations in its endeavours to defend British privileges. 
Heffernan (2001) has argued that two key perspectives can be identified as 
underpinning Europeanisation since 1945: the impact of economic and political 
globalisation and the internationalisation of decision-taking, which increases 
interdependence, encouraging regional forms of governance; and the pursuit of 
national interests and preferences through interstate bargaining conducted within 
European institutions, as reinforced by the supranational consequences that follow. 
Globalisation and its various impacts are thereby deemed inexorable; and because 
there is nothing to be done to stop it, it becomes almost a virtue in itself. Through the 
EU, national governments seek to `effectively pool sovereignty in order to enhance, 
through collective action, their control over external forces' (Heffernan 2001,183). 
The impact of a deepening internalisation of economic and political processes is thus 
felt in the need for co-operation arising from recognition of increasing 
interdependence. Nation-states, slowly acknowledging the possibilities of co- 
dependence with others, are encouraged to explore further forms of informal and 
increasingly formal institutionalised political co-operation. From this perspective, 
economic globalisation is deemed to promote political globalisation by facilitating a 
degree of internationalisation of decision-making in the form of international regimes 
and quasi-supranational institutions like the EU. If economic inter-dependence 
requires co-operation, it is also encouraged by the belief that nation-states have 
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become less independent and more inter-dependent. When globalisation is perceived 
to weaken the autonomy of the nation-state it becomes a factor in encouraging 
European co-operation and deepening Europeanisation. If, according to Alan 
Milward, the strength of the EU `lies in the weakness of the nation state', William 
Wallace is also correct to suggest that the EU's weakness `lies in the strength of 
national and sub-national identities' (Milward 1992,446; Wallace 1991,46). This is a 
key factor in European integration, both prompting Europeanisation and 
simultaneously qualifying it. 
Thus, for New Labour and its precursors, the ideal of a federal Europe, one 
governed by a non-national, technocratic elite and structured around non-national 
geopolitical concerns, is a non-issue (Heffernan 2001,184). What the remaining 
section will argue, against the background of the globalised world, the New Labour's 
Europeanism should be placed in the context of its continuing `Britishness'. 
In particular, like in the 1960s and 1970s, throughout the 1990s, within the 
Labour party it became common sense that in an era marked by the overwhelming 
impact of the globalised economies, the systems constructed around the nation state 
were called into question (Blair 2000f). It was accepted that globalisation changed the 
nature of the nation state as power became more diffuse and borders more porous 
(Blair 1995,20). According to the guru of New Labour, Anthony Giddens, 
technological changes have reduced the power and capacity of government to control 
a domestic economy free from external influence. The global economy and the 
accompanying processes of technological change swamped nascent forms of 
governance (Giddens 1999,25; 2000,123). Of course, this is not to say that the nation 
state becomes obsolete - on the contrary, a prime goal of Third Way politics has been 
to reassert national identity and national purpose against a global backdrop (Giddens 
1999,26). As said earlier, Europe emerged as the context in which the nation state 
would reassert its influence and capacities on a series of issues, and not the context in 
which the national identity would be `absorbed' or `dislocated' as has been suggested 
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(Hobsbawm 1990). New Labour envisages, in opposition to the previous British 
administrations and the party leaderships, a Europe, which is not an identity-crushing 
and centralising nation-state but instead «the nation state's rational response to the 
modem world» (Blair 1998d). The nation-state has been a point of reference in the 
construction of the European identity of Labour Bnitishness. This became feasible by 
acknowledging a more flexible view of sovereignty. 
From the outset, the New Labour government considered that an absolute 
definition of national sovereignty in regard to Europe has done much harm to the 
British people. Throughout the nineties, Labour argued that it was the Tories who had 
failed the nation, especially over Europe by standing on the sidelines. Under the 
Conservative government, it was argued, Britain had become «the sick man of 
Europe, the thick man of Europe, the dirty man of Europe» (Ford 1990,183). The 
maintenance of absolute sovereignty was not a sign of power or independence 
anymore, but an indication of weakness, according to party representatives. On the 
other hand, the loss of sovereignty is out of the question. Although Tony Blair has 
made clear that owe as a country, our destiny, our future, lies in being a major 
European nation (Blair 1998g), this did not imply, in his view, «a wholesale 
destruction of sovereignty» (Blair 1993b, col. 1100). One of the preconditions for 
Britain being member of the European `family of nations' has been the need to retain 
her sovereignty: «Integration where necessary, decentralisation everywhere else» 
(Blair 1998e, 19). The Blair government remains eager to preserve national 
autonomy and sovereignty wherever possible in looking towards Europe in terms of 
`pooling' rather than `surrendering' sovereignty (Heffernan 2001,182). That is why 
there have been continual reassurances that national and constitutional characteristics 
will not be overridden by being a member of the European Union: «We want a 
Europe where there are national differences, where we hold many of our policies in 
common, but keep our distinct, separate identities», as the Prime Minister said at the 
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Warsaw Stock Exchange (Blair 2000e). This is how Tony Blair has summed up New 
Labour's renovated view of national sovereignty in light of the European question. 
As a consequence, New Labour considered the growth of the European 
citizenship a complementary to the existing national citizenships. Explaining Labour's 
contemporary Europeanism, Blair said to the House of Commons in February 1999, 
that «to be pro-British, you do not have to be anti-European - and vice versa. By 
taking a flexible view of sovereignty, as Hughes and Smith (1998) have pointed out, 
in comparison to the previous administrations, the New Labour government has 
adopted a new, positive tone towards the EU. And recently, as Blair and the German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder wrote in their common statement-manifesto on the 
Third Way/Die Neueu Mitte, on the eve of the 1999 European elections, 
tithe politics of the New Centre and Third Way is about addressing 
the concerns of people who live and cope with societies undergoing 
rapid change - both winners and losers. In this newly emerging world 
people want politicians who approach issues without ideological 
preconceptions and who, applying their values and principles, 
search for practical solutions to their problems through honest 
well-constructed and pragmatic policies» (Blair and Schroeder 1999). 
The British leader and his German counterpart recognised that the people's 
concerns transcended the narrow confines of the nation state, whether one thinks of 
trade and investment, environmental pollution, international crime and drugs, or peace 
and security. They deemed that member states had little future tackling these concerns 
by acting solely on their own. But by acting together in a co-operative spirit and 
pooling some elements of sovereignty, politics can still influence the course of events, 
which would otherwise elude the grasp of democratic action. A series of policy 
initiatives reflected the above thoughts. 
First, the issue of subsidiary. `A People's Europe', `Giving Europe Back to 
the People', `Europe working for People' were not just populist shibboleths used by 
Cook and Blair before and during the British Presidency of the EU in 1998 (Blair 
1997g; Cook 1997b; 1997c). Although the principle of subsidiarity, which appeared in 
Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty and required that decisions should be taken at the 
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lowest level of government, applied only to relationships between member states and 
the European Union, and not between governments and subnational governments 
(Bogdanor 1999,277), for New Labour it has been the structural precondition for the 
Europe of nation states. «Subsidiarity» Blair says, «is making Europe work, keeping it 
in touch with the people of Europe» (Blair 1999h). Echoing the calls of the German 
Lander and the leader of the government of the Catalan autonomous region in Spain, 
Jordi Pujol, Peter Hain (1993, col. 554) and Tony Blair (2000d) have sought a 
bicameral European Parliament with a second chamber consisting of members of 
national Parliaments and regional assemblies as a countervailing force on the 
enormously powerful centralising tendencies of the EC. In this respect, Kershen 
(1998) is right to point out that it is becoming increasingly obvious that running 
parallel with Europeanisation, transnationalism and globalisation is a growing 
preoccupation with regionalism, particularism and the meaning and location of 'self. 
Further, on social policies such as drugs, crime and environment the New 
Labour government have taken initiatives and assumed joint operations with other 
European countries. At the European Council at Tampere (October 1999) the British 
proposal that the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in bringing criminals to justice 
should be mutual recognition of court decisions, rather than the harmonisation of 
laws, was adopted unanimously. On combating cross-border crime, at the United 
Kingdom's suggestion, there was to be a new Task Force of European Police chiefs 
working alongside EuroPol, to plan and organise joint police operations across Europe 
(Blair 1999j, col. 253). Finally, the Environmental Project Development Manual' for 
Central and Eastern Europe developed by the British Know-How Fund and the 
European Union's Phare programme was an indication that New Labour's 
constructive engagement had far reaching effects (Cook 1997f), putting, thus, into 
practice the enlarged vision of the European Community. In addition, the `European 
nation' as a «civilised continent» has been imagined sharing common values such as 
«human rights social justice, liberty, democracy, and tolerance)) (Blair 2000e) - on the 
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issue of `values', see also chapter 6. The latter are perceived as the basis of the 
cooperation between the members of the EU on a series of issues in which a notion of 
a European citizenship lurked. However, the implementation of those policies, which 
were expected to enhance the sense of common citizenship on the European basis, has 
been subjected to national considerations. 
First, one of the first measures of the New Labour government was to give 
expression to citizens' rights. The incorporation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights to the British law in 1998 was «to give further effect to rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights» (HMSO 
1998f). It was alleged to be a serious blow to the defenders of the ancient tradition of 
the English common law tradition of liberty and the sacred myth of parliamentary 
sovereignty (Young 1997a, 19; Philips 1997,30). Despite the Whiggish reflexes, even 
within the New Labour government (Verkaik 2000,12), a Bill of Rights constitutes «a 
healthy antidote to the centralising tendency of Whitehall», ending the ((tyranny of 
majority>> as Blair has said, apparently influenced by the liberals Toqueville and Mill 
(White 1995,1). It would enable the British to protect fundamental rights in their own 
courts rather than going to Strasbourg. The Convention on Human Rights allegedly 
promoted an «active citizenship, in essence, «the British way to champion civic 
engagement and local community initiative» (Brown 2000a, 12; HMSO 19980. Yet, 
as Mather has noted, the Human Rights Act has more symbolic than substantial 
significance. Governmental autonomy is respected within the wording of the Act, and 
indeed the government has already exercised its right under the Article 15 (1) of the 
Convention to exclude the UK from the clause 5(3) which restricts the time a suspect 
may be held in captivity in respect of terrorist activities (Mather 2000,182). 
More important, the Social Charter, (the Social Policy Agreement), did not 
imply just common standards of welfare and working conditions in the Community, 
but also common citizenship since, as was argued, «the primary source of Community 
strength, the single most important element in our wealth creation, is people)) 
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(Cunningham 1993, col. 407). Under the Conservative government the British people 
were denied rights that the rest of the European citizens enjoyed. New Labour on 
coming to power, signed the Social Charter on the grounds of citizenship - though 
with reservations as will become clear below. Cook said, owe do not accept that the 
British people should be second class citizens with less rights than employees on the 
Continent». The Foreign Secretary also noted that this was «a democratic response» 
to the wishes of the British people and the interests of British employees» (Macaskill 
and Black 1997,1). The Maastricht Treaty created a symbolic `European citizenship' 
whose only substantive policy was a Spanish proposal to permit EC citizens to vote in 
local elections wherever they reside (Moravcsik ibid, 455). According to Blair, since 
citizenship followed entirely naturally from the fact that people were given certain 
rights and obligations in the Community, the Social Charter was seen as an enabling 
mechanism. It gave ordinary people a sense that they have, according to the Third 
Way language, some «stake» in the EU (Black 1997,3). Yet, the notion of an 
incipient common European citizenship stops here. 
The politics of rights go together with the politics of responsibility in 
Labour's enlightened patriotism (Blair 1999d) - see more on New Labour's notion of 
enlightened patriotism in chapter 8. The allocation of rights as a result of the social 
charter should not constrain the liberty of, or imply additional burdens for, the 
business but entail duties on the part of the recipients to adjust to the new economy 
according to the American-influenced New Labour's thinking. Brown was explicit 
before the elections that Labour would block any new regulations brought forward 
under the social chapter that were seen to burden business (Webster 1996,8). Also, 
Tony Blair was arguing in a letter to ten thousand British businessmen and women 
(July 16,1996) that `he would use the national veto to prevent Brussels imposing 
backdoor social security burdens on British industry (Brown and Coates 1996,161). 
In this sense, as long as national veto overrides the notion of European 
citizenship, the existing national citizenships cannot be transcended. The possibility of 
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constructing a European identity within the Community is rather slim if we take as the 
model of supranational identity the continuing appeal of national identity. This model 
will not do, unless, as Schlesinger notes, we suppose a substantial transfer of 
identification to the supranational level (Schlesinger 1992,14). On the part of the New 
Labour government this remains an illusive prospect. «Diversity», and not 
homogenisation, as Tony Blair said to the French Assembly, «becomes the source of 
our strengrth» (Blair 1998d). In fact, as Hix (2000,52) and Heffernan (2001,181) 
have argued, although New Labour government can lay claim to being Britain's most 
pro-European administration - excepting only Edward Heath's government (1970-74) 
- it is only moderately more `integrationist' than the last Conservative government. 
Labour remains `British' first and `European' second. 
In fact, the issues of border controls, the immigration and asylum policies 
touch a sensitive aspect of the Labour party's own view of national identity: «Because 
of our long historical and cultural ties with other parts of the world, it is important to 
retain control of our own immigration policy, Cook has insisted (Cook 1997d, 
col. 910). Labour's desire was to keep as tight a check as possible on migration from 
the EU by maintaining internal border controls. Labour's position was already 
summarised in their Policy Handbook of 1996: 
«Will Labour join other European countries in abolishing 
border controls to allow people to travel freely within the EU? 
No, Labour believes that immigration border controls are a matter 
for the UK government and parliament to decide. We have no 
intention of abolishing our border controls» 
(Labour Party 1996a, 3.13.3. ) 
So, in Amsterdam in June 1997, the UK retained legal security for the 
frontier controls, and control over immigration, asylum and visas. «As an island 
country, the former Minister for Europe Joyce Quin said, owe feel it makes sense for 
us to do this» (Quin 1999c). The distinctive geographical position of Britain, her 
worldwide links and subsequently historical patterns of migration led her to adopt 
different policing traditions from those of the other European countries. As Hughes 
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and Smith (1998) have noted, Britain remains on this issue outside of the continental 
consensus. After all, according to Home Secretary, the distinctiveness of a nation state 
is an issue that the European Union ought to respect (Straw 1997,22). On issues of 
national political sovereignty British policy preferences have been relatively stable 
over time. This explains why Blair will continue to oppose giving more powers to the 
EU institutions and extending QMV with EU enlargement, as these policies would 
lead to more movement from the status quo than Britain favours. 
At the European Summit in Nice in December 2000, enlargement was one of 
the main issues for discussion. The previous Conservative government favoured 
enlargement of the EU because it lessened the pressure for deeper integration (Holden 
2000,169). Instead, the New Labour government saw EU enlargement as an historic 
opportunity to bring stability and prosperity to the greater part of the European 
Continent (Quin 1999a) - see New Labour's views on enlargement as a process of 
development for the applicant nations in chapter 10. The Nice Summit was regarded 
as one of the most important meeting of EU leaders in years and aimed to pave the 
way for the entry of some 13 new members. However, Tony Blair seemed for the 
most part preoccupied with his famous six "red lines" (national vetoes) on matters 
such as tax, social security harmonisation, border controls, immigration, defence and 
Treaty amendments (White and Black 2000). In this respect, in the British 
government there appears no overall political strategy for enlargement nor does have 
a clear view of the political role or institutional structure of an EU with 25 or 30 
members. In the past, British governments of all parties have chosen to follow or 
object to European initiatives rather than lead or suggest them. Yet, while pro- 
European attitudes now run deeper in Britain than ever before, New Labour's position 
on enlargement does not reflect a positive endorsement of things European. The 
projection of a European citizenship and identity presupposes a long-standing social 
and political practice (Schlesinger 1992,16-7). In the New Labour case, as will 
become clear below, this cannot be feasible by just assuming a paternalistic attitude 
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towards the applicant counties, imposing its own American-inspired agenda of 
economic reforms and remaining on the margins of the most important project of the 
European Union, the single currency. 
When New Labour came to power, the government committed itself in 
principle to the benefits that a single currency would have in the single market: «In 
principle, a successful single currency within a single European market would be of 
benefit to Europe and Britain (Brown 1997c, col. 583). For Tony Blair the issue has 
not been a controversial one provided the economic benefits are clear. Economic 
pragmatism and not idealism has been the essence of the argument. ((It is not a matter 
of Europe, it is a matter of Britain... it is economic union and what is good for British 
jobs, industry, investment is the test that I will apply... », the New Labour leader has 
constantly emphasised (Jones and Sylvester 1999; Blair 1997d; Blair 1998a; Blair 
1998c, col. 573). Likewise, Brown, in his statement in the Commons in October 1997 
viewed British membership of the European Monetary Union in merely technical 
terms: 
((If a single currency would be good for British jobs, British 
business and future prosperity, it is right in principle to join. 
The constitutional issue is a factor in the decision, but it is not 
an overriding one. Rather, it signifies that, in order for monetary 
union to be right for Britain, the economic benefit should be clear 
and unambiguous)) (Brown 1997d, col. 584) 
Nevertheless, the government has explicitly admitted that «to share a 
common monetary policy with other states does represent a major pooling of 
economic sovereignty)) (HMSO 2000,3). This is why the Labour government has not 
yet entered the single currency, declaring in favour of monetary union only in 
`principle' not in `practice', pledging to join only when it is in Britain's interest to do 
so. In fact, as Sassoon (1999) has argued, the key factor here has been the low level of 
business taxation in Britain. The single market under a single currency will dictate 
some convergence on taxation. That is why we have economic as well as monetary 
union. The distinctive competitive advantages of British industry are low wages, low 
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taxes, weak trade unions, flexible working force, limited job security. One way of 
defending national capitalism is to ensure that harmonisation does not eliminate these 
advantages. The New Labour leadership rules out harmonisation, as already seen. 
Labour is now committed to a high wage, high skill economy, and this requires 
cooperating with business (Sassoon 1999,24-5). In this respect, according to Hughes 
and Smith (1998,103), the New Labour government remains a pragmatic European 
without an overall vision and without being a dominant player. 
As a consequence, critics of New Labour have accused it of nationalism over 
the euro and have pointed out that behind its apparent economic considerations and 
tactical reluctance lurk political and not merely technical considerations. More 
specifically, articles written in credible financial papers such as the Financial Times 
have tirelessly pointed out that the set of plausible economic reasons that have been 
advanced publicly by the Treasury as to why they would not contemplate taking 
Britain into the European single currency until 2002 were all moveable feasts 
(Fishman 1998,101). Synchronising economic cycles, the strength of sterling and 
flexible labour markets would not and should not deter a government, which was 
determined for political reasons to participate in EMU. Also, the critics continue, the 
manifestly weak economic positions of Italy and Portugal have not deterred their 
governments from insisting on their places in the first wave (Crawford 1996). So, it is 
assumed that the principal unspoken but perfectly clear reason for not participating in 
the first wave is that Blair had not yet reconciled himself to the loss of sovereignty. In 
short, as Fishman has put it, `he has not yet accepted the radical structural adjustment 
to which Edward Heath committed the state when he piloted Britain into the European 
Economic Community in 1972' (Fishman 1998,102). Hughes and Smith (1998) have 
also pointed out that `the longer Britain remains outside the single currency the more 
political influence in the EU it will lose' - there is no prospect of Britain being a 
`dominant actor' as Blair intends, while the country is not in the EMU. The decision 
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to join or remain outside the single currency area will be a defining one for Britain's 
position in the EU (Hughes and Smith ibid. 98). 
In conclusion, as Wallace (1999) has argued, the apparent paradox of New 
Labour's position on Europe reflects the equally real paradox of the European 
political system in the 1990s, that is, the governance is becoming increasingly a mutli- 
level, intricately institutionalised activity, while representation, loyalty and identity 
remain stubbornly rooted in the traditional institutions of the nation state. Likewise, 
Miller maintains that most of the European nation states support membership of the 
EU on practical grounds but their emotional loyalty continues to be directed towards 
their country of origin (Miller 1995,160). This gives credence to those scholars who 
have incessantly maintained that the supranationalising European Community is 
heavily dependent upon tales of solidarity of bounded communities (Billig 1995; 
Schlesinger 1992). 
The latter selectively construct the walls that separate those who belong and 
those whose assimilation into the national body is impossible. The Immigration and 
Asylum 1999 Act also shows not just that the British nation enjoys pre-eminence in 
the European context by retaining control over the definition of citizenship and the 
regulation of the human flow across its borders, but also that the European dimension 
of the national essence is revealed only in opposition to the non-European `Other'. 
5.5 The Construction of the Non-European `Other' 
To some observers the concept of a common European space is meaningless 
without substantial freedom of movement. They argue that a new Berlin Wall to keep 
people out of Western Europe would be as offensive as the old one that kept people 
inside Eastern Europe (Budge et al. 1997,383). However, immigration and the free 
movement of people raise fundamental issues not only about individual rights and 
human dignity but also about the character and the definition of the cultural identity - 
if there is any - of the `European family of nations. For Labour and its forebears, the 
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latter was consisted of the Western group of nations, which was in turn conditioned 
by the non-Western world. In the 1960s, Roy Jenkins spoke of the "differential 
cultural status" of the Commonwealth people that made it impossible for them to 
become part of the British social fabric (Jenkins 1962, col. 724). As seen above, 
Jenkins was one of the advocates of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1968, 
which invalidated the right of a particular population of British passport holders (i. e. 
Kenyan Asians) to enter the UK. In the 1970s, as Home Secretary, the bellwether of 
pro-Europeanism insisted that "it is in the interests of the racial minorities themselves 
to maintain a strict control over immigration" (Jenkins 1976, col. 1548). It is no 
wonder then that the pro-European representatives of New Labour have espoused a 
similarly restrictive immigration policy. 
Consequently, this section argues that, in view of the Immigration and 
Asylum 1999 Act, New Labour's Britain as a European nation is largely dependent on 
non-Europeans - or better, non-English-speaking populations. The latter define 
precisely the confines of the European space of Labour Britishness. 
An internal Cabinet Office report, which was circulated in Whitehall not long 
time ago, stated that «identity only ever thrives when there is an enemy to rally 
against)) (Sylvester 2000). In particular, asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants 
from countries outside Western Europe and the English speaking world in general 
appear to threaten the `civilised' order and the values the British government wants to 
project over the `European family of nations'. In a leaked memo written by Tony 
Blair, "Standing up for Britain" (Pierce and Webster 2000), «asylum and crime» 
preocci ° prime minister's consciousness: «These may appear unlinked to 
patriot. ... oy are: partly 
because they are toughness issues», Tony Blair wrote. 
The fact that he sees asylum solely as a "toughness issue" rather than a "human rights 
issue" or a "decency issue" provides a vivid insight into the way he defines the 
character of the British national community within the European context. New 
Labour's Britain seems to espouse a European identity with a hard edge. Because, 
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according to the Labour Prime Minister, asylum reaches «deep into British instincts» 
(Pierce and Webster 2000). Here the discourse of sovereignty creeps back in. 
`Community' can become an exclusionary idea marking the line that separates `us' 
from `them' (Painter 2000,234). 
As previously, the construction of New Labour's nationhood involves 
hostility to those who are different. In the case of the Commonwealth, migration was 
assumed to be against the proper order of things, something that damaged the social 
fabric, offended the nation-state and intruded outsiders among the homogeneous 
citizen body. Now, as will become clear, the asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants 
are linked with criminality and economic leeching. The tightening of the borders 
policing and the tolerance of expressions of welfare chauvinism have become key 
features of the current government's policy. 
The 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees to which the UK is signatory 
guarantees the right to asylum. It obliges states to consider all applications for asylum 
by people claiming to be fleeing from persecution. It provides that lawfully resident 
refugees should enjoy treatment at least as favourable as that given the indigenous 
population. Until the 1980s, on the European level it was recognised that asylum- 
seekers had a claim to admission arising from their own need to flee persecution, 
rather than from the receiving, country's criteria for entry (Lunn 2000,93). Yet, the 
recent government policies and proposals have already put in doubt the right to asylum 
of people coming from countries where there has been serious conflict or where grave 
human rights abuses are common. Emphasising restrictions and control implies the 
stigmatisation and in general a negative portrayal of groups of migrants. 
In fact, in New Labour's discourse the asylum seekers and immigrants are 
connected with criminality and unlawfulness. Whereas Europe, that is, the members of 
the European Union, is «a civilised continent» (Blair 2000d), asylum seekers are 
associated with «illegality» (Straw 1999a, col. 38); whereas British society «lives with 
rules and a sense of order» (Blair 1999k), immigration is linked with «criminal 
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gangs, «organised crime» (Ford 2001) and the «vile trade of smuggling and 
trafficking» (Roche 2000b, col. 594). 
Ansell (1997) points out that the nature of threat posed by the enemy without 
revolves less around the allegation of foreign loyalties and otherness than on alleged 
criminal behaviour. Because racism is not something static but an evolving socio- 
historical construct, part of the social structure which arises out of present conditions, 
people coming from countries with civil strife, disorder and violence such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Somalia and Sri Lanka and those from the East and Central 
Europe whose countries ((have not improved their human rights record» (Straw 2001 a, 
col. 485) are seen by the New Labour government as just another group of outsiders 
who must be excluded. It was not accidental that the 1999 Act was introduced when 
the war in Kosovo was under way; the Labour government did not overlook the 
consequences of a globally induced change such as a change of borders following a 
military conflict within the European neighbourhood. 
In this way, immigrants are presented as an acute problem challenging 
societal and political stability and the effective working of the internal market. In 
doing so, the British government, which, in Blair's words, «does not tolerate anti- 
social behaviour or lawlessness>) (Blair 2001), feeds the idea that migrants do not 
belong to the British and European communities, that they are a serious burden for 
western societies and therefore that they should be kept at a distance. As a result, 
every airline serving Britain has been transformed into an arm of the immigration 
service through fines and other penalties imposed on them for carrying people without 
proper papers. The Home Secretary, Jack Straw, the great-grandson of a refugee 
(Cohen 2001), speaking in the Commons, noted that the extension of the Carriers' 
Liability Act 1987 to Eurostar trains from Belgium and the French authorities and the 
introduction of the visa regimes were intended to «reduce the opportunity for illegal 
immigration for those coming in by air, train or ferry» (Straw 1999a, col. 38). In 
addition, the enforcement of the Bill is backed by the criminal law by extending «the 
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scope of the existing offences of obtaining leave to enter or remain by deception... » 
(Straw 1999a, col. 37). In addition, Jack Straw's call for a redrafting of the 1951 
Geneva Convention, a Europe-wide two-tier asylum system and the introduction of 
visa regimes for specific countries such as Ecuador, Colombia and Slovakia raises the 
spectre of a Fortress Europe (Eaglesham 2000; Woodward 2000; Ford 2001; Travis 
and Black 2001; Burrell 2001). The targeted populations have been associated with an 
unstable social order and consequently they appear as a destabilising challenge to west 
European societies (Huysmans 2000,753). That is why, although the British 
government is staying outside the wider Schengen agreement for the gradual abolition 
of borders, they recently joined the Schengen information system to share criminal 
intelligence with EU partners (Black 2000). 
Belonging is not only mediated through cultural identity and through policing 
borders. Asylum has been seen as an alternative route for economic immigration and 
for this reason it so easily connects to illegal immigration. Jack Straw has said that 
«illegal immigration represents a threat to the integrity of the control and costs the 
taxpayer many millions of pounds» (Straw 1999a, 38). Indeed, access to social and 
economic rights is crucial in the governance of belonging in the welfare state. 
Immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees are increasingly seen as having no legitimate 
right to social assistance and welfare provisions. As the Home Secretary has added, 
«we have decided to take them (asylum seekers and immigrants) out of the social 
security system because they are not British residents, although they can become if 
their case for asylum is accepted... » (Straw 1999a, col. 47). It appears that the new 
discourse about the enemy within relies on the economic imperatives involved in 
rooting out illegal immigrants, `bogus' asylum seekers and welfare cheats (Ansell 
1997,75). In April 2001, on these grounds, a report from the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) accused the British government of creating a 
climate of `acute' racism and xenophobia towards asylum-seekers and refugees (ECRI 
2001,20). 
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Thus, immigrants and asylum seekers are fu ther stigmatised, not just on 
ethno-cultural grounds, but also, in a socio-economic way as strangers who exploit the 
society, and are portrayed as an additional burden for, rivals and competitors of the 
indigenous population and illegitimate recipients or claimants of socio-economic 
rights. «Public statements, the ECRI said, «have tended to depict asylum-seekers and 
`economic migrants', explicitly or by inference, as a threat to security, economic 
stability and social peace» (ECRI 2001,18). Curtailing their social assistance and 
access to other social rights can then be justified as an instrument for limiting the 
number of applications for asylum. 
For example, the Immigration and Asylum 1999 Act has made provisions to 
keep asylum seekers out of the mainstream housing and social welfare provision 
putting them instead in «designated accommodation and replacing social benefits 
with «vouchers» (HMSO 1999). 
With regard to the establishing of a voucher system and provision in kind 
instead of cash benefits for asylum-seekers the government looked to Switzerland and 
Germany, whose policies of provision of assistance in kind (food and lodging) and 
coupons (for transport) and a small amount of pocket-money, devised in the early 
nineties, were an essential part of the `politics of dissuasion'. In Germany critics saw 
them as a regression from an inclusive post-war social security provision that reflected 
Constitutional protection of human dignity, back to a system based on exclusion, 
compulsion and denial of dignity last seen under National Socialism (IRR 1999). 
Although the purpose of the measure has been to keep down the cost of asylum 
seekers, estimates suggest that the cashless system could cost three times as much to 
administer as a more straightforward benefits set-up (Tran and Barkham 2000). 
Moreover, there has been widespread protest by civil rights and refugee aid groups. 
They say the voucher scheme is blatantly discriminatory, immoral and humiliating. 
Transport and General Workers' Union leader Bill Morris has campaigned vigorously 
against the vouchers, which he describes as "inhuman" and "degrading" (D. Brown 
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2000). Likewise, the ECRI report in turn described the replacement of asylum seekers 
benefits with vouchers as «degrading and stigmatising» (ECRI 2001,19). 
Also, the Immigration and Asylum Bill forcibly disperses asylum seekers 
around the country «to prevent concentrations overloading local services» (HMSO 
1999). Asylum-seekers no longer have any choice about where they are placed and 
lose access to all state help if they refuse to co-operate. The dispersal policy has been 
designed to place ethnic groups together in clusters, with health, education and 
transition services geared to the different communities. The Institute of Race Relations 
argues that the government has looked to the system in Germany, Holland, 
Switzerland and Scandinavia. Here asylum-seekers live in designated accommodation 
- reception centres and refugee hostels - while decisions on their application are made 
(IRR 1999). Yet, the climate of hostility generated by the local press and inflamed by 
the National Front in Dover in autumn 1999 threw a long shadow over the provisions 
of the Bill. Because of this, Kent social services were forced to move Romanian 
asylum seekers three times in ten days. It was the time when the liberal-minded Home 
Secretary tagged the Gypsies with «theft, burglary and antisocial behaviour (Ford 
1999). It should be noted that Roma/Gypsies are considered to be one of the most 
vulnerable group while they suffer from discrimination and disadvantage in vital areas 
such as education, employment and housing (ECRI 2001,14). 
For the ECRI «episodes of racial attacks and harassment against asylum 
seekers, notably Roma/Gypsies, demonstrate some of the dangers which the 
increasingly negative climate of opinion can bring about» - the killing of a Kurdish 
asylum seeker in Glasgow last summer vindicates the conclusions of the ECRI 
(Seenan 2001). The ECRI report, which was published just days after an official 
European Union survey showed Britain to be more hostile towards asylum-seekers 
than any other EU-nation with 23 per cent of Britons saying victims of human rights 
violation should be refused entry (Fletcher 2001), put the blame for this climate on 
those «politicians [who] direct the general public's feelings of insecurity on one 
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specific group of persons, irrespective of whether these persons have a valid claim to 
remain in the country or not». The New Labour government appears to share a huge 
part of the blame, while, as seen above, they have contributed to «the vilification of 
those who are considered not to have valid asylum claims and are sometimes defined 
as `economic migrants', `economic refugees' or `bogus asylum seekers')> (ECRI 2001, 
19). This comes to throw into doubt those claims made by a section of scholarship that 
the political parties respond as political barometers to popular racism and not the other 
way round (Anwar 1986). The current official state policies and racist practices are 
evidently engaged in a dialectical process with the people. 
As a matter of fact, the UN committee on Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination has recognised the government's toughness on institutional racism and 
racial attacks, its commitment to employment equality targets, and its strong support 
for the Lawrence family and inquiry, but it concludes that the dispersal system "may 
hamper the adequate access of asylum-seekers to legal and other necessary services, 
e. g. health and education" (Owers 2000). For the UN committee, racism is indivisible 
because there cannot be a trade-off between fair treatment of minority groups already 
here and those that newly arrive. Attacks on one group of strangers encourage hostility 
to all who are visibly different, especially by setting up a system that is likely to create 
disadvantage and exclusion for the present and future (Owers ibid). 
As a matter of fact, the distinction, much laboured by the New Labour 
representatives, between «good» foreigners or «genuine» asylum seekers and «bad» 
foreigners>> or «unfounded» asylum seekers makes a mockery of the goal of a «multi- 
racial Britain>> that the New Labour government preaches (Straw 1999b). The racial 
and institutional discriminations between the communities imply that multiculturalism 
is a cause of societal disintegration. The commission on the future of multi-ethnic 
Britain, which included Labour peer, Lord Bhikhu Parekh, and Trevor Phillips, 
chairman of the Greater London assembly, have commented that Mr Straw's policies 
of dispersing asylum seekers and forcing them to live on below-the-breadline vouchers 
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have created "statelessness and racial and ethnic divisions" (Travis 2000b). What the 
Bill does is to mediate the differentiation between `them' and `us' by identifying other 
cultures that endanger the survival of the home culture. Immigration is thus identified 
as being one of the main factors weakening national tradition and societal 
homogeneity. It is reified as an internal and external danger for the survival of the 
national community or western civilisation in general. As Huysmans (2000) has 
observed, this discourse frames the key question about the future of the political 
community as one choice for or against migration and undermines the initiatives for 
the institutionalisation of a more inclusive multicultural Europe which would provide 
extensive political, economic and social rights to immigrants (Huysmans ibid, 758 & 
766). 
Instead, by denying social provision for rejected asylum seekers the 
government is institutionalising social exclusion and creating Victorian-style 
conditions of poverty and destitution. As seen in chapter 3, the Fabian elitist view of 
the inferiority of non-white races was to a large extent driven by domestic 
considerations. In those late-Victorian times, the perceived inferiority of the 
indigenous was projected over the assumed cultural inferiority of the alien. Likewise, 
nowadays, what is most worrying about the structures of exclusion are the 
implications for the poor and deprived parts of the British society. For some, this kind 
of treatment of asylum-seekers is incompatible with the New Labour government's 
commitment to tackling poverty and social exclusion (Lister 2001,67). True, the 
Home Secretary's depiction of homeless as «winos» and the Romanian beggars as 
<<vile» (Watt 2000) have underlined the way the New Labour government considers 
the destitute parts of the British society - the immigrants and the asylum seekers are a 
prominent element of them - as a danger to public order, cultural identity and domestic 
and labour market stability. Hence, the announcement of increasingly punitive 
sanctions against unemployed claimants, cuts in some disability benefits and the 
deployment of deliberately tough language, which serves to construct social security 
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recipients as the `others' to `us' the taxpayers (Lister 2001,66). Despite the 
introduction of an array of anti-poverty measures including the New Deal in 
employment, a comprehensive strategy for neighbourhood and community renewal, 
Health and Education Zones, the Sure Start programme designed to support deprived 
babies and young children, the National Child Care Strategy, tax credits and minimum 
wage, there is little public sense that the British live in a society of profoundly 
changed ethics and values, of greater fairness or economic or social equality. As Benn 
has noted, if the `social exclusion paradigm' of New Labour suggests that the 
provision of work `solves' the problem of welfare, it is not surprising that we hear so 
little in modem Britain of the reality of life on benefits, contributory or means-tested 
(Benn 2000,315). How can one talk about what poverty really means if part of one's 
strategy is often to encourage people into low-waged employment? How can one talk 
about what poverty really means while existing government measures will bring 2 
million out of poverty, leaving though 12 million citizens living under what used to be 
called `the breadline': twice the number that existed in 1979 (Benn 2000,317). 
Then, it is no surprise that, according to Oxfam, the replacement of cash 
benefits with the voucher scheme means that asylum seekers will exist on less than 
80% of basic income support levels (i. e. a significantly lower level than that for UK 
citizens). Consequently, asylum seekers are considered amongst the poorest and most 
vulnerable groups in the UK, and will be further stigmatised and demeaned by having 
to use vouchers (Oxfam 1999). In essence, the explicit privileging of nationals of 
Member states in contrast to third-country nationals and the generally restrictive 
regulation of migration sustains a wider process of deligitimating the presence of 
immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees (Huysmans ibid). As it is rightly commented, 
<<the European Union is concerned about human rights abuses in Turkey, and that this 
is the reason for keeping Turkey out of the EU. But the victims of those abuses are 
"bogus" once they are here» (Alibhai-Brown 2001). 
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Of course, the British neo-socialists vehemently have denied any racist intent: 
"It's nothing whatever to do with race, it is to do with ... people who were 
masquerading as travellers and who are then committing crimes, as the Home 
Secretary said in August 1999 for the Roma (The Times 1999; Ford 1999). Rather 
than conceive racism as a product of unjust social arrangements (Omi and Winant 
1994; Ansell 1997), racism is wholly detached from the social arena and personalised. 
For the Home Secretary racism is just «absurd, a poison, and a form of madness. May 
be we have all been mad to allow a society where such things matten» (Straw 1999b). 
In fact, as Malik (1996) and Ansell (1997) have argued, personal responsibility, moral 
degeneracy and not deliberate institutional discrimination underlines the new racist 
discourse, as such employed by the New Labour government. Instead, the social 
structures are deemed `open' and `fair', `equal opportunity' is purported to exist and 
any proof of discrimination is attributed to `personal responsibility' - in the case of the 
asylum seekers, to the lack of papers. Indeed, the asylum Bill is said to be revolved 
around «a fairer system that reflects our commitment to race equality and human 
rights» (Straw 1999a, col. 37). Contrary to the government's claims, the ECRI report 
said that «the adoption of increasingly restrictive measures in the fields of asylum and 
immigration and the tone of the debate around the adoption of such measures run 
counter to British Government's efforts to improve race relations and to the 
development of a genuine culture of tolerance and respect for difference» (ECRI 2001, 
19). Other critics of the New Labour government have assumed that «the hatred of 
asylum-seekers is generally-directed at any and every foreigner» (Cohen 2001). 
Finally, the Home Office's plans for a differential treatment between asylum 
and immigration as a result of a potential open door policy for professional migrants 
(the concept of `immigrant worker' is avoided) (Bennett and Adams 2000) are the 
consequence of a far broader reconfiguring of specialised labour markets under the 
impact of economic globalisation than of the foreign policy objectives or asylum 
sympathies of the New Labour government. The World Trade Organisation and the 
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North American Free Trade Agreement contain provisions concerning cross-border 
mobility of highly specialised workers (Bennett and Adams ibid). Over the last 
decade, the EU, while encouraging member states to harmonise asylum policy, has 
slowly been introducing measures to control `migratory movements'. But it was only 
recently that the EU's approach coalesced into an overall philosophy, going under the 
name of `global migration management'. Since the UN warned of the growing 
demographic crisis in Europe, brought on by an ageing workforce and declining birth 
rates, there has been a growing recognition within western Europe that immigration is 
necessary and that refugees might even provide an important source of skilled labour. 
Indeed, since the European Commission indicated in November 2000 that the EU 
should open up legal routes for migration, and national governments within Europe 
followed its lead by adopting skills-based recruitment programmes for foreign 
workers, European governments have been openly supporting `managed migration' 
(Fekete 2001). 
Once again, the immigrant will be constructed along the economic needs of 
the country and its contribution to the existing skills shortages and not on the grounds 
of the much-declared aims of «human dignity and equality. This, far from promoting 
the aims of a multiracial society, would lead to further unequal treatment of and 
divisions within the ethnic communities and, according to some commentators, would 
advance a kind of social Darwinism that says that those professionals from the poorest 
countries who survive the worst journeys should be awarded with a job and a legal 
status in their chosen countries (Travis 2000a). Fakete points out that global migration 
management heralds not the old Social Darwinism that believes that the advance of 
civilisation is dependent on the advancement of the superior race, but a socio- 
economic Social Darwinism that allows the rich First World to maintain its economic 
dominance by emptying the poorer worlds of their skilled work-force. In the era of 
globalisation, the skills pool, not the genes pool, is key (Fakete 2001). 
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As Miles has argued, since western markets seem to demand skilled labour, 
the restrictive policies would target primarily unskilled and semi-skilled migrants who 
tend to belong to non-OECD countries (Miles 1993a, 179-80). Even in this case, as 
Huysmans (2000) remarks, the regulation of asylum and the mediation of immigration 
through labour market would be on cultural grounds since the skilled foreign labour 
force tends to be culturally similar and the asylum seekers tend to be perceived as 
culturally different. The latter, and the aliens in general, are expected to find their 
rights only in their own countries of nationality. This is what, as seen in previous 
chapters, theorists of racism called `cultural' or `new racism' or what Sivanandan has 
recently termed as `xeno-racism', which applies especially to the deprived and 
unskilled categories of immigrants: 
Qt is a racism that is not just directed at those with 
darker skins, from the former colonial territories, but at 
the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed 
and the uprooted, who are beating at western Europe's 
doors, the Europe that helped to displace them in the 
first place. It is a racism, that is, that cannot be colour- 
coded, directed as it is at poor whites as well, and is 
therefore passed off as xenophobia, a "natural" fear of 
strangers. But in the way it denigrates and reifies people 
before segregating and/or expelling them, it is a 
xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism. It 
is racism in substance, but "xeno" in form. It is a racism 
that is meted out to impoverished strangers even if they 
are white. It is xeno-racism» (Sivanandan 2001) 
This climate is deteriorated by proposals such as that of Jack Straw, that is, to 
compel refugees to remain in their region of origin, in huge refugee camps, from 
which Europe will `select' a quota to be brought to Europe for resettlement (Fekete 
2001). In this way, Fortress Europe's `zero immigration' approach is not so much 
abandoned as refined. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The above analysis of the European dimension of the Labour party's 
Britishness has shown that nationalism overrides any kind of supranationalist 
ambitions and puts aside any kind of existentialist questions about Britain's future in a 
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federal Europe. Within the Labour movement this prospect has never been at the top 
of its agenda. 
As a matter of fact, the inter-governmental European vision became dominant 
concept within the circles of the main pressure groups of the party such as the Fabians 
and the ILP since the immediate post-war period. More important, their Europeanism 
was defined against the non-Western world. The differential cultural, politico- 
economic standards within the Continent made federalism less attractive for the 
majority of Labour party opinion. Likewise, federalism was not favourable among the 
leading Europeans of the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, the willingness of the New 
Labour government to work closer with its EU partners on a series of social issues 
does not imply the abandonment of essential national rights. Instead, its opt-out from 
common border controls and immigration policy, on the one hand, strengthens the 
claims of those scholars who see supranationalism and internationalism taking the 
limited form of economic common markets, intergovernmental institutions and 
military alliances (Kellas 1998,222), and on the other hand, re-affirms that Labour's 
spatial Britishness is primarily dependent on the construction of the `other' - in New 
Labour's case, the non-European other. The nationalist and discriminating practices 
against the latter provide an illuminating account of the real character of the 
contemporary British society. 
As an overall conclusion, the duality of the boundary remains central, not just 
to the imperial and insular vision, but also, to the European dimension of Labour 
Britishness. The process of exclusion and rejection of the immigrant, asylum seeker, 
and refugee have become constitutive of the British national identity itself and in this 
way the British socialists are delineating one or other cultural aspect of themselves. 
The grandeur of a benevolent multinational community, the economic nationalism and 
populism in defence of the isles and the rights of the islanders and the benefits of 
European intergovernmentalism constitute three different spatial and political 
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expressions of the Labour party's nationhood. Yet, against the background of global 
changes such as the disintegration and the subsequent loss of the Empire, and the 
ongoing European integration they tell us few things about the social norms and 
cultural standards of the British society. As assumed from the beginning of this thesis, 
only the racialisation and containment of the `other', that is, the Immigration Acts, the 
racialisation of the European worker and the discriminatory practices against the 
asylum seeker, as a means of responding to global transformations that allegedly 
threatened the national essence, can account for the social norms and cultural 
standards of the British society. The intersection of space and culture results in the 
cultural definition of the border control. Civic and ethno-cultural elements are mixed 
producing a less `pure' form of nationalism. 
Hence, the analysis of the next part will further provide us with the main 
elements of Labour's cultural nationhood, as it appeared throughout the European 
debates. 
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PART 3 
THE CULTURE OF THE NATION 
In George Orwell's words «there is something distinctive and recognisable in 
English civilisation (... ) it is continuous, it stretches into the future and the past, there 
is something in it that persists, as a living creature» (Orwell 1953,37). 
Continuity springs from the conception of the nation as a historically rooted 
entity that projects into the future (Guibemau 1996,73). Kellas (1998) and Kelman 
(1969), in congruence with Smith (1986), have noted, the frequent emergence of the 
family as a metaphor for the nation states. `Fatherland', `Motherland', `kith and kin' 
are ideas which are powerful political resources, appealing to human instincts and 
they have endured throughout the ages as objects of supreme emotion and loyalty. 
Thus, culture functions like nature, as a way of locking individuals into a genealogy 
(Balibar 1991 a, 22). While the modernist paradigm remains silent on practices of 
cultural contestation, Gellner, in search of cultural sameness, states that nationalism 
engenders nations using «pre-existing, historical inherited proliferation of cultures or 
cultural wealth)) (Gellner 1983,49). 
Culture constitutes the core of the national identity, playing a unifying and 
differentiating role at the same time (Smith 1998,187). Differentiation stems from the 
consciousness of forming a community with a shared culture leading to the distinction 
between members and `strangers', the `rest' and `the different' (Guibemau 1996,73). 
Thus, continuity over time and differentiation from others seem to be the 
defining criteria of the party's cultural identity. As the second element of Labour 
nationhood, culture, first, demonstrates continuities of specific nationalist symbols, 
practices and `tacit codes' such as religious intolerance, institutional deference, and 
enduring values, which as `living creatures' have been treated as genes passed along 
from one generation to another, so denying the possibility that foreigners can ever 
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become British. It is no surprise then that Labour party, a «particularly British 
institution» (Foote 1997,5), emerged as the true inheritor of a legacy which has 
endured for almost three centuries. On the other hand, the Labour party's cultural 
nationhood cannot be defined in an affirmative way. For instance, as will be argued, 
during the European debates the democratic myth of British institutions was primarily 
defined through juxtaposition with the allegedly autocratic nature of the European 
nations and the perceived political immaturity of the New Commonwealth. As seen in 
the space of the nation, citizenship capacity was indeed a matter of belongingness for 
the immigrants and those populations from the non-Western world. As Ignatieff has 
pointed out, <(to belong is to understand the tacit codes of the people you live with» 
(Ignatieff 1994,7). In this sense, culture mediates the way in which humans relate to 
themselves, others and the exterior world (Guibernau 1996,79). Culture engenders 
symbolic boundaries, which cannot be reduced to the entrance card for a concrete 
labour market (Goldberg 1990). In other words, national culture embraces those 
ethnic notions of inheritance, destiny, myths and shared way of life that cannot be 
available to the `others'. 
This part is divided into three chapters, which delineate the symbols and 
shared ways of life found in the party discourse over the European debates - 
Protestantism (chapter 6), Houses of Parliament (chapter 7) and the Enduring Values 
of New Labour (chapter 8). 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROTESTANTISM 
6.1 Introduction 
According to Linda Colley, Protestantism - together with the Empire and the 
war memories - has been considered as the raison d' etre of the British nation (Colley 
1992b). As here will become clear (6.1.1), Protestantism was a shared religious 
allegiance that permitted a sense of national identity to emerge alongside, and not in 
competition with, older, more organic attachments to England, Wales or Scotland. 
Despite the subtle divisions that existed within the Protestant community itself, the 
most striking feature in the religious landscape was the gulf between Protestant and 
Catholic. Eric Hobsbawm has written that «there is no effective way of bounding 
together the disparate sections of restless people than to unite them against outsiders» 
(Hobsbawm 1990,91). Above all, Protestantism was negatively defined by anti- 
Catholicism. For three centuries, after the Reformation in the sixteenth century, 
Britons saw themselves as inhabiting an island illuminated by true religion under 
threat, especially from French Catholicism. Imagining the French as their opposites 
became a way for Britons to contrive for themselves a flattering identity (Colley 
1992b). Decadence, corruption and absolutism were considered foreign to the 
Protestant culture. 
A bulk of these representations about the Catholic `other' passed on to the 
British Labour party due to the integrative role of Christianity in the early stages of 
the British labour movement (Taylor 1935; Edwards 1943; Wearmouth 1957; 
Thompson 1991; Nairn 1972a & b; Kiernan 1952). As well as making easier the 
subordination of the working-class to the interests and institutions of the imperial state 
(see 6.1.2), Protestantism nourished the famous `insularity' and `xenophobia' of the 
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English, which, according to Orwell, was far stronger in the working class than in the 
bourgeoisie (Orwell 1982,49). Here lies the hostility towards the members of the 
foreign working classes, black or white, as seen in the space of the nation, and the 
suspicion towards the Catholic `other' in the post-war years. 
As Tom Nairn (1965b, 166) has noted, the Independent Labour party's 
ethical socialism was derived from the religion of the Protestant sects. At the time of 
the party formation these were reduced to a kind of domesticated national conscience, 
for ever indignant at the `excesses' of capitalism and at the iniquitous conduct of the 
very rich and the very poor alike. Socialism, hence, was apprehended as a moral 
crusade propelled by emotions of outrage at injustice and suffering. As Colley 
(1992b) has asserted, Protestantism meant much more in this society than just 
bombast, intolerance and chauvinism. It gave the majority of men and women a sense 
of their place in history and a sense of worth; it allowed them to feel pride in such 
advantages as they genuinely did enjoy, and helped them endure when hardship and 
danger threatened; it gave them identity. 
Although in the second half of the twentieth century Protestantism was only 
a residual influence on British culture, as was Christianity itself (Cannadine 1983, 
156; Colley 1992a, 328 & b, 374; Greenfeld 1992,77), as will be argued, during the 
European debates (6.3), elements of Protestantism contributed to the perception of 
Europe as the predominantly Catholic Other (6.2). Especially in the early stages of the 
European question, Labour, by re-working the brotherly communal values of co- 
operation in the doctrines of ethical socialism, and the dutiful moralism of 
Protestantism - along with a hostility to European narrowness, corruption and profit- 
making competition - succeeded in forging their allegiance to the British nation as the 
dominant player in world affairs with a moral mission that was threatened by the 
forces of darkness represented by Catholicism. 
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6.2 Protestantism as an Element of British Identity 
Protestantism was central to first English and then British nationalism 
(Manzo 1996,139). Protestantism was central to the British experience after 1700. 
Yet, historians have preferred to concentrate on the more subtle divisions that existed 
within the Protestant community itself, on the tensions between Anglicans and 
nonconformists in England and Wales, between Presbyterians and Episcopalians in 
Scotland and older forms of Dissent (Samuel 1989a, 58; Greenfeld 1992,63; Wolfe 
1989,189; Langlands 1999). In so doing, they should not obscure what remained the 
towering feature in the religious landscape, the gulf between Protestant and Catholic 
(Colley 1992a, 317). 
As a matter of fact, confirmation of Britain's providential mission, especially 
in her endeavour to convert Ireland to Protestantism in order to promote her economic 
and social advance, was provided by the juxtaposition of the purest Protestantism and 
the most corrupt Catholicism. Ideas of national character have typically been formed 
by processes of exclusion, where what it is to be British is defined in relations of 
opposition to enemies both without and within. The discovery of such enemies is a 
normal condition of national life. Catholics occupied this symbolic space for some 
three centuries after the Reformation (Samuel 1989b, xvii). As Colley (1992a & b) 
has argued, this was how it was with the British after 1707; they came to define 
themselves as a single people not because of any political or cultural consensus at 
home, but rather in reaction to the Other beyond their shores. The slang adjective 
most commonly applied to Catholics was «outlandish» and this was meant literally. 
Catholics were not just strange, they were out of bounds; they did not belong, and 
were therefore suspect (Colley 1992b, 23). 
As the nation was thus defined and protected by virtue of her Protestantism, 
it followed that Roman Catholicism was the very antithesis of British values. Cotrell 
has argued that «the ecclesiastical despotism of Rome enslaved the will and the spirit 
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of Catholic nations, while leading them into estrangement from God and bringing 
down his judgement upon them. By contrast, Protestants rejoiced in their political and 
spiritual freedom and commercial prosperity, basking in the sunshine of divine 
favour (Cotrell 1989,267). Likewise, Wolfe has asserted that vif Rome was the root 
of all evil and Britain God's chosen Israel, it was imperative that the nation should be 
kept clear of any contamination with Catholicism» (Wolfe 1989,189). Protestants 
saw themselves as a beleaguered garrison in a world in which all the great powers 
were Catholic (Hill 1989,159). This is further evidence that the evolution of 
Britishness cannot be understood without reference to both European and world 
history. 
British national identity was given sharper relief by the construction of a 
French `Other'. Colley has commented that «the British defined themselves as 
Protestants struggling for survival against the world's foremost Catholic power, the 
French as they imagined them to be, superstitious, militarists, decadent and unfree 
France, as Britain's most dangerous enemy, had a larger population and a much 
bigger land mass than Great Britain; it was its greatest commercial and imperial rival 
and it was a Catholic state; this last point was the crucial one in shaping responses 
throughout Great Britain as a whole (old popish enemy)» (Colley 1992b, 25). France 
was thus presented as a threat to every facet of British life, to that `existence under 
which life is alone valuable'. In fact, onto the Frenchman were projected all the 
forces, fantasies, contradictions and fears with which the British ruling classes, at 
least, were ill at ease and needed to repress. Cotrell has claimed that the French 
threatened «to unleash all that was contained, incarcerated, suppressed or made 
subordinate in British society, and to challenge or subvert all that seemed secure and 
natural» (Cotrell 1989,267). 
The British `ingroup' and French `outgroup' were polar opposites; the 
propaganda proscribed the possibility of there being any common ground between the 
two peoples. At the same time, each pole, or each set of binary opposites, was highly 
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valorised, and every British characteristic was given priority over every French 
characteristic. 
In respect of the Labour party's discourse during the European debates, the 
broadsheets accounted for this extreme polarisation into good and evil, right and 
wrong, by making reference either to God, or to nature, or the character/government 
and constitution dialectic, or to a combination of these. Additionally, another 
characteristic of the intolerant Protestantism, which was to be found in the post-war 
Labour's discourse, was the invocation of British exceptionalism. The spiritual 
framework of the post-war imperial visions of the party leaderships can be traced in 
the religious element of the British culture. In fact, Britain's positive self-valorisation 
was made common-sense by associating itself with `universals', all of which, 
according to the propaganda, France was trying to annihilate - Christianity, mankind, 
civilisation, order, nature, truth, right. In valorising the `ingroup' by reference to 
universals, the cohesion of the group becomes weakened by its over-inclusiveness; it 
becomes everything except that which could be identified as French. Britons were not 
fighting simply to defend Britain, but for the independence of every nation- In order to 
resolve this contradiction between the particular and the universal nature of 
`Britishness', that is, in order to retain the notion of an exclusively `British patriot' 
rather than merely a `Citizen of the World', Britain had to be given an exclusive role 
within the universal. It was Britain which gave order to the world. `Has not Britain 
sustained the balance of Europe? Has she not given laws to the world? ' All other 
nations, having at some stage succumbed to the French wiles, now looked to Britain 
for deliverance. In essence, Britain served, too, as a model and inspiration to other 
nations. Above all, «the propaganda suggested to Britons that they were a chosen 
people, with a particular part to play in the divine plan» (Cotrell 1989,270). In 
particular, as Colley (1992a & b) suggests, Protestant Britons learned that particular 
kinds of trials, at the hands of particular enemies, were the necessary fate and the 
eventual salvation of a chosen people. Suffering and recurrent exposure to danger 
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were a sign of grace; this way of making sense of adversity, and of comforting 
themselves in the face of it, would persist subliminally into the 20thcentury - 
especially in the aftermath of the Second World War. Because, official intolerance of 
the Catholic `Other' was rooted in something far more tangible, in fear most of all, 
and in the way that Britons chose to remember and interpret their own past. 
In particular, in the early stages of the European debate the Labour discourse 
was a further proof of this claim, for the party's origins were embedded within a 
Protestant culture, which nurtured insularity and apartness. 
6.3 The Labour Party, the Catholic `Other' and the European 
Question 
Post-war Britain was still an emphatically Protestant country, in which 
Catholicism was something foreign and therefore suspect (Young 1998,50). The 
Protestants were still considered to be the chosen ones and anti-Catholic prejudice 
was instinctive. Ernest Bevin, the Labour Foreign Secretary of the Attlee 
administration (1945-5 1), was the first who exhibited anti-Catholic prejudice. 
Gladwyn Jebb records a scene on a journey with Mr and Mrs Bevin to a trade union 
conference in Southport: «the train was rather full and people often went by in the 
corridor, including from time to time a Catholic priest in a soutane. Whenever this 
happened Mr and Mrs Bevin became uneasy and Mr Bevin muttered `black crows'. I 
understood that he believed that Catholic priests brought bad luck, and nothing that I 
could say had any effecb> (Galdwyn 1972,176). In fact, these feelings were not 
limited to superstition. 
For the British, the Catholic nature of `Europe' was a generous source of 
prejudice against it. Inevitably, the first moves towards a kind of European unification 
were thus stigmatised by these beliefs. They acquired a strong political formulation 
among people who saw in the Schuman Plan (1950) the beginnings of a Vatican 
conspiracy or, even more luridly, an attempt to recreate the Holy Roman Empire. For 
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representatives of the Labour party, Britain was the major power on the European 
stage while the French and Germans «gang up against her>> (Hynd 1950, col. 1979). 
The purpose of the Schuman plan was politically deemed to be a French plot «to tie 
the Germans up so tightly that they cannot be a menace to the French>; in this way, 
France could form a conspiracy with Germany against Britain so that «it could not do 
its service to the world» (Crossman 1950, col. 2038). Indeed, suspicion about the 
motives of the Schuman plan and Franco-German involvement shadowed the 
economic arguments over the benefits expected to derive from the first post-war 
exercise in collaboration by which countries sank some of their aspirations that kept 
the competitive quest for leadership going. There were suspicions that Schuman and, 
still more Monnet, wanted all along to exclude Britain from the scheme. It was 
claimed that both schemes were deliberately constructed to exclude unwanted guests 
and their architects could, accordingly, well afford to go through the formalities of 
offering membership to those who were never going to join anyway. Christopher Lord 
has said that, in addition to the Labour suspicion that France was really engaged in a 
selfish scheme to re-order diplomatic relationships in its favour, Bevin accused France 
and the US of plotting against the UK's commercial interests by designing an 
industrial grouping with a constitution that they knew Britain could not join for 
political reasons (Lord 1996,15). 
And such speculations were not confined to fusty old imperialists, such as 
Bevin and Little Englanders such as Crossman. Kenneth Younger, Minister of State at 
the Foreign Office, Bevin's astute and educated junior, was one of the few politicians 
or officials sympathetic to the Schuman Plan. But his suspicions on this account were 
evidently important to him. He wrote in his diary about the unsound motives behind 
the rejection of the Plan by the Labour government of Clement Attlee: 
«Of course, the Labour's government's decision was not 
entirely rational. A proposal for European co-operation 
coming from the French was almost distasteful... Suspicions 
were sometimes expressed in Labour circles, that the 
conservative Christian Democratic governments most 
interested in the Schuman Plan were part of a faintly sinister 
231 
conspiracy... In view of the political complexion of the 
French and the German governments and their links with 
heavy industry, one cannot but expect that this will develop 
along old fashioned cartel lines... it may be just a step in the 
consolidation of the Catholic `black international' which I 
have always thought to be a big driving force behind 
Europe... )) (Greenwood 1996,35; cited in Hennessy 
1992$400). 
Such was the background beyond politics to the case of Schuman and the 
Labour party in the early fifties. According to Miriam Camps, ten years later, in the 
face of the first application for British membership, «Europe still had in Labour eyes 
the conservative, Catholic, cold-war image of the Adenauer-Schuman-De Gasperi 
period» (Camps 1967,193). 
In fact, the left wing representatives of the Labour party, before unfolding 
any well-founded counter-arguments, appealed to Harold Macmillan, the then 
Conservative Prime Minister, saying: <(Keep Britain out of the Catholic dominated 
Europe» (The Times 1961,17). As the left-wing Labour MP, Jennie Lee had said, 
Britain faced a «polarisation of world forces into one vast area of power and influence 
which is Communist-dominated and another vast area under Conservative-Catholic 
domination (Lee 1961, col. 1546). The «absolutist conception)) of the European 
Catholic governments (Ungoed-Thomas 1961, col. 1577) and the corresponding 
Communist absolutism were in conflict with the free-loving, «generous» British 
nation, which provided the «bridgehead» to the developing part of the world 
(Bottomley 1962, col. 1203). 
As a result of this, and out of a religious disposition, Labour's Protestant 
inner beliefs made British socialists feel as a people apart, in essence, an insular 
nation: «we can hold our own with a push, a vigorous struggle, discipline, and proper 
organisation» (Shinwell 1961, col. 1731), owe do not need more orders» (Lee 1961, 
col. 1552), owe will survive as a result of our own efforts)) (Wilson 1961, col. 1653), 
«by standing alone we have a peculiar world role» (Rodgers 1962, col. 71 1). The 
nation that passed the test of war was considered to be in God's special care, entrusted 
with an Empire. The Labour representatives deeply believed that although Britain 
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«suffered great damage» during war-time (Woodburn 1962, col. 1034), she was not 
occupied -contrary to most of the Europeans - because she was endowed with moral 
virility, «initiative and the spirit of adventure» (Warbey 1962, col. 689). This was a 
classic Protestant tenet that the British were bound to be regularly tested by periods of 
suffering, and they took it for granted that struggle - especially against those who 
were not Protestants- was their birthright (Colley 1992a). These experiences, their 
profound patriotism and complacency in the superiority of their nation heightened the 
sense of solidarity and sharpened their awareness of `us' against `them'. 
Especially, the French - «the villains of the piece)) for the majority of the 
British public, according to some Labour representatives (Edelman 1974, col. 900) - 
were considered to be merely untrustworthy: «they are very brave when they are 
fighting for France but the idea of their doing anything for an ally does not fit in» 
(Paget 1971, col. 399). According to Linda Colley (1992b), Britons' traditional 
assertion that «the millions of Frenchmen massed against them on the other side of the 
channel were in reality impoverished, downtrodden, credulous, even somehow 
unmanly» was a panacea for nagging anxieties and a way of coping with envy. Her 
post-war economic parasitism in combination with a lingering political clout resulted 
in the UK approaching the Franco-German alliance with suspicion. Whereas the 
Germans and the French, who were more confident about their unique identity, saw a 
Europe without frontiers in terms of opportunity, the British were far more inclined to 
view it as a threat; this partly because they have so often fought against Continental 
European states in the past (Colley 1992b, 375). 
In the post-war period, the French governments were still regarded as 
harbouring «persistent hostility to this country» (Jay 1980,430). As Hugh Brown put 
it, «one cannot trust them» (Brown 1971, col. 984). Giles Radice has asserted that the 
British culture has had a strong Gallophobic streak: the French Revolution accentuated 
British fears, and subsequently, although the entente cordiale in 1914 settled colonial 
differences, the unilateral capitulation to the Germans in 1940 aroused old suspicions 
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(Radice 1992,42). Drawing on these perceptions, Labour resuscitated the old spectres 
of the `militarist' French who were occupied and collaborated with the Nazi regime, 
fomenting, thus, old anti-Catholic suspicions and mistrust within the party for 
potential plots and conspiracies of any kind against their country. The French were «an 
ally with a doubtful military and political value» (Parkin 1954,96) - see more in the 
time of the nation. 
In Peter Shore's eyes Europe remained a «French trap» for Britain (Shore 
1971b, 796). British entry on French terms, Shore claimed, would make Britain «the 
sick man of Europe with negligible influence» (Shore 1971b, 796). The bulk of 
Shore's suspicions of the French derived from the Treaty of Rome: 
«the Treaty gives unmistakable evidence of the harsh 
egotism of French policy. It would be folly to recognise 
that for the past 14 years the policies of Gaulliste France 
have been designed not merely to maximise the interests of 
France but to weaken and disrupt our own. Having 
excluded Britain from the Common Market and having 
insisted that negotiations this time should take place only 
on the basis of a total surrender of British and 
Commonwealth interests, France has gained not only a 
diplomatic triumph at our expense but has placed the most 
onerous burden upon us» (Shore 1972a, 173). 
The author of The Case Against Entry rehearsed several times the familiar 
theme of the French Plot during the negotiations conducted by Heath in the early 
seventies. Shore's strain of patriot paranoia proved effective in the special Common 
Market party conference in July 1971. More than anything else he criticised the Heath 
government's «surrender to France in the Common Market negotiations)) (Clark 
1971a, 4). The cunning Frenchmen, he said, had been scheming to extract their pound 
of flesh from the British tax-payer to give to their miserable poor peasants: «It speaks 
volumes», he added, «about the French meaning of a `Community' and gives some 
indication of the `Community spirit' that we could expect to meet on other problems 
if we became a member, that they should prepare the trap for Britain before the 
negotiations began)) (Shore 1971b, 796). 
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There was a pervasive emotion that the powers across the channel threatened 
to undermine the moral mission, the distinctive purpose of the British nation to help 
the deprived populations of the world, to `fulfil our duty to mankind'. In Labour's 
view the Six suffered from the `four c's'. They were conservative, clerical, cartelist 
and capitalist (Lord 1996,51). Indeed, the European countries were morally 
condemned as a «conspiracy by property)) (Bowles 1962, col. 1051), overwhelmed by 
a «ruthless competitive spirit)) (Blyton 1961, col. 1537) and accused of deliberately 
raising «tariff walls and barriers cutting us from our friends (Commonwealth) outside 
and leaving us to the mercy of the stronger European industries)) (Ungoed-Thomas 
1961, col. 1573). 
Instead, Britain asserted a kind of moral authority in the underdeveloped 
countries through the alleged influence of the Commonwealth. As seen earlier, in the 
nineteenth century, Britain, in opposition to France, was given a universal, exclusive 
world role as an inspiration to the other nations. In the sixties, the `brotherhood of 
man' as it took flesh and blood in the shape of the Commonwealth, the so-called 
«family of nations>> (Collison 1961,212), or, the «free voluntary association of 
people» (Ungoed-Thomas 1961,1576) could not be served by the morally 
unacceptable image of the capitalist-ridden Common Market. The `kith and kin' ideas 
suggest supreme emotion and loyalty and altruistic behaviour among those most 
closely related to each other (Kellas 1998,14). 
In particular, the so-called «co-operative Commonwealth» (Castle 1957,724) 
was expected to materialise solidarity among its members, a mutual understanding for 
their problems, a community sense, a co-existence with no strings attached, by 
contrast to the unfree, conditional membership of the European Community. As a 
result, only the British nation was thought to have a unique grasp of the values of 
«friendship», «comradeship», «assistance», «friendly help», «mutuality», «fair play, 
and «solidarity» (Ungoed-Thomas 1961, col. 1577; Bellenger 1961, col. 1694; Lee 
1961, col. 1550; Bagshaw 1962,171) -a continuous thread of «trust» between the 
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abandoned, destitute populations and the British people, between the «British and our 
friends.. 
. our brothers and sisters)) (Bagshaw 1962,172), as Labour used to call them. 
Such values, sentiments and ties were non-existent within the boundaries of the 
Common Market that demanded tariff-walls for its members. Yet, this rhetoric of 
nationalist `brotherhood' provides the necessary conditions for xenophobia and racial 
discrimination (Kellas 1998,15). 
In this sense, Catholicism was associated, amid others, with high taxation and 
iniquity (Jay 1980,390). In the late sixties, the rallying point of the Europhobics, 
Douglas Jay, did not hesitate to raise this issue in relation to the comments he made on 
one of his colleagues in the Cabinet, Frank Longford who happened to be pro-Marketeer 
and Catholic: 
<ü felt no disillusion towards Frank Longford as a 
pro-Marketeer. He was a devout Catholic, and I noticed 
that to many the Common Market tended to be equated 
with Christendom and Eastern Europe with anti-Christ. 
This perfectly sincere attitude was even more common among 
Continental Catholics; including indeed the founding fathers 
of the Market: Monnet, Spaak, Adenauer and Schumann. But 
though I understood and respected it, I could not agree that this 
particular vision of Christendom justified a system of crushingly 
high taxes on the staple foods of the common people)) 
(Jay 1980,390). 
Colley (1992a & b) has remarked that following Britain's entry in 1972, she 
could no longer comfortably define herself against the European powers at all. 
Greenfeld (1992) and McMillan (1995) have also stressed that there must be few 
cases in history when a tradition (i. e. Protestantism) and the world that describes it 
have lost so much status in so short a time. In particular, it is argued that religion lost 
its authority over the other fields of activity; it ceased to be the source of social values 
and instead of shaping them, had to adapt to social and national ideals. Yet as Colley 
(1992a & b) has also assumed, the agonies that British politicians of all partisan 
persuasions, Labour representatives included, so plainly experience in coming to 
terms with Brussels and its dictates show how rooted the perception of Continental 
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Europe as the Catholic Other still is. In these circumstances the re-emergence of 
British nationalism can be seen not just as the natural outcome of cultural diversity 
but as a response to a broader loss of national, in the sense of British identity. For 
instance, in the early nineties, during the parliamentary debates on the single currency 
the official support given by the Labour leadership for the single currency apparently 
touched a sensitive spot in the nationalist psyche of the party. Austin Mitchell asserted 
that the currency reflected «a nation's uniqueness» (Mitchell 1995,18). It belonged to 
an open, dynamic and democratic tradition. Its abolition for the sake of «a Catholic, 
corporatist, continental tradition was supposed to be «a symptom of impotence and 
depression (Mitchell 1991,18). 
6.4 Conclusion 
Although the last comment was one of the rare instances that British 
Protestantism or French anti-Catholicism made its appearance in Labour's discourse 
during the last two decades, as this chapter has demonstrated, it made its influence felt 
within the party ranks during the European question since the debates of the sixties 
and early seventies, and, as Miller has suggested, the latent Protestantism of the 
British, even in those who no longer subscribe to any formal religion at all, is likely to 
surface in similar circumstances (Miller 1995,172). Especially, as seen above, the 
continuing Britishness of the Labour party with its nonconformist roots and its 
continuing strength in Scotland and Wales as well as England, allows us to see how 
much a common Protestantism contributed to an artificial British identity in the past, 
as primarily, a relational concept. Because the exploration of Britishness in relation to 
the European Union helps to explain its late twentieth century difficulties, at the time 
when there are not just doubts about the viability and influence of the Protestant 
beliefs, but also of the connecting belief in the superiority of British political 
arrangements. 
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Indeed, Colley (1992b) has pointed out that Parliament's importance in 
Britain distinguished its government from that existing in almost every other European 
state. There was an almost embarrassing consensus in the 18th and 19" centuries that 
Parliament was unique, splendid and sovereign, the hard-won prerogative of a free and 
Protestant people. Parliament was part of the Protestant inheritance and, as the 
following chapter will make clear, the Labour discourse on the European question 
placed particular emphasis on the institutional heritage of the British nation which was 
defined in opposition to the supposedly undemocratic nature of the European nations 
and the New Commonwealth countries. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT 
7.1 Introduction 
David Miller (1995) has suggested that the ending of Empire called into 
question a very long-standing set of beliefs about the intrinsic value of British 
institutions themselves. However, as I will argue in this chapter, throughout the 
European debates the Labour party has consistently expressed its loyalty to the 
institutional heritage of the nation. Because of its Protestant roots, since its inception 
Labour came to fully adopt the norms and practices of a parliamentary culture (7.3) 
and, particularly, throughout the post-war period, acknowledge, irrespective of 
ideological predilections and convictions in relation to the European question, the 
continuing symbolic significance of Parliament as the guarantor of democracy and the 
testimony of British uniqueness and exceptionalism (7.4; 7.5). In fact, Westminster 
nationalism, which emerged as the crucially unifying and differentiating element of a 
peculiarly religious-imbued political culture, has been the most fundamental part of 
the British historical tradition (7.2). 
7.2 The Houses of Parliament as an Element of British Nationhood 
As seen previously, English cultural nationhood was defined in terms of 
religious and political values and in opposition to the Catholic autocratic Continent. In 
particular, the concept of British parliamentary sovereignty was developed in 
opposition to the European Continent: a claim to independence by the weak against 
the strong, to self-protection against the pretensions of pope and emperor (Wallace 
1986,382). The English Reformation identified the existence of English interests with 
an autonomous Christian church in Saxon England (Gilroy 1987,65). `This Realm of 
England is an Empire' - the fundamental assertion of the Act of Supremacy of 1534 - 
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was a declaration of independence from the ties that until then had formally bound the 
English church and crown to Rome. Indeed, according to Greenfeld (1992), the 
assertion of the nationality of the English polity in the sixteenth century went hand in 
hand with the insistence on the people's right of participation in the political process 
and government through Parliament. 
In this case, nationhood, England's being a nation, actually meant such 
participation. Nationalism in England legitimated and rationalised what Tocqueville 
later called `democracy' - that is, the tendency toward equality of condition among 
different social strata (Greenfeld 1992,45 & 50). So, the struggle for supremacy 
between Crown and Parliament, which followed over the next two centuries, was at 
the same time, as Trevelyan has noted, a struggle to maintain this separation from the 
Continent, increasingly identified with the autocratic monarchy of France and the 
dogmatic Roman Catholic Church (Trevelyan 1996,63-261). Those opposed to 
monarchy claimed that Parliament was an institution of great antiquity, with origins in 
the German democratic tradition, from which the Saxons were considered to have 
originated (MacDougall 1982; Newman 1987; Loughlin 1995). They looked back for 
the origins of the English constitution to the old Teutonic assembly - the 
Witenagemot. This so-called «ancient» Parliament articulated and encapsulated a 
sense of national identity, based on a widespread stereotype about the racial character 
of the English people who were allegedly of the same blood as the race of conquering 
Teutons that invaded Britain from northern Germany after the fall of the Roman 
Empire -a race of superior stock and outstanding character, and possessing a form of 
parliamentary assembly, the Witenagemot, the prototype of the English Parliament 
(Loughlin 1995,11). Hence in mid-seventeenth century England, the ideas of the 
existence of an Anglo-Saxon Church and Parliament and of an original Anglo-Saxon 
`race' suppressed and oppressed by a foreign `race' since the Norman invasion in 
1066 legitimated political revolution (Jones and Keating 1985,15-9; Miller 1995, 
157). 
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Long before the inception of the British state, therefore the power of the 
Parliament and national consciousness fed on each other in opposition to Europe 
(Gilroy 1987,65; MacDougall 1982; Newman 1987; Greenfeld 1992; Miller 1995). 
The British state established in the early eighteenth century was largely built upon 
pre-existing English institutions and governmental practices - the crown, parliament 
and the unwritten constitution (Ignatieff 1994,4; Nairn 2000,41; Langlands 1999, 
61), which were associated with a supposedly inherent capacity for freedom (Girloy 
1987,66). As Miller remarks, many things regarded as primordial features of the 
nation are in fact artificial inventions for purely political purposes (Miller 1995,157). 
In this respect, the `ancient Parliament' and its traditional accoutrements - 
common law, constitution, crown - have provided the Labour party with the myth of 
British democracy which served as a public expression of the collective self- 
definition, and its differentiation from supposedly undemocratic nations/races. As the 
following section points out, due to its noncomfortist roots, Labour espoused 
wholeheartedly the norms and the practices of the British/English parliamentary 
culture. 
7.3 Labour's Integration to the Parliamentarian Political Culture 
According to Thompson (1991), dissident Christianity played an integrative, 
national role throughout the period of the English working class's political formation. 
From the British triumph over the French Revolution and Napoleon to the imperialist 
hegemony of 1880-1914, the working class in Britain was adapted to the nation-state 
positively in the form of nationalism, and negatively in the form of the profound 
moralism and the ethical conscience that Christianity embodied (Nairn 1972a; c). 
During this period, radical movements combining a strong class sense and 
internationalism challenged the mainstream represented, eventually, by the Labour 
party. But such challenges were unequal to the great historical forces arrayed against 
them. Although class contestation cannot be eliminated even by all-conquering 
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nationalism, it can be `contained' or neutralised over considerable periods of time - on 
the relationship between `nation' and `class' see also the space of the nation. In Great 
Britain the ideology available for this long defensive war of containment was a 
Christian one. As Kiernan has said, «the `mythical cable of theology' kept at bay 
incipient class conflict>> (Kiernan 1952,46). 
Energies and emotions, which were dangerous to social order, were released 
in the harmless congregations of band-meetings, or revivalist campaigns (Thompson 
ibid, 405). All the Nonconformist sects, Methodism included, manipulated the 
submissiveness of their followers and disciplined all deviant growths within the 
Church, which could give offence to authority. ((They were not only a statement of 
ecclesiastical ideals but also a religious `safety valve'», Taylor commented (Taylor 
1935,5). 
English separateness and provincialism; English backwardness and 
traditionalism; English religiosity and moralistic vapouring; paltry English 
`empiricism', or instinctive distrust of reason - all these features, which may be seen 
as distortions of bourgeois development in England, were hammered together during 
the infancy of the working class (Nairn 1972b; c). Any revolutionary impulse was 
strangled, and withdrawal was the only possibility, the turning-in of a whole class 
upon itself. Methodism, as a pitiless ideology of work, and in war periods as the 
`chiliasm of the defeated or hopeless' in Karl Mannheim's words, offered the sole 
escape in the form of, what Thompson describes as `a ritualised psychic masturbation' 
(Thompson 1991,405). It was the paradox of `a religion of the heart' that it should be 
notorious for the inhibition of all spontaneity. 
Deprived of `reason', the working class was beaten by repression and forced 
into a corporative mode of existence and consciousness generating its own values, 
organisations and manner of life distinct from the whole civilisation round about it. 
Nonconformity, as Thompson has noted, is self-effacing and apologetic: it asks to be 
left alone (Thompson 1991,385). In the very secretiveness of the friendly societies 
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we had authentic evidence of the growth of independent working-class culture and 
institutions. This was the sub-culture out of which less stable trade unions grew. 
Yet, this apartness of the working class implied a kind of deference - for it 
resigned everything else to those who possessed authority and wealth. Despite their 
efforts to create a separate world, a real `apartheid' of one class (Nairn 1972b, 202), 
they became a vehicle of assimilation whereby the ruling values, beliefs, prejudice 
and customs were refracted downwards into the working class. There was a reverence 
for the state and a profound belief in the necessity and value of state action even when 
it limited individual liberty (Edwards 1943,63). 
Neither the Utopian-corporative ideology of Owenite trade-unionism (Beer 
1920,160-85; Thompson 1991,857-87), an attempt to build socialism in and for the 
working class ignoring the rest of society, nor the Chartist movement (Beer 1920,280- 
94; Ashton, Fyson and Roberts 1999), a radical-democratic programme dissociated 
from the social instinct of the class, could provide reliable answers to their problems. 
In the end, they were thrown into a timid form of corporate action imitating rather than 
initiating reforms. This was the time when Methodism began to lose momentum, and 
emphasis in Methodist thought and concern was transferred from `what shall I do to be 
saved? ' to entire dependence on state schemes for social and material salvation 
(Wearmouth 1957,250) and to nourishing a sense of superiority to foreign exploited 
masses. In this sense, the leaders of the Labour party have always rejected any kind of 
political action, which fell outside the framework, and conventions of the 
parliamentary system. As Miliband noted, the Labour party has not only been a 
parliamentary party; it has been a party deeply imbued by parliamentarism (Miliband 
1964,14). 
A plethora of scholars and academics of Labour party politics have 
extensively commented on Labour's integration into the British nation, and in 
particular, into the parliamentary process (Wertheimer 1929,78; Miliband 1964,13 & 
15; Nairn 1977,43 & 300; 1999,25; Hindess 1983,92; Wainwright 1989,16; 
243 
Leighton 1995,25; Barnett 1997,15; Ward 1998,197; Wickham-Jones 2000a, 17). 
Robert Colls has noted that the infant Labour party convinced itself that it could only 
travel by full affiliation to a political culture where the omnipotence of Parliament 
was the crucial passport (Coils 1986,38). 
In particular, it has been suggested that unlike many European parties, 
Labour did not have a tradition of opposition to the state; and nor had it endured a 
period underground, persecuted as an illegal party (Fielding 1996,11; Wickham- 
Jones 2000a, 17). British socialism rejected violence and revolution. The latter were 
not in accordance with the democratic principles of a Protestant people. Reinforcing 
the idea that such methods were foreign was the belief that parliamentary democracy 
also made them unnecessary (Ward ibid, 78). Syndicalism and industrial action 
menaced the parliamentary socialists' version of British national identity (Ward ibid, 
101). Syndicalism was seen as foreign and could not take root in the political soil of 
Britain. The concentration on class by syndicalists was one reason why many 
socialists declared their methods un-English. Ramsay MacDonald had said that 
«syndicalism was a French stranger in our language with no registered abode as yet)) 
(Ward ibid, 90). Instead, the ILP's perception was that its methods for achieving 
socialism were adopted to suit the British conditions and the national character. Thus 
in its battle against syndicalist ideas it found itself defending British political 
institutions as much as its conception of socialism. Its view of national history made 
parliament the legitimate arena for social change. The House of Commons stood at 
the centre of the advance to liberty (Ward ibid, 101). 
Likewise, devoted to the piecemeal improvement of workers' conditions 
within the existing conservative social fiamework, trade unionism and Fabian 
gradualism moved only very slowly and reluctantly back towards any political 
challenge to the state. On the one hand, though increasingly strong in itself, trade 
unionism remained mainly deferential to the state and Constitution (Nairn 1977,43). 
Rather than perceiving political revolution as the road to socio-economic betterment, 
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the British workers preferred to see a pragmatic politics evolve bit by bit out of their 
economic struggle. Thus, working class politics evolved on the back of trade 
unionism in Britain, emerging quite empirically as a kind of collective, parliamentary 
voice for a corporate class interest (Nairn 1977,48). On the other hand, the Webbs 
praised the particular advantages of the political institutions of the democracy of 
Great Britain. They noted how parliament had acted upon the national political 
character. As Sidney Webb argued in 1923, «for the Labour party, it must be plain. 
Socialism is rooted in political democracy; which necessarily compels us to recognise 
that every step towards our goal is dependent on gaining the assent and support of at 
least a numerical majority of the whole people» (Labour Party 1923,178). 
For Paul Ward (1998) the party's deep complicity in the whole ancient 
institutional system was a prerequisite for Labour yearning to be a national party. 
Monarchy, Empire and parliament were historical components of Britain and 
Britishness which were overwhelmingly accepted. As Nairn has put it, the Labour 
party became just as Britishized as the Conservatives and Liberals had been (Nairn 
2000,41). British socialism was held to ransom by its national culture (Gilroy 1987, 
54). 
As the European debates will make clearer, the party unanimously never 
ceased to defend the institutional heritage of the nation against the `alien' notions of 
political representation and democracy. 
7.4 Labour's Parliamentarism and the Myth of British Democracy 
In the early sixties the then party leader Hugh Gaitskell warned his colleagues 
of the dangers that «our ancient Parliament runs» if Britain eventually became a 
member of the then Common Market (Gaitskell 1961a, col. 1495). His successor in the 
party leadership, Harold Wilson lamented the fact that <<we shall have after 700 years a 
written constitution, not written by us... » (Wilson 1962b, 16). In the seventies, James 
Callaghan recalled the «civil war)) where the roots of British parliamentarianism lay, 
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as he claimed (Callaghan 1972b, col. 659), while the bellwether of Labour pro- 
Europeanism at the time, Roy Jenkins was in favour of Britain bringing «more 
democracy in the political institutions of the Community)) (Jenkins 1972b, col. 71). 
Likewise, before he became leader of the party, Michael Foot had already stated his 
loyalty to the «independent authority of the Parliament» because, according to him, it 
exemplified «the democratic power to control our destinies» (Foot 1973,293). Finally, 
regardless of their intentions to revise the old constitutional order, Tony Blair and 
Robin Cook have both praised «the first Parliament of the world» (Blair 1996b, 87) as 
the institution, which has presumably been «the starting point for many democratic 
systems» (Cook 2000b). 
Throughout the European debates, the British Labour party has consistently 
maintained that the House of Parliament embodies the essence of democracy. In 
reality, as the above quotes reveal, Labour has fought in defence of its own Whiggish 
interpretation of history and the British constitution (Butterfield 1931; Marquand 
1995b; Ward 1998). 
Professor Albert Venn Dicey (1939) noted in his book The Law of the 
Constitution, that «the Rule of Law and legal sovereignty of Parliament upon which 
the British constitution rests distinguishes the British (or `English', as he preferred to 
call it) from all other constitutions» (Dicey 1939,34). The British Constitution has 
been a typical characteristic of English culture and embodied a particular perception 
of democracy through the sovereign Parliament. Indeed, for Labour, the «700 years 
old British unwritten constitution, which rested on «moral than legal grounds)) (Jay 
1970, col. 385), was «the real thing)) (Bellenger 1961, col. 1692), ((embedded deeply in 
the hearts and minds of the British people)) (Benn 1971b, col. 1761), as the republican 
of the party, Tony Benn put it. Unlike the «rigid, written Treaty of Rome which 
reflected the «undemocratic nature of Community)) (Warbey 1962, col. 692), the 
English constitution was considered to be a facet, of the wider life of the national 
community, springing out of British social history, structure, values and culture, 
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rather than being superimposed upon British citizens. In this way, an unwritten 
constitution distils the finest qualities of the national community and enshrines them 
in a historic compact to which foreigners could not adhere (Gilroy 1990). In this 
sense, cultural Englishness is a set of private characteristics and ways of doing things 
that are thought to be typically English (Miller 1995,172). If character is not the 
principal organiser of a historical account then institutions are likely to play that role 
(Wright 1985,144). Drawing more on historical precedent, mythologising Britain's 
constitutional past, and placing emphasis on the longevity of the British institutions 
the representatives of the party portrayed the Crown in Parliament as the unique, 
treasured possession of the people and home of individual liberty and popular 
democracy as defined against the supposedly autocratic Europe and the politically 
`immature' New Commonwealth. 
It was argued that unlike the Common Law, the guarantor of individual 
liberty and a principle of institutional morality (Jowell 1994,72), on which, as 
mentioned above, the British constitution was based, the Roman Law, on which the 
Rome of Treaty was rested, included «2,000 years of history of several authoritarian 
Empires - Roman, German and French and the Russian too... » (English 1972, 
col. 1197). Thus, according to the Eurosceptic Labour MPs, the Roman Law 
represented an authoritarian view of conducting the nation's way of life and a political 
structure replete with «dictators and military)) (Abrahams 1971,126), that is, 
«enemies of the democratic institutions of Britain, the sovereign will of the people» 
(Warbey 1962, col. 695). Consequently, different forms of democracy, «different 
conceptions of law», ((more slender parliamentary tradition», «shorter history of 
stable democratic government>> were wholly alien to British democracy and in 
congruence with the European political traditions (Jay 1968b, 14). Britain's 
Continental partners were thus considered to be less susceptible to those constitutional 
values that constituted «the oldest democracy in Europe>> (English 1971, col. 1152). 
Hence, the Treaty of Rome was thought to be «pre-Magna Carta» wholly alien to the 
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British tradition and closely modelled «on the pre-1914 constitution of the German 
Reichstag» (Warbey 1962, col. 692); the European Commission was regarded as «a 
bureaucratic, autocratic hierarchy)) (Warbey 1962, col. 693), «the most terrible 
tyranny» (Roberts 1971, col. 1555); and the European Parliament, or merely 
«Assembly» (L ' Assemblee) as it used to be called, was considered to be «the most 
fertile talking shop ever invented» (Shore 1973b, 289; Leighton 1982a, col. 455). In 
short, as the self-acclaimed `True Briton' of the party, Peter Shore put it, «their 
institutions are certainly not our own and are not responsible to British democracy» 
(Shore 1971 a, col. 1123). 
It was no wonder then that Labour representatives tended to regard all 
foreigners as what Kipling called «lesser breeds without the law)). Myths and symbols 
act as `border guards' distinguishing `us' from `them', ascribing permanent 
differences and leading thus to the construction of racial differences (Armstrong 1982, 
6). For example, party representatives alleged that they preferred «the white 
Commonwealth to the 53 million emerging black people in Africa who at present, as 
we all know, are not following some of the well-defined democratic practices for 
which we stand... » (Bellenger 1962, col. 540). 
From the early stages of the European debates it was evident that blackness 
had acquired a negative political signification. The party pro and anti-Europeans 
reached the same conclusion. Roy Jenkins insisted that New Commonwealth's 
differential cultural status did not make them a coherent association with which 
Britain could integrate. It was just «a disparate group containing countries of different 
stages of development and peoples with different religions, different cultures and so 
ono (Jenkins 1962b, col. 724). This amorphous entity was also incompatible with 
British living standards and in no way could have been an alternative to the Common 
Market. It was perceived as a «loose consultative unit based on mutual tolerance of 
very different regimes with very different outlooks)) (Jay and Jenkins 1962,12) to 
which Labour did not feel any instinctive allegiance. The isolation of an inherently 
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democratic, Protestant political culture conditioned the existence of the <<House and 
the freedoms of the elected representatives of the people and the people themselves» 
(Spearing 1977, col. 44). In this way, the nation is conceived as a community extended 
in history and with a distinct character that is natural to its members and alien to 
foreigners (Miller 1995,157). As racial thought has exhibited, the isolation of cultures 
has been the condition for the preservation of the national context of each race 
(Balibar 1991b, 57). The post-war immigration debates have been a case in point. The 
exclusion of the black immigrants was based on social and cultural grounds. As 
Ansell (1997) has assumed, the national community is not open to new people who 
want to integrate; for «it is a community defined by culture, naturally constituted not 
only by geographical location» (Balibar 1994). 
Already in the immediate post-war period, Rita Hinden of the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau had remarked that «once we come to the coloured peoples entirely 
different factors enter)) (Hinden 1949,188). ((They are not after all part of a great 
Christian, Anglo-Saxon conglomeration; their languages and traditions are entirely 
distinct; they do not easily intermingle with the white people; nor do they always 
accept the same social values and institutions as the people of the West» (Hinden 
ibid). On the contrary, the ties with the white dominions have been based on racial, 
religions, sentimental and cultural affinities. «It has been easy for this community of 
peoples to feel a common loyalty to the Crown, to share the same forms of 
parliamentary democracy, and the same political and social values, Hinden noted 
(Hinden ibid). 
Hence the cultural affinity of the Labour representatives with the 
transoceanic white Commonwealth, `the unique family of nations' during the 
European debates. In the late sixties, Herbert Bowden, the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs, stressed Britain's `kith and kin' ideas and links with 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand: «we have links, and very special links, with 
what are sometimes known as the old Commonwealth countries - people largely from 
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our own stock, sharing our ideas and our traditions, and with ties that have been tested 
and have never been found wanting>> (Bowden 1967, col. 1184). As mentioned earlier, 
the nation represents the continuity of the extended family from one generation to the 
next (Anderson 1991,143). 
In his study of racial thought from the late 1890s to the early 1960s, Paul 
Rich (1986) has maintained that common Anglo-Saxon racial origins in the colonies 
of white settlement, and the belief that British parliamentary liberties were a product 
of Anglo-Saxon tribal institutions, have been carried down through centuries and 
underlay British imperial mission. The Anglo-Saxon racial ideal led some imperial 
advocates to stress the common ties of `blood' with the United States and so make a 
natural ally for Britain as rival European powers like France and Germany challenged 
British imperial pre-eminence in the late nineteenth century. Inevitably, as mentioned 
above, the then infant Labour party inherited these notions and never renounced them. 
What theoretical racism calls `race' or `culture' is therefore a continued 
origin of the nation, a concentrate of the qualities, which belong to the nationals as 
their own (Balibar 199 1 b, 59). For example, it was argued that 
«... Australia and New Zealand have a political and 
parliamentary system based very closely on the British 
parliamentary tradition has prevailed to this day. Canada 
combines a parliamentary system modelled very closely on 
Westminster with a federal structure more like the United 
States (... ) Despite all the contemporary differences (... ) this 
community of language, ideas and political tradition represents 
something real and valuable which ought to be preserved as 
(... ) the British public feels genuine and deep ties of sentiment 
towards it... » (Jay 1968b, 14). 
The common political culture between Britain and the white Commonwealth 
was considered to be «a connection which no other European country has with any 
country in the world. It is a unique connection which arises out of the unique 
character of our own history» (Shore 1973a, col. 580). English law and the 
parliamentary process were thus presented as the summit of the national, and in 
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general, Anglo-Saxon civilisation, the pinnacle of Britain's historic achievements 
worldwide. 
During the decolonisation period, as the distance from crude biologism 
increased, so the question of law became more important as a marker for the cultural 
processes involved (Gilroy 1990,267). The black immigrants (and more recently the 
asylum seekers) have allegedly been unable to adhere to it. Their `illegal' immigration 
and propensity to crime have confirmed their alien status. That is why, as seen earlier, 
criminality provided the principal means to underscore the cultural concerns of the 
new racism. Yet, Britain's right to control the movement of the undesired aliens and 
to display welfare chauvinism against them was about to be abolished by the ceding 
of powers to the European Commission: ewe would renounce control over movement 
of capital, labour and goods... » (Shore 1971a, col. 1123). Consequently as ((trustees» 
of their constituents, the Labour MPs considered that what was at stake was the will 
of the people who demanded «checks and balances in respect of the importation of 
foreign labour into many of our industries» (Bellenger 1960, col. 1136). As a result, 
already in the sixties, the party leader, Hugh Gaitskell declared that, «the British 
people now, at this stage, are not prepared to accept supranational majority decisions 
being taken against them, either in a Council of Ministers or a Federal Parliament, on 
vital issues ... » 
(Gaitskell 1962b, 161). 
As seen in chapter 4, it has become part of the British constitutional 
conventional wisdom that sovereign power ultimately emanates from the people of 
the United Kingdom. Jones and Keating (1985) have observed that the sovereignty of 
Parliament has been closely identified with the nation-state. The English 
constitutional formula linked the public to the executive power through Parliament 
(Dyson 1980,38). Thus, the will of Parliament has been synonymous with the will of 
the people. The system is said to be democratic because it ensures that government 
policies reflect «the will of the people» (Birch 1998,22). 
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By contrast, Europe was seen as a discrete and separate issue, which could be 
tacked on to Parliament's traditional business as a kind of optional extra. It was seen 
as something extraneous, as a separate and insulated political system whose points of 
contact with the UK Parliament would be very few. It seemed natural to conceive of 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament as in competition with 
Parliament, rather than Parliament being complementary to Community institutions. 
For instance, the proposals for harmonisation of taxation systems without 
prior authorisation by the national parliaments and the right of the Council of 
Ministers, as another Roman emperor - «Caesar Augustus)) according to Mark Hughes 
(Hughes 1972, col. 1209) - to levy taxes were seen as a direct challenge to the 
authority of British Parliament, the rights of the people and the British democracy. In 
fact, the Labour spokespersons, especially the anti-European faction, based their case 
on the constitutional history of the British Isles. 
According to Peter Shore, «the strongest of all our constitutional principles is 
that Parliament, and in particular the House of Commons which represents the people 
of this country, alone has the right to levy taxation. That has been the basic 
constitutional doctrine. Because Parliament three centuries ago insisted on this right, 
we gradually brought the Crown and the Executive under the control of elected 
representatives. As we were reminded recently, Parliament made the supply of money 
to the Government conditional on the remedying of grievances. That was the way in 
which control by the House of Commons was brought about» (Shore 1972b, 
col. 1165). These comments are part and parcel of the Whig interpretation of history, 
which studies the past with reference to the present (Butterfield 1931,12). In this 
way, the national past worked powerfully in the context of the party consciousness 
and was mostly related to what Heller (1982) has called the «sense of national 
existence». As Miller (1995) has suggested, sometimes the back-projection has an 
explicitly political character. 
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In particular, Mackenzie has noted that the Commons owed their place in 
Parliament to the necessity of securing their assent to aids. It was the unwillingness of 
the Lords to take the responsibility for raising the subsidy demanded in 1254, which 
had brought the Commons to Westminster. From the moment of their arrival it was 
inevitable that the Commons, as the ultimate source of revenue, should eventually 
become the effective controllers of the taxation. This was a very slow process and it 
was only in the 1660s that the principle that no tax might be imposed without the 
consent of Parliament, was finally established (Mackenzie 1950,67). So, for the 
Labour Eurosceptics it was unacceptable for British MPs to allow «decisions taken by 
foreigners» (Stonehouse 1961,212), alien institutions to undo an historical right, the 
centrepiece of British parliamentarianism, reducing the House of Commons to a 
toothless institution, «an empty shell where democratic power will become a myth)) 
(Castle 1962, col. 691). As a result, after Britain's entry to the EC, the Eurosceptic 
MPs insisted on «patriating the British constitution» (Shore 1980, col. 240), that is, the 
restoration of the fiscal and legal rights of Parliament from Brussels to Westminster. 
Because of Britain's different constitutional traditions and history, Labour MPs found 
it sometimes difficult to comprehend a legislative division of powers between two 
levers of government. 
Practices common to European constitutional history but till then completely 
alien to British constitutional history were resisted by the majority of the Labour MPs. 
In fact, when in March 1972 Labour's Shadow Cabinet and NEC opted for a 
referendum, Roy Jenkins, the deputy leader, resigned, expressing his opposition to a 
referendum which would frustrate liberal reforms and change the balance of the 
parliamentary system (The Times, 11.4.72). In his memoirs, Jenkins wrote that he and 
his like-minded pro-European colleague, Shirley Williams, «were resistant on 
principle to the importation of the novel device of the referendum into our 
constitutional arrangement because we saw it as being the likely enemy of many 
progressive causes from the abolition of capital punishment to race relations 
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legislation to effective land-use planning controls)) (Jenkins 1991,341). In this 
respect, the referendum should not be seen just as «a device to hold the party 
together as most of the literature suggests (Robins 1979,127; Broad and Geiger 
1996,83; George and Heythorne 1996,115). Even during the debates on devolution 
in the nineteen seventies Jenkins figured as the proponent of «an absolutely classic 
feudal definition of parliamentary sovereignty» (Wilson 1979,49; Benn 1989,303; 
Bogdanor 1999,178). 
Similarly, from the anti-European faction, for Maurice Edelman the 
referendum was not just a political device for inter or intra- party short-term benefits. 
Primarily it was regarded as «the instrument of the demagogue and the totalitarian 
states. As the Labour MP noted, it was «the means by which public opinion is 
exposed as a device for imposing on the public the views of those who seek to dictate 
opinion to the public)) (Edelman 1971, col. 1827). Likewise, amid others, David 
Ginsburg (1971, col. 1532-7) and Dick Taverne (1974, col. 1520-4) argued that «the 
problem (Britain's entry) has to be decided through British institutions of 
representative democracy>> (Ginsburg 1971, col. 1354), because «Parliament 
historically and traditionally is the agency by which the people of this country express 
their views and those who seek to challenge or attack the right of MPs to declare 
themselves in this situation are doing a disservice to parliamentary democracy>> 
(Edelman 1971, col. 1827). 
The anti-Europeans were not alone in arguing that the so-called Mother of 
Parliaments» (Ludbrook 1977,252), the House of Commons, held long traditions, 
immensely superior to those of the Continentals and, for these reasons, «should give a 
lead towards democratic procedures>> (Wood 1973, ii). As Nairn maintains, even 
fervent Europeanists still regularly transmitted surreal notions on how good it would 
be for the Continent to have lessons in democracy from the Mother of Parliaments. 
Neither side in the debate relaxed its grip on the udders of island constitutionalism for 
a moment (Nairn 1977,54). For instance, Leo Abse exalted the «British genius to 
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create and foster democratic institutions» and, as a result, believed that Britain had «a 
special contribution to make in shaping new institutional forms and new institutional 
practices which will feed into the Commission the views and aspirations of the people 
of Europe>> (Abse 1971, col. 1890). Similarly, Frank Judd alleged that «only Britain of 
all nations, with its rugged and deeply rooted democratic traditions has an essential 
contribution to make in bringing more democratic accountability to the Community>> 
(Judd 1978, col. 451). Other pro-European MPs, such as A. Woodburn and D. 
Marquand, drawing on the war memories (see more in the time of the nation), 
remarked that Britain's absence from the European Community would only 
«strengthen the enemies of this country, the enemies of democracy and of the 
democratic left, on the Continent>> (Marquand 1971, col. 1916). It was even argued 
that every European country was waiting for Britain to prevent «the rise of other 
dictators. Woodburn was convinced that «they want us in a united Europe because 
they realise that this country with its stable institutions is a very important factor in 
preventing the return of dictatorships and preserving democracy» (Woodburn 1962, 
col. 1035). 
In the early 1990s, a considerable number of Labour MPs still adhered to an 
identity, which, according to David Marquand, still lay under the spell of the relics of 
the past, especially the Westminster nationalism that embodied the blanket of 
provincialism, which had enfolded the British political parties for the great part of the 
post-war period (Marquand 1990,10). Labour MPs still presented the British 
Parliament as the bastion of British democracy, the centre of the Empire that «has 
caused us to be the envy of the greater part of the world» (Shore 1996, col. 318). As 
Andrews has noted, almost half a century after the official demise of the Empire, `the 
machinery that ran it is still mostly intact' (Andrews 1996,131). 
Indeed, for the bulk of the scholars of Labour party politics and the 
constitutional history of the British isles such as Anthony Barnett (1996), Tom Nairn 
(1988) and David Marquand (2000a), the claim that the British Parliament has been 
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the mother of democracy and that her Continental partners have been somehow 
inherently less democratic cannot be easily sustained. According to Miller, the 
democratic nature of the Westminster model has been more a myth than a living 
reality and that is why such claims cannot survive critical reflection and canons of 
rationality (Miller 1995,157). They are part of artificial or deliberate inventions, 
which aim to preserve national prerogatives and defend an homogenised way of life 
from alien forces. The British Labour party has played a great part in sustaining such 
myths throughout the post-war period. 
One myth concerned the democratic credentials of Parliamentary 
sovereignty. As Leo Amery wrote in Thoughts on the Constitution, the British system 
was "government of the people, for the people, with but not by the people" (Amery 
1947). In a diary entry for 24 September 1966, Richard Crossman, who had served 
nearly two years as a Labour cabinet minister, observed that the idea of giving people 
a chance to decide things for themselves - the essence of social democracy to his mind 
- was "extremely unpopular" with most of his colleagues. "They believe, " he wrote, 
"in getting power, making decisions and getting people to agree with the decisions 
after they've been made ... 
The notion of creating ... a 
live and articulate public 
opinion able to criticise actively and make its own choices is something which most 
socialist politicians keenly resent" (Crossman 1976,50). Parliamentary sovereignty 
was built up as a barrier against democracy, as a way of keeping the elite in authority 
(Nairn 1988,155). The settlement of 1688 did not divide power between crown, 
parliament and the law, as some believed. It did not create checks and balances. 
Instead, it shared undivided power amongst those who entered the political realm. 
Limited, at first, to a small oligarchy, then, widened after success in war to a greater 
franchise, the British system extended the sharing but retained its undivided power. 
This was the secret of its ability to evolve while staying the same (Barnett 1996,20). 
As for the claim enunciated throughout the post-war period that democratic 
values and practices cannot flourish within the European Union, one should recall that 
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in 1914, Switzerland, Sweden, Serbia, Norway, Italy, Greece, Germany, France, 
Finland, Bulgaria, Belgium and Austria all had wider franchises than Britain did. 
Indeed the only European state, which was even less democratic than Britain in 1914, 
was Hungary (Colley 1999a, 27-9). Between the Great Reform Act of 1832, which 
increased the size of the electorate from 4.5 per cent to 7 per cent of the adult 
population, and the arrival of manhood suffrage in 1918, women could not vote until 
they reached the age of 30. It is estimated that, in 1914, only 18 per cent of adults in 
the UK were enfranchised. Most of the men and all of the women who struggled for 
the country's freedom in the First World War had themselves no freedom to vote. 
This was not only unimpressive in itself, but it was certainly unimpressive by 
European standards. As Marquand has noted, the first general election in which every 
adult citizen had one vote, and no one had more than one, was that of 1950 
(Marquand 2000a). 
Far from being the embodiment of democracy, as Marquand puts it, the 
parliamentary culture of the nation has been a vision of insiders not outsiders, of 
establishments not dissenters (Marquand 2000a). As the recent debates over 
immigration and asylum showed, Marquand's comment applies no less to the New 
Labour's attachment to Westminster culture. 
7.5 New Labour and the Westminster Culture 
Throughout the eighties and early nineties, there were calls from 
commentators, intellectuals and political figures within the British left for a major 
transformation of the British constitutional ancien regime. Amid others, Tony Wright, 
David Marquand, Tony Benn and Anthony Barnett each put the case for a 
constitutional review from a different perspective. 
Tony Wright, a political scientist and newly elected Labour MP, stated that 
democracy in Britain had been artificially grafted on to an «elaborately hierarchical 
social structure and a rigid class system in a manner which had preserved rather than 
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supplanted a profoundly authoritarian society)> (Foote 1997,335). He saw a 
continuation of the old doctrines of whiggism, that is, balance, continuity and 
adaptation, and as a result, representation and responsibility were transformed into 
fictions, concealing an increasing shift towards centralised executive power. 
Similarly, David Marquand, in The Unprincipled Society argued that Britain's 
adjustment problems have as much to do with politics as with economics, and with 
tacit political understandings as with political institutions. This political culture was 
one in which society was seen as a collection of separate, atomistic individuals 
pursuing their private interests without regard for any more general purpose 
(Marquand 1988). Moreover, Will Hutton's famous The State We're In saw Keynes' 
economics as a solution to a moral rather than an economic problem - the need for 
commitment and trust which was lacking in monetarist Britain, as John Smith had 
rightly pointed out earlier. Hutton maintained that co-operation and commitment 
could only result from the building of an interdependent institutional structure, and 
this required a very new type of British state. This did not involve the abolition of the 
monarchy necessarily but it did involve a civic culture based on citizens rather than 
subjects (Hutton 1995). The republican of old Labour, Tony Benn, in his Common 
Sense advocated a Commonwealth of Britain Bill, demanding a republic based on 
democratic institutions, with a decentralisation of power to the English regions, as 
well as to Scotland and Wales, together with the re-establishment of genuine power in 
local government. Also, he embraced a more institutional approach of radical popular 
sovereignty manifested in a decentralised polity (Benn and Hood 1993). Anthony 
Barnett, the creator of Charter 88, saw the Europeanisation of British politics as a 
way of overcoming the submissiveness that afflicted British life (Barnett 1990a, 16). 
He perceived Europe as a pluralist democratic model, which exposed the inadequacies 
of British parliamentary absolutism. The Europeanisation of Britain, according to 
Barnett, was about preserving English traditions of liberty and freedom and respect of 
law in a European way, which would transform the institutional settlement born in 
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1688 and formed in the heyday of the Empire. And the way of doing so, was the 
adoption of a written constitution and assemblies in Scotland and Wales as well as 
London (Barnett 1990a, 16). For the British Labour party, this should have been not a 
matter of losing Britain's identity in Europe, but of remaking it as part of European 
political culture (Barnett 1990b, 19). 
The rise of New Labour in the mid nineties and its ensuing constitutional 
policies reflected Neil Kinnock's `applied patriotism' (<<patriotism that springs from 
the love of people, the commitment to the people» (Kinnock 1991,319) and John 
Smith's «new modem conception of citizenship» (Smith 1993a & b), and signaled a 
further distance from the old constitutional order. As Anthony Criddens notes, 
disenchantment with neoliberal policies, plus the problems of governability in the 
globalised world - see in the space of the nation more on the relationship between 
sovereignty and globalisation - were factors leading to the rise of communitarian 
thinking in Labour (Giddens 2000,63). It was not accidental that, during a period in 
which Thatcherite neoliberal economics and bureaucratic rigidities of the central state 
were discredited, Labour started talking about the `community'. 
The incorporation of the European Human Rights Act (HMSO 1998f) into 
British law in combination with the radical, though timid devolution of power 
(Bogdanor 1999,203; HMSO 1998e; Naim 1998,8; 1999; Marquand 1994; 1999a; 
2000; Rawnsley 2000,237; Tomaney 2000; Toynbee 2000; Young 1997a, 19) has 
shaken the already shaky doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the Crown-in- 
Parliament, the so-called «keystone of the constitution» (Dicey 1939). For New 
Labour, the British institutions no longer reflected the sentiments, loyalties and 
allegiances of the British public. In particular, the applied, civic or enlightened 
patriotism (see more in chapter 8) of the party leadership (Blair 1999m; 2000c; 
Brown 1997a, b; Cook 1997b) appeared to draw on the teachings of the ethical 
tradition of British socialism (Mandelson & Liddle 1996,4; Jones 1968; Pierson 
1973,1979; Dennis & Hasley 1988). Like Victorian civic patriotism (Wright 2000), 
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third way politics is assumed to be the politics of involvement in which the role of the 
local contexts and constituencies is highly appreciated because they are maintained by 
an internalised sense of identity, loyalty, responsibility and reciprocity. 
Despite its initial radical rhetoric, New Labour has inherited the Westminster 
culture, which has suffered from continuity, traditionalism and complacency that have 
not been slow to reassert themselves. Marquand (1999b) has commented that although 
the Labour tribe has moved into new ideological territory, it is still the same tribe. It 
has carried its culture with it. While the narrow nationalism of the Tories is 
condemned, the Crown-in-Parliament, which still stands for authoritarianism in 
British politics, holds a supreme role over the democratic programme of devolution, 
according to New Labour (Labour Party 1996b). The transformation of Britain from 
being `whig and paternal' to being `modern and democratic' is conducted by means of 
the ancien regime. As Nairn has pointed out, the weak link in the new politics was all 
along on the Westminster side: ofor an undefeated anachronistic state, self- 
preservation is always likely to be the determining issue)) (Nairn 2000,7). 
For instance, the Scotland Act provides in section I for the establishment of a 
Scottish Parliament. Section 28 provides that this parliament may make laws within 
its area of competence; subsection 7 declares that 
«This section does not affect the power of the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland)) (HIvISO 1998e) 
This subsection succinctly lays out the central constitutional principle 
underlying devolution. It rejects both separatism, under which the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom would no longer have power to legislate for Scotland at all; and 
federalism under which the Parliament of the United Kingdom would have power to 
legislate for Scotland only in certain defined areas, other areas becoming the entire 
responsibility of the Scottish Parliament. Federalism would have entailed a limitation 
of parliamentary sovereignty and a legally defined attribution of responsibilities and 
functions. In a Federal Britain/United Kingdom a constitution would have made 
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transparent which matters were dealt with at a provincial/regional level and which 
were dealt with at the federal level (Robbins 1997). Instead, the Act, in theory at least, 
preserves parliamentary supremacy, and Westminster can, if it wishes, continue to 
legislate on matters devolved to Scotland (Bogdanor 1999,203). 
Trying to explain the `New Labour paradox' (see also chapter 5), Marquand 
has commented that New Labour, in its endeavour to reconstruct the political order on 
lines appropriate to a modern, post-imperial, late twentieth century society, sought to 
renew the old Faustian bargain of the left with the old order: power within the existing 
system, in exchange for adherence to its norms (Marquand 2000a, 24). The former 
SDP member asserted that like their political ancestors, Blair and his entourage 
wanted to use the powers available to the autonomous executive of the republican 
tradition to re- engineer society from the top - not, any longer, in the name of social 
ownership, or even social citizenship, but in the no less compelling names of equal 
opportunity and international competitiveness (Marquand 2000a, 25). 
Indeed, the undiminished authority of the Parliament makes Blair's populist 
rhetoric - owe are the servants of the people, he said just after the general election 
(White 1997a, 9) - and the espousal of a quasi-popular sovereignty, sound 
unconvincing. In Blair's lexicon, the British people and the British nation are 
synonymous (Beer 1998,25). Yet, the populist rationale, which underlines New 
Labour's rhetoric, cannot undo the much-vaunted parliamentary sovereignty. The 
`people's Britain' runs against the grain of British constitution. Popular will works 
through the filter of representative democracy. As the devolution programme makes 
clear, Parliament and not The People, is sovereign (Young 1997b, 19). So, a marriage 
of Burkeian whiggery and ethical socialism appears to loom large over the 
constitutional agenda of the New Labour government, as Marquand had predicted 
before the 1997 general election (Marquand 1994,26). 
In relation to Europe, the New Labour government, having initiated the 
modernisation of the Houses of Parliament with the partial abolition of hereditary 
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rights, has insisted that Parliament remains the «source of democracy>> (Cook 2000d) 
and «can influence the shape and destination of Europe>> (Blair 1998a), and, as seen in 
the space of the nation, in respect of the border controls, its «sovereignty will remain 
undiminished» (Blair 1996a, 274; Cook 1997g, 910). Further, the parliamentary 
debates on the 1999 Immigration Act have exposed, on the one hand, that the 
preservation of the national essence remains the prerogative of the `Mother of 
Parliaments'; but, on the other hand, according to ECRI, they have contributed to a 
«general negative climate» towards «specific groups of persons irrespective of 
whether these persons have a valid claim to remain in the country or not» and, 
consequently, a public debate which has taken on <<racist and xenophobic overtones» 
(ECRI ibid, 18). The recent report of the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) rebuked the New Labour government for failing to develop «a 
genuine culture of tolerance and respect of difference, by its quasi-obsession with 
«security», «economic stability>> and «social peace» as particularly embodied in the 
discriminatory and «restrictive measures» of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act 
(ECRI ibid, 19). Thus, cultural preservation through the construction of symbolic 
boundaries against the discourses of the Other - the non-EU refugees and asylum 
seekers- is still mediated through the Houses of Parliament. In other words, British 
socialism has abandoned its socialism but not its cultural Britishness: Parliament and 
the parliamentary class or elite. Both remain, primarily, as Nairn noted, «a technique 
for saving the national family» (Nairn 1988,155). 
7.6 Conclusion 
Because of its non-conformist roots, Labour party had espoused the norms 
of the Protestant parliamentarian culture (Langlands 1999,61). It had become a 
politically conservative force. During the European debates, the Westminster culture 
emerged as a kind of symbolic boundary in the party's discourse against which 
nations and populations, who did not align with the superior British democratic 
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standards and common law and needed lessons in democracy from the Mother of 
Parliaments, were negatively signified and excluded from the national body. Despite 
the recent radical rhetoric of the party and the constitutional revision of the ancien 
regime, the habits, command structure and instinctive assumptions of parliamentary 
sovereignty have not largely disappeared from New Labour's cultural Britishness. 
As a consequence, even though New Labour now prefers to talk more about 
allegedly inclusive `values' and less about exclusive `institutions' over the European 
question, as the following chapter also makes clear, its value-loaded, cultural 
nationhood is primarily top-down and defined through the exclusion and 
marginalisation of the `others'. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE `ENDURING' VALUES OF NEW LABOUR 
8.1 Introduction 
As seen previously, the rise of New Labour coincided with an array of timid 
constitutional changes. Yet, despite its adherence to the Westminster culture, New 
Labour defines Britishness in relation to Europe more «in terms of values rather than 
institutions)) (Blair 1999h). Even though Parekh has assumed that the real difficulty 
with any picture of'Britishness" that relies predominantly on shared values is that it 
is very hard to create a consensus as to what exactly these "values" are and what they 
will mean in practice (Parekh 2000,13), in a Downing Street lecture not long ago, the 
historian Linda Colley talked about «a new, revivified citizen nation» (Colley 1999b, 
15). The role of the state is crucial to create not clients but citizens. This would make 
people more relaxed about being citizens of the European Union if they could be 
brought to accept that such citizenship does not necessarily involve buying into an 
homogenised European identity, and discarding older, valued points of reference. The 
emphasis, here, is on values rather than detailed policies and old worn institutions. 
Even though New Labour government, for reasons explained previously, could not 
entirely get rid of the Westminster ethos, it continued to see Britain in Europe along 
these terms. 
As a matter of fact, a few months after the 1997 general election, setting out 
the principles of modem British foreign policy, Tony Blair noted that «an enlightened 
patriotism is based on the right values and principles» (Blair 1997e). Later, at The 
Hague, putting forward his vision of `a modem Britain in a modem Europe', the 
Prime Minister placed emphasis on the «British values of creativity, tolerance, 
fairness and democracy (which) can influence the shape and destination of Europe» 
(Blair 1998a). He also stressed that Britain had the ability to «project our values on 
the world stage, to be open, outward-looking, supportive of free trade, human rights 
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and democracy and playing a major role in the great international issues of the day>> 
(Blair 1998a). Finally, on the eve of the EU Summit at Feira in June 2000, in a joint 
article published in the Financial Times and El Mundo, the British Prime Minister and 
his Spanish counterpart, Jose Maria Aznar noted that «Europe is based on shared 
values of liberty, democracy, tolerance and social justice)) (Blair and Aznar 2000). 
The basic assumption which arises from these quotes and informs the rest of 
the chapter, is that Britain appears to have a unique grasp of these values that enables 
her to project them on the European and, in general, world stage. Britain's right to 
these values is derived from notions of what Gordon Brown (2000a) has called «an 
internalised sense of kinship» and inherited cultural background, which retains the 
assumptions the command culture of the Westminster model. Hence, like 
Protestantism and Parliament, the so-called `enduring' values, the allegedly defining 
element of the New Labour's cultural nationhood, suggests continuity over time. In 
this sense, they are the product of the old constitutional status quo. 
Ironically, Gordon Brown is right to suggest that «Britishness lies in 
something far more subtle and more enduring - born of the qualities and values of our 
people, rooted in our history and land and evolved from our collective experience 
over time» (Brown 2000a). New Labour's cultural nationhood suggests a certain kind 
of fixity and inheritance of what Blair has called «the values of living that are 
timeless» (Blair 1993a, 11). Yet, Smith maintains that this sense of the irreplaceability 
of the cultural values and norms of the political culture very often involves a shared 
conviction of moral superiority (Smith 1995,98). The New Labour's invocation of the 
Victorian entrepreneurialism and command of ethical values such as human rights and 
democracy implies cultural inequality, or, even, superiority over the rest of the nations 
(see New Labour's `greatness in retreat' in the space of the nation), and, inevitably, 
differentiation from, and exclusion of those who do not seem to share the `tacit codes' 
and norms of London. 
265 
As Vickers (2000) has suggested, this is one of the problematic aspects of the 
third way politics. The New Labour government's projection of the British notions of 
`entrepreunerialism' and `individual liberty and duty', in respect of the issue of the 
single market, on the one hand (8.1.1), and, `democracy', `internationalism', and 
`human rights' in relation to the war in Kosovo, on the other (8.1.2), makes obvious 
that their perception of the British national culture is constituted through the locus of 
the `Other', or, as Bhabba and Jenkins have called it, through the dialogical processes 
of both group identification and social categorisation, inclusion and exclusion 
(Bhabba 1990b, 313; Jenkins 1994,209). 
8.2 The `Entrepreneurial' Britishness 
According to David Marquand (1999b), the first New Labour government 
has espoused a new version of nineteenth century entrepreneurialism. As a matter of 
fact, at the annual party Conference in 1997, the Prime Minister proclaimed that he 
wanted «Britain to be a country of enterprise and ambition» (Blair 1997c). Similarly, 
two years later, at the US-UK joint Enterprise Conference, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Gordon Brown wanted to see «Britain as a world leader in enterprise)) 
(Brown 1999c). Blair's and Brown's shared vision of their country was embodied in 
the European destiny of Britain. As a result, on the eve of the special meeting of the 
European Council in Lisbon on 23 and 24 March 2000, which was hailed as «a 
turning point in Europe's approach to economic and social policyo (Blair 2000b; 
Schaefer 2000), the British government argued for a new «Entrepreneurial Europe» 
programme, focusing on innovation and economic dynamism (Vaz 2000a; Blair 
2000b; Cook 2000a; b). As both Blair and Brown have argued, Britain's right to 
«shape the destiny of Europe» (Brown 1997a; b; Blair 1998e) derives from her 
«creative adaptability and Victorian values, (which have) consisted the essential 
ingredients of Labour's campaign to revitalise "the British genius"» (White 1997b, 
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12). In fact, the Victorian entrepreneurialism appears more inclusive in the party's 
discourse than in the Thatcherite's one of the eighties. 
Along the lines of ethical socialism, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gordon Brown, has sought to revisit the meaning and the content of the Victorian 
entrepreunerialism that the New Right adopted during the previous decade. <<Far from 
being an age of selfish free market individualism, Brown noted, «the Victorian era, 
so often evoked by Margaret Thatcher, saw `entrepreneurial vigour' go hand in hand 
with `a spirit of responsibility and mutuality'» (White 1997b, 12). A free-for-all 
market which glorified individualism did not encourage a community spirit, but, 
instead, created, as Gordon Brown has called, a Britain of strangers rather than a 
Britain of neighbours or othe little platoons)) (Brown 1999a; 2000 a& b). Likewise, 
the post-war Fabian inspired centralised, managerial state did not leave room for the 
individual's initiatives. According to Jonathan Sacks, what the Victorians taught New 
Labour was that wherever people sought collectively to create, the way to do so was 
to focus more on character and less on governments. Nineteenth century benevolence 
was rooted in certain assumptions about character. The Victorian society was a 
society as much informed by moral character as by interests (Sacks 1997,257). 
As Sacks (1997) also tells us, the nineteenth century in Britain and in 
America had witnessed intense debates about welfare policy. There was a moral 
imperative to help those in need, but help sometimes provides an incentive to remain 
in need. On both sides of the Atlantic philanthropists wrestled with the problem of 
how to balance the alleviation of suffering with the encouragement of independence. 
There was no easy answer, but some rough-and -ready principles emerged: a Social 
Darwinist distinction between the `idle' and the `deserving' poor, a charitable effort 
that included education and character formation and a readiness to suspend benefits to 
those who seemed unwilling to help themselves. In fact, in the nineteenth century, the 
Victorians constructed their institutions in terms of the moral ideas: virtues and miles, 
praise and blame, reward and punishment, action and responsibility. These methods 
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became the model for thousands of philanthropic endeavours in the Victorian age 
(Sacks 1997,119). 
As a result, despite New Labour's claims to the opposite, exclusion and 
social classification were the necessary ingredients of the Victorian civic patriotism. 
Samuel (1989b) remarks that a spirit of caste imbued Victorian Britain, with rigid 
demarcations between `in' and `out' groups, and a strict order of preference between 
them. Hence, the social determination of race as seen in Victorian discourse about the 
`residuum' or the `dangerous classes' (see space of the nation). In spite of the 
apparent inclusionary rhetoric, New Labour's talk about `entrepreneurialism' and 
`individual liberty and duty' carries the seeds of the same exclusion. As David 
Marquand has argued, the New Labour government's aim to re-engineer the society 
and culture so that the economy can compete more effectively in the global market 
place has given the old, nineteenth century distinction between the deserving and the 
undeserving poor a new lease of life (Marquand 1999a, 45). For example, the changes 
in their policies as delineated in the Third Way philosophy (Blair 1997e; f; 1998b; d; 
1999a; Giddens 1998; 1999; Hargreaves and Christie 1998), away from the 
Thatcherite crude individualism and the post-war socialist collectivism, have resulted 
in the redefinition of the inclusive ethical socialist tradition (Bevir 2000) and the 
revival of the Victorian social classifications. 
New Labour's Anglo-Saxon socio-economic model, as has been put forward 
on the domestic front and projected on the European context, have changed the ethical 
socialist values and inculcated them with the exclusionary spirit of the Victorian 
entrepreneurialism. In particular, by implementing the welfare programmes (HMSO 
1998a; b; c; d), by putting the issue of employability at the centre of the European 
agenda (DEE 1998) (see also space of the nation on the issue of the single market) 
and by introducing the Human Rights Act, the New Labour government put into 
practice the vision of what Blair has called «one-nation society based on a modern 
citizenship of rights and duties together (Blair 1998f). Thus, the moral and inclusive 
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ethical discourse of New Labour is combined with `contractual' discourse (Fairclough 
2000,39), which is inevitably exclusionary - more on New Labour's exclusion 
paradigm see also the debates on asylum in chapter 5. 
As Ansell (1997) has argued, while the call for a return to Victorian values is 
not inherently racist, the implicit moral distinction evoked between deserving and 
undeserving citizen operates on a terrain that is already heavily racially coded. One of 
the most allusive passages of the 1997 party manifesto talks of «a government that 
will govern in the interests of the many, the broad majority of people who work hard, 
play by the rules, pay their dues and feel let down by a political system that gives the 
breaks to the few, to an elite at the top» (Labour Party 1997). But the sub-text of this 
passage, borne in other utterances, is that there may be others (the so-called 
`underclass'), on the marginalised outreaches of society, who do not utilise the 
opportunities of the `enabling' state ('long-term unemployed', `lone parents', 
`disabled people', `older benefit claimants') and who do not play by the rules ('illegal 
immigrants', `unfounded asylum seekers'). The difficulty of reconciling what often 
appears to be a somewhat unitary concept of community with an increasingly diverse 
and multicultural society is evident (Painter 2000,234). In fact, the distinctiveness of 
the above populations has been put in cultural and moral terms. The breakdown of the 
family structure of the underclass and its propensity to criminality do not just indicate 
social and personal inadequacies as the New Labour leadership asserts (Blair 1996a, 
244), but also racial differences (Malik 1996,202). Members of the `underclass' are 
considered to carry some fixed cultural attributes that prevent them from making 
themselves into good citizens. «There are some people, Blair has said, «who are 
growing up in a culture almost entirely alienated from society's mainstream)) (Blair 
1996a, 244). 
This notion of mutual rights and responsibilities is now expressed as a 
market relationship, a modem notion of social justice - «something for something» - 
which means that being human is comprehended not just in ethical terms of moral 
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personhood within the community as the ethical socialists argued in the late 
nineteenth century, but also in terms of responsible conduct. Blair wishes to retrieve 
from the older and more capitalist version of liberalism «the primacy of individual 
liberty in the market economy>> (Blair 1998a). The skills that the individuals need to 
develop are instrumental and marketable ones that will increase employability, rather 
than their autonomy and well-being. Only one individual activity is singled out, that 
of successful entrepreneurs. The rhetoric of the enterprise culture, `choice', `freedom', 
`individualism', `initiative' and the rest gives increased scope for one's identity as a 
consumer or entrepreneur, but not for other identities. It gives pride of place to 
entrepreneurial values and to the entrepreneurial character type, but extols particular 
moral values at the expense of others such as human dignity. Indeed, Marquand has 
pointed out that civic patriotism is positively hostile to identity-choices that threaten 
the authority of the entrepreneur and the supremacy of entrepreneurial values 
(Marquand 1997a, 162). 
In relation to the European question, the New Labour government holds, in 
effect, the Social Darwinist doctrine that economic change and adjustment to 
economic change come, and can only come, through the market: in Albert 
Hirschman's (1970) suggestive language, through Exit and the threat of Exit. This 
undistorted, competitive market rewards economic agents who adjust, and punishes 
those who fail to adjust; thus, the enterprising and adaptable (Americans and British) 
prosper, while the unenterprising and unadaptable fall by the wayside (Marquand 
1997a, 156). The continental tradition embodied in the 1994 Brussels Commission's 
White Paper on European Social Policy, having been codified to a limited extent in 
the Social Charter of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty (from which the Conservative 
government negotiated an `opt out') approaches the processes of change and 
adjustment in a more complex way. It does not deny that Exit can and should be 
supplemented by what Hirschman called Voice: that economic agents are influenced 
not only by the hope of reward and the fear of punishment, but by persuasion, 
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negotiation and mutual education. In the continental tradition, losers are bought off 
(as for example in the CAP): a degree of strict allocative economic efficiency is 
sacrificed for the sake of social peace and political consensus. On the contrary, 
implicit in the tradition of Anglo-Saxon economic liberalism is the assumption that 
losers or the non-adaptable must be swept aside - most obviously by the market, but 
also by the state, whose role is to ensure that market forces are not impeded and that 
market outcomes are not interfered with. 
Etienne Balibar (1991 a) has pointed out that behind this situation lie barely 
reworked variants of the idea that the historical cultures of humanity can be divided 
into two main groups, the one assumed to be universalistic and progressive, the other 
supposed irremediably particularistic and primitive. According to the French scholar, 
we encounter a paradox here: a `logically coherent' differential racism would be 
uniformly conservative, arguing for the fixity of all cultures, since on the pretext of 
protecting European culture and the European way of life from `Third Worldization', 
it closes off any path towards real development. But it immediately reintroduces the 
old distinction between `closed' and `static', `static' and `enterprising'. The difference 
between cultures, considered as separate entities or separate symbolic structures, 
refers to cultural inequality within the European space itself or more precisely to 
culture as a structure of inequalities tendentially reproduced. Nowadays, as the 
previous analysis has made clear, the cultures supposed implicitly superior are those, 
which appreciate and promote `individual' enterprise, social and political 
individualism, as against those, which inhibit these things. These are said to be the 
cultures whose `spirit of community' is constituted by individualism. Although the 
concepts of inferiority and superiority implicit in racial hierarchy are part of a buried 
scientific paradigm, we see how the return of the biological theme is permitted and 
with it the elaboration of new variants of the biological `myth' within the framework 
of a cultural racism (Balibar 1991 a, 26). This casts doubts on the accurate `newness' 
of new racism as such (Miles 1993a, 36) and it seems that the suppression of the 
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theme of hierarchy is more apparent than real (Balibar 1991a, 24). The return of the 
biological themes and the revival of the traditions of Social Darwinism in the Anglo- 
Saxon countries aim to explain the vital importance of cultural closures and traditions 
for the accumulation of individual aptitudes and most importantly the `natural' bases 
of xenophobia and social aggression (Balibar 1991a, 26). Indeed, behind the talk 
about entrepreneurialism lies the more elusive issue of national culture. In turn, the 
language of culture and nation involves a hidden racial narrative. 
The party's invocation of the Victorian entrepreneurial Britishness thus 
contains the seeds of exclusion and intolerance, tending as it does to imply that those 
citizens who do not display enterprise, creativity and other desired qualities are 
destined to the social margin (Parekh 2000,13), or - in the case of the European 
family of the nation-states - do not merit the same status with the other European 
nations. As Smith (1995) has argued, only those who share in the public culture of the 
people, who adhere to the `civil religion' of the national state, are entitled to a share in 
those rights and duties. Being member of a `family' means to understand the tacit 
codes and share the same values (Ignatieff 1994,7). As in the case of the English- 
speaking Commonwealth, the New Labour's European dimension of Britishness 
draws on the idea of the `European nation' as a family to isolate the false and 
exogenous elements. 
Even if New Labour does not see Britishness suppressed within a European 
Community of `enterprise', `creativity', `individuality', `flexibility' (Blair 1999h), 
this may not apply to other national identities such as those of Central and Eastern 
Europe. According to the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, one of the necessary 
preconditions for the adhesion of the East and Central European countries to the 
(<European family of nations)) is the «the development of a democratic civil society 
and a market economy)) (Cook 1997e). National consciousness is derived from 
sharing values, traditions and plans for the future contained within a particular culture 
(Guibernau 1996,67). The failure of those countries to meet the economic and social 
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demands of `Entrepreneurial Europe' will put them on the margin of the European 
`family', especially as long as the doubts over their law-abiding culture persist. As 
previously in the case of the black Commonwealth, the question of law still remains 
important as a marker of cultural identification and differentiation. Lack of the 
language, the set of symbols and ways of life translates into the impossibility of 
entering a different culture (Guibernau 1996,67). As a matter of fact, Barbara Roche 
has noted that «asylum seekers from Central Europe, especially Polland and the 
Czech Republic have been overwhelmingly unfounded» (Roche 2000a, col. 20). 
Recently, Tony Blair has personally written to the leaders of the two nations 
demanding that they take immediate action to stop their nationals from illegally 
entering Britain (Bambell and Cracknell 2000). Close links between Britain and the 
two nations date back to the Second World War, when soldiers and airmen from 
Poland and the then Czechoslovakia fought alongside British forces (Cook 1997f; g) - 
see war memories in chapter 9. Yet this fact has hardly registered in the memory of 
some of the New Labour representatives whose concern for cultural preservation 
under the guise of entrepreneurialism surpasses other humanitarian concerns. Further, 
(as seen in the space of the nation), the Social Darwinist inspired recent predilection 
for non-EU `economic migrants with special skills' singles out their enterprise spirit 
and not their human dignity. On the contrary, the `illegal', `unfounded' immigrants 
and `bogus' asylum seekers are considered to be a threat to the national welfarism and 
public order. As Sivanandan (2001) has pointed out, the other side of the coin of fear 
of strangers is the defence and preservation of `our people', our way of life, our 
standard of living, our 'race'. 
Likewise, as the war in Kosovo exhibited, the government's projection of 
British values such as `internationalism', `democracy', `tolerance' and `human rights' 
in the context of its `ethical' foreign policy has been dependent on the difference 
between cultures and the exclusion of those populations who do not fit with the UK's 
cultural standards. 
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8.3 The War in Kosovo: For a `Good International Citizenship' 
The war in Kosovo -a war, according to the British Prime Minister, fought 
«not for territory but for values» (Blair 1999c), a war made «for the sake of 
humanity» (Blair 1999b), «in support of democracy and justice but also for tolerance» 
(Blair 1999e) - is an illuminating example of the problem with British values that 
New Labour wants to project abroad. The war in the Balkans showed how the 
projection of the `superior' cultural values such as `internationalism', `democracy' 
and `human rights' over the non-European world involved the element of `superiority' 
over the alien cultures and, hence, the exclusion of the populations coming from these 
war-torn regions. 
As mentioned earlier, the introduction of the European Charter of Human 
Rights in the British law in 1998 was alleged to be «the harbinger of a new rights and 
responsibilities' culture» (Straw 2000b; Wintour 2000). Not long after the party came 
to power, there was an acknowledgement by the government of its `moral 
responsibility' for human tragedy overseas. True, the government admitted that the 
values, which guided Labour's foreign and domestic policies, should be consistent. 
The much quoted commitment of the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook for an ethical 
foreign policy concerned with the priority to be accorded to the promotion of human 
rights: «our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the 
demands of other peoples for the democratic rights which we insist for ourselves» 
(Cook 1997a). Wheeler and Dunne (1998) discerned in New Labour's rhetoric an 
attempt to define a model of good international citizenship. Already, in his 1997 
general election speech in Manchester, Blair had claimed: «We believe that 
membership of the international community carries with it responsibilities as well as 
rights. And that is why we will work with others to ensure the promotion of 
democratic values, respect for human rights, the rule of law... » (Blair 1997a). Nations 
that wanted rights must accept responsibilities. 
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In speeches such as the Chicago and South African ones in 1999 (Blair 
1999d; Wickham-Jones 2000b, 15), the British Prime Minister extended the logic of 
the `rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe' approach (Blair 1996a, 236) to the 
international arena. In particular, Blair's Chicago speech showed that during the war 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Britain emerged as the judge, jury 
and executioner of what counts as a human rights violation by taking the lead in 
developing criteria under which forcible humanitarian intervention could be 
legitimised, and in establishing a deeper consensus on the standard of civilised 
conduct expected of governments around the world. In fact, Blair was blunt in 
outlining his commitment to intervention and claiming a moral underpinning for such 
acts: «our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral 
purpose in defending the values we cherisho (Blair 1999a). 
The events in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 stimulated a new search for a 
basis for a foreign policy based on the values of the late twentieth century. Although 
Blair had been briefly a member of the parliamentary Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) at the beginning of his political career (Wickham-Jones 2000b, 
7), he was resolute in instigating NATO's military offensive against Serbia and in 
defending the action on moral grounds. Writing in Newsweek for an American 
audience, Blair argued «for a new internationalism where the brutal repression of 
whole ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated and for a world where those 
responsible for such crimes will have nowhere to hide» (Blair 1999c). In June 1999, 
again in Newsweek, he repeated his claims of a new internationalism and argued that 
NATO's actions represented «a new moral crusade» (Blair 1999i). Blair was not 
alone in taking a broad view of the UK's interests. Apart from Cook, George 
Robertson, Labour's defence secretary, as well, said, «I want our armed forces not 
only to defend our country, but to be a force for good, in a very complicated and a 
very difficult new world that we're facing>> (Robertson 1997). Americans were by far 
the most significant contributor to Operation Allied Force, launching all the 
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Tomahawk cruise missiles and flying ninety per cent of the bombing missions (Dunne 
and Wheeler 2000,67). Yet, there is no doubt that Tony Blair, Robin Cook and the 
defence secretary George Robertson enabled the UK to punch above its weight, as all 
the post-war British administrations did in the past. For instance, when the war was 
coming to an end the final settlement was not to be decided by the people of this 
beleaguered country: «it will be peace, on our terms» (Blair 1999f), as Blair said. 
As we have already argued in the space of the nation and Dunne and 
Wheeler (2000), Bourne and Cini (2000) and Hodder-Williams (2000) have also 
suggested, New Labour often suffers from the delusion of great power status, as 
though the United Kingdom had the economic and military capability to `demand' 
that the values British cherish be respected by others (Dunne and Wheeler 2000,73). 
This is not to imply the government has been inactive in its defence of human rights, 
with significant deployments of troops and resources in Bosnia and Kosovo; yet, New 
Labour's ability to do something about Indonesia, Algeria, Angola, Afghanistan, 
China, Myanmar and so on is severely limited (Dunne and Wheeler 2000; Chomski 
2001). Especially, the UK's relationship with Indonesia illustrates the limits of a 
human rights dialogue (Lawler 1999; Pilger 1999). Perhaps the best description of the 
UK government's Janus-faced policy towards Indonesia has been offered by an East 
Timorese activist: «There is a profound contradiction between pushing for a peaceful 
solution and awning the Indonesian armed forces which are orchestrating the militia 
death squads and preventing a peaceful solution in East Timor» (Budiardjo 1999). 
The case of the arms sale to the Indonesian regime showed that Cook's 
promise for an ethical dimension to his foreign policy was a calamitous error. It was 
an honourable but half-baked claim, hoisting to prominence the false assumption that 
his predecessors had always been unethical and carrying the implication that he, a 
principled foreign secretary, would address the harshness of the world from a more 
elevated position. Yet, as Kellas (1998,203) has put it, Britain's continuing 
aspirations to Great Power status has been in accordance with an emphasis on a 
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separate, different or even, superior culture, which is primarily defined against the 
'Other'. 
Indeed, New Labour considers that the British notions of democracy, human 
rights and so on capture a higher cultural echelon than that of the rest of the nations. A 
focus on good international citizenship and the international community suggests 
some notion of equality between citizens, which does not fit with Blair's emphasis on 
the UK's moral leadership and cultural superiority. As Bhikhu Parekh (2000) has 
commented, it is risky business for New Labour's Britain to aim to become a beacon 
to the world - «Britain at its best, a beacon of hope, democracy and dynamism to 
nations and peoples everywhere)) (Blair 1999m); «Britain, one of the cradles of 
European freedom and liberty» (Cook 2000a) - because to imagine that British have 
some special talents in this area and that the rest of the world eagerly looks to them 
for moral guidance is to invite disappointment and the charge of hubris (Parekh 2000, 
12). In more specific terms, to say that every nation has a `purpose' - `destiny' in New 
Labour's language - is to make the Thatcherite mistake of taking too simplified and 
singular a view of its history and identity and suppressing its inescapable diversities 
and disagreements. For the New Right, it was enough to be `one of them' by not being 
`one of us'. Thatcher's cultural Britishness was predicated on a sustained process of 
purification and exclusion (Dodd 2001,215). Instead, New Labour's talk about 
`internationalism', `promoting democracy', `promotion of our values and confidence 
in our identity' gave off an apparent inclusiveness and tolerance (Dunne and Wheeler 
2000,63). Yet, the exclusion of the Kosovar asylum seekers and refugees from the 
national body suggests that New Labour's cultural nationhood fails to provide an 
alternative, less exclusive account. The Under-Secretary of State for Home Office, 
Mike O'Brien had claimed that ((the Human Rights Act 1998 and an ethical foreign 
policy can be balanced by the firm immigration controls» (O'Brien 1999, col. 122). 
But the stigmatisation of the immigrants and refugees seems to negate the British 
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notion of human rights and democracy. As Balibar has suggested, the border control 
has indeed a cultural dimension (Balibar 1994,339). 
Moreover, the ethical credentials of the Labour government were jeopardised 
by official policy towards the 800,000 refugees who fled to Albania and Macedonia. 
As Barlett (2000) tells us, the exodus was unprecedented. Local families took in many 
refugees but were burdened by the added economic cost of caring for the migrants. 
Most refugees were confined in cramped conditions in the new tent cities hurriedly 
constructed with aid from the allied countries and calls grew for the allies to take the 
refugees into their own countries. However, in Balibar's (1991b, 57) terms, New 
Labour policy appeared to concur with `boundary maintenance' and isolation of those 
alien cultures as a precondition for the preservation of the natural milieu of the British 
race. In essence, they argued that it would be better for the Kosovars - «our fellow 
human beings», according to the Prime Minister (Blair 1999c) - to remain within the 
region to facilitate their eventual return home (Schaefer 1999). Ansell (1997) has 
assumed that new forms of racialised political discourse are not so much against the 
`other' or the values of `alien cultures' as in previous discourses of Empire, as it is for 
6 us' and the values of Western culture. In other words, exclusionary sentiment 
orchestrated through racial discourse is less about justifying the lack of civil and 
political rights of those excluded than about legitimating the `natural' desire to remain 
`oneself. 
Anne Clwyd, the left-wing Labour backbencher, encountered claims, during 
a visit to the camps, that some refugees were being barred from entry into the UK. 
She told the House of Commons that «they have been told that Britain did not want 
them. I found that a very worrying statement indeed and I do not know whether it is 
true or not. But so far we have only been told that two hundred and fifty Kosovo 
refugees are coming to this country>> (Schaefer 1999). At the same time as the Labour 
government was focused on the plight of the Kosovar refugees, its asylum bill, about 
which much talk was made above, was going through parliament. On this issue, one 
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rather caustic article has emphasised, `the Kosovar Albanians are the victims of the 
greatest crime of post war Europe, but as soon as they cross the Channel, they grow 
horns and become scrounging frauds' (Cohen 1999,15). Once more, British culture is 
construed as being homogeneous and inevitably weakened by alien strains, thus 
unifying people against the racialised other. The `Other', in the case of the Kosovar 
refugees, as representative translator of a non-Western culture, posed a threat to the 
`British way of life'. In this way, racism is an important secondary bond in the values 
debate, there for those who wish to discover it (Ansell 1997,188). 
8.4 Conclusion 
The maintenance of the basic assumptions of the command culture of the 
Westminster model has conditioned the New Labour's projection of the so-called 
enduring values over Europe. 
The longevity of British institutions was concomitant with the Protestant 
notion of the elect nation - on the continuity of British institutions, see also time of 
the nation and, especially, war memories - and the subsequent inscription upon it of 
particular ideals such as liberty and democracy. This was tied to the negative 
representations of those nations and populations whose cultural standards (religious, 
political) were supposedly inferior or constituted a threat to the British ones. National 
identity becomes understood only in opposition to the other. Hence, culture is playing 
a unifying and differentiating role at the same time. During the European debates, 
especially in the early stages, anti-Catholicism was equated with `corruption', 
`conspiracies' and `authoritarianism'; values considered completely strange to a 
Protestant freedom-loving, democratic nation. The Houses of Parliament have been 
depicted as the embodiment of the qualities of the national community. As a 
consequence those populations who lacked those constitutional values that constituted 
the `oldest democracy' in Europe were completely alien to the British tradition and 
way of life. The immigrants from New Commonwealth were associated with a 
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dubious sense of law whereas the European nations were regarded as politically 
unstable and needed to take lessons in democracy from the `Mother of Parliaments'. 
The assumptions and relics of the Westminster culture were passed on to New Labour 
whose constitutional agenda embodies the command structure of the ancien 
institutional status quo. 
As a result, the projection of the `enduring values' such as Victorian 
entrepreneurialism and democracy, internationalism and human rights on the 
European and world stage carried with it the internalised sense of superiority, 
complacency and parochialism of the British political culture and was made possible 
only through the locus of the `other'. The social Darwinist classifications entailed by 
the revival of the Victorian value system led to cultural inequality of the national 
cultures on the European stage and the exclusion from the British national community 
of those populations who did not exhibit the merits of entrepreneurialism. 
Accordingly, during the war in Kosovo Britain emerged as the true defender of 
democracy and human rights, building at the same time symbolic boundaries for those 
populations from the war-torn countries. In both cases, the preservation of the national 
milieu implied the isolation of alien cultures. 
However, as Noakes (1998) has suggested, the construction of national values 
requires the idea of a national past. The projection of a Protestant political culture, the 
universality of its values and the notions of a democratic and chosen people who, 
despite suffering and damage, have learned to survive and become «the torch of 
freedom and liberty» of the whole world would not have been possible without the re- 
membering of a particular past that embodied all the previous cultural attributes and 
situated British people not only with each other but with their ancestors. The war 
memories and the summoning up of imperial greatness have served as «quickening 
agents to inform a «united people)) who they really are (Wright 1985). It is to the 
temporality of the nation, and in particular, the war memories and the notions of global 
development that we should now turn. 
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PART 4 
THE TIME OF THE NATION 
Several scholars of nationalist thought have placed a particular emphasis on 
the implied continuity and difference of the national temporality which, seen in 
chapter 2, is perceived as a shared past (Renn 1990) and a common journey 
(Anderson 1991; Outlaw 1990). 
Anthony Smith (1995) has written that national identity is constructed from a 
number of related elements, which he categorises as ethnic, cultural, territorial, 
economic and socio-political. Each of these, he argues, comes to signify a bond of 
solidarity between members of national communities who are also united by shared 
national traditions, myths and memories. In fact, although a sense of shared history 
remains important to contemporary national identities, the latter have to stress the 
continuity of imagined, communal, contemporary beliefs in order to have the widest 
appeal possible (Noakes 1998,9). Anderson's (1991) thesis that the nation is 
essentially an imagined concept, one that exists primarily in the minds of those who 
consider themselves its members, illustrates the importance of national identity, 
particularly, as chapter 9 will argue, in times of war. In particular, the narrative of 
British history that has fed into constructions of national identity is one that highlights 
both past glories and national unity in the face of adversity (Colley 1992a & b). 
Military success against France was taken as a confirmation of a British identity that 
embodied the root principles of liberalism: Protestantism, limited government, and 
free commerce overseas. 
During the examined period of the European debates, Britain has undergone 
a crisis of identity, in which the past has provided one of the few secure footholds in 
an increasingly uncertain present. Ernest Gellner (1997) has emphasised the use of the 
past as a means of providing some degree of continuity and serving the interests of the 
present-day leaders. As will be argued, the war memories and the memory of a 
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benevolent Empire have been strong cards in the hands of all the Labour party 
leaderships to overcome the European challenge and the crisis of the imperial centre. 
Central to this narrative has been the Protestant image of `plucky little Britain' facing 
overwhelming odds and winning through a combination of cultural and moral 
superiority (Noakes 1998,10). The sense of continuity as embodied in the 
recollections of the `Dunkirk spirit' and the `White Man's Burden' has been grafted 
on to the feelings of adversity and difference. While this sense of difference, of 
separation from those who are not members of the nation, is a central component of 
nationalism, the perception of the Labour party's British temporality cannot be made 
possible without the `other' temporality. 
The perception of the time of the nation either as a shared past or as a 
historical journey, involves the distracting presence of another temporality that 
disturbs the contemporaneity of the national present. Homi Bhabba (1990a) has 
argued that 
«emphasis on the temporal dimension of national entities 
serves to displace the historicism that has dominated 
discussions of the nation as a cultural force. The people are 
not simply historical events or parts of a patriotic body 
politic. The focus on temporality resists the transparent 
linear equivalence of event and idea that historicism 
proposes; it provides a perspective on the disjunctive forms 
of representation that signify a people, a nation or a national 
culture» (Bhabba 1990a, 292). 
The latter are signified in relation to minorities and cultural difference. Thus 
people are also a complex rhetorical strategy of social reference where the claim to be 
representative provokes a crisis within the process of signification. We then have a 
contested cultural territory where the people must be thought in a «double-time»: 
«As historical `objects' of a nationalist pedagogy, giving 
the discourse an authority that is based on the pregiven or 
constituted historical origin or event; and also as the 
`subjects' of a process of signification, of a performative 
strategy that must erase any prior or onginary presence of 
the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living 
principle of the people as that continual process by which 
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the national life is redeemed and signified as a repeating 
and reproductive process» (Bhabba 1990a, 297). 
In the first case, the re-membering of the pedagogy strategy aims to represent 
a homogenised community in a succession of historical moments, whereas the «active 
forgetting)) of the performative strategy aims to cast a shadow between the people, 
differentiating the self from the other. Difference therefore persists in and alongside 
continuity (Hall 1990,227). 
What follows is the analysis of the memories which either as the possession 
of heroic past or as a historical journey have encapsulated the double-time (historical 
continuity and difference) and have endured through the continuous revival in the 
party discourse during the European debates: the World War II memories (chapter 9) 
and the memory and practice of a world, benevolent Empire (chapter 10). 
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CHAPTER 9 
WAR MEMORIES 
9.1 Introduction 
The legacy of the Empire was a telling proof that Great Britain has always 
been an extraordinarily warlike state, and was for a long time both aggressively and 
successfully imperialistic. George Orwell in his famous wartime essay Lion and the 
Unicorn (1941) noted that «England resembles a family, a rather stuffy Victorian 
family... it has its private language and its common memories, and at the approach of 
an enemy it closes its ranks» (Orwell 1941,84 & 88). As Orwell's words suggest, the 
idea of Britons as a family depends in part on a stock of common memories. As 
Renan put it, «a heroic past, great men, glory - this is the social capital upon which 
one bases a national idea>> (Renan 1990,19). The most stable notion of a heroic past 
in the Labour discourse is that of World War H. As with any national history, this one 
has been raided selectively for significance and meaning. 
After the Second World War -a time when peace and imperial retreat fostered 
a highly introverted view of the British past, a period during which Britain has 
normally been a peaceful, though, an increasingly disgruntled and essentially second- 
ranking state - historians such as Linda Colley (1992b) tells us that Britain found it 
easier to understand its past in terms of political, social, religious and cultural 
divisions than as a one-time great power influencing and being influenced by every 
continent in the world. 
However, experiences of total defeat separated most of the European 
Continent from Britain, since Britain's `finest hour' cast something of a paralysing 
spell on its relations with European countries. On the Continent, the war had not only 
destroyed industrial plant, transport systems, and economic life generally, but it had 
disrupted the whole process of political life as well. Countries had been occupied, and 
284 
governments had been discredited or had spent the war in exile. And after the war 
many of the continental countries and particularly France, Italy, Germany and the 
three Benelux countries were ready to think and act in European terms. The war, 
though, had been different for the British. It had left them not with a sense of national 
failure and a feeling of national inadequacy, but with a sense of national achievement, 
cohesion and an illusion of power. The spirit of the times intoned that Britain's 
destiny had been determined by her military victory, and nourished the illusion that 
war had increased the country's inherent strength, not sapped it. It was no wonder that 
at such a time and in such a mood the British took it for granted that Great Britain 
was, and would always remain, a first-class world power. She alone of pre-war 
European great nations had never been reduced to impotence during the war by defeat 
and occupation. Her formidable armed forces ranked her with Soviet Russia and the 
United States in the `Big Three' that had waged and won the war against Nazi 
Germany (Barnett 1986,2). They saw themselves still, like their grandfathers, as a 
senior and superior race (Young 1998,24). In the continuing mood of victory 
politicians and people shared an `invincible confidence in the genius of Britain' 
(Barnett 1986,7). The Labour party shared most of these perceptions of Britain's 
standing as a result of its victorious past. 
9.2 War Memories and Labour: A Question of National Character 
Inevitably during the European question what was actually remembered was 
an instinctive national character. In 1962 it was perceived that the decision of 
Macmillan's Conservative government to apply for British membership of the 
Common Market was «an appeal of sheer economic and political defeatism» that 
<<-undermined both the initiative and the spirit of adventure of the British people)) 
(Warbey 1962, col. 689) which had led them to a victorious war: «We ourselves have 
not had that experience (defeat); we ourselves have not had that need (to form a 
union)» (Ungoed-Thomas 1961, col. 1576). The motto of the time was that the British 
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«bad the power and the authority to go their own way pursuing their own policies and 
their own courses» (Edelman 1962, col. 590). Labour emphasised with their owe stood 
alone» rhetoric which was reminiscent of a Protestant ethos, that the British had the 
power and the authority to go their own way as an indication, as seen previously, of a 
unique national character and a democratic culture. Uwe Kitzinger noted that the 
peculiar qualities of Britain's state and society seemed to have been vindicated by its 
ability to stand alone against Hitler, whilst others fell to the invader with alarming 
rapidity (Kitzinger 1973,78). 
The Second World War confirmed the respect that the British people have in 
the political institutions and leadership of the society and rooted it in the imagery of 
the community (Williamson 1988,167). On these grounds, the Eurosceptic Douglas 
Jay argued against British entry throughout the European debates that, 
«If a country (Britain) with an unbroken record of 
parliamentary government and civil liberties maintained 
for centuries were to put all this at risk by merging with 
a larger group, the first criterion should have been to 
choose a group with a similar record of stability stretching 
back, if not so long, at least till its foundation as a state. It 
is not obvious that Germany and Italy were the leading claimants 
to this distinction. History suggests the contrary)) (Jay 1980,360) 
The very ritual of re-memory proclaimed the continuity of British life and 
British institutions while foreign tyrants came, briefly puffed themselves up into a 
menace, and went. Labour Eurosceptics prided themselves that history had shown that 
in times of crisis the British people had provided «better judgement of the needs, 
aspirations and ideals of their nation» (Peart 1971, col. 1097), and boasted that the last 
person who said that Britain ((could not go it alone was Hitler whom the British 
people defied victoriously (Judge 1971,336). The speeches of Tony Benn spoke the 
language of national resilience and continuity till the early nineties: 
«Apart from Ireland, we are the only country in the Community 
that has not lived under Fascism or Nazism or been occupied by 
Fascists or Nazis» (Benn 1983, col. 684; 1990,400). 
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The `Dunkirk spirit', which accompanied the feelings of national pride and 
superiority that separated the Continental countries from Britain since the end of the 
Second World War, underlined this special character of the British. Several scholars 
have assented to this view. For Miller, although a close study of the evacuation of 
Dunkirk would reveal many aspects that the myth overlooks, the `Dunkirk spirit' was 
taken to show the instinctive solidarity of the British people in the face of a national 
crisis; it revealed something distinctive about their character: their ability to improvise 
a solution to a problem without being ordered to do so by some higher-up (Miller 
1995,36). Likewise, Noakes (1998) has pointed out that «the dominant myth of the 
blitz is that it was a time when the nation, led by Churchill and under bombardment 
from Hitler, overcame its internal divisions and aligned itself behind shared values of 
`freedom', `democracy' and the `rights of the individual'. If the Second World War 
can be seen as a key period in British national history and national identity, 
representing a moment when all the imagined values of the British nation were widely 
articulated and shared then the blitz is a key moment in the. war: the moment when 
`the people' became `the nation')) (Noakes 1998,29). 
In the mid-sixties, Wilson, assuming the role of «Dunkirk Harold in 
Churchillian garb)) (Morgan 1987,259) in a Cabinet meeting, wound up saying, owe 
should have a bash, and if excluded, not whine but create a Dunkirk-type robust 
British dynamic)) (Ziegler 1993,335). 
Above all, the war memories led to the construction of British national 
character in opposition to that of the main European nations. It is precisely this shared 
historical experience that has sustained a sense of common nationality alongside an 
equally powerful sense of difference (Miller 1995,173). Williams (1983) has noted 
that war stands out as one of the fundamentally unifying and generalising experiences: 
the identification of an alien enemy, and with it what is often real danger, powerfully 
promotes and often completes a national identity. In this sense, the Common Market 
was stigmatised as a political union consisting of «small Powers» (Bellenger 1960, 
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col. 1137), «countries defeated in the last war, countries disappointed in their own 
state, countries finding themselves inadequate for their own protection and for their 
purpose, and, therefore, having to form a new union in order to provide themselves 
with a sense of security and confidence that they lack» (Ungoed-Thomas 1961, 
col. 1575). Unlike Britain's feelings of pride, the trauma of 1939-45, during which all 
the Continental European societies were at some stage defeated, occupied, 
temporarily extinguished as sovereign units, or shamed by the crimes of war, was to 
much Continental opinion the final act in a crisis of confidence in the nation state as a 
provider of society and economic welfare (Lord 1996,40). 
In particular, the party representatives associated particular European 
countries with authoritarianism, militarism and cowardice. Already, in the early 
sixties, Gaitskell wondered whether the emerging Common Market would be a 
«Europe of Hitler and Mussolini... » (Gaitskell 1962b, 158). 
In fact it was maintained that there was «a sort of hunger for authoritarian 
government abroad and a feeling of disillusion with the processes and mechanics of 
democracy itself, particularly in Western Germany, given the way in which 
nationalism there may so readily take on the forms, and embody some of the 
principles, of those excessive forms of nationalism that came to power in the 1930s» 
(Brooks 1966, col. 1264). A number of events fomented lingering hostility, especially, 
towards the Germans. 
For example, a highly emotional response was aroused in many Labour 
circles to the arrival in Wales of German troops on exercise. At the party conference 
in 1960 H. Fowler argued that «Germany's history shows a strong military element 
and its people have blindly followed those war leaders into wars» (Fowler 1960,176). 
Although the war was long behind them, Labour could not disassociate the new 
generation of German soldiers from the atrocities of their predecessors. «The young 
German soldier), it was alleged, «may be a new generation but many of those who 
now lead him acquiesced against some of the foulest atrocities ever committed)) 
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(Newton 1961,175). It was alleged that many of those that trained them «had 
personally served in Hitler's army which set out to enslave the world, which raped 
almost the whole of Europe, which created the death camps of Auschwitz, Belsen and 
Buchenwald for the slaughter of millions of innocent men, women and children 
(Miller 1961,176). The long shadows of Nazism were predominant in the Labour 
members' minds, almost twenty-five years after the end of the war. 
In the late sixties, the rise of the right-wing National Democratic party 
(NDP) in Germany filled Labour with suspicion of the political stability of this 
country and, of the subsequent effects on the balance of power in Europe. It was 
openly claimed that there was a resurgence of Nazism in Germany, with not the same 
names and faces ((but the same tactics» (Molloy 1966, col. 1248). Obviously affected 
by Russian fears of a re-unification of Germany, Labour unburied the old worn 
arguments of German nationalism, at the time when the Ostpolitik of Kurt Kiesinger 
started to take flesh and blood, which was testimony to Federal Germany's economic 
strength and Britain's inactivity in the European theatre due to her economic 
weakness and imperial illusions (Northedge 1974,267). The rise of the National 
Democratic party (NDP) in Germany also alarmed the pro-European George Brown 
who admitted that owe cannot pretend that fears of Germany do not exist» (Brown 
1966b, col. 1173). In reality, between 1949 and 1969 a variety of right wing Parties 
and organisations, many of which were led by former Nazis or people with close ties 
to former Nazis, came and departed from the German political scene. At the end of 
the 1960s the NDP made a strong effort to gain representation in the national 
parliament, but it failed to clear the 5 percent hurdle necessary for entrance into the 
legislature (Conradt 1978,72). After that it faded, as an indication of its poor 
organisational base and insufficient strength to seriously challenge the Republic. 
Nevertheless, Stanley Henig warned his colleagues, that one of the mistakes made 
thirty years ago was that «the western countries failed to take seriously anything 
happening inside Germany» (Henig 1966, col. 1217). 
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In spite of Willy Brandt's ascension to power in 1969 as head of a 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SDP) - dominated coalition with the Freie 
Demokratische Partei (FDP) - the first social-democratic chancellor of Germany since 
Hermann Müller (1930) (Sassoon 1996,285) - Germany (<<our enemies in two world 
wars» (Brown 1971, col. 984) was still regarded by some within the party as «a 
military nation (Paget 1971, col. 399) with «designs on the lands that they lost at the 
end of that war to Poland and Russia)) (Messer 1968,243). After all, from 1943 
Labour was one of the first socialist parties that ceased to communicate officially with 
the exiled leadership of the German SDP in Britain and cut off financial support for 
the SDP, except for limited humanitarian purposes. William Chiles, the then 
International Secretary of the Labour party had expressed the view at that time that 
`the Germans' spirit is not really democratic' (D. Benn 1990,182). No less 
remarkable was the continuity of these views and the suspicions about Germans in the 
sixties. 
As Robins (1979) and Ziegler (1993) have pointed out, there were long held 
fears that Germany's new power would be harnessed to revanchist policies and 
frequently the language used in the left-wing Press resorted to the demonology 
reminiscent of the party pamphlets of the 1930s with sections of German leadership 
labelled as `devils', `savages' and `wreckers'. To a considerable extent, then, the 
party's debate on EC was ruled from the grave. 
Even in the early eighties the republican Tony Benn noted that «we live with 
the legacy that Hitler left. )) (Benn 1983, col. 687). His perception of the Common 
Market was immensely coloured by xenophobic feelings: 
<ü loath the Common Market (... ) of course it is 
really dominated by Germany. All the Common Market countries 
except Britain have been occupied by Germany, and they have this 
mixed feeling of hatred and subservience towards the Germans. 
It is such a complex, psychological relationship 
(Benn 1990,234). 
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As some party representatives further commented, they were «very glad that 
during the war there was an English Channel between us» (Burstin 1971,346). In this 
way, by mobilising the cosy myth of the war, as a powerful frame for feelings of 
national pride (Waters 1997,210), as sole proof of being and identity through the 
construction of the militarist German character, the Labour party's xenophobic 
arguments acquired a tone deftly encapsulated by David Low's famous and genuinely 
moving cartoon of a British soldier standing firmly on the British islands raising his 
fist to a Nazi-dominated Continent, and declaring `Very well, alone! ' The party's and, 
in general, the country's love affair with the Second World war and the forest hours it 
enshrines has been driven and shaped by an increasing anxiety about how the nation 
measures up in the present, and a growing sense of discomfort with the nation's 
contemporary identity fueled by its post-war decline (Barnett 1986,2). This led the 
party spokespersons to a distortion of European history. 
Contrary to the widespread belief within the Eurosceptic wing that 
historically Britain and Germany were natural antagonists,. as Paul Kennedy has 
shown, there is a longer history of collaboration and mutual understanding. Indeed, 
before 1914, many British politicians and pundits argued that Germany was their 
natural ally (Kennedy 1980,41). So, by remembering a certain version of the War too 
well, they tended to neglect and misperceive their longer history, and so failed to 
grasp possibilities for the present and the future of the country in the Continent. This 
treatment of Germany as a perpetual outcast and the nourishment of animosities 
whose roots went back decades, indicated an unwillingness by Labour to face the 
reality of a country which struggled to get rid of the demons of the past. Labour's 
position reflected a backwardness and a parochial assessment of the real facts. George 
Thomson, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, rightly argued that xenophobic 
attitudes, such as statements that «German and Italian industries poured millions of 
pounds into the Hitler and Mussolini coffers» (Taylor 1967,276), can only «revive 
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German resentment and help to create the very situation which we should want to 
avoid» (Thomson 1966, col. 1284). 
A .s for the French, Labour constructed them as merely untrustworthy. As 
Hugh Brown put it, «one cannot trust therm) (Brown 1971, col. 984). In particular, De 
Gaulle was regarded as the prisoner of the elements in the army that «washed him up 
and betrayed their oath to the French Republic; elements like Soustelle who never 
denied his Fascist considerations and leanings» (Plummer 1958,205). Gordon Walker 
reminded, in a contemptuous tone, his counterparts of the role of France in the war, 
and asserted that he could not imagine Britain in association with «France which was 
conquered, occupied by and collaborated with Nazi Germany>> (Gordon-Walker 
1961b, 185). 
Finally, the Italians were racially constructed as cowards who sided with the 
relatively strong nations for their own protection and the achievement of their own 
goals. For Labour war appeared as the means to attain recognition, to pass, as Elshtain 
put it, «the definitive sense of political manhood» (Elshtain 1992,143). In this respect 
the Italians had failed. They seemed innately weak and incapable of defending 
themselves. It was actually alleged that Italy was the country that started and ended in 
the war on the same side (Paget 1971, col. 399), because ((the Italians cannot fight>> 
(Brown 1971, col. 984). 
In short, throughout the three main moments of the European debate in the 
sixties and early seventies (1962,1967,1971) Labour Euro-sceptics constructed 
national characters whose cultural attributes - `militarism', `authoritarianism', 
`cowardliness' - were essentially different from the `democratic instincts' and the 
`spirit of adventure' of British people. But it was not just the party Eurosceptics who 
represented Europeans in this way. 
For Shirley Williams, Arthur Bottomley, and David Marquand and the rest of 
the pro-European Labour MPs, Europe was never above suspicion. For instance, 
Williams was afraid of Britain being outside of the Common Market and thus <deave 
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Western Germany leading a European bloc» (Williams 1961,219). Sharing the same 
concerns, Bottomley doubted deeply German intentions: 
<(In two wars Germany tried to control economic and social 
conditions of Europe - they failed. Are we going to let them 
do it by peaceful means? )) (Bottomley 1971,333). 
Along with his pro-European colleagues, Marquand assented to the view that 
only the British abstention from European affairs would awaken the evils of the past. 
The role of Britain was held to be crucial for the maintenance of peace and progress in 
Europe. The lessons of the past became the guide for the present: 
((It was partly our fault that because of the Versailles 
settlement, Hitler came to power in Germany when 
he did. It was partly because we failed to give the 
left-wing government in France in the 1930s enough 
support and security that the second world war took 
place when it did. It would be a tragedy if the same thing 
happened again in the 1970s and the 1980s as a result of the 
action of this House, above all, as a result of the action of my party. 
That for me is a very powerful reason to think very carefully before 
rejecting these terms. Entry into the Common Market offers the 
best practical way by which the values of my party can be realised 
in practice» (Marquand 1971, col. 1916) 
For the Labour pro-Europeans the future of the Continent depended on 
Britain. Their arguments were equally attached to the spirit of national greatness, 
superiority and pride, complementing the negative racial constructions of the 
European countries of their Eurosceptic colleagues. <<Britain out of Europe who 
knows where it would lead>> was their familiar tone (Bottomley 1971,333). For them, 
the Second World War memories reinforced too this feeling of separateness from the 
Continent and the special character and moral quality of Anglo-Saxon institutions; the 
image of Britain being the benevolent overseer and the enlightened democratic power 
in Europe. As Foster has remarked, one of the catalysts of national unity at the time of 
Dunkirk and the Blitz was the assertion, hammered home again and again by 
Churchill in his war speeches and maintained by successive generations of British 
politicians (see Falklands war), that Britain was standing alone in defence of civilised 
values against the forces of barbarism (Foster 1999,50). As mentioned in chapter 7, 
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their desire was to export the rule of law, the constitution and the ideals of peace and 
freedom - for which their country stood - to the Common Market (Molloy 1971, 
col-2156). What is implicit in the discourse of the pro-Europeans is the second 
meaning of time, as a historical journey. In the pro-Europeans' arguments, the cultural 
and temporal dimensions of Labour Britishness intersected each other. To them, 
Britain had the `obligation' on the grounds of her long democratic traditions to 
assume a kind of civilising role in a Europe replete with lingering suspicions of 
authoritarianism and carry its nations along the path of progress and democracy. 
The past, which this deeper sense of cultural meaning and superiority 
occupies and enshrines, is not the simple historical past of antecedent events but a 
precedent and preferred identity that the Second World War is taken to realise. Myths, 
like the Dunkirk spirit or the Blitz, provide reassurance that the national community 
of which one now forms part is solidly based in history that it embodies a real 
continuity between generations; and they perform a moralising role, by holding up 
before `us' the virtues of `our' ancestors and encouraging `us' to live up to them 
(Miller 1995,36). Yet, this dimension of temporality will become clearer in respect of 
the memories and practice of Empire in chapter 10. 
However as mentioned previously, most of these myths were based on a 
distortion of Britain's democratic traditions and the post-war European history. This 
applied no less to the historical role of the New Commonwealth. As the Labour party 
saw it, Britain's world role did not rest on the strength of the United Kingdom alone; it 
rested also on that of the British Empire and Commonwealth. Although the Empire 
had produced only one-tenth of the munitions of war supplied to Britain and the 
Empire together, the war had witnessed a heart-warming revival of imperial loyalties 
(Barnett 1986,3). But these imperial loyalties embraced the old white and not the new 
black countries. Labour spokespeople claimed that they preferred «the white 
Commonwealth which has shown its practical adherence to the mother country when 
the mother country has been in danger, to the emerging nations of the black 
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Commonwealth... » (Bellenger 1962, col. 540). It was actually maintained that «without 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, who came into the war in 1940, this country would 
have been overrun by the Germans, and we should not be bothered about the Common 
Market now» (Lisle 1961,219). 
According to Renan (1990), forgetting is a crucial factor in the creation of a 
nation. In the same way, as a dialectic of inwardness and outwardness defines one's 
national identity, a dialectic of remembering and forgetting might be said to sustain it 
as well. Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the `habitus' expresses well this dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting. The `habitus' refers to the dispositions, practices and 
routines of the familiar social world. It describes `the second nature' which people 
must acquire in order to pass mindlessly through the banal routines of daily life. 
Bourdieu emphasises the elements of remembering and forgetting: the `habitus'- 
embodied history, internalised as a second nature and so forgotten as history - is the 
active presence of the whole past of which it is the product. The result is that the past 
is inhabited in the present in a dialectic of forgotten remembrance (cited in Billig 
1995,42). 
Labour forgot that Britain's rise to mercantile dominance and the process of 
generating the surpluses of wealth, which set its own economic development in 
motion, were founded on the slave trade and the plantation system in the Americas in 
the seventeenth century. Similarly, India provided the basis for the foundation of 
Britain's Asian Empire in the eighteenth century; and the penetration by British trade 
of Latin America and of the Far East was the centrepiece of Britain's industrial and 
imperial hegemony in the nineteenth century. In each of these phases, an economic 
and cultural chain had bound the fate of millions of workers and peasants in the 
colonial hinterlands to the destiny of rich and poor in Britain. The wealth - drawn off 
through conquest, colonisation and trade - had enriched one British class after another 
(Hall 1978,33). More important, thousands of West Indians and Indians were 
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recruited to the Royal Air Force and served in the British armed forces in 1939-45, 
but this fact hardly registered in Labour's memory of the war (Soysal 1996,69). 
Remembering, as Bhabba has said, is never a quiet act of introspection; it is a 
painful re-membering, a putting together of the dismembered past to make sense of 
the trauma of the present - in this case, the loss of Empire (Bhabba 1990b, 195). The 
war was taken to evoke the British at their best, the qualities of Churchill's «island 
race. This helped to construct a sense of nation and nationality that excluded the bulk 
of post-1945 immigrants who were deemed as a distracting presence of another 
temporality that disturbed the contemporaneity of the national present (Bhabba 1990a, 
297). The doubts about the solidarity of the black populations were a case in point: «if 
this country is in trouble again I hope that some of the newer Commonwealth 
countries will come to our aid in the same way as the older dominions have done so 
often... I have some doubts about some of them» (Bellenger 1961, col. 1694). For each 
party leadership, the reference back to Britain's finest hour focused on Britain that 
was white. In this sense, David Miller has remarked that «in. so far as the British 
people thought about the Empire at all, their attention was more likely to focus on the 
`White Dominions' to which relatives might have emigrated, and which were later to 
supply troops to fight alongside the British in two world wars» (Miller 1995,168). 
In the early sixties, Hugh Gaitskell evoked the role of the old dominions 
which stood beside Britain against the continental enemies: «I remember Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada that they came to our aid at once in two World Wars ... We, 
at least, do not intend to forget Vimy Ridge and Gallipoli; we, at least, do not intend 
to forget the help they gave us after this last war>> (Gaitskell 1962b, 161). Only by 
harking back to the war years could Labour find who were Britain's allies: «I look 
around to see who are my true comrades... Australia, New Zealand and Canada, when 
the mother country was in trouble, did not ask when they should come in; they came 
in at once. Anybody who has fought in a war and has been in the Army knows the 
true meaning of the word (comradeship)... » (Bellenger 1961, col. 1695). It was 
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actually argued that «only the old Commonwealth nations came into the war and 
sacrificed their blood and their people for our sake... » (Lisle 1961,219). 
In the same way, Douglas Jay, President of the Board of Trade during the 
Wilson administrations in mid-sixties, argued that «nobody can pretend that in the last 
two world wars we had as much help from all the members of the EEC as we did from 
the English-speaking Commonwealth and the United States)) (Jay 1968b, 95). It was 
imperative for him and many others within the party that the defence of the 
Commonwealth was not based on sheer trade grounds, but also because these 
countries «have proved to be our friends, not just in theory, but in hard practice)) (Jay 
1968a, col. 459). But it was not only the phobic Jay who expressed these sentiments. 
George Thomson, an ardent European and member of the Wilson Cabinet, insisted that 
«we shall honour those bonds which have linked us so inseparably in the past, and 
brought them to our side in two world wars)) (Thomson 1968, col. 539). 
Likewise, in the early seventies, during the Heath negotiations, Harold 
Wilson, while demanding more safeguards for the dairy products of New Zealand 
from the Tories who allegedly «sold the New Zealand interests short, did not omit to 
remind his colleagues of the New Zealanders' «spirit of sacrifice in Britain's interest 
to keep us fed» (Wilson 1971c, 357). «New Zealand», the then party leader said, «is 
part of our history, of Britain, of national life)) (Wilson 1971c, 358). In sharp contrast 
with the New Commonwealth, the Commonwealth's role during and after the war was 
considered to be a badge of solidarity of an organic community coming together in 
times of national crisis because the Commonwealth countries were part of the British 
way of life as they stood for «social justice and as an example of stable constitutional 
democracy>> (Huckfield 1971,1958). In this sense, to be obliged to forget was the 
construction of a discourse on society that performed the problematic totalisation of 
the national will along cultural criteria such as citizenship capacities - see more in the 
immigration debates. The profound historical forgetfulness provided exactly that 
space within which the racist ideas from the imperial past could be elaborated anew in 
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the new, culturalist discourse (Lawrence 1992,70). The essence of British culture has, 
after all, depended on a kind of historical forgetfulness which reworks the whole 
meaning of «Britishness» in powerful images of the purity of the nation, family and 
way of life, now jeopardised by the alien, external wedge. As Russell Kerr, the 
Australian Labour MP, who was a wartime member of the Royal Air Force Bomber 
Command flying Lancasters over Germany with a mixed Commonwealth aircrew, 
accusing the Tory government of «short-sightedness and lack of a sense of history, 
said, «the Commonwealth is based upon democratic decencies and the rule of 
law... and has contributed substantially to world peace)) at variance with the 
authoritarian spirit of the European countries (Kerr 1972, col. 1400). 
Finally, during the row over the farm price issue during the Falklands war - 
see chapter 3- once more the links, allegiances and everlasting loyalties of the British 
nation and New Zealand were considered to be forged during the times of emergency 
such as war time. It was argued that to be part of the British nation was above all to 
have been there at its `finest hour' : 
«T'here is no alternative outlet for New Zealand butterfat 
that now comes to the Common Market. Are we elected 
to this place to eliminate the economy of one of our 
greatest allies in two world wars? ) 
(Pavitt 1980, col. 943) 
Q do not need to be lectured about the contribution that 
New Zealand made to this country during the last war, or 
about the amazing and valuable contribution that both New 
Zealand and Australia made to post-war reconstruction. I hate 
to think what would have happened to our food supplies in the 
immediate post-war period but for the co-operation and 
generosity of our Commonwealth friends in Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada)) (Stoddart 1980a, col. 968) 
In conclusion, as Hall (1978) has assumed, the development of an indigenous 
British racism in the post-war period began with profound forgetfulness - loss of 
historical memory, a kind of historical amnesia, a decisive mental repression - which 
overtook the British people about race and Empire since the late 1950s. The native, 
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homegrown variety of racism, as part of the racial longue duree (Winant 1994; 2000), 
began with this attempt to wipe out and efface every trace of the colonial and imperial 
past. Behind the facades of a society which had fought Hitler to defend human 
freedom and dignity there were many worrying signs that the values for which Nazi 
Germany had been opposed - racism, anti-Semitism and authoritarianism - were 
themselves part of British society (Williamson 1988,171). Clearly, as seen in previous 
chapters, that was one effect of the traumatic adjustment to the very process of 
bringing Empire to an end. As the `bastard' children of Empire set up camps in the 
heartlands of the mother country, a degree of internalisation was forced on the 
reluctant Briton. The blacks were now a home-grown problem. The `alien' cultures of 
the blacks were seen as either the cause or else the most visible symptom of the 
destruction of the `British way of life'. They were in Britain but, as Labour discourse 
reveals, not of Britain. They did not just share a common past but also, as the next 
chapter argues, were not on the same point of the historical journey. 
9.3 War Memories and New Labour 
Lucy Noakes has argued that as the Second World War inevitably fades from 
living memory a new sense of shared identity will develop (Noakes 1998,170). 
However, a close look at the New Labour discourse tells us that despite their 
diminished significance during the last stages of the European debate, war memories 
cannot be so easily discredited as part of the party's temporal nationhood. The myths 
that have accompanied war memories, especially those concerning the country's 
national character, have underpinned the New Labour's Britain's `greatness in retreat', 
at a time when the rights and privileges of nation-state are challenged by the ongoing 
European integration. 
At the 1996 party Conference, the war memories figured in Tony Blair's 
definition of the New Labour's view of the British nation: 
«Consider a thousand years of British history and what 
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it tells us (... ) two World Wars in which 
our country was bled dry. This is our nation, 
our characteristics - common sense, standing up 
for the underdog, fiercely independent» 
(Blair 1996b, 87) 
This spirit of pride is evident when we turn to the `special relationship' with 
the Atlantic ally. As mentioned in the space of the nation, New Labour's Britishness is 
not restricted to the European contours. The party has not abandoned Britain's world 
role pretensions. By standing shoulder to shoulder with Britain's closest ally, America, 
the Labour party is reconsecrating the special relationship which underwrote the 
country's finest hours from the Second World War, redeeming its national past, 
reaffirming its status as a former and future world power, and making thus difficult its 
adaptation to a European role. Thus, the war memories have strengthened the 
contemporary vision of `greatness in retreat' - see space of the nation. This perhaps 
explains Tony Blair's elaborate toast of Bill Clinton at a White House banquet, where, 
as Martin Kettle notes: `Blair quoted Harry Hopkins' biblical remarks to Churchill in 
the midst of the second world war: «Whither thou goest I will go, and whither thou 
lodgest I will lodge. Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God». Then Blair 
continued: «And Hopkins paused, and then he said, `Even to the end', and Churchill 
wepto (Kettlle 1998). 
Additionally, for New Labour the significance of war memories is such that 
the latter continue to divide those members who have a right to belong to the same 
association of nations with Britain and those who do not. For New Labour, war 
memories still underline a special character and its arguments are imbued with the 
spirit of pride and superiority. Tony Blair has said that the European nations owe their 
freedom to the British soldiers: «British servicemen died to set Europe free)) (Blair 
2000a). Like previously, Britain feels allegiance only with those European countries 
who have `fought' and 'suffered' along with the British soldiers. At the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange, Tony Blair devoted a considerable part of his speech to the Second 
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World War and especially recalled the role of Poland and its right to gain entry to the 
European Union because of that: 
((Britain went to war in 1939 because Hitler invaded 
Poland. Robbed of their own homeland, the Polish 
people gave themselves selflessly in the liberation of 
Western Europe, only to see the iron curtain come down 
on Poland. Winston Churchill said of the pilots who so 
valiantly and against such odds defended the last bastion 
of resistance in Europe against Hitler's air armadas that 
never had so many owed so much to so few. And of 
those few, the Polish pilots are remembered and revered 
for their courage, their skill, their idealism. They laid 
down their lives not in defence of their own country, but 
in defence of an ideal, in defence of a free Europe. As 
the Allied forces struggled to roll back fascism, Polish 
servicemen marched, fought and died for that same 
ideal, shoulder-to-shoulder with their British comrades; 
in the Battle of the Atlantic; at Tobruk and Monte 
Cassino; in Normandy; the unsung heroes of the Special 
Operations Executive and the most spectacular 
intelligence coup of the Second World War, Enigma. 
Few countries have contributed more to the fall of 
fascism and Soviet dictatorship in Europe. Now we 
want you in the European Union» (Blair 2000e). 
In the same way, the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook also praised the role of 
the Czech Republic during the war: «Czech soldiers and airmen fought alongside 
British troops during the World War II» (Cook 19970. In comparison with the other 
candidate-countries for membership of the EU, Poland and Czech Republic, on the 
grounds of common memories, appear to have a legitimate right to become members 
of the European family of nations. 
9.4 Conclusion 
During the European debates, the double temporality of war memories in the 
Labour party's discourse was indicated, on the one hand, by the continuity of British 
life, institutions and shared values of freedom and democracy, and, on the other, by 
the differentiation from those nations associated with authoritarianism, militarism and 
cowardice, and by the exclusion of those populations from New Commonwealth who 
were not registered in Labour's memory of the war. The development of indigenous 
racism coincided with Britain's adjustment to the loss of Empire and Labour had a 
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great share in it. Although they have lost their significance the last few years, New 
Labour has consciously stressed the we stood alone' rhetoric in order to sustain not 
only Britain's special character but also its pride, superiority and `greatness in retreat' 
in relation to the other European nations in the face of the ongoing European 
integration. 
Yet, the development of racism, as a result of the disjunctive forms of 
representation of certain populations who have signified a threat to British way of life, 
is also made possible by the way the Empire has been remembered. 
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CHAPTER 10 
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 
10.1 Introduction 
The possession of a heroic past does not exhaust the significance of the time 
of the nation. Reminiscent of the Romantics, theorists such as Anderson have added 
that a nation also conceives itself as an organic community moving steadily down (or 
up) history (Anderson 1991,26). Lucius Outlaw has argued that evolutionary theory, 
as opposed to typological thinking, has now become the dominant intellectual 
framework for explanations of human and natural difference (Outlaw 1990,67). The 
ordering of human groups along an ascending scale (from primitive to civilised in the 
nineteenth century and from underdeveloped to developed in the twentieth) has made 
possible the equation of race and nation. Indeed, as Kate Manzo has noted, the sense 
of being at the same point on a historical journey is just as important to national 
identity as common ownership of the past (Manzo 1996,63). The memory and 
practice of Empire, where the twin notions of time - as a possession and a journey - 
come together to create the British nation as a progenitor of global development 
constituted the second aspect of the Labour party's temporal Britishness. 
10.2 Labour and the `Trusteeship' concept 
However, at the end of the war and throughout the European debates, Labour 
was in a certain confusion in its attitude towards Commonwealth -a mixture of 
thought made up, on the one hand, of a recognition of the rights of all people to self- 
determination; and, on the other, of a sense of responsibility for the welfare of those 
who were backward. The irony in Labour attitudes was the deployment of the 
discourse of the economic and moral development of the colonies just when their 
guardianship was ending. This confusion led to two distinct lines of policy: the 
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complete shedding of imperialism as far as the more advanced of the dependent 
peoples were concerned; and the application of the principle of trusteeship - or 
benevolent imperialism - for the rest. 
As a result, as seen in the space of the nation, throughout the European 
debates what was recalled was a benign, nonviolent, benevolent and progressive 
Empire. Even when the Empire officially ceased to exist, there was a shared 
assumption of British cultural superiority within the ranks of the party. In concise 
terms, the end of the Empire was suffused with a general attitude of paternal 
superiority; the talk was all of `trusteeship' (Foot 1982a, 638); `standards' (Henderson 
1964,1177; Jay 1968b, 125; Gaitskell 1970), `conditions', `building up', `guidance' 
(Wilson 1964a, 424), `responsibility' (Griffiths 1967,1130; Callaghan 1987,313) and 
`granting' (Lawrence 1992,66). These paternalistic beliefs about the Commonwealth 
were part a wider web of beliefs, which can be traced back to nineteenth century 
Britain. 
Rita Hinden has noted that humanitarianism, a spirit of trusteeship, a sense of 
mission, and a concept of what was due to growing children were stronger currents of 
thought than the crude balance-sheets of profit and loss within the ethical strand of 
British socialism (Hinden 1949,113). Its inspiration came from the great struggles for 
the abolition of the slave trade early in the nineteenth century. The Abolitionists were 
inspired by certain ideas of human rights and liberties and by a love of humanity 
rather than by economic arguments. Attention was drawn to conditions in Africa and 
the West Indies. The strong non-conformist conscience of Victorian times which 
contributed so much to the ethical content of British socialism, could not condone the 
evils of colonial rule which were gradually becoming known to people at home. This 
stream of thought did not feel that these problems would be solved automatically by 
breaking the links between Britain and the Colonies. Instead, it felt that Britain had a 
positive duty to help in the improvement of colonial conditions and to build up 
democratic self-government in the colonies (Hinden 1946,8). Inevitably, the cosmetic 
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version of the British imperialism - the idea of imperial trusteeship' for the betterment 
of backward peoples - took shape at the time (Fryer 1984,165). 
Additionally, as seen in the culture, racial Anglo-Saxonism became in some 
respects a natural accompaniment of British overseas imperialism since it was an 
ideology that both embodied a view of the historical past as well as stressing the 
common racial make-up of the white British colonies of settlement. It developed 
though in the wake of a debate about the nature of the British `national character' in 
the mid-years of the nineteenth century (Rich 1986,13). By the turn of the century 
English people took for granted that Europeans were the top race and that among 
Europeans, the inhabitants of the British Isles `had achieved the apogee of human 
existence and were uniquely endowed by the Creator with qualities and attributes 
lacking in other lesser human beings (Fryer 1984). 
Thus, the trusteeship plank in British imperial policy had two main 
components: it was a blend of the missionaries' view that Africans `represented 
unregenerate mankind, sinful and unwashed' and the pseudo-scientific arguments for 
racial superiority. Since Africans were inferior, said the trusteeship theory, the British 
who ruled them owed them a special obligation, not unlike the obligations that decent 
Englishmen owed to women. (Fryer 1984,383). The vocabulary of `advanced' and 
`backward' nations/races was a frequent device used by Victorians to understand the 
international plane since it extended the discourse of British class politics and the 
debate over the family into the realm of inter-state relations, as seen in previous 
chapters. 
The development of the Commonwealth ideal did much to attenuate the 
appeal of segregationism in British political discourse on race. The nineteenth century 
mythology of black races as essentially rural and pastoral peoples governed by norms 
and values inherently antithetic to those of the urbanised and advanced metropolitan 
races of Western Europe and North America thus continued to shape and guide much 
of the mainstream thinking in Britain on race up to the Second World War. As Hinden 
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(1946; 1949) remarked, between 1933 and 1942 Labour stressed that the British 
people had a serious `responsibility for the welfare of these many millions of people' 
and that `in raising the standard of life of workers who are now used to depress 
general world standards, they are not only carrying out principles of justice and 
equity, but are doing something which will substantially promote the security and 
welfare of the British people themselves'. 
In 1948 Arthur Creech Jones, Labour Colonial Secretary of the Attlee 
administration, summed up the post war party attitudes to New Commonwealth: «the 
central purpose of British colonial policy is simple. It is to guide the colonial 
territories to responsible self-government>> (cited in Hinden 1949). The statement was 
to become a basis of future policy for both Labour and Tory politicians. British left- 
wing opinion on race and Empire remained ultimately restricted both by its 
predominant concern with the fostering of black agrarian societies free from 
penetration or exploitation by white settler capitalism and the championing of the 
cultural values and folkways of peasant, as opposed to proletarian, social groupings 
(Rich 1986,203). This left successive party leaderships unprepared to cope with the 
advent of black immigrants into urban working class communities in the post-war 
years. Long after the material conditions that originally gave rise to these racist ideas 
had disappeared, these ideas went on gripping the minds of the British political 
establishment. Trusteeship was a concept now accepted by all parties, yet it involved 
no theory of political development and rested substantially on the ability of local 
governors and the static nature of tribal rule. The Labour party, while conceding the 
principle of independence, was too timid to take positive action: maintenance of 
`trusteeship' and `good government' were the first priorities (Davis 1963,79). 
Turning now to the party discourse in the early sixties, Hugh Gaitskell's ideal 
of «Commonwealth standards)) or «ideals» (Gaitskell 1970,209-211), that is, the 
notion that it embodied the principle of the richer members helping the poorer ones, 
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reflected to a great extent the above notions. The party leader of the time put it 
explicitly when he referred to New Commonwealth nations: 
((today as never before in history the so-called 
backward countries in Asia and Africa are determined to 
break loose from the static economy with the standard 
of living permanently anchored to subsistence level; 
they are determined to imitate the industrialised and 
developed nations with their rising curves of 
productivity and their ever-increasing prosperity. But 
the process of swift transition is a profoundly difficult 
one for these countries - socially, politically and 
technically (... ) to carry it through there must be help 
from outside. Thus, (... ) the obligation of other 
Commonwealth countries to help is inescapable» 
(Gaitskell 1970,211) 
For the party leader, the social, political and cultural backwardness of the 
New Commonwealth made it difficult for them to reach the other old Commonwealth 
countries, which were called to assume the responsibility to help them to reach higher 
levels of development. The old white Commonwealth, that is, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, was considered as something of the greatest value, with a mission «to 
spread democratic institutions and ideas and bridge the gulf between races, colours, 
standards of living and continents)) (Jay 1968b, 125). «We all have an obligation, 
James Griffiths said, «to the countries which in the past were conquered, acquired 
and... exploited by us» (Griffiths 1967, col. 1130). Even as a member of the Common 
Market, Britain, according to Griffiths, out of moral responsibility and differential 
nature, had to assume a leading role vto lessen the terrifying gap between the poor and 
rich nations of the world» (Griffiths ibid, col. 1131). At the same time, the proposals, 
enunciated at the time, for a «co-operative Commonwealth» (Castle 1957) and for a 
«Commonwealth Bank» (C. Jenkins 1961) were both in accordance with the party's 
residual attachment to the paternalistic, trusteeship credo. 
During the European debates every party leadership sought `safeguards'. 
`protection' and `better deals' for the Commonwealth countries on the grounds of 
possession of a common past. «We have been in control of their destinies for 125 or 
130 years», it was argued (Loughlin 1964,1218). Wilson did not see Britain as a 
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merely European country. «We have a role in issues going far beyond Europe looking 
at problems not through European eyes but through eyes whose vision has been 
sharpened by years of active partnership in the greatest multi-cultural system in the 
world» (Wilson 1962a, col. 1282). That is why, when he announced in the Commons 
the decision of his government to make a second application for British membership 
of the EEC, Harold Wilson stated that owe have the bounden duty to seek the 
necessary safeguards (for the Commonwealth countries)» (Wilson 1967b, col. 1073). 
In the early seventies, Wilson's concern about Commonwealth sugar and New 
Zealand butter were a matter of «moral obligation (Callaghan 1987,313). It was 
once more due to the «vast experience in terms of aid to the developing world» (Oram 
1972,83) that Britain had to secure the best terms for the Commonwealth countries. 
Likewise, in the early eighties, Michael Foot, stressing the common past, felt that the 
Falklands islanders' «trust» in the `mother country' was the most important reason for 
the latter to act because «they have looked to us over the past 150 years (... ) for 
special protection (Foot 1982a, col. 639). It was the time when, for the second time in 
forty years, Britain was defending «civilisation as our ancestors» (English 1982, 
1025). Despite the Commonwealth's declining influence, the Labour party as a whole 
considered that it had to live up to a legacy and fulfil its responsibilities towards the 
association that enhanced the country's world standing. As Miller (1995) has noted, 
the historic national community is a community of obligation. Because our forebears 
have toiled and spilt their blood to build and defend the nation, we who are born into 
it inherit an obligation to continue their work, which we discharge partly towards our 
contemporaries and partly towards our descendants. The historical community 
stretches forward into the future too. This then means that, if we are going to speak of 
the nation as an ethical community, we are talking about a community that is not one 
that the present generation can renounce. This involves an essentially historical 
understanding in which the present generation is seen as heirs to a tradition, which 
they then pass on to their successors. Of course the story is continually being 
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rewritten; each generation revises the past as it comes to terms with the problems of 
the present. Nonetheless, there is a sense in which the past always constrains the 
present: present identities are built out of the materials that are handed down, not 
started from scratch (Miller 1995,175). 
So, it was not accidental that it was not just the Eurosceptics who repeatedly 
maintained that the EEC inhibited British to fulfil «a duty to the outside world» (De 
Freitas 1970, col. 497), to lead «a crusade to raise the living standard of 2,000 million 
people who are living on the margin of misery» (Henderson 1964, col. 1177), but also 
the `moderate' pro-Europeans such as George Brown and Roy Jenkins who viewed 
the Commonwealth in terms of «care for the poorer nations of the multiracial 
association of nations)) (Brown 1962,193) and «world progress)) (Jenkins 1972a, 79). 
The Labour representatives were adamant in their opinion that their own 
political and cultural system was superior to all others, that they had a civilising 
mission. However, as Hinden (1949) had noted, the trouble with all imperial 
trusteeships was that they infringed the fundamental dignity of the dependent people. 
«We cannot teach and preach democracy and liberty and equality between all men, far 
less try to practice these principles in our policy, without ourselves challenging the 
whole colonial system which rests on autocracy, subjection and flagrant inequality, 
said the head of the Fabian Colonial Bureau in the forties (Hinden 1949,172). And 
she concluded saying that <the imperialist's `blind spot' is another psychological 
problem of its own. Perhaps the mere fact of being a `master race' brings down a 
certain shutter in our understanding of others. Perhaps we suffer, inevitably, from 
something of patronage, of superiority towards our dependents. And feelings of 
superiority may be just as harmful to clear thinking as feelings of persecution and 
inferiority>> (Hinden 1949,174). 
Bearing in mind the last comments, we can realise how difficult it was, not 
just for the Labour representatives, but also for the inhabitants of the British isles to 
accept the black immigrants as fellow citizens carrying the same rights, enjoying the 
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same social status and, of course, sharing the same temporality with them. For this 
reason, we argued in chapter 3 that Labour did not adopt restrictive and discriminative 
policies in the nineteen sixties by merely responding passively to public hostility 
towards black immigrants and electoral calculations. Assuming the aforementioned 
paternalistic attitudes, the party representatives could not regard the New 
Commonwealth populations who came to Britain as more than `lesser human beings'. 
The imperial past in no way determined the shape of contemporary racism, but the 
attitudes of superior/inferior, responsible/irresponsible, mother/children, 
barbarism/civilisation, etc. provided a reserve of images upon which racists and 
racism could play. It helped explain the specific way racist ideas were formed in the 
British context (Lawrence 1992,68) and apparently continue to shape contemporary 
party notions of temporal Britishness. 
10.3 New Labour and the Twilight of Greatness 
As said earlier, New Labour praises the benevolent legacy of Empire by 
being most eager to extol an `outward-looking approach to the world' or `outward- 
looking open-mindedness'. Nowhere is this more the case in Africa. Blair has 
developed an intense fascination with the problems facing sub-Saharan Africa in 
which there is the patriotic sense of a moral, almost Christian duty - that Britain 
should have a pivotal role in the world because of a tradition of enlightened foreign 
policy. According to his cabinet memo: "New Labour is standing up for Britain in the 
world: fighting for ethical values" (Hunt 2001). It is exactly those values that the 
British Empire embodied and that New Labour wants to project over Europe. 
Tony Blair said to his constituents in his 2000 New Year message: 
«There's still no place on earth that has our combination 
of qualities. Our creativity, our determination, our 
courage, our sense of fairness. Foreigners will continue 
to ask: why does such a small country produce so many 
great actors, singers, authors, architects? Why is there 
such a concentration of ground-breaking scientists, 
inventors, thinkers? "The answer I think is that there is 
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still something called the British genius -a collection of 
qualities deep in our character. We will always stand out 
as a nation, we will never be a run-of-the-mill people 
doing run- of-the-mill things» (Blair 1999n). 
Thus the twilight of Greatness remains unextinguished. New Labour's vision 
of British leadership in Europe is apparently determined by a deep sense of her past. 
Promoting a self-confident image for his country Blair noted that history had taught 
them that British could not be `run-of-the-mill-people'. The British had still much to 
be proud of. He also said at the 1996 party Conference: 
«Consider a thousand years of British history and what 
it tells us (... ) an Empire, the largest the world 
has ever known, relinquished in peace, the invention of virtually 
every scientific device of the modern world (... )» 
(Blair 1996b, 87) 
The leading role assumed by Britain in Europe today lies in representing 
those key values and ideas of adaptability, outward-looking openness, creativity, 
solidarity, democracy and enterprise (Blair 1999h), that bound the dominions and 
made her `Great' in the past and which today are deemed necessary for the other 
European nations in order to adapt to the rcquircmcnts of the modem complex world. 
Precisely, on these grounds of national character and the teachings of history, Britain 
has today a «strong sense of national purpose, underpinned by clear values>> and 
aspires to be «a champion of enlargement» (Cook 2000c). 
Inevitably, there is no sign or reason of apologising about the atrocities made 
in its name because of the significant legacy it passed on through its worldwide links 
and the cultural values that these links reflected. New Labour does not take a 
defensive posture to British history. As leading commentators have pointed out, 
«Britain had much to be proud of that did not entail the brutalities of imperialism, but 
that it co-existed with social and political change. When India achieved independence 
there were many Tories who believed that Britain, having begun to surrender its 
Empire, had undermined its own raison d'etre. It should now be clear that they 
misread history in the same way that terrified anti-reformers of modern Conservatism 
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invoke their static view of what nation means)) (Young 2000). The party leader has 
noted that owe should not either be apologising for it, or wringing our hands about the 
Empire. It is a fact of our history. It was, in many ways, a most extraordinary 
achievement and it has left us with some very valuable connections - in the 
Commonwealth, in the English language» (Blair 1997e). 
In parallel with the world role assumptions ('greatness in retreat'), New 
Labour has not apparently abandoned the Social Darwinist spirit of trusteeship as 
well. Actually, New Labour has transposed the `trusteeship' concept to Eastern and 
Central Europe and presents in a paternalistic way the process of enlargement as a 
kind of civilising mission, as an ascending scale toward a pan-Europeanisation. 
In particular, for New Labour, like the Fabians in the immediate post-war 
period, Europe is divided between the Western democratic, politico-economically 
modernised societies and the Eastern world where democracy, economic and political 
integration cannot grow without help from outside. «We in the West» said Blair, 
«intend to honour a special sense of obligation)) towards countries, which suffer from 
the abuse of human rights - see Kosovo (Blair 1999g). According to the Prime 
Minister, «Britain, France and Germany standing together as partners, friends and 
equals)) are the guarantors of democracy, human rights and prosperity (Blair 1999g). 
Those countries are responsible for securing a common future for all the nations of the 
Continent: «let us offer a common vision of the future: where nations become part of 
the true family of Europe, part of our security, part of our prosperity. (Blair 1999g). 
Likewise, speaking to the Hungarian Ambassadors' Conference in Budapest, 
Robin Cook stressed the socio-economic gap between the Western Europe and the 
East and Central by noting that «enlargement will end the division of our continent by 
standards of prosperity)) (Cook 2000c). The Foreign Secretary also placed particular 
emphasis on the socio-political standards to which these countries should adhere in 
order to become members of the European family: <<Enlargement will help make our 
continent more stable by integrating more countries into a Union that promotes the 
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principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and respect for human and 
minority rights» (Cook 2000c). As seen in the debates over immigration and asylum, 
populations from the East and Central Europe whose countries «have not improved 
their human rights record» (Straw 2001a, col. 485) are seen by the New Labour 
government as just another group of outsiders who must be excluded. Furthermore, 
personally, Tony Blair has reprimanded Poland and Czech Republic for their inability 
to deter their nationals from coming illegally to the British Isles (Bamber and 
Cracknell 2000). 
Besides, in relation to the market economy, all the talk is about `the front- 
runners' or `first rank or wave applicants' who have made `rapid progress', other 
applicant countries who `have further to go', in order to meet the `established criteria' 
of `flexibility', `employability', `enterpreunership' and take part in the European 
nation's historical journey (Cook 1997e; f; g). For instance, addressing Czechs, the 
Foreign Secretary assured them that «Britain is determined to help you make that 
journey (... ) through targeted assistance... » (Cook 1997f). Action Plans are the main 
vehicle for UK support to individual applicant countries. The aim of the Action Plans 
is to bring together and enhance the UK's practical support for reforms in the 
applicant states. It enables better co-ordination and targeting of the UK's pre- 
accession assistance. Activities include secondments and information exchanges in 
fields from agriculture to local government reform. Progress across the range of 
activity under the action plan is reviewed at regular intervals. So far, Action Plans 
have been developed with the following countries: Bulgaria (2001), Czech Republic 
(2000), Estonia (1999), I Iungaria (2000), Latvia (2000), Poland (1999), Romania 
(2001), Slovakia (2000), Slovenia (1999), Malta (1999) (FCO 1999). 
If the `advanced' and `backward' races of the New Commonwealth were the 
object of trusteeship and responsibility in the post-war period, now the `first wave' and 
`second rank' nations of the Central and Eastern Europe should reach specific socio- 
economic standards in order to gain entry in the European family of nations - see also 
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the social Darwinist-inspired talk about Victorian entrepreneurialism in chapter 8. As a 
consequence those nations and populations who do not possess the same historical 
time or cannot take part in the same journey with Britain are excluded from the 
European family in which the UK has assumed a leading role. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, racism in the post-war period, however, is 
not simply a rehash of old ideas. There have been many significantly different racisms 
- each historically specific and articulated in a different way with the societies in 
which they appear. Racism is always historically specific in this way (Hall 1978,26). 
Though it may draw on the cultural and ideological traces, which are deposited in a 
society by previous historical phases, it always assumes specific forms, which arise 
out of present conditions and organisation of society. As the previous analysis has 
revealed, the two core images of colonial peoples, as children needing protection or as 
the equally immature `brutal savage', gained new meanings and inflexions in the 
period of decolonisation and, today, again, their signification is being reinvented. In 
this sense, like its spatial and cultural dimensions the New Labour's temporal 
Britishness cannot be defined in isolation from the racial `other' - be they European, 
Asian or African. 
10.3 Conclusion 
As the analysis of the Labour party's discourse on the European question has 
demonstrated so far, national identity refers to the process by which people who live 
within national borders (space of the nation) feel themselves to be members of that 
nation on the grounds of shared beliefs and values (culture of the nation) in opposition 
to those `others' who are not considered to be members of the imagined community. 
The disjunctive forms of belonging as embodied in the boundary conscience and 
cultural identity of the Labour party's Britishness applies no less to the temporal 
dimension of the nation. War memories underlined the continuity of special qualities 
of British character by differentiating the latter from alien cultures through the 
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performative strategy of historical forgetfulness and distortion of European history 
that led to the negative racialisation of the character of particular nations and 
populations. In the same way, memories of a benevolent Empire indicated British 
cultural superiority over those populations who needed protection that resulted in the 
construction of images (child/parent) which fed racist ideas in the post-war Britain, 
making thus impossible for the party representatives, or, even indigenous population, 
to accept black immigrants as fellow citizens. The current problems with immigrants 
from the East and Central Europe are perhaps due to the fact that New Labour has 
transposed many of the aforementioned notions of imperial benevolence to the 
European context. It remains to be seen whether the continuing attachment to varying 
degrees of whiteness and the negative signification of the blackness can provide New 
Labour with scapegoats in order to tackle the problems arising from the uncertain 
position of nation state within the global context. 
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PART 5 
TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS 
CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSIONS 
During the last few years, there has been a sprawling debate about British 
identity and Europe. What is Britain? When was Britain? Does Britain still exist? Will 
Britain survive? Political commentators have declared Britain "dead" and "abolished" 
(Man 2000; Hitchens 1999). Tom Nairn maintains that the single currency is the 
precursor of vast social and political mutations in the new millennium (Nairn 2000, 
16). 
Before we respond to these questions, it is necessary to examine to what 
extent we have fulfilled our aim of producing a coherent account of the competing 
visions of the Labour party's Britishness, which is primarily defined against the 
`other'. In order to draw out the conclusions of this study, we will first produce a 
synthesis of the conclusions drawn from each part (11.1), then go on to indicate the 
political implications arising from this thesis as a whole and, in particular, in answer 
to the previous concerns (11.2), and, finally, make suggestions for further research 
directions emerging from this work (11.3). 
11.1 A Synthetic Analysis of the Labour party's Britishness, 1961- 
2000 
From the beginning of this thesis we assumed that for the Labour party, the 
European question was not just a matter of inter- and intra-party competition, party 
management and conventions of British politics, as most scholars have suggested. The 
nationalist beliefs of Tabour on Europe are a central, if somewhat neglected part of 
the party's history. From Hugh Gaitskell's `one thousand years of British history' in 
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1962 to Tony Blair's `constructive engagement with our European partners' in 1997, 
the talk about Europe concerned the different perceptions of national identity among 
the front- and back-benchers of the party. One of the main tasks of this thesis was to 
analyse the competing visions of nationhood found within various parliamentary 
circles of the party and their corresponding intellectual traditions. The latter provide 
us with the explanatory framework of the various narratives of nation that figured in 
the Labour party's discourse on Europe. 
Following on from the initial assumption comes the particular definition of 
Labour Britishness as something more than a hybrid of civic and ethnic accounts of 
the British nation. In this study, national identity can be understood neither as a 
category nor as a mere account of its civic and ethnic components; it is primarily a 
matter of boundary negotiation and construction against the `other', the `alien'. In 
more specific terms, it is relational and contextual: the most recurring elements of 
nationhood, that is, space, culture and time become understood only in opposition to 
another race coded as `other', the `different' (relational), in moments of anxiety 
attendant upon changing global power relations (contextual). Race, coded as identity 
and difference, becomes a constitutive element in the definition of nation whose 
examination can be possible within a wider canvas. The disintegration and the loss of 
the Empire, the mass movement of populations from the Commonwealth to the 
mother country, the economic crises in the 1970s, the imperial adventure in Falklands, 
the ongoing integration and enlargement of the European Union, are some of the 
global changes against which the European debates were unfolded the last forty years. 
Bearing in mind the above assumptions, the purpose of this conclusion is not 
simply to reiterate the arguments of each chapter separately. What I intend to do is to 
give a synthetic account of Labour Britishness in which its spatial, cultural and 
temporal components intersect each other. A mere account of the conclusions drawn 
from each part, let alone each chapter, cannot provide us with a full picture of the 
labour party's Britishness, Even though the spatial component has been the most 
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salient aspect of the conceptions of British nation, it cannot always explain everything 
about Labour nationalism. What follows is the analysis of the three dominant spatial 
perceptions of British nation found in Labour discourse over the European question 
along with their cultural and temporal components in order to consider in a following 
section their possible political implications for current policy choices. 
As seen in Part 2, the space of the nation in Labour's discourse appeared in 
three different forms: the imperial of Britain and the Commonwealth; the Little 
Englander of the British Isles; and the European of Britain in the EC. 
First, Commonwealth appeared as the fulcrum of the Labour's post-war 
foreign policy. From its inception, the imperial thought of the Labour party had a 
humanitarian colouration. For the Fabians, who, in comparison with the other two 
founding socialist groups (marxists and ethical socialists), were most outspoken in 
support for imperialism, the question at issue was whether the British Empire could be 
made into an agency for good. Fabian imperialism defined Empire as Commonwealth 
and as a `partnership' between the races and defended imperialism as long as it 
involved a moral obligation. However, the Fabians' notion of `moral obligation' was 
conditioned by the perceived innate inferiority of the colonised. For many years the 
Fabians continued to treat Africans as `sub- human'. Differences in law, custom and 
civilisation were used to construe human distinction. Later, Labour's construction of 
Commonwealth was built around a particular understanding of what constituted 
readiness for independence creating thus the distinction between old and new 
Commonwealth which became important during the immigration debates in the post- 
war years. As a matter of fact, Labour's discourse on Europe borrowed and re-worked 
elements from that missionary liberalism in order to defend and re-enact the imperial 
`imagined' space as an index of greatness and a sign of a world power with still a 
`civilising', `moral' mission around the world. 
Thus, defying trading patterns, politico-economic transoceanic fantasies in 
tabour revived the White Man's Burden and made the Common Market look like a 
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narrow association with insignificant world influence. Gaitskell's ideal of 
`Commonwealth standards', Wilson's belief in the Greater Britain ('Britain's frontier 
at the Himalayas') and the assumption of a peace-keeping role in Asia were evidence 
for the sheer breadth of this largesse which was expected to enfold the world's poor 
shielding them from Brussels. In the 1970s, the end of the `East of Suez' role did not 
mean that the British socialists abandoned the `post-imperial Great power syndrome'. 
One of the central objections of Labour to the terms of entry negotiated by the 
Conservative government of Edward Heath in 1972 was the protection of agricultural 
exports to Britain from Australia and New Zealand. Heath's arrangements were seen 
as a `betrayal of the Commonwealth', whereas pro-Europeans presented Europe as a 
surrogate for the lost Empire and expressed concerns for a more `outward-looking 
foreign policy'. Like their colleagues, the European-minded MPs were not 
accustomed to seeing Britain as a medium size country. As a result, in the early 
1980s, a crisis in one of the post-imperial leftovers, such as the Falklands Islands, 
brought to the surface the ever-lasting imperial loyalties. The `defence of the rights of 
the people' by words alone could not satisfy the Labour party's liberal imperialism. 
The imagery of a `sceptred isle set in a silver sea', powerfully supported by the 
English-speaking world from across the seas, continued to set the context for 
Labour's entire foreign policy, not only its European policy. The Falklands episode 
reignited the anti-narrowness grandeur so that the role of the Europeans during the 
crisis was judged along these terms. As the ensuing debates over CAP showed, 
Europeans were still the `narrow-minded people', whereas the Commonwealth people 
were the real patriots. Finally, the transoceanic identity remains unextinguished in 
New Labour's psyche. The balancing influence between the American continent and 
Europe is the self-acclaimed role assumed by Britain due to her glorious past and 
world links. Britain as a European nation still embodies the connection between the 
English speaking world transplanting into the Continent those values and principles 
that have enabled her and America to respond to the new challenges of the global 
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economy. Accordingly, British premier's favourite motto, when talking about 
America, has been that «there is no more important task in international statesmanship 
today than to bind America and Europe close together)) (Blair 2000d). The issues of 
the single market and defence indicate New Labour's adherence to the globalisers. 
Delusions of grandeur and claims of moral superiority remained linked to the 
racially discriminating practices that the party adopted against those `others' who did 
not share the character of the national community. Whereas Commonwealth stood for 
British greatness, the postcolonial black immigration in the sixties and seventies 
questioned the standing of the British political community. As the immigration 
debates of that period have unveiled, alien cultures were alleged to embody a threat, 
which in turn, invited the conclusion that national decline and weakness had been 
caused by the arrival of blacks. 
First, Labour reinforced the image of the coloured minorities as suitable for 
menial, un-British jobs. Thus, the political community of the Commonwealth was 
ruptured by a notion of labour market, and the union of British brethren became a 
pool of mobile labour, which was in turn associated with arguments about social 
pressure and prior claims on resources. Racism appeared as a discourse of 
marginalisation, which is integral to a process of domination. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom in the literature, Labour did not reflect popular racism; rather, 
Labour instigated it by adopting discriminating practices. Second, the party 
representatives voiced arguments about the irreconcilability of the British way of life 
with that of the coloured Commonwealth citizens. The restrictive character of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Acts in 1968 and 1971 narrowed the expansive ideology 
of the Commonwealth and the imperial family of nations bonded in common 
citizenship to a more parochial that saw culture in neat and tidy national formations. 
Labour parliamentary references to immigrants invoked notions of development 
(literacy, education and competence in English) as indicative of difference. Hence, 
multiculturalism represented a means to an unequal society. In the 1980s, the 
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immigrant from the New Commonwealth was still the unwanted, the undesirable, 
despite the assurances given by some MPs for a less racist policy. Nowadays, 
refugees and asylum seekers have been racialised along the same lines. 
As becomes evident, the imperial vision of the British nation in Labour's 
discourse cannot be examined in solely geographical terms. Cultural and temporal 
elements intersect with space. 
In relation to common culture, nationalism relies heavily on the idea of 
nation as a family with myths and symbols which act as `border guards', 
distinguishing `us' from `them'. In particular, the Houses of Parliament have been 
regarded as the summit of Anglo-Saxon civilisation. Especially, in the post-war 
period, as crude biologism gave way to new (cultural) racism, law and parliamentary 
process became more important as a marker for the cultural processes. In this sense, 
the black immigrants were considered unable to adhere to the British culture. Illegal 
immigration and propensity to criminal activities confirmed their alien status. As a 
result, the protection of the rights and welfare of the British people justified racial 
discrimination against the immigrants. Apart from cultural distinctiveness, the extra- 
territorial vision of Commonwealth also involved a distinctive temporality. 
The sense of shared time in this thesis is termed as a possession of a heroic 
past and as a historical journey. First, memory and practice of Empire came together 
to create the British nation as a progenitor of global development. As seen above, 
throughout the European debates what was recalled was a benign and benevolent 
Empire. All the post-war party leaders subscribed to it. This meant, on the one hand, 
the defence of the rights of all the people and, on the other, a sense of responsibility 
for the welfare of the backward ones. This led to the shedding of imperialism as far as 
the more advanced people were concerned and the application of the trusteeship for 
the rest. Hence, the exclusion and the inscription of cultural differences, which 
stressed the unsuitability of Commonwealth people who could not be part of the same 
journey as the indigenous population. Second, in relation to war memories, to the 
321 
party representatives, the role of the old Commonwealth during the war was 
considered to be a badge of solidarity of an organic community. Instead, the New 
Commonwealth was not considered part of the historical journey. They were not there 
and did not share in Britain's greatness. Hence, they were somehow inferior citizens. 
But the imperial vision of the British nation was not the only layer of Labour 
Britishness. Little Englanderism gained prominence at a time when the 
Commonwealth was in decline and the international financial system exerted huge 
pressure on the British economy. In the 1970s, to a significant segment of the party it 
appeared that the only way to respond effectively to (British degeneration» was to 
become «a nation of Little Englanders. Little Englanderism was dominant in the 
ethical tradition of British socialism. Robert Blatchford exhibited a very insular ideal 
of a self-sufficient community free from foreign influences. As a consequence, the 
nation and the working class of other nations were always potential enemies, for the 
prominent ethical socialist. Radicalism (`Britain for the British'), economic 
nationalism and racialism intersected each other. In similar terms, the radical 
expression of the Labour party in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Bennite New Left, 
put forward their own populist, though insular vision. Thus, Labour turned to a kind 
of economic nationalism as expressed in the Programmes of 1973,1976 and the 
Alternative Economic Strategy - which was a combination of central planning, public 
ownership, import controls and industrial democracy - and became the basis of the 
1983 election manifesto that presented a non-nuclear `Fortress Britain'. In essence, 
Little Englanderism was mainly associated with a shared reluctance within the party 
to see any weakening of the powers which a future Labour government might wish to 
use to control or direct its own affairs, either on the economic front or over the border 
controls. Yet, the arguments over sovereignty at that time were more about what it 
meant to be British in a world without Empire; what was its standing among the other 
nations. These concerns were articulated in renewed interpretations of warfare. The 
instinctive movement towards the en-closure of the nation, made race become the 
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framework through which the crisis was experienced and the means by which this 
crisis was to be resolved. Echoing 13latchford, Labour defended the welfare state in 
racialised terms, as `our' welfare system that should be used to benefit `us' and should 
not be exploited by `them'. As a result, all the party talk was about farmers worried 
about `fewer defences' against European imports, fears of a wholesale invasion of 
Britain by workers from across the Channel. 
Cultural and temporal elements interacted with the narrow vision of 
Britishness. On the one hand, culturally, French anti-Catholicism presented Britain 
with the self-image of a Protestant `freedom-loving' people in contrast to the 
Continentals' `absolutism'. In this sense, Labour's Protestant inner beliefs made them 
feel as a people apart, an insular nation. In their thinking, Britain had a moral mission 
towards the underdeveloped world through the special relationship with the 
Commonwealth; by contrast, at the time of Little Englander isolationism, Catholicism 
was associated with `higher taxes' and iniquity. Although religion has lost its power 
on the party's thinking during the last two decades, Labour's latent Protestantism 
might resurface in the face of a renewed confrontation with the Europeans. 
Furthermore, the Houses of Parliament, whose Protestant nature is undeniable, were 
depicted as the guarantors of the rights of the British people, whereas Europeans were 
presented as strangers to and enemies of the British democracy. Hence, the calls 
coming from the Little Englander camp for the restoration of the fiscal and legal 
rights of Parliament from Brussels to Westminster. On the other hand, memories of 
the Second World War (time of the nation) reinforced this feeling of separateness 
from the Continent and of the special character and moral superiority of the Anglo- 
Saxon institutions; the image of Britain being the benevolent overseer and the 
enlightened democratic power in Europe. Labour emphasised with their owe stood 
alone» rhetoric, which was reminiscent of a Protestant ethos, that the British had the 
power and the authority to go their own way, as an indication of a unique national 
character and a democratic culture. 
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Finally, Britain as a European nation, as the third vision of Labour 
Britishness, has dominated the party's thinking, especially during the last ten years. 
Already, in the post-war period, the pressure groups in the party had assented to some 
form of a united Europe in which Britain would have a prominent role due to her 
imperial links and democratic traditions. Despite the federal and trans-continental 
visions voiced within the Fabian Society and the ILP, however, what finally prevailed 
was the Europe of nation states. Accordingly, the majority of Labour MPs favoured 
the functional approach during the European debates. The national instrumentalisation 
of the European idea was the essence of their arguments. Since the sixties, no speech 
was made by Europhile MPs that said in plain terms that national sovereignty would 
be lost. The retention of powers over matters such as taxation, social policy or border 
controls and the reluctance to proceed to a federal Europe have been linked with 
exclusionary measures for those who fall outside the European context. The New 
Labour government espoused intergovernmentalism within the European Union as a 
response of the nation state to globalisation. Despite its radical domestic agenda, New 
Labour looks towards Europe in terms of `pooling' rather than `surrendering' 
sovereignty. While co-operating with other European nation states on issues such as 
social policies, in contrast, on other issues, such as border controls, immigration, 
single currency, and defence, the New Labour government's stance on Europe is 
placed in the context of its continuing Britishness which is now defined against the 
non-European `other'. The Immigration and Asylum 1999 Act shows that the 
European dimension of the national essence is revealed in opposition to refugees and 
asylum seekers. New Labour's domestic Darwinian social policies have defined the 
substantive core of the discriminatory policies against non-European refugees or 
asylum seekers (voucher system, forcible dispersal system). These policies have 
revived the Victorian-style conditions of poverty and destitution, cultivating, thus, the 
ground for the general public's feelings of insecurity and hatred towards one specific 
group of persons. 
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As a consequence, the cultural aspect of the European layer of Britishness 
has to do with British law. As with the decolonisation, law and order have been the 
important markers for negative racialisation of the non-British. Thus, cultural 
preservation through the construction of symbolic boundaries against the discourses 
of the Other - the non-EU refugees and asylum seekers- is still mediated through the 
`Mother of Parliaments'. Further, the value system ('enduring values') that New 
Labour has projected over the European question has invoked the very Victorian 
concepts of `entrepreneurialism', the `idle' and the `deserving'/'undeserving' poor or 
citizen which operate on a terrain that is already heavily racially coded. New Labour's 
Britain appears to have a unique grasp of these values. As the war in Kosovo also 
showed, New Labour considers that the British notion of democracy, human rights 
and internationalism captures a higher cultural echelon than that of other nations. 
Further, the temporal element of the Europeanised Britishness supports the cultural 
superiority of New Labour's Britain. 
Indeed, New Labour has transposed the `trusteeship' concept to Eastern and 
Central Europe and presents in a paternalistic way the process of EU enlargement as a 
kind of civilising mission, as an ascending scale toward a pan-Europeanisation. All 
the talk is about `the front-runners' or `first rank or wave applicants' who have made 
`rapid progress', other applicant countries who `have further to go', in order to meet 
the `established criteria' of `flexibility', `employability', `enterpreunership'. In 
addition, further evidence is provided by war memories, which underline in New 
Labour discourse a special character while its arguments are imbued with the spirit of 
pride and superiority; New Labour's Britain feels allegiance only with those European 
countries who have `fought' and `suffered' along with the British soldiers. 
Considering the above synthesis of Labour Britishness, one may suggest that 
the `other' has been the essential condition for the three main narratives of Britishness 
(imperial, isolationist and European) found in the Labour party's discourse during the 
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European debate. Following on from this, the next two sections comment on the 
political implications and the potential research directions. 
11.2 The Political Implications 
One of the issues that this thesis should address is whether the current 
European dimension of Labour Britishness still requires the non-European `other'. 
Judging from the initial steps taken from the second New Labour administration, one 
can safely assume that the above synthesis of Labour Britishness proves to be a useful 
guide for the future implications of the party's European policy, in terms of its own 
view of nationhood. 
In particular, the signs are that the European destiny of Britain will continue 
to be defined against the non-European `other', as the new Foreign Secretary, Jack 
Straw sees Europe «as an instrument of civilisation in the world» (Straw 2001). 
Notions of development voiced in the aftermath of riots by Asian youths in Oldham, 
Burnley and Bradford from April to July 2001 (the worst riots in Britain since the 
Handsworth, Brixton and Tottenham uprisings of 1985 (Kundnani 2001), such as talk 
about `importing poverty', `vicious circles of underachievement' (Stokes 2001) in 
relation to immigrants and plans to raise further cultural barriers (linguistic) as a 
condition of applying for British nationality (Carrell 2001; Sparrow 2001), echoed the 
debates of 1960s and 1970s. Tony Blair's rhetoric of `thuggery' refused to look 
beyond a narrow law-and-orderism and see in the riots the reflection of his own failed 
ambitions to tackle `social exclusion' (Kundnani 2001). Likewise, the new 
immigration checks demanded by the British government to be introduced at Prague's 
Ruzyne airport, which are mostly targeted at Roma, who are perceived as `serial 
abusers' of the British asylum system, is a further case in point (Connolly 2001). The 
Czech Republic is expected to enter the European Union in 2004. Before then it needs 
to work hard to convince the European leaders of its human rights record by taking 
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discriminatory measures against its estimated 200,000 Roma in order to become aa 
member of the European family of nations. 
As the previous analysis has showed, to break domestic immigration laws is 
now redefined as a criminal act, even though the 1951 UN Convention on the Status 
of Refugees upholds the right of refugees to break domestic immigration laws in order 
to seek asylum. Indeed, the Smuggling Protocol of the 2000 UN Convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime states unequivocally that the `migrant' should not be 
viewed as a blameless victim but, rather, as partly complicit in the act of `illegal 
migration'. It is now an international offence to assist any person in an illegal border 
crossing, regardless of whether she or he is a refugee in need of protection or not 
(Fekete 2001). In this respect has Britain along with her EU partners succeeded in 
shifting the terms of the asylum debate so as to treat asylum seekers not as people 
from many different countries, with many different experiences and each with an 
individual story to tell, but as a homogenous and undifferentiated mass. As already 
seen, the new policies instituted at the Tampere European Council in October 1999, in 
essence, formalised arrangements which had earlier been ad hoc and piecemeal (Blair 
1999j). In future, Western Europe's asylum policy would not commence at the point 
of arrival in Europe; rather, the EU's policy of `refugee reduction' would be achieved 
at the point of departure, via pre-embarkation checks (Fekete 2001). In future, 
responsibility for the prevention of refugee movements would be passed on to the 
asylum seeker's country of origin or the Second or Third World countries through 
which asylum seekers passed on their way to Europe. 
As a result, whereas European nation states are prepared to pool sovereignty 
on immigration and asylum issues in order to stop asylum seekers from getting in to 
the EU, the poorer nations of the world lose their sovereignty over immigration 
controls in order to stop their citizens getting out (another sign of the European notion 
of `good international citizenship'). Unless, that is, these citizens are part of the 
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chosen few: highly-skilled computer wizards, doctors and nurses trained at Third 
World expense and sought after by the West. 
What is more, the vision of a `Fortress Europe' is not sustained and refined 
by New Labour just against the non-European immigrants and asylum seekers but 
also against all those who challenge the rules and standards of the globalised economy 
that New Labour government has espoused. As Manzo (1996) maintains, the 
racialised alien can always be found `within' sovereign boundaries - alien who in turn 
is linked to aliens `without'. The anti-globalisation demonstrations in Genoa during 
the G8 summit in July 2001 prompted the European leaders in considering to establish 
an anti-riot force (Carroll and Allison 2001). Although Britain's operational 
relationship with other specialised policing units on the continent is currently limited 
to providing intelligence and "spotters" to help prevent trouble, in particular, at 
international football matches, Blair's New Labour government is willing to take on 
the anti-capitalist protesters because the latter apparently challenge its own view of 
democracy and nostrums for economic development (Baldwin 2001). Hence, the 
Terrorism Act 2000, which gives the Home Secretary powers to proscribe any 
organisation threatening, according to him, violence to advance "a political, religious, 
or ideological cause" (Sivanandan 2001). 
So, in response to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, it can 
be safely now argued that under the impact of ongoing European integration and, in 
general, global pressures, Britain will never `die' or be `abolished', because as the 
case of the Labour party has demonstrated, the creation of geographic, cultural and 
temporal boundaries between nationals and aliens can always be found in the 
articulation of national identity. As the analysis of the imperial, little Englander and 
European visions of Britishness revealed, the `other', the `alien', the `foreigner' was, 
has been and will remain a glue strong enough to hold Britain together in a changed 
European or global context. The end of the Empire in the late 1960s, Britain's entry to 
the EC in the 1970s and the ongoing European integration could not and cannot undo 
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`one thousand years of history' because the black immigrants, the European workers 
then, and, now, the asylum seekers and refugees have conditioned the country's 
existence. 
11.3 Research directions 
Taking into account the nationalist and racist beliefs enunciated over the 
European question, the vitality of this issue for British identity is without question. 
This confirms Tom Nairn's (1971,1972a & b) and Featherstone's (1981 a &b; 1988) 
analysis of the Labour party's European policy. Other studies of Labour and Europe, 
made by, for example, Newman (1983), Robins (1979), Bilski (1977), have focused 
upon the party management and the conventions of the adversarial nature of British 
politics. This study has shown that the European question cannot remain confined 
only to these short-term considerations. Instead, it has broadened the scope of the 
discussion and defined Labour Britishness through its competing spatial, cultural and 
temporal visions of nationhood, which have been conditioned by the racialisation of 
the 'other'. 
Yet, to consider the centrality of Europe in the past formulation and future 
revision of Labour's Britishness, one needs to examine it, not just within the ranks of 
a political party, but in a comparative way bearing in mind the beliefs enunciated 
within the rest of the political parties and pressure groups of the British political 
system whose impact upon a Euro- sceptic public cannot be denied. Therefore, the 
centre of attention should be placed upon those political attitudes which turn the 
public opinion towards `significant others' which supposedly threaten to overturn the 
country's fortunes within EU. Furthermore, accounts of European social democratic 
parties' views of their own national identity would help us to challenge those studies 
which have assumed Labour party's uniqueness and exceptionalism within the 
European context (Thompson 1978; Callinicos 1988). This assumption has been left 
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unchallenged due to the small number of truly comparative studies of European social 
democracy in relation to issues of national identity (Berger 1999). 
To conclude, the Labour party's nationalist and racist beliefs towards the 
European question exhibited during the last forty years have to be studied in a wider 
perspective and not just within the narrow confines of the party competition, because 
Europe is not just about party identity but embraces the past, present and future of 
Britain as a nation. 
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